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**National attributes, elite perceptions and interstate interactions:
An analysis of foreign policy behavior in West Africa**

Anda, Michael Onipe, Ph.D.

The University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee, 1990

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**NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES, ELITE PERCEPTIONS AND INTERSTATE
INTERACTIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR
IN WEST AFRICA**

BY

MICHAEL ONIPE ANDA

**A Dissertation Submitted in
Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of**

**Doctor of Philosophy
(Political Science)**

at

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

November 1990

Volume I

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

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**The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1990
Under the Supervision of Professor Mark Tessler**

Our research contributes to the theoretical literature in comparative international relations by analyzing interstate interactions in West Africa. It traces the diplomatic history of the subregion from independence until present times, builds upon studies on functional cooperation within the context of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and explores the broader question of international relations in West Africa. We argue that interactions among memberstates of this subsystem are influenced by three interrelated factors: leaders' perceptions, the national attributes of West African states, and the external environment.


Several research questions and hypotheses are deduced from relevant aspects of power approach, decision-making theory, and systems perspective. Are economic interactions more frequent than political interactions? What are the effects of states' power, development, and contiguity on regional behavior? What is the impact of leaders' ideological belief systems on interstate relations? What is the nature of interactions between West African states and specific extra-African powers?

Covering a fifteen-year period, 4,365 directed dyadic foreign policy events were identified, abstracted, and coded from West Africa (London) and Africa Research Bulletin (Exeter) publications from January 1975 through December 1989. A scale which transforms non-routine foreign policy events into numerical quantities was derived from Edward Azar's Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB). National attribute data were also collected for 1977, 1982, and 1987, and estimates among the various variables were established through Pearson's correlation coefficients.


The high volume of interactions in the 1970s (the period of relative affluence) has been replaced by passivity in the 1980s (the period of resource scarcity and limited income). Interactions are more likely to involve West African states and extra-African powers than West African states exclusively. Whereas events in the former dimension are mainly economic, events between West African states tend to be political. Size, wealth, development, contiguity, military and diplomatic capabilities, are, as hypothesized, positively associated with interactions.

Consequently, some states may eventually reap the benefits of regional

interactions at others' expense. Our research also entails implications that extend beyond West Africa, and demonstrates the relevance of the scientific approach to the foreign policies of developing states.



Major Professor



Date

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Any errors of omission or commission in this research are mine alone.

November 1990

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter One: INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUALIZATION	1
Introduction	1
Statement and Definition of the Problem	6
Analytical Focus of the Study	13
Critique of Earlier Studies	18
Rationale for the Investigation	20
Primary Assumptions of the Study	25
Organization and Scope of the Work	32
References and footnotes	36
Chapter Two: THEORETICAL DISCUSSIONS AND CONCEPTUAL SCHEME	54
Introduction	54
Prevailing Explanations of International Political Behavior	55
The Systemic Perspective	58
Power Theoretical Approach	69
The Decision-Making Process	73
Domestic Socioeconomic Context	81
Leaders' Ideology and Foreign Policy Orientation	84
The Foreign Policy Process	86
A Conceptual Scheme	86
National Attributes	90
Decision Process	94
Foreign Policy Events	97
Research Propositions	102
References and footnotes	114
Chapter Three: ELITE IDEOLOGY AND POWER POLITICS IN WEST AFRICA	131
Introduction	131
The Concept of Ideology	132
Origins of the Idea for a West African Community	138
Early Developments in Francophone Africa	141
Ideology and Bloc Politics in Post-Colonial West Africa	147

First Conference of Independent African States	157
First All-African Peoples Conference	160
The Conakry Declaration	162
Early Attempts at Political Union	163
Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union	163
The Saniquellie Summit	165
Second Conference of Independent African States	166
Second All-African Peoples Conference	169
Third All-African Peoples Conference	169
Leaders' Perceptions and Orientations	171
New Realities: Elements of Continuity and Change	176
References and footnotes	185
Chapter Four: INTRA-AFRICAN INTERACTIONS IN WEST AFRICA	201
Introduction	201
POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC INTERACTIONS	203
Diplomatic Representations in West Africa	203
Presidential Visits in West Africa, 1975-1989	211
Bilateral Treaty Commitments, 1975-1989	218
Mutual Memberships of Regional Organizations	231
ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL INTERACTIONS	234
The Structure of West African Economies	236
Overdependence on Agriculture	237
Weakness of the Industrial Sector	241
General Trends: Economic Decline and Harsh Realities	242
Patterns and Directions of Intra-regional Trade	246
Trade Patterns with Extra-African States	256
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL INTERACTIONS	263
Language and Interstate Cooperation	265
Transport and Communications	268
Migration and Social Interaction	278
MILITARY AND STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS	284
References and footnotes	293
Chapter Five: EXTERNAL INFLUENCES IN WEST AFRICAN COOPERATION	312
Introduction	312
French Policies in Africa	314
French Political Influence in West Africa	315
French Economic Influence	317
French Military Interests	320

British Policies in West Africa	322
U.S.-African Relations	325
West Germany and Africa	332
Soviet Objectives in West Africa	333
Chinese Influence in West Africa	341
References and footnotes	348
Chapter Six: METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH AND SOURCES OF DATA	360
Introduction	360
Conceptual Definition: Scaling of Foreign Policy Events	361
Operational Definition: Measuring the Dependent Variable	364
Nature and Sources of Primary Data	368
Methods of Analysis and Category Construction	373
Independent Variables and Sources of Secondary Data	380
Category Construction for the Independent Variables	388
References and footnotes	402
Chapter Seven: DATA ANALYSIS AND SYSTEMATIC FINDINGS	410
Introduction	410
General Characteristics	411
Aggregate Interactions	420
Selected Dyadic Relations	424
Bivariate Relationships: The Effects of National Attributes on Foreign Policy Behavior	432
Size and Interstate Interactions	435
Economic Source Variables and Foreign Policy	438
Military Preparedness and Foreign Policy Behavior	442
The Effect of Diplomatic Capability	444
Geographical Contiguity and Interstate Behavior	446
Lagged Bivariate Relations and the Effects of an "Outlier"	450
Investigating the Collective Relationships Between the Various National Attributes and Interactions in the Regional Subsystem	456
References and footnotes	471
Chapter Eight: GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	478
Implications of the Study	490
References and footnotes	498

APPENDICES	502
Appendix I: Azar-Sloan Internation Scale	502
Appendix II: The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events Initiated in West Africa: The Intra-African Dimension	505
Appendix III: The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events Initiated in West Africa: The Extra-African Dimension	520
Appendix IV: Raw Scores: National Attributes and Foreign Policy Behavior of West African States	535
Appendix V: Frequencies of Variables Used in the Study	544
Appendix VI: Frequencies of Dimensions of Interactions in West Africa	617
Appendix VII: Correlation Matrix: Attributes as at 1977 and Various Interactions in West Africa	629
Appendix VIII: Correlation Matrix: Attributes as at 1982 and Various Interactions in West Africa	630
Appendix IX: Intercorrelations Between Aggregate and Selected Dyadic Foreign Policy Interactions in West Africa (1975-1989)	631
 BIBLIOGRAPHY	 632
Bibliographic Arrangement (Books)	632
Bibliographic Arrangement (Selected Journals, Articles, and Chapters)	661
Bibliographic Arrangement (Unpublished Papers and Dissertations)	679

LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1	Diplomatic Representation in West Africa	207
Table 4.2	Presidential Visits Between West African States 1975-1989	215
Table 4.3	Bilateral Treaties and Agreements Between West African States 1975-1989	221
Table 4.4	Frequency of Joint Membership in West African and Pan-African Organizations - 1985	233
Table 4.5	West Africa: Dependence on Major Export Categories, 1978	239
Table 4.6	Proportional Shares of Mining and Manufacturing Activities in GDP of West African Economies (%)	240
Table 4.7	Nigeria's Oil Statistics, 1966-1982	245
Table 4.8	Share of Intra-West African Trade in Total External Trade	247
Table 4.9	Nigeria's Trade with West Africa, 1979-1983	250
Table 4.10	Arrival of ECOWAS Citizens into Nigeria Through Recognized Routes from 1979-1982	283
Table 4.11	Rank Order of West African States by their Total Military Involvement Scores (T.M.I.S.), 1 January 1956 to 30 April 1984	287
Table 6.1	Azar-Sloan Internation Scale	365
Table 6.2	Events Initiated towards other West African States (1975-1989)	367
Table 6.3	Selected West African Newspapers and Periodicals	374
Table 6.4	Correlation Matrix of the Dependent Variables	377
Table 6.5	Factor Scores for Foreign Policy Categories	379
Table 6.6	Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables (1977)	390
Table 6.7	Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables (1982)	391
Table 6.8	Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables (1987)	392
Table 6.9	Factor Analysis of the National Attributes of West African States (1977)	396
Table 6.10	Factor Analysis of the National Attributes of West African States (1982)	398
Table 6.11	Factor Analysis of the National Attributes of West African States (1987)	399
Table 7.1	Events Initiated by all 22 Actors (180 months)	412

Table 7.2	Events Initiated Towards other West African States (1975-1989)	413
Table 7.3	Events Initiated and Received by non-African Powers (1975-1989)	415
Table 7.4	Aggregate Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events Initiated in West Africa, 1975-1989	417
Table 7.5	Aggregate Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events Initiated in West Africa: The Intra-African Dimension	418
Table 7.6	Aggregate Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events Initiated in West Africa: The Extra-African Dimension	419
Table 7.7	Correlation Coefficients Between the Independent Variables and Events Initiated (Interactions) in West Africa	437
Table 7.8	Bivariate Correlations Between Independent Variables (1977) and Events Initiated to West African States at Different Points in Time	451
Table 7.9	Bivariate Correlations Between Independent Variables (1982) and Events Initiated to West African States at Different Points in Time	452
Table 7.10	Bivariate Correlations Between Independent Variables (1987) and Events Initiated to West African States at Different Points in Time	453
Table 7.11	Intercorrelations Between Major Attribute Variables (1982) in the West African Regional Subsystem	458
Table 7.12	Multiple Regression: The Effects of Contiguity, Development, and Power (1982) on Interstate Interactions (1975-1982) in West Africa	461
Table 7.13(a)	Selected Regression Analyses: Variance in the Dependent Variables Explained by the Independent Variables	463
Table 7.13(b)	Selected Regression Analyses: Variance in the Dependent Variables Explained by the Independent Variables (Excluding Nigeria)	464
Table 7.14	Simple Correlations Between the Independent Variables	466
Table 7.15	Simple Correlation Coefficients Between the Various Independent and Dependent Variables	467
Table 7.16	Partial Correlation Coefficients Between the Various Independent and Dependent Variables	468

LIST OF GRAPHS

Graph 7.1	Dimensions of Interaction (Aggregate), 1975-1989: West African Regional Subsystem	421
Graph 7.2	Dimensions of Interaction, 1975-1989: Ghana to Ivory Coast	425
Graph 7.3	Dimensions of Interaction, 1975-1989: Ivory Coast to Ghana	426
Graph 7.4	Dimensions of Interaction, 1975-1989: Ghana to Nigeria	427
Graph 7.5	Dimensions of Interaction, 1975-1989: Senegal and Gambia	430
Graph 7.6	Dimensions of Interaction, 1975-1989: Burkina Faso and Ghana	431

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1	A Conceptual Scheme for Comparative Foreign Policy Research	89
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUALIZATION

Introduction

Three critical themes of Third World politics, namely, national liberation (or decolonization), conflict resolution and economic development, constitute the irreducible core of African international relations. In other words, these central issues may be rightly identified as the common concerns of African foreign policies.¹ Whether African states are involved in intra-African matters or in global affairs, the perennial problems of economic and political cooperation in terms of these issue-areas recur constantly.² By assuming that cooperation among a set of less developed countries (LDCs) reflects the extent to which their external policies are coordinated, and by concentrating on foreign policy behavior in West Africa as a case study, this research analyzes the extent to which African states have succeeded or failed in harmonizing their foreign policies as a strategy towards maximizing the collective goals of African unity. Thus, this work is a partial contribution to recent cross-national literature on African foreign policies which concentrates substantially on regional studies.³

Among the various reasons for our expressed interest in West Africa include, first and foremost, the wide range of cooperative activities in the subregion. A large,

complex area, West Africa has an active network of cooperative organizations as evidenced by the plethora of numerous intra-African intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and institutions.⁴ West African history is replete with proposals and arrangements that were designed to foster West African unity. Predating the infamous Berlin Treaty of 1884-1885, which eventually led to the historic "partition of Africa,"⁵ and the advent of colonialism, the West African subregion had witnessed a long history characterized by a flurry of diplomatic activities between African rulers and European powers.⁶ As a consequence of lacking resources to deal adequately with the total range of international issues, West African states must be selective in the geographic and functional areas they emphasize.

Indeed, it has been contended that before informal and formal colonialism, Africa was an "actor" in the international system "albeit a weak and marginal one."⁷ This point needs to be underscored. There is a strong but unfortunate tendency in the literature to regard Africa as the passive continent par excellence, as "a recipient of influences rather than a transmitter of effects."⁸ In contrast to this angle of misperception, however, it is widely acknowledged that "Africans were never passive bystanders in continental or global affairs; even in pre-colonial and colonial times they affected outcomes by adopting alternative strategies of conflict and cooperation."⁹ More specifically, Zartman maintains that relations between the states in West Africa began to develop "even before independence. It is one of the anomalies of Western Africa that there were foreign relations - even foreign policies - before there were states."¹⁰

After political independence, the idea of pan-Africanism flourished best in West Africa where several leaders envisioned, in principle, a continental union of Africa with the actual fostering of West African unity as a means to that end. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that in relative comparison with their counterparts in other subregions, West African states are active members of an overwhelming majority of the entire network of pan-African IGOs in Africa.¹¹ Within this context, it is apparent that the task of analyzing the levels and variations in West African foreign policies is relevant and important as prelude to adequately understanding any design for cooperation in the area.

The current trend in the global system towards regionalization and subsystem dominant characteristics has led to theories of regional cooperation and peripheral state behavior. One of the prominent features of the contemporary international system is the heightened tendency of some states to gravitate toward some degree of regional cooperation.¹² Accordingly, the development of subregionalism is likely to form one of the formidable pillars of inter-African relations in the foreseeable future.¹³ Basically, our study is premised on the assumption that West Africa is a rising but inchoate international "regional subsystem."¹⁴ An international regional subsystem is defined here as comprising a set of geographically proximate and regularly interacting states that share to some degree a sense of regional identity and are so perceived by external actors.¹⁵ "The primary stress is on a geographic region, with consensual recognition by most other actors that it is a distinctive community, and self-identification by the constituent members of that system."¹⁶ As

George Shepherd notes on international cooperation, the major problem-solving concern of a regional subsystem "is to coordinate the external policies of its members."¹⁷ By definition, therefore, a regional subsystem has a structure peculiar to it and separate from global politics. Applied to the foreign policies of West African states, this translates into an endeavor towards the effective rationalization and coordination of common economic and political positions on issues concerning the larger collective interests of African states. Indeed, writing along similar lines, one commentator concluded that "the emergence of the notion West Africa, and consequently, the notion West Africans, will depend largely on the evolution of Intra-African diplomacy."¹⁸

For a working definition of the hypothesized West African regional subsystem, we include the sixteen sovereign and more or less geographically contiguous memberstates of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), namely, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde Islands, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.¹⁹ These states occupy about twenty percent of the total land mass of Africa, and include within them, approximately one-half of the entire population of black Africa. For the purposes of this multi-nation comparative study, these sixteen memberstates of ECOWAS constitute our primary unit of analysis (that is, the units whose behavior we are attempting to explain).²⁰ Contemporary international relations in West Africa consist, to an overwhelming extent, of a set of mirrors reflecting the image of this interstate grouping. ECOWAS represents a

practical example of the view shared by many that subregional groupings in Africa are a more moderate and realistic approach towards interstate cooperation than impracticable grand designs for a continental union.²¹ In short, this coalition furnishes a living and veritable laboratory for testing the neo-functional claims that subregional organizations are more effective in handling interstate problems than regional and global forums.

Although our study builds upon studies on functional integration and economic development within the context of ECOWAS, it will also focus on exploring the much broader question of international relations in West Africa. For example, in order to fully attain ECOWAS goals, memberstates are generally encouraged to harmonize their policies, not only in terms of scientific and technical advancement, but also in political and diplomatic matters, and in problems pertaining to mutual defense and security. Indeed, African scholars and diplomats alike have long advocated a coordinated ECOWAS foreign policy as a useful complement to the much broader continental strategy. According to this perspective, ECOWAS memberstates (and the organization as a whole) provide a useful mechanism for discussing and coordinating foreign policies on a broad range of African affairs, from such disparate issues as the growing need for economic development to the avowed recognition of the MPLA (*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*) government in Angola.²² Thus construed, ECOWAS represents a realistic organ for the promotion of greater intra-African cooperation and for the advancement of other avenues of regional collaboration.

Statement and Definition of the Problem

This project contributes broadly to the growing literature on the comparative international relations of the Third World,²³ by concentrating on assessing the multiple dimensions of regional cooperation among the smaller and less developed states of West Africa. Since developing states represent the vast majority of countries in the world, it is ironical and disappointing that they are often neglected in the study of international relations.²⁴ Expressing this intellectual concern in their innovative work, two scholars, McGowan and Gottwald, state that for the analyst who is genuinely interested in building "general, positive foreign policy theory, the great power bias in the literature must be overcome if we are to explain the external behavior of all types of states."²⁵ In like manner, William Thompson writes eloquently of discredited models that contain "a 'great power' bias which could not effectively be used to explain the behavior of less-than-great powers,"²⁶ and Cantori and Spiegel wisely caution that "international politics cannot be fully comprehended if there is a concentration only on the relations among the greatest of powers."²⁷ As Brecher finally concludes, the prudent path to "a valid theory of state behavior is a multidimensional attack, designed to uncover findings from a broad typology of actors. The patterns of behavior which are likely to emerge from such an inquiry would enrich our descriptive, explanatory, and predictive capability much more than a priori theorizing."²⁸

According to most objective indicators, the economic situation and prospects of African states are generally precarious and bleak. At present, economic trends are

most often negative. Despite significant regional variations, the continent as a whole presents a terrifying case of absolute poverty and attendant social and political instability. For instance, by one count, twenty-six of the world's thirty-six poorest states are in Africa, and almost half of these are located in the West African subregion.²⁹ Not only is the standard of living in the West African subregion one of the lowest in the world,³⁰ by another count, thirteen of the sixteen ECOWAS memberstates are officially included among the forty-two most economically disadvantaged countries in the world economy.³¹ In general, therefore, the onerous fact that the African continent represents a unique collection of largely small and impoverished states, poses a pressing moral concern to the peace researcher and the developmentally-sensitive scholar.³²

African and other Third World states are traditionally discussed as pawns in global great-power struggles. We argue that this view, strongly influenced by a Cold War interpretation of world politics, does not fully grasp the changing realities of an international system that has become increasingly multipolar and nationally pluralistic. In particular, the political independence of African states in the 1960s largely reduced the capability of the great powers to control smaller powers, and has increased the relative autonomy and importance of these generally small states. In addition, more recent changes in East-West relations suggest the need for a fundamental reorientation of scholarly assumptions about what the balance of the twentieth century holds in store for this relatively underdeveloped region.³³ In this sense, within the framework of a comparative subordinate state system, interstate relations in Africa

deserves more careful and sustained attention, thereby contributing to a reduction of its traditional neglect.

As a consequence, it is important to emphasize that our study bears two principal audiences in mind. First, we hope to stimulate the interest of scholars in the field of comparative international relations theory, including casual readers with substantive interest in regional cooperative behavior, but especially "specialists in African and small state foreign policy behavior."³⁴ We have already indicated that for the benefit of sound theory, it is imperative that scholars also extend systematically derived hypotheses or propositions to other non-Western polities. For instance, Roger Cobb and Charles Elder have for long stressed the increasing need for studies of the developing regions of Latin America, Southeast Asia and Africa, in order to determine the extent to which the different indicators of cohesion in these regions hold consistent with the findings of the North Atlantic area.³⁵ This endeavor will indeed assist in resolving the tough issue of deparochializing the bases of some of the current research which has been frequently linked to the nationalistic biases of particular scholars and information sources.

Our second audience comprises students of the analytical and empirical analyses of international interaction, some of whom have expressed strong concerns about insufficient data on African politics in particular, and Third World politics in general. George Yu has strongly complained, for instance, about the paucity of data on the interaction pattern of most states: "The problem becomes especially acute when we move away from North America and Western Europe. We know, in fact,

very little about the categories, extent, frequency, and levels of interaction between and among non-Western states. Yet, any meaningful theory of international politics must take data into account.³⁶ Ideally, attempts should be made to clarify the content, effect and direction of the external movement of all states. It is an open secret that many quantitative analyses³⁷ in international relations exclude African states because of the unavailability of reliable data for the region.³⁸ Yet, there has been little or no systematic attempt in the literature to assess empirically international cooperative patterns among a sample of countries incorporating inter-African states' relations.

It will, of course, be inadequate to assume that quantification is a goal by itself independent and devoid of substantive and theoretical analysis.³⁹ One is not simply interested in bare statistical rules outside a clear-cut theoretical context, without which any data presentation is ethereal and drifts rudderless, regardless of appearances. It is, rather, the substantive and theoretical commitment to comparative political inquiry that underlies the readiness of contemporary analysts in the field to quantify their data.⁴⁰ Proper research in comparative foreign policy, therefore, entails the blending of both theory and data; a commitment to foreign policy as an object of inquiry, and a commitment to the comparative method via multi-nation comparisons.⁴¹

The initial conceptual problems in this study are reduced to two specific tasks. Firstly, for the sake of conceptual clarity, we define the term "regional cooperation" in order to exclude several troubling questions that are raised when dealing with such complicated matters as political and economic "integration." Ernst Haas, a prominent

figure in the neo-functional school of regional integration theorists, has argued that the analysis of regional integration is conceptually different from the analysis of regional cooperation. The concept of integration, he suggests, concerns explanations of "how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge, and mix with their neighbors so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves." Regional cooperation, on the other hand, addresses the process of "getting there." International regional cooperation, in other words, merely assist to "describe steps along the way" to regional integration.⁴² Thus, in this study, we are concerned not so much with the question of international integration as we are with how best to devise an appropriate set of categories which will assist in analyzing cooperative relations within a specific region of interest. Secondly, we attempt to propose an elaborate definition of interstate cooperation which addresses and captures the essential aspects of two antithetical analytic continua.

On the first point, the literature on regionalism suggests that scholars often misapply the term to mean the actual integration of political communities or, at any rate, erroneously apply the concepts "regionalism," "integration," and "cooperation" interchangeably. Such misplaced and imprecise perspectives pervade the writings of most students of international integration. In order to avoid this apparent terminological confusion, we posit that these related but not identical terms must be distinguished. Leon Lindberg defines integration as "the processes whereby nations forgo the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies."⁴³

Similarly, Charles Pentland equates the term with "the circumvention, reduction, or abolition of the sovereign power of modern nation-states,"⁴⁴ and Ernst Haas defines it as "the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states."⁴⁵ We argue that these narrow and technical definitions of integration may be rendered analytically useless especially where challenged by the harsh rigidities of the state-centric polities of many countries in the Third World. Through their misguided assumption that the era of the nation-state is nearing an end, these definitions raise false hopes and expectations.⁴⁶ Consequently, we contend that the phenomenon of regionalism may be understood better if the phrase "regional integration" is abandoned, and in its place, the term "regional cooperation" is substituted.⁴⁷ In this sense, integration may be treated as the resulting condition or consequences of regional cooperative activities.⁴⁸ Regional cooperation, then, ranges on a continuum from such symbolic foreign policy events as comments made about general policies of mutual interest between states, to joint activities in regional alliances and confederal programs.

A word of clarification is in order at this juncture in relation to our second conceptual task. A review of the literature reveals considerable controversy as to whether the concept "cooperation" should be analyzed within a cooperation-isolation continuum or a cooperation-conflict space.⁴⁹ Much like its antonymy, conflict, cooperation is indeed a relational term devoid of any absolute or critical zero-point.

Even in the technical and rigid scheme of political integration, the definition of the state of affairs is not couched in finality or zero-sum terms.⁵⁰ In other words, cooperation-conflict distinctions are mainly artificial since cooperative interactions may transpose into conflictual ones, and discord may indeed turn into collaboration. These two conditions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. As one analyst puts it, "systems of pure conflict and pure collaboration are rare on the international scene. Most systems are mixed systems, that is, systems characterized by both conflict and collaboration."⁵¹ This means that any careful and comprehensive study of regional cooperation in Africa must also account for conflictual patterns. "African unity is a subject heavily charged emotionally and affectively; but it is also confused, and full of incitements to discord, as soon as the attempt is made to examine it closely and analyse its content."⁵² African states are thus centers of momentary conflicts and coalitions. Occasionally, this phenomenon may even assume an ironical form such as the border crisis between Sierra Leone and Liberia, in March 1983, which almost developed into war between the two "founding fathers" of the Mano River Union (MRU).⁵³

In this study, therefore, both analytic continua - cooperation and conflict - are deemed essential to any comprehensive framework on regional cooperative behavior. Short of being a single-stream interaction model, cooperative interaction between states, in conceptual and operational terms, falls along a conflict-cooperation continuum, not a cooperation-isolation (or conflict-isolation) space.⁵⁴

To summarize, we contend that although an ambiguous concept, regional

cooperation is defined in this study as generally indicative of (and applicable to) any interstate activity with less than universal participation designed to meet some commonly expressed need of community-formation processes. The term may be defined as a process whereby two or more countries in a particular region voluntarily pursue common policies in fields of common interest to the mutual advantage of participating states. Basically, international cooperation requires that the actions of states "which are not in pre-existent harmony - be brought into conformity with one another through a process of policy coordination."⁵⁵ In addition, cooperative interstate behavior may range from relations of amity on one side of the spectrum, to open or concealed enmity on the other.⁵⁶ "Cooperation is in dialectical relationship with discord, and they must be understood together. Thus to understand cooperation, one must also understand the frequent absence of, or failure of, cooperation, so incessantly stressed by realist writers."⁵⁷ In practical terms, one does not argue that Africa can attain a situation where no conflicts occur. As Msabaha and Hartmann readily point out, "such a position would be utopian. There are bound to be conflicts and tensions prevailing within the African circle as a whole, but such problems should not prevent an attempt to reach a consensus over a small range of vitally important issues, especially vis-a-vis international relations, which affect most African countries" (emphasis in original).⁵⁸

Analytical Focus of the Study

The chief purpose of our research is to explore interstate relations in West

Africa and to delineate patterned cooperative interactions that have continued between West African states in spite of fundamental differences and persistent conflicts among them. In an attempt to investigate the problem of regional cooperation in this area, the analytic concern of this dissertation will generate two broad techniques: (1) systematically mapping out the aggregate structure of interactions between the sixteen states of West Africa, and (2) testing specific propositions about the network of interstate interactions (defined in terms of conflictual and cooperative behavior) in the subregion.⁵⁹ Cognizance must therefore be taken of both the dynamic nature of foreign policy and the intricate interaction of the internal and external environment in which foreign policies function.

The first method in our research objective assumes that regionally-situated less developed states are structurally linked by their foreign policy behavior. It is in this specified sense that the states of West Africa may be construed as representing an international regional subsystem.⁶⁰ Although the careful specification of requirements for longitudinal comparison across states are lacking, some have suggested that the comparative study of foreign policy also includes comparisons of a system through time as well as across units.⁶¹ In evaluating the possibility of regional cooperation among developing states, dynamic rather than static effects should be emphasized. A researcher may therefore test hypotheses by studying (for example, through graphic illustrations) the composition of foreign policy event flows on a regional scale, thus addressing the rise and fall of trends in regional behavior in both longitudinal and spatial dimensions. In addition, the produced comparative

systematic description of external behavioral patterns at this broad systemic level may serve as a useful departure for case studies on a comparative basis.⁶²

By also including the role of national attributes and elite perceptual factors, the second technique adopted in this study attempts to resolve several fundamental questions concerning the appropriate combination of explanatory variables which may best account for observable behavior at the systemic level. Correlates of cooperation and conflict may have important implications in modern world politics. For instance, what factors account for interstate conflict as well as the cohesion of international alliances? In short, we focus on certain correlates of foreign policy behavior, while at the same time, conceptually assessing (in a narrative and evaluative fashion)⁶³ the impact of elite perceptions within that context.⁶⁴ Although states are the actors in international politics, it is individuals in their role as national decision makers who act and react to the stimuli of the international environment.⁶⁵ A conscious effort is thus made in this study to combine quantitative and qualitative methods of inquiry. It is widely suggested that in the sphere of regional cooperation it is not so much the technical knowledge that has been lacking but the political will.⁶⁶ In an attempt to analyze the human factor in the move toward regional cooperation, it is our overall contention that leaders are often galvanized into undertaking foreign policy actions on the basis of their perceptions of both their states' attributes or capabilities and the general international situation.⁶⁷

For example, between the late 1950s and the early 1960s, the external behavior of Ghana, a West African state, was greatly influenced by socio-political

variables not the least of which included an ideologically active leadership coupled with the fluctuating effects of economic and material conditions at home. It may be convincingly argued that economically, socially, and politically, Ghana started off with greater prosperity and expectations than any of the West African states in the 1960s. Accordingly, Accra was to play a role as the center of Pan-Africanist ideals for much of this period. However, subsequent collapse of the Ghanaian economy in the 1960s contributed in no small measure to the increased domestic chaos and the general reduction, over the years, in Ghana's hitherto active role in foreign affairs. Whereas in the late 1950s and early 1960s Accra was the hub of Pan-Africanist ideals, for much of the 1970s the center had emphatically shifted elsewhere.⁶⁸ The era of foreign policy activism had given way to engagement in a more passive role. Yashpal Tandon succinctly captures these interesting phenomena in a recent article:

Ghana in 1957 was the first black African country to achieve political independence. Its first leader, Kwame Nkrumah, was a radical spokesman for Pan-Africanism and for continental liberation from imperialism. He did well as long as the price of cocoa was high in the world market and his attempt to mobilize the people of Ghana was backed by the availability of essential commodities that people could buy in shops. Widespread discontent arose, however, when cocoa prices deflated, external debt soared and the ideology of socialism, which Nkrumah advocated, became an empty slogan against the background of high black market prices of soap, salt and other essentials.⁶⁹

In this specific case, it is our argument that the steadily sinking Ghanaian economy coincided positively with the relative decline in Ghana's international importance and respect. It follows, then, that other things equal, in periods of affluence and abundance, nation-states are likely to exhibit activist foreign policy

postures, while in periods of resource scarcity and limited income, they are likely to assume a low profile stance. Due to inadequate resources, compromises have to be made at certain times in order not to offend other actors in the international system. This is especially so where a state has a conciliatory leadership, and where, consequently, foreign policy tends to be less assertive.⁷⁰ In short, our theoretical generalization is that the availability of resources and the perception of these resources by policy makers will be related to foreign policy behavioral patterns which states exhibit in the international system.⁷¹

Construed more broadly, our present study represents an overview of both the cross-sectional and the longitudinal patterns of interactions in which the West African regional dynamics are to be investigated. Secondly, it also seeks to advance some major variables, that is, those factors which are assumed to impinge on the interactive patterns amongst the sixteen ECOWAS states under survey. The study is interested in analyzing the extent to which such factors as power and leadership have been exercised in the processes of interstate interactions in West Africa. What background characteristics of leaders, attributes of states, and general systemic factors within the international environment dispose countries to exhibit different styles of foreign policy behavior?⁷² As a simple thesis dealing with a complicated matter, a major theoretical argument advanced here is that variations in certain attribute variables, influenced by the mediating effects of elite perception (both of these variables and of the general international "situation") account for differences in foreign policy behavioral patterns in West Africa. As used in this study, situational factors refer to

the international and national variables considered by decision makers when making foreign policy. Essentially, they involve three major sets of issues: first, the general international setting (or environment), including the attitudes, actions, and national interest considerations of policy officials in other states; second, the relative power or capability of the state as calculated by its own decision makers; and finally, the specific actions and reactions undertaken by other states related to the policy decision and execution.⁷³

Critique of Earlier Studies

The above analytical position suggests that there are identifiable problems with the present status of international relations studies in Africa. One critic has lamented (and we believe quite rightly so) that, current literature in the field if taken as a whole, "are a frankly disappointing bunch. The number of studies which take an analytical approach to their subject matter and have something interesting and original to say about it, is dispiritingly small."⁷⁴ In response to this kind of observation, our study attempts to shift from the traditional monotony of earlier studies on African foreign policy. Rather than remaining wholly normative, narrative and speculative, it takes the view that this field should benefit from, and be supplemented by, the systematic techniques of inquiry developed and utilized in the social sciences. Systematic research may be defined as comprising those studies which tend to elucidate and express explanatory statements in terms of the general rather than the particular.⁷⁵

A further criticism of previous studies on inter-African diplomacy is that even where empirical import is applied, indicators are often purely economic, thus using only the transactions and attribute data of states to the detriment of their broader foreign policies.⁷⁶ For example, it is suggested that most available handbooks merely provide data on trade and IGO membership which, taken together, represent a single dimension of the total spectrum of international relations - that of routine monetary transactional flows within institutional arrangements.⁷⁷ It has further been argued that this approach neglects the cultural, military, and especially "the political interactions between African states" (emphasis in original).⁷⁸ In this sense, the rigid compartmentalization of economic and political variables weakens analysis.⁷⁹ It is our contention that to correct the above oversights, economic indicators must be positively combined with other non-economic factors in the analysis of regional cooperation in Africa and elsewhere. Certainly, West African states do not envisage regional cooperation as an exclusively economic undertaking, but rather as "a multifaceted enterprise."⁸⁰ Indeed, in recent years, especially in theory if not in practice, the distinction between the disciplines of politics and economics is becoming blurred. In the field of international relations, in particular, politics can hardly be divorced from economics in any meaningful manner.⁸¹ Political concerns often "shape economic policy, as important economic policies are frequently dictated by overriding political interests."⁸² Joseph Nye has pointed out, for instance, that regional cooperation between developing countries, in particular, produce not "gradual politicization" but "over politicization" and that such development often

reduces the scope for bureaucratic initiatives and quietly arranged package deals.⁸³

Theoretically, the flipside of this argument dictates that a state's foreign policy is more than a political and diplomatic matter. International relations also involves commercial, cultural, strategic and technical ties. We suggest that non-routine foreign policy events data, partly because they incorporate the multi-faceted network of all these interstate activities, are useful and invaluable to this project.⁸⁴

To briefly recapitulate our proposed contribution, little or no studies exist on empirically estimating foreign policy behavior in Africa on a comparative basis.⁸⁵ With particular focus on international relations in West Africa, our present study attempts to remedy this neglect. Investigating interstate interactions which characterize the subregion, over a period of time, may provide a rigorous, imaginative and innovative approach by augmenting the considerable transactional and attribute data already collected and analyzed with reference to this area. By providing the prospective analyst with an estimated view of a state's position in relation to others, comparative international studies grant the much needed avenue for investigating the differences between nations, and for assessing the impact of such variations on foreign policy behavior.

Rationale for the Investigation

To further review the perennial problem of regional cooperation among the less developed states of West Africa, some preliminary research questions need to be

addressed. Why should one bother with studies between African states? Put differently, why should participation in international affairs be so important to weak and dependent states which lack freedom of action in an increasingly competitive globe?⁸⁶ Responses to these fundamental questions⁸⁷ generate several points that are of both theoretical and practical significance.

First and foremost, it can be argued that interstate cooperative and conflictual behavior in West Africa deserves to be studied for the sake of understanding international relations alone. As an academic exercise in intellectual curiosity, the study offers an investigative forum within which a researcher could ardently pursue the task of scholarly discoveries that is analytically fulfilling.⁸⁸ Such a theoretical perspective offers an intellectual challenge to students interested in foreign policy phenomena, in the hope of contributing to deeper comprehension of the dynamics whereby nations adapt to their environments. In addition, according to this view, without having partial theories - what Guetzkow terms "islands of theory" - of relatively well developed explanations of regional behavior, it is impossible to systematically accumulate knowledge towards the construction of a truly general theory of international relations.⁸⁹

Secondly, we have earlier alluded to the theoretical shortcomings of underemphasizing the salience of the smaller and less developed states in world affairs. In a field that prides itself in the search for valid generalizations across states, ignoring the less-than-great states leaves much to be desired. It has been argued, for instance, that more debate should focus "on the validity of academic

research which too often excludes a considerable number of international, albeit less prominent actors."⁹⁰

Neglecting the activities of weak and dependent states in foreign affairs is not only logically contradictory, it is also practically unjustifiable. The very weakness of African states should provide the basis for scholarly attempts at understanding their efforts at cooperation in the first place. Regionalism is important in Africa because many countries cannot afford to accomplish singularly the requirements for basic development. Indeed, it is the very dependent status of these states that prompts attention to their collective need for a less dependent status.⁹¹ As Clapham correctly notes, this is why most contemporary literature on Africa's international relations focus on regional studies:

There are over fifty states in Africa (including the islands), most of which are poor and weak; it is therefore unsurprising that much of the continent's diplomacy should be conducted through multinational organizations, or that states should seek through myriad cooperation and integration schemes to compensate for their weaknesses as separate units. The study of the resulting continental and subcontinental institutions likewise account, for a large part of the African international relations industry...⁹²

It is specifically widely assumed that the memberstates of ECOWAS perceive economic integration as a means of overcoming the disadvantages of small size, low per capita incomes, small populations, narrow resource bases, and of making possible a greater rate of economic growth and development.⁹³ According to the standard economic theory upon which resource efficiency is based, economies of scale and the associated division of labor inevitably depends on the size of the market, in terms of income levels and distribution, population and the geographical area covered.

Therefore, in analyzing the prospects of small and weak African economies, the issue of interstate planning and management cannot be ignored.⁹⁴ In like manner, Jalloh argues that sheer economics provides the motive force for regional cooperative arrangements in the LDCs: "A motive factor was the consciousness of the small size of the countries involved and the realization of many of them that without joining others in larger groups, they faced serious obstacles in promoting their economic development. The reasoning was that if even major countries like France and Germany felt the need for regional integration, such a need was even greater for far smaller and underdeveloped countries."⁹⁵

Arguments for regional cooperation hinge on the issue of the economic rationality of factor endowments. By pooling scarce resources and by avoiding the unnecessary duplication of services, efficiency is promoted and each of the West African states achieves greater economic rewards.⁹⁶ In other words, actions that are undertaken at a regional level are naturally expected to be cheaper than those singularly attempted by the states. For instance, an agricultural school built for a group of West African states would certainly be less expensive and more rational use of scarce resources (financial, personnel, administrative and managerial) than a project implemented by each of the individual sixteen states. Through regional cooperation, the standard of living could all be raised. Indeed, not only do West African leaders see regionalism as a means for expediting the development of their economies, it may further be argued that the increasing cooperation among European countries raises the odds against African states in general. Thus, especially with the

imminent emergence of a "mega-Europe" in 1992, Jalloh's arguments should sound an alarm for African countries, on the need to enhance regional cooperation in order to withstand, more effectively, developments in the more advanced regions of the world.⁹⁷ In this sense, the rationale for West African cooperation is perhaps primarily, but not exclusively, economic.

Not only must poor states research common grounds upon which to survive economically, African states, in particular, regard their policies toward each other, as borderline states, with considerable priority. There is thus a political dimension to the problem. One of the reasons for the apparent lack of political cooperation in Africa lies in the colonial inheritance. The "scramble for Africa" in the nineteenth century by European colonial powers led to the arbitrary balkanization of African political space on the basis of European conceptions of territorial order. African interests were subordinated to colonial fortunes of conquest. Since African conceptions of political boundaries were not sought when the international boundaries were being drawn, interstate tension, social disruption and boundary disputes have remained rife on the continent today.⁹⁸ In West Africa, in particular, this is rather evident in the artificial nature of the states that have emerged and the suspicions they have perpetuated. Despite their cultural homogeneity, the Ewe are divided by the Ghana-Togo border, the Fullahs by the Guinea-Sierra Leone border, the Akan by the Ghana-Ivory Coast border, the Wollofs by the Senegal-Gambia border, the Senufo by the Ivory Coast-Mali border, and the Yoruba by the Benin-Nigeria border.⁹⁹ In short, neighboring West Africans with identical cultural traditions found themselves

overnight subjected to different colonial languages and doctrines. For the political theorist and the policy maker, therefore, the study and promotion of regional cooperation may increase understanding of such political conflicts as boundary disputes.¹⁰⁰ It can even be argued that by studying why and how nations engage in cooperative interaction, we can better understand the sources of conflict.¹⁰¹ The most important advance that has been made in the domain of inter-African cooperation is probably within the context of regional organizations, and the question one seeks to answer is the extent to which this has been realized in the West African setting.

Primary Assumptions of the Study

This research investigates the patterns and trends of interstate interactions in West Africa, by tracing the diplomatic history of the subregion from independence until present times. Basically, the subject matter involves several fundamental principles. At the core of this study are six major assumptions:

- (1) The first assumption concerns the conventional designation of the subregion tagged "West Africa." We assume that a modern and an adequate definition of the area comprises the more or less geographically contiguous memberstates of ECOWAS. These sixteen states, which include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo have thus been classified together and called "West Africa" and constitute the primary unit of analysis in this investigation.

(2) By emphasizing the totality of international relations, it is further assumed that it is possible to analyze interactive patterns of the sixteen West African states as a whole. There is an appeal for a more holistic analysis, less emphasis is placed on individual states and greater recognition is accorded regional patterns of behavior. This is not to suggest that there are no significant differences among the units under analysis. In fact, it is often assumed, for instance, that West African states display differences in socioeconomic conditions, colonial experiences and legacies, and ideological orientation. Although the so-called giants of Africa are merely secondary powers by world standards, many will argue that because of size, power and economic attainment, states like Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana and Ivory Coast are much closer to the epicenter of regional changes in the area. Therefore, several generalizations in this study will emanate from a comparative understanding of the individual experiences of several of the sixteen countries under survey. But the main focus is less on the foreign policies and processes of individual West African states than on interstate relations in the area as a whole. Thus, the entire complexity of the linkages between domestic and foreign policies will only be indicated in general terms. More striking patterns will be described, to the relative neglect of many nuances that might have provided for a more adequate account of interstate interactions. The study does not attempt a detailed appraisal of the internal economic, political and social complexity in each country, except where this is viewed as having serious implications for the subregion in general. In addition, since one attempts to probe the "internal influences on external behavior" this study represents an

interdisciplinary amalgam of comparative politics and international relations.¹⁰²

(3) It is further assumed that a significant and meaningful study in comparative international politics can concentrate on the relations between West African states. This perspective construes the subregion as a relatively cohesive unit in international relations with subcomponents in regular, purposive interaction. In this sense, the study is in accord with the fundamental remarks and rationale long offered by Zartman that:

just as a meaningful study can be made of intra-European relations, or even of intra-Six relations in Western Europe, so it is important to investigate the development of interaction and reaction among... states of Western Africa. A state's primary area of interest is with its neighbors; even if a policy toward neighbors does not immediately appear, it is eventually imposed by the necessity of getting along with them.¹⁰³

Paraphrasing Daniel Villey who once reasoned (in an article devoted to the European Common Market) that the European idea, like common sense, is the most widely shared thing there is, Doudou Thiam has suggested that "the pan-African idea is the most widely shared thing in Africa."¹⁰⁴ For while in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s, the French Prime Minister, Aristide Briand, coined the term "Common Market" and submitted a detailed scheme for a European union to the League of Nations Assembly, in 1929,¹⁰⁵ in East Africa, arrangements for a customs union were completed, in 1927, between Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika (the former name of Tanzania);¹⁰⁶ and in West Africa, stalwart nationalist politicians preached the idea of West African unity.¹⁰⁷ Although it may be argued that conditions in the developing countries are strikingly different from those that exist in the developed

world (upon which the established theoretical framework for economic integration has been based),¹⁰⁸ most research on regional cooperation in the Third World are still dominated by theories based on the European experience. As African governments searched for solutions to their economic and social problems, they looked to European models based upon regional economic cooperation theory. Arguments based on the rationality of regionalism were thought to be applicable to the continent and, consequently, Africans formed integrative groupings.¹⁰⁹ Therefore, an analysis of structural arrangements and regional collaborative processes in Africa is, in these various respects, justifiable and helpful.

(4) This research does not consider West Africa as constituting a completely autonomous system of interstate relations. One is thus objectively aware that no group of states can be entirely self-sufficient and insulated from external contact. Political systems do not theoretically exist in isolation since "the actions open to one system are affected by the past or probable actions of others."¹¹⁰ In more concrete terms, African states operate in a complex milieu of internal stress and strain, compounded by a multitude of external pressures. As Thomas Hodgkin puts it, "one cannot hope to understand the West African state system in isolation from other African systems and, of course, from other non-African systems, the Western bloc, the Soviet bloc."¹¹¹ Indeed, the economic and military weakness of African states assist in no small measure to entrenching external states (especially with respect to the superpowers and the former colonial powers), in their role of essential actors in Africa.¹¹² In particular, because West Africa comprises largely small and dependent

states, it is assumed that an account of the interaction between selected extra-African states with this area will also be meaningful to analysis. The continuing pull of Europe, especially with respect to such issues as foreign intervention and neocolonialism, will remain crucial in inter-African relations in the foreseeable future. Thus, the West African subregion is analyzed to determine the extent to which it has been penetrated politically, socially, economically, and militarily. Worthy of note, therefore, are also the interests of external powers in the African region. Although the Cold War has thawed, it may be argued that it is nevertheless a factor in international relations. Especially with respect to sporadic conflicts in the periphery, it may be illusory "to feel that the Power blocs and polarities that emerged in the early fifties and the early sixties have now [completely] disappeared."¹¹³

This study will focus on external involvements and linkages with six non-African dominant "great powers,"¹¹⁴ namely, Britain, France, Western Germany, Communist China, the Soviet Union and the United States.¹¹⁵ These six actors are assumed to represent the best testimony to the fact that West Africa has significant historical ties to Europe and has, at least for much of the period studied, a place in the Cold War context. On the other hand, the apparent exclusion of interactions with African countries in other subregions (especially with respect to the fascinating development of regional cooperative processes in Southern Africa), is made only for the purpose of analytical convenience, and does not mean that these dimensions are unimportant. So also is the partial exclusion of both IGOs and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Since the work is largely concerned with bilateral, interstate

relations, the activities within the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations will not receive major attention.

(5) It is assumed that the theoretical notions of power, systems and decision-making analyses can be applied to West Africa as well as to other states in the international arena. It is our argument that these approaches to international politics are not mutually exclusive foci. Taken together, these theoretical perspectives enrich each other and form the basic parameters for a valid area of focus in our study. This integrated approach has been deliberately selected in order to take advantage of the analytical insights derived from existing studies. Our conviction is that the pursuit of these interdisciplinary frameworks indepth can yield insights into the structure of relations in West Africa in particular. Thus, an attempt is made in this study to apply theoretical ideas in international relations to the developing states of West Africa, to test their applicability, and at the same time, to develop a clearer understanding of the theories themselves for possible reapplication elsewhere.

(6) Finally, it is assumed that interstate cooperation and diplomacy between states reflects the extent to which their policies are coordinated, and that foreign policy events can be valid as working data for measuring the nature and extent of interactions in any given geopolitical configuration. The various canons of comparative analysis can best be summarized by noting that foreign policy data can and must always be made.¹¹⁶ In the absence of direct observation of international interaction, the analysis of contemporary international behavior has come to depend heavily on newspapers, journals or chronologies of international events as sources of

empirical data. Of course, in reality, it is impossible to keep track of all the transactions that occur between states. Many events that occur are never recorded and the foreign policy analyst must often accept data that are less than perfect. Especially in Africa, transactions may be undertaken *in camera* for political reasons. Data may be inaccessible because of secrecy and event data do not always convincingly account for the extent to which inter-African relations merely mirror the interests of the great powers. Neither do they capture unreported, concealed or hidden cases of external interstate subversion.¹¹⁷ Steffan Wiking points out, for example, that "a successful foreign intervention can be extremely difficult to verify. Not only is the intervening nation interested in keeping such intervention secret, this desire is also shared in equal measure by the military interventionists."¹¹⁸

It is therefore not an objective of this study to present a direct replica of the real world. That will, of course, be impossible. Instead, one merely contends that if utilized properly and carefully, international interaction data may provide a relatively modest, sensitive and replicable indicator of interstate relations within certain reasonable degree of confidence. First, we contend that event data in form of event flows provide a reasonably reliable means of observing and measuring the several processes that occur within the regional setting. Secondly, we assume that for the purposes of mapping out the spectrum of foreign policy for a variety of states, certain forms of "soft" data are better than no operational data at all.¹¹⁹ A researcher need not refrain from dealing with a particular type of foreign policy behavior simply on the basis that it is unobservable. By providing new insights, an approach that

emphasizes the collection and analysis of events data may thus also help studies of new states' foreign policies become more rigorous, sophisticated, and comparative.¹²⁰

Organization and Scope of the Work

This study is organized in three parts. Part I (comprising this chapter and the following one) provides the introduction, the reasons for the research, and an overview of the conceptual and theoretical dimensions relevant to understanding the dynamics of regional cooperation in West Africa. In Part II (Chapters 3 to 5), we attempt to reconcile our theoretical fervor with the imperatives of more substantive analysis. The methodological dimensions pertinent to this study are finally taken up in Part III (Chapters 6 to 8) which deals with the results of the empirical research conducted and an examination of the major findings, policy implications, recommendations and conclusions of the work.

In the remainder of this study, we will attempt to further elucidate the analysis presented in Chapter 1. For example, Chapter 2 seeks to engage in an interpretive overview of past theoretical efforts with the hope of providing answers to certain basic problems of political inquiry. What light do existing theories and explanations of foreign policy behavior shed on the nature of interstate relations in general? If one must indeed accept that international relations must be approached with certain rudimentary theoretical notion, what approach (or combination of approaches) ought we utilize in this study? Addressing these problems will require a survey of the

literature in order to abstract relevant variables and propositions which may assist in accounting for foreign policies in West Africa.

Chapter 3 represents a narrative account of the quest for unity by African leaders in West Africa. The primary objective here is to analyze the historical role of leaders' ideology and power configurations in the evolution of interstate interactions in the area, from the colonial era until the present. The chapter analyzes the role of elite perceptions and ideology in the politics of West African states in that context. We attempt to give an account of the main trends of political thought in the subregion particularly in relation to the role of salient political personalities. One general observation in this regard is that the tendency for elite perceptions to be colored almost exclusively by ideological preconceptions in the late 1950s and early 1960s has given way to greater emphasis on more pragmatic concerns.

In Chapter 4, the study introduces and describes the nature of interactions and cooperative processes in the West African subregion. Although past studies have mostly concentrated on the economic aspect alone, this chapter addresses several component facets of foreign policy behavior by positing that, in the relations between West African states, the evolution of post-colonial interactions are divisible into political, economic, socio-cultural and military issue-areas. The suggestion here is that a comprehensive understanding of foreign policy behavior in any system must incorporate the multi-faceted network of these four different dimensions of interstate behavior. These structural components constitute, in other words, the basic elements of cooperation and cohesion in the foreign policies of West African states. With the

aid of both attribute and events data, these dimensions are thus descriptively investigated and assessed accordingly.

Since the foreign policy of any country is an interaction between internal and external factors, Chapter 5 analyzes the role of external influences in West Africa by reviewing the policies and actions of the great powers in the area. One can only provide a complete panorama of the network of relations in a regional subsystem when the effects of the external powers have been added. In short, the external linkages between the subregion and principal actors are examined here in a series of case studies. Respectively, Chapters 4 and 5 take cognizance of the fact that two dimensions have always mattered historically in the international relations of West African states: first, the links African states should create with each other, and second, relations they should maintain with the outside world.¹²¹ By means of this discontinuity between intra- and extra-African foreign policy, African states are perpetually in the process of developing positions vis-à-vis other members of the African community and the non-African world.¹²² In a much wider sense, the main purpose of the substantive section (Chapters 3 to 5) is to analyze the implications for regional cooperation of the domestic, intra-African and global contending factors of the foreign policies of West African states.¹²³

Chapter 6 entails a discussion of the methodology of content analysis applied in this research and the various sources of data used in the work. In recent years, attribute and events data have become increasingly useful in the development of policy oriented studies in the field of international relations. Since data collection does not

by itself constitute research, Chapter 7 represents the various analyses and interpretations of the data extracted from public sources and the empirical findings of the hypotheses tested in the study. Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the implications of our study and advances recommendations in light of previous analyses.

References and footnotes

1. These policy issues concern "Unity, Solidarity, Liberation and Development." While African statesmen remain generally preoccupied with the domestic imperatives of nation-building and economic development, they nevertheless strive simultaneously to build African unity and to free the continent from white supremacy and foreign rule. See West Africa (London), June 6, 1988, especially pp. 1007-1009. For a broad and insightful analysis of these themes, see G. Aforika Nweke, Harmonization of African Foreign Policies (Boston, Mass.: Boston University, African Studies Center, 1980). Recently, there has been an attempt to add human rights to these issues. See for example, Amadu Sesay, Olusola Ojo, and Orobola Fasehun, The OAU After Twenty Years (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984) pp. 79-91; Claude E. Welch and Ronald I. Meltzer, eds., Human Rights and Development in Africa (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1984). For a recent compilation of important human rights documents of African origin and concern, see M. Hamalengwa, C. Flinterman and E. V. O. Dankwa, The International Law of Human Rights in Africa: Basic Documents and Annotated Bibliography (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988).
2. For example, one United States Government publication concludes that the votes of African states "and their often coordinated position on many issues is significant and often crucial." U.S. Department of State, "Sub-Saharan African and the United States, Discussion Paper," p. 20. Quoted in Gavin Boyd, ed., Regionalism and Global Security (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1984), p. 62. It has also been noted that in the United Nations (UN), African states function "as an effective caucusing group when issues of common interest come before the General Assembly. The African bloc has played a major role in the decolonization process, in efforts to create a new international economic order, and in building international development strategies." See Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, The International Relations Dictionary, Third Edition (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio, 1982), p. 329.
3. For recent substantive inventory of these works, see Domenico Mazzeo, African Regional Organizations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Robert Jaster, Southern Africa: Regional Security Problems and Prospects (Aldershot: Institute of Strategic Studies/Gower, 1985); El-Ayouty and I. William Zartman, eds., The OAU After Twenty Years (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984); Peter Robson, Integration, Development and Equity (London: Allan and Unwin, 1983); R. I. Onwuka and Amadu Sesay, The Future of Regionalism in Africa (London: Macmillan Press, 1985).
4. These IGOs include, among many others, the Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO), Conseil de l'Entente (ENTENTE), Mano River Union (MRU), Secretariat Permanent Sene-Gambien and the Economic Community of West African

States (ECOWAS). Arising in part from their common colonial experiences, there is a strong movement for unity among the states of West Africa. For example, apart from Guinea and Mauritania, all the countries that formerly comprised French-speaking West and Equatorial Africa are members of the franc zone. For West Africa, these include Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. In addition, Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Togo and Niger form the Conseil de l'Entente (the Council of Understanding); Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and the Gambia are in the Sterling area and are also members of the Commonwealth; and all the states are members of ECOWAS. According to the executive secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa there were, by 1977, "over 20 intergovernmental multi-sectorial economic cooperation organizations" in Africa and "about one hundred single sector multinational organizations that are meant to promote technical and economic cooperation in Africa." See Adebayo Adedeji, "The Need for Concrete Action," Regional Cooperation in Africa: Problems and Prospects (Addis Ababa: African Association for Public Administration and Management, 1977), p. 10. For West Africa, both Adedeji and the executive secretary of ECOWAS state that there are as many as 32 IGOs in existence. See Adebayo Adedeji, "Inter-African Economic Cooperation in Light of the Final Act of Lagos," Adebayo Adedeji and Timothy M. Shaw, eds., Economic Crisis in Africa: African Perspectives on Development, Problems and Potentials (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1985), p. 61. Aboubakar Diaby-Quattara, "ECOWAS and Regional Economic Cooperation," Unpublished address to Nigeria's principal representatives abroad, Lagos, July 27, 1979.

5. See John D. Hargreaves, "The European Partition of West Africa," in J. F. A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder, eds., History of West Africa, vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 402-423. See also, John D. Hargreaves, "West African States and the European Conquest," in L. H. Gann and P. Duignan, eds., Colonialism in Africa (Cambridge University Press, 1969).

6. Examples of African pre-colonial diplomatic activity in global affairs mainly followed the patterns of the Caravan trade and the Atlantic trade. The first trade, which is much older, flowed towards the western Sudan, and then across the Sahara to countries in North Africa, and across the Mediterranean to southern Europe and the Middle East. The second trade runs southwards to the Guinean coast, and from the second half of the fifteenth century extended across the Atlantic to Britain, western Europe and the Americas. For several accounts of this, see J. B. Webster and A. A. Boahen with H. O. Idowu, The Growth of African Civilization. The Revolutionary Years. West Africa Since 1800 (Longmans, 1968).

7. See Timothy M. Shaw and 'Sola Ojo, eds., Africa and the International Political System (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982), p. 2. This same point is made elsewhere: that "despite its unfortunate inheritance and mixed performance, Africa has emerged as an important actor in the contemporary arena of world politics." Timothy M. Shaw, "Towards a Political Economy of Regionalism in Africa," Ralph I. Onwuka and Amadu Sesay, eds., op. cit. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), p. 8.

8. There is quite often the overly simplistic assumption that African societies lack the capacity to respond actively in world affairs. However, this psychological specter that Africa is a passive or dormant continent lies more within the realm of (mis)perception, since the same evidence that is interpreted as the effect of the outside world upon Africa can also be interpreted as an example of Africa's influence upon events in the outside world. See Ali A. Mazrui, The Africans: A Triple Heritage (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1986), p. 303.
9. See article by Timothy M. Shaw entitled "Africa in the World System: Towards More Uneven Development?" in Timothy M. Shaw and 'Sola Ojo, eds., Africa and the International Political System (Washington, D. C.: University Press of America, 1982), p. 115.
10. See I. William Zartman, International Relations in the New Africa, Second Edition (New York: University Press of America, 1987), p. x.
11. In fact, West African states are statistically active members of over eighty percent of the entire network of pan-African IGOs in Africa. For this computation, See Olatunde Ojo, D. K. Orwa and C. M. B. Utete, eds., African International Relations (London: Longman Group, 1985), pp. 146-149.
12. In fact, much of the cooperative and conflictual behavior in international politics occurs within the regional context, hence the significance of understanding the sources and forms of this behavior. The "region" is defined here as that intermediate unit of analysis between the international system on the one hand and the nation-state on the other.
13. See I. William Zartman, "Coming Political Problems in Black Africa," Jennifer Seymour Whitaker, ed., Africa and the United States: Vital Interests (New York: New York University Press for Council on Foreign Relations, 1978), p. 95. Similarly, Shaw contends that "It remains the case that the regional level is the locus of African states' principal foreign policy concerns." See Timothy M. Shaw, "Regional Cooperation and Conflict in Africa," International Journal, vol. 30, no. 4 (Autumn 1975), p. 671. See also, John Revenhill, "The Future of Regionalism in Africa," Ralph I. Onwuka and Amadu Sesay, eds., op. cit. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), p. 206.
14. Our study assumes that the West African subregion constitutes an international regional subsystem on the bases of geographical contiguity, sociocultural affinity, and economic and political interactions. Although this assumption is made at this point without any evidence, its analytical and empirical bases should become clearer in the latter portions of the study.
15. For this definition, see G. Pope Atkins, Latin America in the International Political System, Second Edition (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989), p. 24. For the advantages of the regional subsystem (or subordinate system) approach to international

politics, see Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 4-5.

16. Michael Brecher, "Research Findings and Theory-Building in Foreign Policy Behavior," Patrick J. McGowan, ed., Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, vol. 2 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1974), p. 61.

17. See George W. Shepherd, Jr., Non-Aligned Black Africa: An International Subsystem (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1970), p. 9.

18. See S. B. Ajulo, "Towards a Definition of ECOWAS Territorial Space," Journal of African and Asian Studies, vol. xx (1985), p. 39.

19. The Treaty of Lagos, which established ECOWAS, was signed and ratified in May 1975 and November 1976 respectively, by 15 states with the aim of promoting trade, interstate cooperation and self-reliance in West Africa. Cape Verde joined a few months later in 1977. With the possible exception of Cape Verde Islands, the memberstates of ECOWAS are geographically contiguous. But Cape Verde shares a common sea boundary with the subregion. For the sake of analytical convenience, it is assumed in this study that Cape Verde is contiguous with Senegal - its closest point of contact (approximately 620 kilometers apart).

20. Although there is no universally recognized definition of the countries comprising the subregion of West Africa, the memberstates of ECOWAS constitute our primary unit of analysis. In geo-political terms, these states, which extend from Mauritania to Nigeria, cover the huge area of North West Africa (south of the Sahara), and may even include Western Sahara if the prevalent UN conception of West Africa is adopted. For a definition closer to this UN conception of the area (i.e., including Spanish Sahara) see E. A. Boateng, A Political Geography of Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 103. An area with striking geographic and ethnographic diversities, West Africa is also conventionally delimited as the region bounded by the Atlantic ocean and lying west of Cameroon (i.e., the area covered does not include Cameroon).

21. Intra-African politics are conducted at two distinct geo-political and institutional levels: (1) The continental level is identified with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), whose relatively more ambitious objective is to coordinate the foreign policies of all African states (with the exception, of course, of the Republic of South Africa). (2) The subregional level is focused upon greater functional attempts to harmonize the policies of specific clusters of African states. Examples include ECOWAS, the defunct East African Community (EAC), the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States (PTA), and so on. The Economic Community of the States of Central Africa (CEEAC) is the latest initiative with its treaty signed in Libreville in October 1983. For

details of treaty establishing the CEEAC see "North-South Monitor," Third World Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 2 (April 1984), p. 477. For discussion of SADDCC and PTA, see Douglas G. Anglin, "Economic Liberation and Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: SADDCC and PTA," International Organization, vol. 37, no. 4 (Autumn 1983), pp. 683-711; Christopher R. Hill, "Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa," African Affairs, vol. 82, no. 327 (April 1983), pp. 215-239. For a brief preview of these organizations in general, see Olatunde Ojo, D. K. Orwa and C. M. B. Utete, eds., op. cit. (1985), pp. 142-181.

22. Consider the reported statement by Bolaji Akinyemi, then Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, who suggested that the failure of some ECOWAS states to recognize the MPLA government in Angola raised "fundamental questions for ECOWAS and African Unity." West Africa (London), February 9, 1976. The passive states were not identified. However, Akinyemi was clearly not referring to Guinea and Benin who, in a communique, jointly denounced "imperialism" in Angola. Nor was he speaking of the late Nigerian leader, Murtala Mohammed, who urgently sent a special message to the Sierra Leonean President Siaka Stevens urging action on the Angolan situation. See West Africa, July 7 and December 22/29, 1975. In fact, subsequent Nigerian leaders have stressed that ECOWAS is not designed to "serve economic purposes alone." See West Africa, March 5, 1979, p. 409; and July 13, 1987, p. 1364. One should be aware that although during its fifteen-year history ECOWAS has been concerned with differing areas of emphasis, none has perhaps been so important as the emphasis on economic development.

23. For similar studies along these lines, see George T. Yu, China and Tanzania: A Study in Cooperative Interaction (Berkeley, Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, 1970); Georges A. Fauriol, Foreign Policy Behavior of Caribbean States: Guyana, Haiti, and Jamaica (New York: University Press of America, 1984); and Tareq Y. Ismael, International Relations of the Contemporary Middle East: A Study in World Politics (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986).

24. Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System (London: Frank Cass, 1981), p. 3; Ronald P. Barston, "The External Relations of Small States," August Schou and Arne Olav Brundtland, eds., Small States in International Relations (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1971), p. 39.

25. See article by Patrick J. McGowan and Klaus-Peter Gottwald, "Small State Foreign Policies: A Comparative Study of Participation, Conflict, and Political and Economic Dependence in Black Africa," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 4 (1975), p. 470. Earlier, in another study, McGowan had criticized what he called "the clearly ethnocentric nature of much research on foreign policy....most 'theories' of foreign policy and much of the substantive research reflects a great-power bias. Very little theorizing and research have proved relevant to the needs of the less modern and less powerful states of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. If we are concerned with developing a general science of foreign policy studies, then our work has

been parochial rather than general." See Patrick J. McGowan, ed., Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, vol. 1 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1973), pp. 14-15.

26. William R. Thompson, "The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 1 (March 1973), p. 90.

27. See Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel, eds., op. cit. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. ix.

28. Michael Brecher in Patrick J. McGowan, ed., op. cit. (1974), p. 79.

29. For these facts, see Christophe Butsche, "L'Afrique noire frappée de plein foveat," Le Monde Diplomatique (November 1982), p. 12; See also, R. Craig Nation, "Soviet Engagement in Africa: Motives, Means, and Prospects," in R. Craig Nation and Mark V. Kauppi, eds., The Soviet Impact in Africa (Lexington, Mass.: Heath and Co., 1984), pp. 28, 50). The poorest states in Africa include Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Comoro Islands, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome e Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the Sudan, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda. As emphasized above, many of the least developed states in Africa are located in West Africa.

30. The per capita income of the West African Community, in 1974, was approximately U.S. \$270 compared to the global average of \$1,422, the European average of \$3,313, the Latin American average of \$953, the Asian average of \$479, and the African average of \$366. These facts are contained in a paper presented by Diaby-Ouattara, Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, at the inaugural conference of the West African Economic Association, in Lagos, in March 1978.

31. Contained in a study conducted by the Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research (NISER) and the Ivorian Center for Economic and Social Research (CIRES) entitled A Critical Appraisal of the Economic and Social Conditions in West Africa Sub-Region (March 1979).

32. See Patrick J. McGowan and Klaus-Peter Gottwald, op. cit. (1975), p. 469.

33. See George W. Shepherd, Jr., op. cit. (1970), p. 1.

34. Patrick J. McGowan and Klaus-Peter Gottwald, op. cit. (1975).

35. See Roger W. Cobb and Charles Elder, International Community: A Regional and Global Study (New York: Holt, 1970), p. 141. For an early but essentially qualitative attempt at extending generalizations from the North Atlantic area to West African states,

see William J. Foltz, From French West Africa to the Mali Federation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 189-192.

36. George T. Yu, op. cit. (1970), p. 10.

37. By quantitative analyses is meant those analyses that are more reliable than the more usually intuitive ones.

38. For example, Bruce Russett had serious problems finding reliable data for Africa. See Bruce Russett, International Regions and International Systems: A Study in Political Ecology (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), p. 15. For this same problem, see Bahgat Korany, How Foreign Policy Decisions are Made in the Third World: A Comparative Analysis (1986), p. 41.

39. In fact, the frequent criticism of Rudolph Rummel's Dimensionality of Nations (DON) project especially at its early stage focused on the almost exclusively inductive nature of the work. There was little attempt to incorporate theoretical justifications for the variables and dimensions examined. For a review of specific criticisms of the study, see Gordon Hilton, A Review of the Dimensionality of Nations Project (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1973), esp. pp. 51-54.

40. In short, one should not neglect substance for method.

41. James N. Rosenau, "Introduction: New Directions and Recurrent Questions in the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy," Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and James N. Rosenau, eds., New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy (Boston, Mass.: Unwin Hyman, 1987), p. 7.

42. See Ernst B. Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing," International Organization, vol. 24, no. 4 (Autumn 1970), p. 610.

43. Leon N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 6. For Lindberg's later view of the term as embracing the broader process of international integration, see "Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon Requiring Multivariate Measurement," in Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, eds., Regional Integration: Theory and Research (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 45-46.

44. See Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Integration (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), p. 29.

45. Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968), p. 16.

46. See Domineco Mazzeo, op. cit., (1984), pp. 11 (fn. 1), 233-234. Indeed, it has been argued that since the stipulation of pluralism and spillover may be ill-suited for the condition of regional integration in the developing areas, applications of integration paradigms to the Third World countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America have demonstrated additional problems in academic theorizing about political unification. See Juergen Dedring, Recent Advances in Peace and Conflict Research: A Critical Survey (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1976), p. 90. See also, Michael Haas, "Paradigms of Political Integration and Unification: Applications to Korea," Journal of Peace Research, vol. 21, no. 1 (1984), p. 47.

47. One way of distinguishing "cooperation" from "integration" is by suggesting that the former is a loose form of the latter. In other words, integration is a comparatively intense form of cooperation. Integration, thus, explains a terminal end - the condition of states that have come together - whereas cooperation is a loose term which indicates "the process of getting there." In our usage, possible synonyms of "regional cooperation" may not preclude "regional coordination" of policies and "regional associations."

48. For a suggested application of this conception to West Africa, see S. K. B. Asante, The Political Economy of Regionalism in Africa: A Decade of the Economic Community of West African States (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986), p. 9. However, this definition is not necessarily restricted to African IGOs alone. For example, it has similarly been pointed out that the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) represents "a regional cooperative, not a regional integrative, organization." See R. P. Anand, ed., Cultural Factors in International Relations (New Delhi, India: Abhinav Publications, 1981), p. 26.

49. Harold Guetzkow was perhaps the very first to identify a "collaboration-isolation" continuum by discussing how the behavior of groups within the nation determines the isolationistic and collaborative tendencies of its external relations. See Harold Guetzkow, "Isolation and Collaboration: A Partial Theory of Inter-Nation Relations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 1 (March 1957), pp. 48-68. See also, James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 152-163. The converse of Guetzkow's position are conflict-isolation studies which pervades intellectual circles. One methodologically rigorous social scientist whose singularity of purpose is marked by the study of conflictual behavior is Rudolph Rummel. In Rummel's Dimensionality of Nations (DON) project, explanatory variables are narrowly and exclusively confined to this singular foreign policy dimension. For some of his works, see Rudolph J. Rummel, The Dimensionality of Nations Project (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1972); Field Theory Evolving (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977); and National Attributes and Behavior (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1979). Studies of international relations have generally focused more on conflictual patterns of interaction than on instances of cooperation, although interaction patterns between states have been predominantly cooperative. This is not to deny the

importance of studying conflicts, but students of international politics should also be concerned with cooperative behavior.

50. For example, see Phillip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, eds., The Integration of Political Communities (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964), p. 10; and Maurice Duverger, The Study of Politics (New York: Thomas Y. Cromwell, 1972), p. 245. One scholar makes the same point in the context of national integration when he argues that political integration "should not be perceived as a zero-sum game, but rather as a process which is present in various degrees in various countries as well as among various identifiable groups in any given country and at any given time." See Peter Osei-Kwame, A New Conceptual Model for the Study of Political Integration in Africa (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1980), p. 3.

51. Andrew M. Scott, The Functioning of the International Political System (New York: Macmillan Co., 1967), p. 114. For a game-theoretic interpretation for analyzing conditions for cooperative resolution in policy conflict, see Paul J. Quirk, "The Cooperative Resolution of Policy Conflict," American Political Science Review, vol. 83, no. 3 (September 1989), pp. 905-921. Quirk's analysis defines cooperation in the context of policy conflict.

52. Doudou Thiam, The Foreign Policy of African States: Ideological Bases, Present Realities, Future Prospects (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 16.

53. S.K.B. Asante, op. cit. (1986), p. 146.

54. For a similarly broad conceptualization of cooperation, see James Story Thomason, "Intra-African Cooperation, 1962-68: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment," Unpublished Dissertation (Evanston, Northwestern University, 1978), pp. 14-16. See also, Charles P. Schleicher, International Behavior: Analysis and Operations (Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1973), p. 70.

55. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 51.

56. Indeed, Cantori and Spiegel refer to this structure of relations as "the spectrum of relations," which shows a range "extending from the close cooperation of a bloc to the exacerbated conflict of direct military confrontation." See Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel, eds., op. cit. (1970), pp. 17-18.

57. Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 4 (December 1988), p. 381.

58. See Ibrahim S. R. Msabaha and Jeannette Hartmann, "Tanzania After the Nkomati Accord: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Changing Strategic Balance in Southern Africa," in Ibrahim S. R. Msabaha and Timothy M. Shaw, eds., Confrontation and

Liberation in Southern Africa: Regional Directions After the Nkomati Accord (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press/Gower, 1987), p. 129.

59. These two fundamental questions with which we are preoccupied assume the general format of the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) project. As a cross-national study of the foreign policy behaviors of 36 nations, CREON had the dual objectives of (1) mapping and comparing the range of foreign policy activities initiated between 1959 and 1968 by the nations under study, and (2) seeking explanations of foreign policy behaviors in terms of combinations of different theoretical perspectives. See Maurice A. East, Steven A. Salmore, and Charles F. Hermann, eds., Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1978), p. 9. For an earlier but basically similar approach, see Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, eds., Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Relations (New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 73.

60. Again, although this assumption is made in passing, its bases rest on such factors as the geographical contiguity, sociocultural affinity, and economic and political interactions of West African states. As specified before, the analytical and empirical bases for the assumption will be made explicit later in this study.

61. See Charles F. Hermann and Gregory Peacock, "The Evolution and Future of Theoretical Research in the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy," Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and James N. Rosenau, eds., op. cit. (1987), fn. 3, p. 37.

62. For similar logic, see Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, eds., op. cit. (1962), p. 73. However, we are not interested in the descriptive analysis of a single case unless it illuminates, for example, why the case does not fit the general pattern across states.

63. In the explanation of interstate interactions, qualitative analysis may be very helpful where variables do not easily lend themselves to quantification. For example, the ideological differences between the so-called conservative, radical or revolutionary leaders in West Africa, deserve conceptual and evaluative analysis.

64. On the impact of elites, one agrees with Thompson's logic that the interaction of states is "an abstract concept, for states, abstract concepts themselves, cannot interact." See William Thompson, op. cit. (1970), p. 152. See also, Timothy M. Shaw, "Southern Africa: Co-operation and Conflict," The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 12, no. 4 (December 1974), p. 637. Indeed, in most developing states, it is often the elites that interact, and it is partly in this sense that we talk of interstate interactions. Thus, although regional cooperation is undertaken within an interstate forum, it is limited to elite participation. Notably, psychoanalytic theorists would contend that the general orientations, attitudes, and perceptions at the foundation of leaders' foreign policies can

be inferred by critically reviewing biographical materials, speeches, statements and remarks made by the foreign policy elites of states in several published (although often very limited) sources. Many problems arise from exploring the effect of leader personality on foreign policy not the least of which include those of devising reliable and valid measures for estimating personality characteristics of changing leaders who are often inaccessible for taking tests or being interviewed.

65. Plano and Olton put it thus: "It is individuals, not abstract entities called states, who define and interpret the concept of national interest, that plan strategies, that perceives issues, that make decisions to act, and that evaluate actions undertaken. As a result, psychological factors are crucial in the decision process, since individuals tend to act and react differently to the same kinds of stimuli." Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, *op. cit.* (1982), p. 6.

66. Peter Robson, *op. cit.* (1983), p. 3.

67. For another brief introduction to this analytic framework, see Merritt's article entitled "Foreign Policy Analysis" in Richard L. Merritt, ed., Foreign Policy Analysis (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1975), p. 1.

68. See A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, "West Africa: Nigeria and Ghana," Peter Duignan and Robert H. Jackson, eds., Politics and Government in African States 1960-1985 (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p. 67.

69. See Yash Tandon, "Africa Within the Context of Global Superpower Struggle," Emmanuel Hansen, ed., Africa: Perspectives on Peace and Development (London: Zed Books, 1987), pp. 43-44.

70. See West Africa, March 31, 1986, p. 669.

71. One is of course acutely aware of possible counter-arguments to this generalization. As the Tanzanian experience illustrates, even a small and weak state may enjoy a margin of autonomy quite out of proportion to its power. Citing this case, for example, Akinyemi has argued that the consequences of having an assertive foreign policy with insufficient resources "may not be as negative as people may think" since ideas and motivation can compensate for economic shortfalls. Also citing Tanzania, Shaw suggests that "leadership, rather than realist resources, is the basis of its notable national control over external penetration." We argue, however, that with greater resources Nyerere would have been much more militant and consistent in foreign policy matters. For instance, despite its "self-reliance" slogan, Tanzania has ironically increased its reliance on external loans, grants and other forms of assistance. Its external debt (eight largest in Africa) went from \$248 million, in 1970, to \$1.6 billion in 1982; and its share of overseas development assistance increased from \$267 million, in 1976, to almost three times that figure in 1982. For Bolaji Akinyemi's interview, see West Africa (London), March 31, 1986, p. 669. See also, Timothy M. Shaw, "African States and International

Stratification: The Adaptive Foreign Policy Behavior of Tanzania," K. Ingham, ed., Foreign Relations of African States (London: Butterworths, 1974), p. 215; and J. Gus Liebenow, African Politics: Crises and Challenges (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), p. 168. For an excellent account of early Tanzanian foreign policy, see Okwudiba Nnoli, Self Reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania: The Dynamics of the Diplomacy of a New State 1961 to 1971 (New York: Nok Publishers, 1978).

72. Michael Haas, International Conflict (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974), p. 4.

73. See Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, op. cit. (1982), p. 20.

74. See Christopher Clapham's review article entitled "Africa's International Relations," African Affairs, vol. 86, no. 345 (October 1987), p. 576. A decade earlier, Chris Allen had similarly contended that "most international relations work on Africa can be safely neglected." See Chris Allen, "A Bibliographical Guide to the Study of Political Economy in Africa," Peter C. W. Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds., The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976), p. 298. For another similar criticism of the scholarly weaknesses of African international relations, see Mark W. DeLancey, "The Study of African International Relations," in Aspects of International Relations in Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University African Studies Program, 1979), p. 22.

75. As confirmed by one scholar, such studies wish to generate general explanatory statements: "Scientific studies of foreign policy aim at making general explanatory statements about foreign policy behavior in the fashion that each social science seeks to make such statements about its own subject matter." Patrick J. McGowan, "Introduction," op. cit. (1973), p. 13.

76. In fact, most of the extant literature on West African regionalism adopt an exhaustive but basically economic approach. For some of these see Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Urwin, 1961); Nicholas Plessz, Problems and Prospects of Economic Integration in West Africa (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1968); Akin L. Mabogunje, Regional Mobility and Resource Development in West Africa (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1972); V. P. Diejomoah and Milton A. Iyoha, eds., Industrialization in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Ibadan: Heinemann, 1980); Uka Ezenwa, ECOWAS and the Economic Integration of West Africa (London: C. Hurst, 1983); Douglass Rimmer, The Economies of West Africa (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1984).

77. See J. Barron Boyd and Michael A. Kelley, "International Relations and the Black Africa Data," (Paper Presented at the African Studies Association Meeting, 1973), pp. 1-12. For example of a handbook containing the attributes and transactions of African states, see Donald G. Morrison, Robert C. Mitchell, John N. Paden, and Hugh M. Stevenson, et al., Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook (New Haven: The Free Press,

1972). For example of data on international integration in the form of measures of diplomatic exchange, see especially pp. 150-156. For an updated version, see Donald G. Harrison, Robert C. Mitchell and John N. Paden, Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook, Second Edition (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1989).

78. J. Barron Boyd and Michael A. Kelley, op. cit. (1973), p. 8. Similarly, Christopher Clapham has criticized the absence of "any hard-headed argument on the prospect of political integration" in Africa (emphasis in original). See Clapham, op. cit. (1987), p. 579. The primacy of politics in regional integration schemes is a major factor that cannot be ignored. Indeed, the close and intimate relationship between politics and economics is particularly evident in the case of regional cooperative schemes in Africa. The above remarks may be also be significant especially when considered in light of Nkrumah's beliefs in the supreme efficacy of political unity as a necessary framework within which integrated economic and social development could be worked out.

79. Indeed, for African states, the political impediments to regional unity may be far more serious than the economic. In fact, in the African context, this element needs to be stressed almost ad nauseum because economic policies must often get the approval of the politicians before they can be implemented. To be sure, where political considerations clash with economic considerations, the former usually prevail. Addressing the same theme from a different angle, one report concludes that the mini-war between Mali and Burkina Faso should serve "as a terrible reminder that Africa's problems were not just of a purely economic variety." West Africa, January 6, 1986, p. 3.

80. S.K.B. Asante, op. cit. (1986), p. 45.

81. ibid., pp. 3-4.

82. Joan E. Spero, The Politics of International Economic Relations (London: Allen and Unwin, 1977), p. 4.

83. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neo-Functionalist Model," International Organization, vol. 24, no. 4 (Autumn 1970), pp. 831-832.

84. It could be argued that since events data provides a quantifiable coverage of the widest range possible of types of external activity, its systematic accumulation alone is a substantial contribution in this research effort.

85. It has been suggested, for instance, that the variability in internal and external policies in Africa is one that requires modes of analysis that are more nuanced than is sometimes found in the literature. C. M. B. Utete, "Africa and the Former Colonial Powers," in Olatunde Ojo, D. K. Urwa and C. M. B. Utete, eds., op. cit. (1985), p. 113.

86. These same questions are asked by Clapham. See Christopher Clapham op. cit. (1987).
87. Vernon McKay has long asked similarly fundamental questions thus: "If power is a prerequisite for a foreign policy, can weak African states really have enough of a foreign policy to merit analysis? Are African states still too new to have discovered and developed the national interests on which foreign policies are based?" See Vernon McKay, ed., African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966), p. xi.
88. In this regard, our argument is not unlike George Mallory's famous reason for climbing Mt. Everest: "Because it is there." Quoted by Stuart A. Bremer, Simulated Worlds: A Computer Model of National Decision-Making (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977). Unlike Bremer's tautological arguments, however (see pp. 6-7), our rationale here does not ignore related issues of policy relevance and moral considerations. Indeed, this is well explained in our subsequent reasons for undertaking the research.
89. See for example, Randolph M. Siverson, "Inter-nation Conflict, Dyadic and Mediated: Egypt, Israel and the United Nations, 1956-1957," Unpublished Final Report, Stanford University, July 1969, p. 5.
90. Georges Fauriol, op. cit. (1984), p. 11. See also, Vincent Khapoya, "The CREON Coding Scheme: A Kenyan Perspective," Paper Presented at the International Studies Convention, Washington, February 1975.
91. See Michael Haas, op. cit. (1984), p. 54. See also, Claude Welch, Jr., Dream of Unity: Pan-Africanism and Political Unification in West Africa (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. ix-x.
92. Christopher Clapham, op. cit. (1987), p. 576.
93. S. K. B. Asante, op. cit. (1986), pp. 5-6.
94. Julius Olu Aiyegbusi, "Collective Self-Reliance and External Assistance," Adebayo Adedeji and Timothy M. Shaw, eds., Economic Crisis in Africa: African Perspectives on Development, Problems and Potentials (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1985), p. 104.
95. See Abdul Aziz Jalloh, "Recent Trends in Regional Integration in Africa," Nigerian Journal of Internal Affairs, vol. 6, nos. 1 & 2 (1980). Also quoted in Olatunde Ojo, D. K. Orwa and C. M. B. Utete, eds., op. cit. (1985), p. 142.
96. See Caroline M. Somerville, Drought and Aid in the Sahel: A Decade of Development Cooperation (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), p. 54.

97. In this specific sense, in terms of international economic relations, a mega-Europe may pose a threat to Africa's interests since it may increase Europe's collective bargaining power vis-a-vis those of "fragmented" African states. See Africa Report, vol. 34, no. 3 (May-June, 1989), pp. 51-54.

98. See Peter Osei-Kwame, op. cit. (1980), p. 7. See also, Doudou Thiam, op. cit. (1965), pp. 73-78; Carl Gosta Widstrand, ed., African Boundary Problems (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1969); Saadia Touval, "The Organization of African Unity and African Borders," International Organization, vol. XXI, no. 1 (Winter 1967); Saadia Touval, The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972); West Africa, January 6, 1986, p. 3; Ian Brownlie, African Boundaries (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Omolade Adejuvibe, "Readjustment of Superimposed Boundaries in Africa," Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 2, no. 1 (1976), pp. 68-85; and I. William Zartman, "The Politics of Boundaries in North and West Africa," The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 3 (1965), pp. 155-174.

99. Adu Boahen, with Jacob F. Ade Ajayi and Michael Tidy, Topics in West African History, Second Edition (London: Longman Group, 1986), p. 131.

100. Indeed, Brecher and his associates have advanced the proposition that policy makers perceive their own subordinate system as the level of the international system most directly impinging on vital questions of national security. See Michael Brecher, Belma Steinberg, and Janice Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 13, no. 1 (1969), p. 91.

101. See George T. Yu, op. cit. (1970), p. 9. East and Gregg conclude that the frequency of cooperation is much more closely related than is conflict to a state's international and domestic situation. See Maurice A. East and Phillip M. Gregg, "Factors Influencing Cooperation and Conflict in the International System," International Studies Quarterly, vol. II, no. 3 (September 1967), p. 266.

102. See James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," R. Barry Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 27-92. See also, James N. Rosenau, "Comparative Foreign Policy: Fad, Fantasy, or Field?" The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 79; and Walter S. Jones, The Logic of International Relations (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1988), p. xii.

103. I. William Zartman, op. cit. (1987), p. ix. Thus, despite the rift created by the ethnic violence in Mauritania and Senegal, for example, renewed cooperation remains a central question for both states. As the Senegalese daily, Le Soleil, has reportedly pointed out, "real answers need to be found because, quite simply, the two countries are 'condemned to live together.'" See article entitled "Ethnic Time Bomb Explodes in Dakar and Nouakchott," Africa Report, vol. 34, no. 3 (May-June, 1989), pp. 8-9.

104. Doudou Thiam, op. cit. (1965), p. 48.
105. Anthony J. C. Kerr, The Common Market and How it Works (New York: Pergamon Press, 1977), p. 5. See also, Dennis Swann, The Economics of the Common Market (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), p. 13.
106. See Arthur Hazelwood, Economic Integration: The East African Experience (London: Heinemann, 1975), p. 22.
107. In West Africa, this was done under the auspices of such intellectuals as J. B. Danquah of Ghana, then vice-president of the West African Students Union (WASU) in Great Britain.
108. Amitai Etzioni has argued, for instance, that because of limited horizons, lack of administrative and political skills and preoccupation with problems of domestic modernization, regional economic integration in a developing area (such as West Africa) is, in many respects, a very different phenomenon than in economically advanced areas such as Western Europe. See Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 318-321.
109. Carolyn M. Somerville, op. cit. (1986), p. 54.
110. Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 44.
111. For this quotation, see Thomas Hodgkin, "The New West African State System," Millar Maclure and Douglas Anglin, eds., Africa: The Political Pattern (University of Toronto Press, 1961), pp. 74-82.
112. No African country possesses the power to counterbalance foreign (defined as extracontinental) encroachment in Africa. As Mazzeo puts it, "most African countries still feel militarily, politically and economically exposed to the vagary of extracontinental forces." Domenico Mazzeo, ed., op. cit. (1984), p. 225.
113. For discussion along this dimension, see Olajide Aluko, "Africa and the Great Powers," Timothy Shaw and 'Sola Ojo, eds., op. cit. (1982), pp. 15-40. For a more comprehensive account, see Olajide Aluko, ed., Africa and the Great Powers in the 1980s (New York: University Press of America, 1987).
114. Our definition of a "great power" coincides closely with Stoll's definition of "a major power," namely, "a state that has interests, and the power to influence actors in pursuit of these interests, in other regions of the world as well as its own." See Richard J. Stoll, "State Power, World Views, and the Major Powers," Richard J. Stoll and Michael D. Ward, eds., Power in World Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner

Publishers, 1989), p. 136. In the formulation of Cantori and Spiegel (1970:14), "the primary powers (the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.), together with the secondary powers constitute the great powers, that is, nations which influence domestic politics and foreign policies of other countries in several areas of the world and which are individually superior to other nations materially, militarily, and in motivation."

115. We include in our investigation of West Africa, dyadic interactions with the superpowers, two ex-colonial powers, West Germany and China. It is assumed that these 6 "intrusive" powers are uniquely active in West Africa. Britain and France are included because they are dominant ex-colonial powers in the subregion; the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are also included because they are superpowers. China's status as a developing power and her unique relations with Africa and the Third World in general justifies its inclusion. With the notable exception of West Germany, included as a strong economic power in its own right, the great powers represent the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Furthermore, although an ex-colonial power, Portugal is excluded from our analysis because of her declining status as a weaker variant of great powers. The addition of six external states will, of course, increase the total number of actors under consideration, including the West African states, to 22. Note that Cantori and Spiegel include these 6 states plus Japan in their definition of the "great powers." Although Japan is a formidable economic power, its political significance in West Africa is doubtful, hence its exclusion from our analysis. See Cantori and Spiegel, op. cit. (1970), p. 25.

116. James Rosenau, "Comparative Foreign Policies: Introduction" in James N. Rosenau, ed., Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings, and Methods (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1974), p. 17.

117. As McKay points out, emphasis may equally rest here on the efforts of certain independent African states to undermine one another. See article entitled "International Conflict Patterns," in Vernon McKay, ed., op. cit. (1966), p. 9.

118. Steffan Wiking, Military Coups in Sub-Saharan Africa: How to Justify Illegal Assumptions of Power (Uppsala: Scandanavian Institute of African Studies, 1983), p. 104. Similarly, Cantori and Spiegel (1970:29) state that "acts of subversion are by definition difficult to document."

119. Charles F. Hermann, "Comparing the Foreign Policy Events of Nations," Charles W. Kegley, Jr., Gregory A. Raymond, Robert M. Rood and Richard A. Skinner, eds., International Events and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1975), p. 146. The pioneering use of events data in comparative foreign policy is indebted to such scholars as McClelland, Hoggard, Rummel, Azar and Ben-Dak. See especially, Edward E. Azar and Joseph D. Ben-Dak, eds., Theory and Practice of Events Research (New York: The Free Press, 1975); Charles A. McClelland and Gary D. Hoggard, "Conflict Patterns in the Interactions Among Nations," James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign

Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 711-724; Rudolph J. Rummel, op. cit. (1972, 1977, 1979).

120. See Douglas G. Anglin and Timothy M. Shaw, Zambia's Foreign Policy: Studies in Diplomacy and Dependence (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), p. 353.

121. W. Arthur Lewis, Politics in West Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 45.

122. L. Gray Cowan, "Political Determinants," in Vernon McKay, ed., op. cit. (1966), p. 130.

123. Cantori and Spiegel categorize these three arenas as the dominant, the subordinate and the internal systems. "The dominant system, in the global arena, is the confrontation of the most powerful of nations; the subordinate system, in the region, is the total interaction of relations within that region; and the internal system, in the nation-state, is the totality of relations of the organizations which compose its domestic politics." Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel, op. cit. (1970), p. 3. For the same idea, see Domenico Mazzeo, op. cit. (1984), p. 226.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL DISCUSSIONS AND CONCEPTUAL SCHEME

Introduction

It is not within the scope of this research to offer any rigid, formal or uninterpreted theories of international political behavior.¹ It may be suggested that international relations, and indeed the social sciences, are not like the physical sciences in the sense that no specific frame of reference captures the irrefutable truth.² In his critique of questions on epistemological certainty, Karl Popper argues, for instance, that even where theories survive critical tests, "they can never be positively justified: they can never be established as certainly true nor even as 'probable' (in the sense of the probability calculus)."³ There are several studies and criticisms about the neopositivist claims of science and the extent to which scholars can, in fact, ever know for certain.⁴ Thus in this study, we contend that what is often termed theories of international behavior, are merely representative of broad analytical insights schematized to inject structural precision or intellectual order into what would otherwise have constituted a proliferating chaos of confused terminologies.

This chapter will explore some of these analytical insights and will also attempt to offer a conceptual schema which can serve as a relevant and convenient

method for reviewing salient theoretical literature on the comparative study of foreign policy.⁵ Through a critical review of the several theoretical approaches, we propose a conceptual scheme from which we can deduce testable propositions to explain foreign policy behavior. Our overall purpose is, as one scholar puts it, "to combine empirical research and a factual account of events with theoretical analysis, rather than engaging solely in arid theorising that bears little or no relation to reality."⁶ Rather than assuming an extremely rigid approach that is virtually unrelated to observable international political reality, our hope is that any discerning reader will become aware of certain common and unifying threads running through, connecting, or synthesizing the essential aspects of this chapter.

Prevailing Explanations of International Political Behavior

A longstanding theoretical, methodological and epistemological task of social scientific inquiry is the use of theories to organize, systematize and integrate existing knowledge in any particular field successfully.⁷ The field of comparative international relations is by no means an exception in this regard, and a wide variety of approaches have been presented by theorists to explain interstate relations in general.⁸ Although there have been various attempts to explain why nations act, this, however, does not mean that the field is without focus or that general hypotheses cannot be logically deduced. For our own cursory review of the literature on the smaller and less developed states of West Africa, we utilize aspects of three distinct but mutually complementary approaches to the study of foreign policy behavior.

These broad multi-level and multi-variable explanations of international behavior are represented in the general systems theory, the power theory and the decision-making approach. These separate theories do not necessarily contradict each other. Rather, they represent selected perspectives researchers have chosen for their expositions. With a focus on the several salient dimensions related to regional interactions in a Third World setting, our argument is that each of these frameworks is theoretically interesting and substantively important for our purposes. Although separately inadequate, we argue that they constitute frameworks from which much has been learned and which could form the basis for even more comprehensive theories in future. The three approaches were chosen primarily on the criteria of their usefulness and relevance⁹ to the specific problem of interest and their pervasive influence in foreign policy studies.

The prescriptive utility of current international relations theory correlates with the level of concern. Since it attempts to combine two levels of analysis (the individual-national and the systemic) within a singular conceptual scheme, our proposed framework raises "the level-of-analysis problem"¹⁰ in international relations. In fact, many studies have purported to draw a rigid distinction between internal and external processes or issues. Such a standpoint generally construes the levels of analysis as discontinuous, thus disallowing for the applicability or interchangeability of propositions across levels. Although claiming increased theoretical specificity, such distinctions have remained vague and obfuscated especially because they failed to consider the fundamental fact that, in many respects,

domestic and foreign policies have become virtually indistinguishable. In other words, levels are continuous and propositions derived from one analytical level can be applied to understanding phenomena at another analytical level. For the purposes of our research, therefore, we argue, firstly, that a combination of both levels is necessary and appropriate for the proper understanding of regional behavior in West Africa, and secondly, that an integrative approach strikes at the heart of the matter by reconciling motivational, institutional and behavioral dimensions. While it is, of course, possible to choose one of the two levels in theorizing (usually by making assumptions about the other), we contend that neither the actor-model nor the system-oriented model fully accounts for the factors which we intuitively believe are at work.

Addressing similar concerns, for example, John Garnett argues that although an easier classification of perspectives would distinguish statesmen's perspectives from those of the system in which states behave, "Sensible students will not opt exclusively for either the 'actor' or the 'system' approach to the study of international politics. Both perspectives have something to offer and there is no need to choose between them."¹¹ There is "no clear reason" why in studying interstate behavior "a finding at one level should not direct our attention to the corresponding, but not identical, data on another analytic level."¹² Likewise, Rosenau concludes that the unfortunate tendency of scholars to distinguish rigidly between national and international political systems despite "mounting evidence that the distinction is breaking down," is a conceptual problem that appears "to be holding back the development of general theories of external behavior."¹³ In short, the failure to

integrate internal and external variables in the analyses of the foreign policy behavior of states diminishes the explanatory value of proposed theoretical schemes. Such failure results in an unnecessary inhibition to expanded inquiry. This is especially so on even relatively more factual or historical grounds since it has been suggested that the "history of West Africa, like that of [other regions], is the result of internal and external factors."¹⁴

As already stated, our attention is consciously confined to the systems, power and decision-making approaches because they have been particularly influential in determining the agenda for research in international relations theory. Arguably, literature from these frameworks remains at the cutting edge of theory building in foreign policy studies. From a critical examination of the conceptual and theoretical postulates of these approaches, we contend that, for our purposes, these models must be seen as interrelated.¹⁵ There is no need for an analyst to make an irrevocable or rigid commitment to any one basic research focus and, as such, these models can be applied towards an analytically comprehensive study of international relations in West Africa. However, although these models are construed as interrelated, they will be reviewed separately here to elucidate more clearly their distinct impact on current theoretical debate.

The Systemic Perspective

The notion of the international system emanates, at least conceptually, from the general systems theory. The version of the general systems literature that is

analytically relevant to this study stems from the universal standpoint that all bilateral and multilateral interactions can be analyzed within a systems framework.¹⁶ By definition, therefore, the general systems theory signifies that approach which aims at establishing how interstate interactions are effected in the widest variety of systems.¹⁷ This simplified and abstract approach states that a whole functions as such because of the interdependence,¹⁸ through the coordinative process of communications,¹⁹ of its parts. A system is thus "a set of elements standing in interaction."²⁰ It can also be defined as "a set of objects together with relationships between the objects and between their attributes."²¹ Relationships between objects (or actors) refer to the ways in which actors are linked, which separate members of a system from nonmembers. Attributes, on the other hand, represent conceptual variables describing each object, and relationships between attributes constitute the hypotheses to be tested. These definitions embody the idea of a group of objects standing in some structural relationships to one another and interacting on the basis of certain characteristic processes. The relevance of this systemic analogy to the problem of regional cooperation in any geographical area is self-evident. As a structural set of elements in interaction, a system is living and dynamic and is characterized by cohesion (that is, the condition of sticking together) and covariance (the process of changing together).

Proponents of the systems approach usually set up the following criteria for establishing the existence of a system: (1) that a system is definable in the sense that it can be located with considerable precision in space and time; (2) that a variety of

operations be conducted by several disciplines before concluding that a specific system exists; and (3) that a system manifests significant variations in the time scales of its structures and processes.²² A fundamental theoretical position in this paper is that international political phenomena can best be organized by construing them as parts of a systematic whole. In other words, the phenomena of politics are usually mutually related and tend to cohere in terms of systems of action. To refer to something as a system is an abstract (or an analytic) way of examining concrete phenomena in the sense that a system is an aspect of phenomena abstracted from reality in some degree for the purposes of analysis.²³ To the extent that systems analysis provides useful insights to our research questions and assumptions, its related conceptual postulates are reviewed here for heuristic purposes. Specifically, relevant aspects of systems analysis can be adapted and applied to African foreign policies and to regional studies in the developing areas.

There are three principal reasons why the systems framework is advantageous and useful in the comparative study of foreign policy. First, the systems approach is adequate for isolating international systems and subsystems that exist in several regions of the world. Secondly, the method generates concepts, variables and theoretical propositions that are testable, empirically verifiable, and relevant to assessing the behavior of the system's component units. Thirdly, the method provides convenient linkage between international system-level and intra-national individual or domestic-level relations. The idea of the hierarchy of systems integrates intra- and international politics. This added usefulness permits the researcher to represent the

linkage idea which emphasizes the relationship between a system and its environment. The relevance of these advantages to this research will be investigated in that order.

Systems theoretical perspectives have long been usefully applied to international relations by scholars who view the field from a general systems framework. A major problem, however, is that initial efforts to integrate systems concepts into international relations theory resulted in exclusive or predominant attention to the activities of great powers in global affairs.²⁴ Especially during the Cold War era, international relations witnessed a concentration of scholarly works on the bipolar "East-West system" and the dominant "European state system" to the exclusion of other identifiable systems. This definition seemed increasingly inadequate as the number of nation-state actors doubled and then trebled with the demise of empires in Asia and Africa. Hence, Brecher's counsel that "it is dangerous to assume that the elephants are the only members of the [international] system or to ignore the squirrels by virtue of a specious claim that the elephants determine all or most of their actions."²⁵

In reaction, a new focus on the regional subsystem has emerged in comparative international relations. A regional subsystem has been defined as "a relatively regular and intense pattern of interactions, recognized internally and externally as a distinctive arena, and created and sustained by at least two and quite probably more general proximate actors."²⁶ Through theory-directed research, scholars have increasingly focused their attention on the partially self-contained conglomeration of geographically localized states in Latin America, Southeast Asia,

the Middle East and Africa.²⁷ Through an approach which we have labeled "the regional subsystems approach," we propose that the West African area represents an inchoate but dynamic international regional subsystem. This conception is not without precedence, however. Decades ago, Michael Brecher speculated that at least five definable subordinate systems existed in the global environment, namely, Middle Eastern, American, Southern Asian, Western European and West African.²⁸ He also proposed a comprehensive catalogue of variables that played relevant roles in a regional foreign policy decision-making system.

Elaborating further, Brecher developed a set of fairly rigorous prerequisites through which the existence of a subordinated subsystem (such as the West African case) may be fully confirmed. Such developments, Brecher argued, would require at least six significant conditions:

- (1) That the subsystem's scope is delimited, with primary stress on the region;
- (2) That there are at least three actors;
- (3) That taken together, they are objectively recognized by other actors as constituting a distinctive community, region or segment of the Global System;
- (4) That the members identify themselves as such;
- (5) That the units of power are relatively inferior to units in the Dominant System using a sliding scale of power in both; and
- (6) That changes in the Dominant System have greater effect on the subordinate system than the reverse.

Applying these six conditions to the international system, Brecher conclusively

established that "there are five subordinate systems-Middle Eastern, American, Southern Asian, West European, and West African; others may emerge."²⁹

But the inclusion of West Africa in Brecher's catalogue has drawn some opposition in the theoretical literature. Larry Bowman has suggested, for instance, that the subregion has "little real unity, certainly less than Southern Africa, and at this time could hardly be called a system."³⁰ Other scholars have recently taken the more general and pessimistic view that the "systems theory of international relations is not particularly well suited to Africa" because it was developed to explain relations in the industrialized world, and because "the data that is needed to make it applicable to Africa simply is not available."³¹ Despite these criticisms, however, we strongly argue that Brecher's rigorous conditions are far more substantiated by current empirical trends in West Africa. This is rather obvious in the successive reapplication of the systems perspective to the area in the works of several scholars. For example, George Abangwu has developed "a postulational model of systems approach to regional integration in West Africa" with reference to what he terms the concept of "exogenous socio-political input capacity."³² Similarly, William Zartman has cogently argued that it is possible to analyze the subregion "as a whole." According to Zartman, this research technique is desirable in order to apply the theoretical ideas from international relations to a new area.³³ Other applications of the international systems perspective to West Africa are represented in the studies by Thomas Hodgkin,³⁴ George Shepherd,³⁵ Bruce Russett,³⁶ and Cantori and Spiegel.³⁷

A second major advantage of the systems approach lies in its provision and

description of a theoretical framework for the generation of related variables about political phenomena. But to generate variables is not to establish relations and associations. Hence, the systems approach also permits the classification of the potential sources of variables and the testing of hypotheses subsequent to the coding of data deemed relevant to the system's component units. One can thus diagnose a wide variety of causal layers to lay bare the sources of foreign policy events. Not only are the sources of foreign policy open for study, the consequences of foreign policy behavior may be subjected to analytic probe.

For example, since the systems method permits multivariable explanations of heuristic value, Brecher's last two conditions may render the dependency approach axiomatic in the application of systems analysis to comparative international relations of the developing areas. Scholars such as Johan Galtung, Immanuel Wallerstein, J. G. Gobalet and L. J. Diamond have sought to define sets of transnational relationships constituting a structure that enables the resources of the underdeveloped countries (i.e., the periphery) to be transferred as a function of the asymmetrical benefit of the developed countries (or the center).³⁸ The distinguishing feature of all dependency scholars, therefore, is that they treat the socioeconomic development of underdeveloped countries as being conditioned by external forces, namely, the domination of these countries by other, more powerful states.³⁹ To recapitulate briefly, Brecher suggests that using a sliding scale of power in both, the units of power in the subordinate system are relatively inferior to units in the dominant system, and secondly, that changes in the dominant system have greater effect on the

subordinate system than vice-versa. Put differently, the penetration of the subordinate system by the dominant system has a greater impact than the reverse flow of penetration. Clapham has similarly claimed that two distinct spheres exist in the external environment of African foreign policies: "the sphere of equals" consisting of other African states and the LDCs and "the sphere of outsiders" comprising the superpowers and former colonial powers. He concludes that "The relation between African states and each of these two categories and the influence which these have on the foreign policy of the state concerned, are different enough to make them worth considering separately."⁴⁰

Thus, in applying systems analysis to our study, it is important to distinguish two dimensions of international variables. Firstly, within "the sphere of outsiders" where global systemic variables generate foreign policy inputs into the regional subsystem, the LDCs are largely dependent upon the intrusive activities of great powers. In dependency terms, this systemic postulate suggests that the behavior of the smaller states are somewhat impinged upon from the external environment by the activities of the more powerful states. If this actual or imagined "dominance-dependence" relationship is true, it obviously poses serious questions concerning the role of the African state, its limits, scope, and autonomy, in the execution and conduct of foreign affairs. Secondly, regarding "the sphere of equals," regional subsystemic factors assume the form of foreign policy outputs exhibited between developing states themselves. The phenomenal character of these cooperative and conflictual output behaviors may be political or economic. But because African states

are generally, by definition, impoverished and underdeveloped, economic variables are more likely to be recurrent in their interactions than political or cultural matters.⁴¹ Indeed, on a more general level, it has been suggested that one of the new theoretical and methodological problems created by an ever interdependent world, is the increasing relevance of economics to the conduct of foreign policy.⁴²

In a nutshell, then, the systems perspective is relevant and useful to the foreign policy behavior of Third World states in the sense that it can generate variables and relationships that are based on the defining characteristics of developing states. There are several key systemic phenomena which these states have adopted for their foreign policies. For instance, as a direct consequence of their poverty and low level of modernization, developing states exhibit low profile foreign policy behavioral patterns, some of which can be subsumed under the following basically theoretical generalizations:

- (1) Low levels of overall participation in international affairs leading to the tendency of great actors to dominate foreign policy activities in these areas;
- (2) Prominence of the north-south economic behavioral concerns of modernization and growth over more political issues;
- (3) Tendency for regionally situated developing states to engage in cost-effective non-verbal (deeds) than in verbal (words) behavior.⁴³

These research questions encompass typological variables of the international system and are thus representative of the broad nature of relationships at the systemic level of the subordinated regional subsystem, as is

hypothesized in several studies.

The final advantage of the systems perspective is that it provides a bridging structure between broad levels of analysis in international relations, such that any level in the hierarchy of relevant systems can be analyzed in terms of a variety of concepts. It has been suggested that because the sources of foreign policy span all levels from the state to the global community, "those who study foreign policy must, perforce, concern themselves with politics at every level."⁴⁴ By providing a comprehensive framework with a hierarchy of systems and subsystems, the systems framework provides the opportunity to undertake research on events that take place at several levels. For example, analytical insights can be transferred from one level of systems to another such that large-scale systems may be studied by shifting techniques acquired in the study of one system to others. Phenomena may then be construed within a continuum of interlocking systems or system rungs, at increasing levels of generality and inclusiveness, ranging from world politics to the individual decision-maker. In the most general sense, two levels may be designated: the systemic macro-level comprising the global system, the dominant system and the subsystems; and the unit, or micro-level, comprising state actors and the decision-making apparatus.

In conducting research, the point of incision is that point where a thorough knowledge is required to explain the behavior of the system under analysis with the greatest accuracy. Once a regional subsystem has been identified and isolated, its dominant intrusive systems may be studied. In addition to these environmental

factors, the region's component state systems, their various attribute variables, including the policy-making mechanism established therein, become focal points of analysis. Thus, consistent with our argument that any comprehensive investigation of foreign policy behavior requires progressive effort towards a multi-level and multi-variable explanatory framework, our next set of theoretical explanations shifts the level of analysis from the macro-level (the system of interacting units) to the micro-level, where the state system reveals the several foci that are possible within its domain. It has been noted of systems analysis that, by employing "the concept of the whole, it nevertheless obliges us to isolate and examine the different factors influencing international relations."⁴⁵

A state's foreign policy behavior is not solely an act of, or a resolution to, systemic and external stimuli; domestic variables too are widely reviewed in the literature as influencing international actions. James Rosenau recently described foreign policy analysis as "a bridging discipline." This field of study, Rosenau argues, takes as its focus, "the bridges that whole systems called nation-states build to link themselves and their subsystems to even more encompassing international system of which they are a part."⁴⁶ One objective of this research is to review relevant theoretical literature with a view of showing how we can apply the general systems theory at the systemic level and connect this with power and decision-making concepts at the intrastate level. Thus stipulated, this section attempts to fuse the invaluable contributions of power, systems and decision-making perspectives thereby acknowledging "the continuing erosion of the distinction between domestic and

foreign issues, between the sociopolitical and economic processes that unfold at home and those that transpire abroad."⁴⁷

Power Theoretical Approach

A central concept in the study of world politics, power is a persistent and elusive term whose theoretical basis is interconnected with numerous scholarly efforts to understand both conflictual and cooperative interactions. As a notion which assumes the dominance of realpolitik analyses of foreign policy, power, in the international arena, can be ordinarily defined, firstly, as the coercive or persuasive ability of one state to cause another to do what the latter otherwise would not choose to do, and secondly, as the ability to make another state refrain from doing something it wants to do.⁴⁸ Power theory comprises two basic varieties: first, the systemic component of the balance of power and its several variations, and second, the national power equation consisting of such quantitative ingredients as natural resources, population, productive capacity, and so on. Power is a mixture of capabilities derived from both domestic sources and international activities. The concept may thus be used as an attribute of states and, because power cannot be studied in a vacuum, as a set of changing relationships in any given international system. In this specific sense, one could critique both the bases and the effects of national power. A proper conceptualization of power must take into consideration three major elements: capabilities, acts and responses. Hence, to contend that a state is powerful is to suggest: (1) that the state possesses large amount of resources for use in influence

attempts; (2) that the state is undertaking a large number of actions to influence other states; (3) that the target states respond in a manner consistent with the desires of the state making the influence attempts.⁴⁹

Based primarily upon national interest,⁵⁰ international power theory is predicated on the notion of political realism. Political realism views the nation-state as the major actor, the ultimate point of reference, in the international system. It begins from the premise that universal conformity is not possible, and since states are generally unwilling to surrender their sovereignty to international institutions, conflict is endemic to relations in the international system. To realists, therefore, the behavior of states in the global system may best be understood in terms of international politics defined as a ceaseless struggle for power. Morgenthau has cogently maintained that international politics is "a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aim of politics, power is always the immediate aim."⁵¹ One policy implication of this view dictates that since power overrides all other factors, every state must be preoccupied with the struggle by continually adjusting its actions and behavior in foreign affairs, to its power requirements. Therefore, the configuration of power among states at any given time influences the distribution of the benefits of international relations with the more powerful receiving a larger share than the others.

Based on the lessons of history and historical experience, power politics and political realism posit that rational statesmen must be concerned primarily with their vital interests. Indeed, in the international system, the supreme responsibility of each state is to protect and promote the interests of its people against the opposition of

other groups. In an anarchic world, an actor seeks power and develops both the capability and willingness to control others, for this "law of nature" is the "law of nations"⁵² under which a state's survival may be ensured or endangered. The "law of nature" does not, therefore, expect a prudent actor to be bound by morals; a statesman must be pragmatic and must use morals only as a means to an end - the promotion of personal interest.⁵³

Resting on certain universal assumptions about the nature of man and society, the power perspective is applicable to African international relations since it makes universal claims about the behavior of states, and because it emphasizes the salience of the struggle for survival. This generalization is noticeable on both vertical and horizontal dimensions. Firstly, on the horizontal dimension, several balance of power scenarios have continually been featured in intra-African relations, to show that rather than being passive actors in the international system, African states are indeed characterized by an active struggle for power and influence. As one scholar aptly puts it, a critical review of intra-African relations "reveals the dominance of power politics. In Africa, alliances are short-lived and tend to be entered into in order to balance out the power of either a potential aggressor or a domineering state for the purposes of preserving sovereignty and independence."⁵⁴ The relative distribution of power among regional actors remains a key factor in describing and explaining the nature and likely outcomes of change and conflict in contemporary inter-African relations.

On the vertical dimension, however, power politics in extra-African relations

has principally assumed the posture of struggle against external domination. Power, thus, figures prominently in the literature of dependency theorists who view the world as comprising "centers" and "peripheries," with the former exercising tremendous influence over the latter.⁵⁵ This unequal power dimension of dependency theory draws one to variables outside Africa, and sensitizes the critical analyst to the conditioning situation imposed on the region by centuries of colonial and post-colonial experiences. On both vertical and horizontal dimensions, therefore, African states are generally preoccupied with the preservation of their sovereignty and independence, which they perceive as threatened from within and outside the continent. The ability to exert power, in Africa, may be roughly equal (symmetrical) or severely unequal (asymmetrical). The international politics of African states may thus be characterized as a struggle for economic, military and political power in these significant respects.

Power is further important in the scientific study of world politics, and one conventional method for estimating power is by analyzing its contributing elements. Indeed, to advocate empirically-based theorizing about state behavior, one cannot but assume an approach that construes foreign policy as resting on certain elements that can be analyzed. These sources of foreign policy behavior, the equivalence of Morgenthau's "elements of national power,"⁵⁶ include such relevant power-based indicators as geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, population size, military preparedness, social structures, and so on. Applied to foreign policy behavior, therefore, power theory assumes that interstate interactions involve a

multiplicity of factors which constitute the sources of national power, and which may be investigated and estimated in considerable detail.

In spite of its relevance to our research, the power theoretical approach is not without major flaws. First, the theory is static and conservative preferring to deal with "what is" to the detriment of "what ought to be" or "what is becoming." Differently put, a universally valid conception of national interest is assumed without adequate reference to the reality of changing environmental conditions. Second, the power theoretical approach popularly construes the concept in terms of a series of independent variables when the term can also be analyzed as a dependent variable. In addition, the theory is one-directional in the sense that it poses a single-minded behavior. Power is thus presented solely as an end in itself, which competing states must always pursue. Not only does this falsely assume that there is consensus about what power means, it also ignores the relational dimension of power; it fails to address adequately the relative and contextual question, power to do what?⁵⁷ Finally, the power approach attributes almost every foreign policy action in terms of one single factor to the detriment of all others. Indeed, we strongly contend that power alone cannot explain the workings of the international system. If they are to be useful in explaining the intricacies of interstate relations, "single-factor" theories such as power and economic deterministic theories must be located within some more inclusive and realistic "multi-factor" theory.⁵⁸

The Decision-Making Process

Decision-making can be defined as a process which selects from a limited amount of problematical alternative projects one project intended to produce the specific outcome desired by the decision-makers. By positing individuals' decisions as fundamental in the analysis of political behavior, studies have conceptualized foreign policy in terms of the human decision-making model at the state level of theoretical explanation. This well-established micro-analytic view of international politics advances the significance of national actors operating in an organizational context, the domestic and external variables which influence them, and the process through which they arrive at foreign policy decisions.⁵⁹ In order to lend analytic insights to international behavior, our study is further preoccupied with the components of action, the sources of initiatives and alternatives, and several other factors involving the policy-making process. There is some truth in the notion that the foreign policies of developing states are "domestic politics pursued by other means or that they are domestic policies carried beyond the boundaries of such states."⁶⁰ We hold that the individual leader, far from being solely manipulated by such abstract forces as "national interest" or "power relationships," is central to the interpretation of foreign policy actions.

The decision-making approach contributes to an understanding of foreign policy behavior along several intellectual dimensions. First, the psychological dimension depicts the extent to which insights gained from the use of psychological models can be fruitfully translated into systemic behavioral predictions. A considerable amount of research has been undertaken in the area of psychology and politics and, more

recently, the relationship between psychology and foreign policy behavior has been an important area of focus. The psychological explanation assumes that the national belief system of individual leaders may actually present them with a selection of alternatives for interpreting the objective world.⁶¹ One is thus interested in the "motives" underlying an individual's decision and why specific leaders have greater difficulty than others in making national decisions. This perspective posits that a focus on motivational attribution is vital for prescriptive international relations theory. Richard Snyder has, for instance, often referred to the significance of motivational analysis as an important component of the national decision-making process.⁶² It has been argued that leaders differ according to personal characteristics, degree of nationalism, need for power, and belief in ability to control events. For instance, leaders with "participative orientation" (defined in terms of having a desire to involve the state in the international arena) are generally noted to maintain a low degree of distrust, low nationalism, little need for power to control others, and low belief in their ability to control others. On the other hand, leaders with "expansionist orientation" (often entailing desire or willingness to consider enlarging one's territorial claims) are likely to exhibit a high degree of distrust, high nationalism, high need for power to control others, and high belief in their own ability to control events.⁶³ Scholars are therefore generally interested in investigating why certain types of behavior occur and what it is that causes leaders to behave the way they do.⁶⁴

Another angle to the psychological dimension concerns the central role of

perceptions and misperceptions.⁶⁵ Indeed, the perceptual base of interstate interactions raises certain fundamental questions. Do idiosyncratic characteristics of decision makers affect foreign policy behavior, and, if so, why do foreign policy makers make the decisions that they do? Second, how do leaders and statesmen perceive their nations, and how do their perception of other nations influence their behavior and actions? Third, how do leaders' cognitive, evaluative and affective orientations, and indeed their basic personality traits, ideological predispositions, decision styles, values and attitudes, relate to or affect international political behavior?⁶⁶ One widely endorsed response to these problems suggests that international politics comprises a network of both subjective perceptions and objective conditions. For instance, adopting an input-process-output approach, Brecher has outlined the relationship between what he calls "the operational environment" in terms of objective external influences, and "the psychological environment" or the specific interpretation of those influences by decision-makers.⁶⁷ In similar vein, Robert Jervis contends that:

Perceptions of the world and other actors diverge from reality in patterns that we can detect and for reasons that we can understand....Logic permits us to distinguish between the "psychological milieu" (the world as the actor sees it) and the "operational milieu" (the world in which the policy will be carried out) and to argue that policies and decisions must be mediated by statesmen's goals, calculations and perceptions.⁶⁸

The decision-making approach attempts to explain the behavior of states in terms of statesmen's "images"⁶⁹ and "belief systems"⁷⁰ as related to interpretations of the international environment. Not only is the issue of leaders' perception assigned a major role in terms of their "definitions of the situation," critical analysts sometimes

view the world as interpreted subjectively by elites as even more important than objective reality.⁷¹

The consequences of these points are particularly exaggerated in Africa where, because of the low level of modernization and small bureaucracy, policy is so often controlled by the leader and some close associates. How ethnocentric or nationalistic is the African head of state and how much control does he feel his government has over events? For instance, does he favor cooperation or conflict and competition in dealings with other nations? Due to the reduced scale of complexity it is generally assumed that weak states have fewer bureaucratic influences on foreign policy making.⁷² Indeed, in his seminal article entitled "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," Rosenau advances "individual" variables as the most potent factor in the foreign policy behavior of underdeveloped (large or small, open or closed) societies. In these states, individual and personality characteristics such as the self-confidence, perceptions and the political culture of the leaders most strongly correlate with external policies.⁷³

But to say that individuals are central to political analysis is not to suggest that it is only specific personality characteristics that are important. Although leaders often make decisions, their decisions are more or less directly related to such factors as governmental variables, state capabilities, systemic factors, and so on. Hence, our next major theoretical extension of the decision-making approach in this study, argues for a fusion of both objective indicators of national power and other subjective (non-rational) factors. Labeled the "national attribute approach,"⁷⁴ this analytical

dimension posits several state characteristics and assumes a linkage between them and interstate behavior. For too long, several social and political commentators have talked and written as though African foreign policies lay outside the realm of state capabilities or attributes. On the contrary, in this study, differences in the basic internal attributes of states are related to variations in their foreign policy behavioral patterns. Reviewed in isolation, however, the basic premise of the national attribute perspective, that states' tangible characteristics are the cause of their foreign policy behavior, is fundamentally flawed. We argue that the approach is unrealistic because it bypasses the political input of decision makers and their "capacity to mobilize" resources. Although state capabilities affect foreign policies, this is only indirectly so; the relationship is not usually a clear, direct, automatic and causal one. State capabilities can only contribute to an explanation of foreign policy behavior if research is sensitive to the political context and systems of which nations are a part. Resources *per se* do not give power since one must consider both the willingness to follow a systematic plan of action and the ability to bring influence to bear on other actors. In our study of interstate relations in West Africa, therefore, we advance a thesis which helps us to locate foreign policy initiatives and actions in the socioeconomic and political dynamics of the subsystem's constituent states.

We argue, among other things, that understanding the foreign policy behavior of African states within a regional setting requires multi-source explanations of foreign policy behavior.⁷⁵ In short, a proper understanding requires an adequate conceptual construct which incorporates systemic variables and specific domestic attributes of

these post-colonial states, as well as the perceptions of relevant policy makers. Specifically, we argue that the availability of resources, and the perception of these resources by policy-makers constitutes an essential component of foreign policy behavior. State leaders arrive at decisions affecting foreign policy on the basis of what they perceive their power to be relative to the power of others in the international environment. Thus, to the extent that nation-states differ in size, wealth, availability of resources and composition of decision-makers, we would expect that foreign policy behavioral patterns would also differ. By analyzing how the resource and psychological constraints and opportunities faced by decision-makers affect foreign behavior, our perspective reconciles domestic and international politics, thus assuming that there are no inherent inconsistencies in the various levels of analysis.⁷⁶

The foregoing discussions show that different theoretical orientations qualify in the scientific explanation of international political behavior. No single explanation is ever adequate for the understanding of interstate interactions within any regional subsystem. By itself, each perspective is but a partial and very limited explanation and cannot be justified as a universal foundation for why nations act. The decision-making approach, for instance, does not best capture the essential nature of foreign policy processes. First, the decision-making perspective cannot ably capture "non-decisions," that is, the decision not to take action. There is sometimes a tendency to ascribe too much credit to the decision maker when, in fact, events that occur may be due to inaction. Inaction or action with unintended consequences may also play an important a role in the decision-making process. As Henry Bretton has stated, "a

frequently overlooked point is that decisions not made or made but not as intended may play as important a role in the entire process as do decisions made and deliberately so."⁷⁷ An additional time-worn attack on those who stress foreign policy decision-making are made by critics who argue that such tasks are impossible since decisions may indeed be a function of irrational decision-makers. "If decisions are in part irrational, how can anyone hope to analyze them systematically as if they were rational?"⁷⁸ Although the personality of leaders is not unimportant, this variable alone is further constrained by both external and internal environmental factors. For our purposes in this study, therefore, we have not directly applied any specific model of international relations. Rather, our strategy has been to take our cues from a combination of the various theoretical perspectives. This technique is meaningful in that these orientations are mutually complementary with regard to their analytic utility in comprehending the nature and problems of international relations in West Africa. The combined approaches form the basis for the selection of factors, variables and propositions in our investigation of interstate behavior in the subregion. The relative applicability of each theoretical perspective will therefore be evident in our hypotheses, empirical data and conclusions.

Since we stress regional and domestic factors, our focus has the advantage of enabling us to consider both interstate and domestic factors within a singular analytical framework. Abstracting from our theoretical review, several clusters of factors appear to be very significant in our attempt to identify researchable issues in this study. The rationale behind these research problems stem from two fundamental

assumptions: (1) that because of constrained resources, developing states generally tend to exhibit, at the international level, low profile foreign policy behavior; and (2) that stratification or hierarchy tends to be discernible among all states in relation to their degrees of development, size, and processes of decision-making.

The first assumption implies that it does not necessarily follow that regional activities are best explained at the level of the state. Such processes may indeed be reflective of the outcome of processes outside the control of single state participants. Testing hypotheses about foreign policy output behavior is not an inherently less valuable activity than examining propositions at the national level. But while our theoretical interest lies partly with conditions at the regional subsystem, we are also interested in the association between the varying degrees of state attributes and interactive processes characterizing the system as a whole. The focal points of investigation at this juncture constitute the sources of foreign policy behavior. Consequently, three major clusters of variables will be examined here in analytically distinct but empirically integral categories: (1) the domestic socioeconomic context (2) leaders' ideological predispositions as they influence foreign policy orientation, and (3) foreign policy processes as observable output behavior.

Domestic Socioeconomic Context:

Theoretically, the domestic socioeconomic context within any state affects foreign policy behavior in a variety of ways. In concrete terms, such often not unrelated social and economic attribute variables as population, education,

technological resources, industrialization and natural wealth form the basis of a nation's capabilities, and consequently delimit ability to influence regional and international systems. One argument suggests that needs and pressures at the domestic level may necessitate or require international action, hence representing a source of foreign policy objectives. A second alternative argument holds that the domestic social and economic context may indeed establish limits or constraints on foreign policy endeavors. It is contendable that even in the Third World, national wealth and economic development are important variables affecting international behavior.

Domestic politics and circumstances define the "discourse" of contemporary African international relations since size, economic constraints and opportunities, domestic structure and domestic political developments all contribute to shaping the international political behavior of African actors. Without question, despite their common cultural configurations and parallel economic and political concerns, there is considerable range of variability (in terms of both constraints and capabilities) among African states.⁷⁹ Certain relatively poor states in the so-called South are indeed wealthier than others, hence the distinction often made between "third" and "fourth" world states.⁸⁰ It is indeed possible to distinguish analytically between the relatively wealthy and the relatively poor states in the African region and elsewhere. For intra-African politics, this assumes the form of a division of states into a majority at the periphery and a minority at the semi-periphery, those at the center of intra-African coalitions and those who follow rather than lead. It is further suggested that because

of their relative positions these sets of distinguished states - the semi-periphery and the coalition centers - have realized the status of *primus inter pares* in African politics.⁸¹ In general, for the politics of the Third World, transactions take place between the less developed developing countries⁸² where a distinction may then be drawn between two kinds of "horizontal" interactions, that is, between "continuous" and "cascade" interactions.⁸³ Continuous transfers are those which take place between a donor and a recipient occupying almost identical levels of competence and they assume a "helping each other" orientation. On the other hand, transfers between a donor and a recipient occupying somewhat different levels are of the "cascade" kind. In the latter case, although both countries are at "neighboring levels," relations between them are nevertheless to be distinguished from strictly "vertical" relationships.⁸⁴ However, the latter category of states are naturally more constrained in their ability to conduct diplomacy effectively even with immediate neighbors. A study of Zambian foreign policy notes, for instance, that because of the scarcity of resources the government cannot monitor global issues as regional powers like Nigeria may be tempted to do.⁸⁵ Similarly, discussing the capabilities and power status of states, Joseph Frankel argues that this primarily applies to the geographical dimension: "the boundaries of the scope of Nigeria's or Ghana's interest cannot be conceived as confined to the African continent as can the interests of their smaller and less powerful neighbours."⁸⁶ More generally, there have been elaborate efforts to explain the distribution and patterns of foreign policy events by reference to the size, economic development or bureaucratic structure of states.

Leaders' Ideology and Foreign Policy Orientation:

The leaders of any political system usually espouse a set of more or less persistent, integrated doctrines that purport to explain and justify their leadership in the system. A set of political doctrines of this kind is often referred to as a political ideology.⁸⁷ As a dominant or central pattern of modern political thought, ideology can be defined as an interrelated set of assumptions, beliefs, values and psychological preferences concerning human nature and the nature of society that legitimizes the patterns of everyday life. According to one authoritative and scholarly source, an ideology is "a form of social or political philosophy in which practical elements are as prominent as theoretical ones; it is a system of ideas that aspires both to explain the world and to change it."⁸⁸ "The function of ideology, then, is evidenced as a process of cultural, social, and political transformation."⁸⁹ Standard political texts also define ideology as "a set of closely related beliefs, or ideas, or even attitudes, characteristic of a group or community"⁹⁰ or "a value or belief system accepted as a fact or truth by some group."⁹¹ As a political formula, the concept refers to the relationship between objective experiences and the subjective interpretation of experiences - the world experienced directly as well as the lives outside the perimeters of one's own immediate experiences. The link between ideology and foreign policy orientation is therefore based upon the objective historical experience of a society with the outside world, and the interpretation of that experience by the state. To the extent that the making of foreign policy is an elite decision in most societies, it is the role of foreign policy decision-makers to interpret the world outside to the population - that

is, to interpret the relationships of regional and international conditions to the state's circumstances, and to explain the state's actions in the regional and international arenas. The ultimate objective of ideology is to incite people to action in relation to principle. Assumptions, beliefs and values embodied in the institution of the state are transmitted by decision-makers about the nature of the world. Such assumptions constitute the ideological basis of foreign policy.

It may be argued that the ideological differences among West African leaders determine the nature of their interstate interactions. Specifically, the historical foundations of the ideological base of Africa's international relations are to be found chiefly in the enduring patterns of nationalism, pan-Africanism and African socialism.⁹² These terms remain among the most convenient catch-phrases which summarize the dominant strands in contemporary African ideology. "They are labels which reflect the pre-eminent day-to-day concerns of African decision-makers, as well as their cultural and intellectual stances."⁹³ As a cluster of variables, however, they are not unrelated to other less psychological factors. Thus, the major distinguishing sources of African foreign policies originate not only in the political ideologies of their leaders, they also reside in their cultural heritage, colonial origins, and the extent of their modernization.⁹⁴ In addition to the idiosyncratic characteristics of decision makers, certain variables in a state's environment do have discernible influences on foreign policy outcome. For all states, therefore, meaningful explanations can be made through measurement and analysis of the relationship between the environmental variables and dimensions of policy.

The Foreign Policy Process:

The third major category - in addition to socioeconomic and ideological factors - can be found in the various aspects of the foreign policy process itself. The central assumption here is that foreign policy phenomena (as external behavior of international actors) may be construed as the primary or basic object of inquiry.⁹⁵ Discernible elements at this level would include the structural attributes of a region (or system) such as the nature of cooperation, conflict, competition, and the like which represent the several significant dimensions of international interactive processes. These systemic variables lead, of course, to the investigation of factors beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. However, as already stated, because of the inextricable linkages between domestic and international factors, such examination of international interactions alone would be artificial and misleading.⁹⁶ At a minimum, then, foreign policy behavior reflects the consequence of a complex interplay of factors that converge upon the relevant actors who, so to speak, process them.

A Conceptual Scheme

From the theoretical discussions thus far, this study posits an integrative, heuristic framework comprising elements which permit modest abstraction in foreign policy studies. Conceptual scheme is defined here as an organizing device composed of a set of concepts some of which may serve as the basis for the formulation of hypotheses and the analysis of political phenomena. The classificatory scheme offered here also attempts to provide the connecting analytical thread that binds the

theoretical perspectives together. By serving as a device for the collection and ordering of data, the framework represents an attempt to demonstrate how a number of variables can be brought together into a coherent context. It posits a list of potentially relevant factors while, at the same time, attempting to specify expected linkages among the variables. Furthermore, the conceptual scheme offers foreign policy behavior as a variable with different values or properties that might be expected to change with the factors identified. The inclusion of a set of interrelated factors in a general schema, we argue, provides a universal framework for analyzing and explaining relevant foreign policy relationships, and permits the testing of refutable propositions.⁹⁷

The following five main characteristics are therefore considered within the scope of a developing regional subsystem: 1) that the state as a social entity is the principal actor and unit of analysis; 2) that the variable to be accounted for (the phenomena to be explained, or the dependent variable) is the action of the state in the international system; 3) further, that the actions undertaken by the state can be analyzed along several major analytical dimensions; 4) that the explanatory variables used to account for international behavior distinguish between a state's internal attributes and its international environment; and (5) that the independent variables affect the dependent variable through an intervening variable (the decision-making process).⁹⁸ In short, the independent variables isolate multiple source-levels that interact with the decision-making intervening variables to affect foreign policy outcome. Each of the independent components (variables) of the system is viewed as directly manipulable

and conditioned by the decision-making processes in such a way as to exhibit foreign policy outputs identified as dependent variables. Our main underlying theoretical assumption is that government decision makers, on the basis of their appraisal of domestic conditions and the international situation, implement action which they expect will maximize national policy goals.⁹⁹ Before undertaking a planned initiative, therefore, decision makers analyze the capability or power potentiality of their states vis-à-vis other states within the context of an international milieu and relative to the states directly affected. Thus, our proposition here is, in a sense, rationalistic in that it is assumed that policy makers essentially follow a rational mode of calculus to arrive at their choices.

The schematic diagram (see Figure 2.1) presents foreign policy behavior as a simplified input-output process. As already specified, the structure of the diagram is logically discernible into the following component parts. National attributes are construed as independent variables which influence foreign policy behavior (the dependent variables) through the national decision-making process (intervening variables). The list of variables provided is, of course, potentially inexhaustive but the factors presented should suffice for our purposes in this research. For the sake of maintaining analytical clarity and coherence, the scheme provided is necessarily a simplification of reality. However, since precise language is an essential tool of every scientific endeavor, the definitions of the analytical concepts in the schema will be specified in order to reduce ambiguities and to avoid semantic confusion.

FIGURE 2.1**A CONCEPTUAL SCHEME FOR COMPARATIVE FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH**

Independent Variables	Intervening Variables	Dependent Variables
NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES	DECISION PROCESS	FOREIGN POLICY EVENT TYPES
National size Socio-economic factors -> Level of economic devt -> Colonial experience -> Systemic/global factors	Leaders' perceptions Personality traits -> Ideology/belief systems National style -> Establishment factors	{Economic {Political {Social {Military {Cooperative {Conflictual {Verbal {Nonverbal

NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES:

Comprising the independent variables in this research, national attributes fall within the realm of capability analysis. Therefore, it is generally assumed that, other things equal, such attributes of statehood as national capabilities (or domestic conditions) constitute the base of power which impacts on foreign policy behavior.¹⁰⁰ These attributes significantly affect the determination of state international attitudes and policies. The term national size may refer to specific physical magnitude and features of a state in terms of either the territorial size of a state or its population size. The territorial size of a country refers to the total area enclosed within the national boundaries, including that covered by water, usually measured in square kilometers.¹⁰¹ The population size, on the other hand, can be defined as the estimated whole number of people or inhabitants of a country at a particular point in time.¹⁰² Ray Cline develops an image of power that he calls the "critical mass" comprising "a large area" accompanied by "a large population."¹⁰³ In sum, with the totality of individuals occupying a given area, states range from having a small national size to having a large one. States may also be densely populated (that is, crowded) or sparsely populated. It may further be pointed out that these definitions overlook the quality and structure of the population analyzed, that is, the level of literacy (or the general quality of life) and the population's distribution. In addition, other factors such as the ethnic and tribal homogeneity of peoples and their adherence to traditional or modern lifestyles may be equally significant.

The second factor in the national attributes' variables' variables relates to a complex array

of domestic factors classified and treated together as socioeconomic factors.

Socioeconomic factors refer to the internal structures and conditions of a state which constitute the sources of foreign policy behavior. Arguably, lumping so diverse phenomena together blurs the differences among internal factors and confuses the question of how they relate to foreign policy behavior. For the purposes of our discussion, therefore, socioeconomic factors refer specifically to the material resources of a state, that is, those economic, military and diplomatic abilities that enable a state to achieve its national interest objectives in the international environment. First and foremost, economic capabilities may be defined as the financial and economic resource endowments of a state which relates to, and is based upon, the production, distribution and consumption of goods produced and services rendered within a period in an economy. Usually entailing practical, infrastructural and industrial significance affecting material resources, economic capabilities basically outline the structure of the economic life of a state including its natural resources (the availability of raw materials) and its economic strength (agricultural and industrial output).¹⁰⁴ Without a strong economic base at home, states could hardly afford to pursue vigorous or adventurist policies abroad. Second, defined here as a nation's ability to wage war or to deter other states from attacking, military capabilities comprise the quantity and quality of the army including its several complementary aspects such as the relative size, organization, techniques, weaponry and equipment, training, efficiency and manpower reserves of the armed forces (defined as the ground, air and naval forces). Military capabilities also include the effect which

technological developments have on the ability of stronger powers to increase their margin of superiority over weaker nations (or of the latter states to eventually overtake the former).¹⁰⁵ Third, the diplomatic influence of a state concerns the number of diplomatic missions that a country has, to maintain constant and meaningful governmental contact with other states and institutions in the global system.

The level of economic development of a state is another factor considered within the national attributes category. It relates to those attributes that index the general welfare of the peoples of a state (not necessarily the wealth of the entire state as a cohesive entity). This variable will include such factors as the gross national product (GNP) per capita, energy consumption per capita, and so on, that represent measurements of average productiveness. As used in this study, the term economic development is synonymous with economic modernization. Its major indicator - the GNP per capita - incorporates, quite effectively, the effect of the element of population per head in the total productive capacity of a state. States with very low levels of development are commonly termed underdeveloped, which thus, refers to economic backwardness especially when measured against the standards of the more advanced societies. Empirical features of underdevelopment include low national per capita income and productivity, high rates of illiteracy, high birth rates with decreasing death rates, leading virtually to population explosion, heavy dependence on subsistence agriculture, and so on.

Colonial experience includes such political variables as the effect of foreign

(especially European) domination on the sociopolitical processes of a state. The notion of colonial experience refers to the historical process of living through colonial rule imposed from the outside. For the majority of African states, this assumes the form of external political control by such former colonial powers as Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal. The concept refers to the domination of all the countries of West Africa (with the possible exception of Liberia), prior to their political independence from 1957 onwards, when they were still regarded as dependent colonies, and therefore, part of the European empire. Colonial heritage has direct or indirect consequences for the foreign policies of African states and several scholars have argued that the most important factor determining the foreign relations of African states is their colonial history and heritage.¹⁰⁶ Specifically, it is assumed that the greater the degree to which two or more states share similar "colonial experience" vis-à-vis the same metropole, the greater the frequency of those states' cooperative interactions with each other.¹⁰⁷

Finally, systemic or global factors address the external domain of explanatory variables and include factors that are beyond the immediate control of the national environment. This category refers, therefore, to the external or situational predisposition and may take the form of interstate influences on interstate behavior (that is, external factors influencing external behavior), or the effect of such global phenomenon as a decline in world prices of commodities. The economies of African states are generally incorporated into the world system in response to external rather than internal changes, and this vulnerability to outside pressures and demands has

continued to the post-colonial period.¹⁰⁸ In addition, geographical factors such as international boundaries that constitute limits within which a state exercises territorial jurisdiction may also be construed as systemic variables. In the main, the overall importance of systemic factors has been assumed to be overriding especially when considered in light of the so-called "billiard-ball" theory of international politics, which holds that state behavior is explained exclusively by reference to interactions with other states, thus virtually ignoring the dynamic role of internal factors.

DECISION PROCESS:

Comprising the intervening variables in this research, this category attempts to analyze international political systems and behavior as a function of salient human actors and several other policy-making factors that characterize political structures and decision-making roles. Leaders' perceptions are those important psychological and intangible factors that are often more difficult to assess (because they cannot be accurately measured), and which may nevertheless be responsible for the relationship among the leaders of various interacting states. These include, in their evaluative forms, the mental picture of leaders compiled as a result of past perceptions, corrected and modified by actual experiences. In most states, the head or chief of government plays the leading role in the decision-making process, perceives foreign policy issues, and defines and interprets the concept of national interest. As a result, psychological factors are most crucial and foreign policy-making is transformed into an art (rather than a science) dependent on the judgment of national leaders and their

subjective evaluation of available data. Personality traits refers to the distinguishing personal characteristics and self-awareness of the leader. One is not so much concerned here with a leader's behavior as with those dispositions underlying the behavior depicted. Thus, psychologists would generally argue that dispositions precede attitudes, and that personality, therefore, tends to shape attitudes rather than the other way around. Is the personality analyzed a born leader? In other words, is he a charismatic leader characterized by a mystical messianic quality that elicits widespread popular support? Indeed, especially in the so-called newly emergent nations, the conspicuous presence of a revered leader with a charismatic, dominant personality is not too uncommon, as was clearly exemplified in the African cases of Nkrumah's Ghana and Nasser's Egypt. The terms ideological orientation and belief system are used in this study to define the doctrinaire political situation of "conservatism" (that is, the tendency to preserve established institutions) or "radicalism" (meaning, tending to favor basic institutional changes) held by political leaders at specific points in time. It is widely asserted that the beliefs of decision makers account for more variance in foreign policy behavior than any other single factor. Ideology refers to an ideal social system, a fundamental belief system, or a way of life. Relating this concept to foreign policy, states may aim at maintaining the status quo, that is, to preserve the existing international territorial, ideological, or power distribution. A status quo policy is basically conservative and defensive in nature and seeks stability rather than change. Conservatism is thus a set of beliefs derived from a view of society as complex and organic, rather than

functional and mechanistic. The view implies a fundamental distrust of political change, especially sudden, violent or radical change, since it is perceived as being more likely to damage than to improve the delicate interrelationships of society. On the other hand, in a revisionist foreign policy, a state seeks to alter the existing territorial, ideological, or power distribution to its advantage. Such policy is, by definition, basically expansionist and acquisitive in nature and states are more likely to pursue it when their decision makers are dissatisfied with the status quo and believe that their states have the ability to achieve their objectives by more radical means.

National style refers to the characteristic behavioral patterns (the national character) of a state as it attempts to grapple with its foreign policy problems. Synonymous with the notion of national character, national style may be described as a function of ideological values, common historical experiences, traditions, and precedents which have evolved in the body politic of a state. Some developed societies, over time, have more or less evolved predictable national styles in terms of their general national character in the international environment. In these societies, then, it is more unlikely that a change in regime will result in a drastically altered approach in foreign policy behavior. Not so for emergent or developing societies where, by definition, national styles are still being created (or are evolving) and are thus not easily subjected to scientific controls. Finally, as a subset of decision-making variables, establishment variables refer to those factors which emanate from the administrative organization of states and are related to the nature and effectiveness of governmental machinery. This would necessarily include the input of more

technical actors (short of the chief-of-state and his political aides) who function as high-ranking, seasoned decision makers. Often working under the supervision of the minister of foreign affairs, sometimes called the secretary of state, these technical actors include the bureaucracy that functions under the foreign office, which is the executive agency charged with the routine formulation and implementation of foreign policy. Although the foreign affairs ministry is the main vehicle through which the bulk of relations with other countries is conducted, other ministries, particularly the defense ministry, and its constituent high military officers, contribute to those aspects of the foreign policy decision-making process that relate to the vital questions of national security.

FOREIGN POLICY EVENTS:

Comprising the dependent variables in this study, this category of variables refers to the various identifiable aspects of the foreign policy events undertaken by the state as an actor in the international system. As a strategy or planned course of action undertaken by the decision makers of a state vis-à-vis other states or international entities, foreign policy is aimed at achieving specific goals, traditionally defined in terms of the national interest. Although there is no agreed upon definition of foreign policy behavior, nor are there well-known and validated typologies and scales of foreign policy behavior, the classification presented in this study should suffice for our purposes. Essentially, the study focuses on the observable behavior of actors such as national governments and their representatives, bureaucratic elites. It has thus

accepted as a working definition of foreign policy behavior, the actions of states and their representatives toward explicit targets external to those states undertaking action in the international system. Through semantic differentiation, the actions of states constituting foreign policy events may thus be classified along the following several analytical dimensions. Generally indicating participation and collaboration among states, few would disagree that a foreign policy event may therefore be either economic, political, social or military; it may also be cooperative or conflictive; and, finally, it may be verbal or nonverbal.

Economic or commercial interactions refer to economic relations existing between states and their peoples which concern such complex matters as interstate trade, production, financial and developmental arrangements that they adopt toward each other with regard to their national economic interests. Under the general rubric of economic interactions, these relations are developed because of the vast flows of commerce and the growth of interdependencies. The focus here is on the distribution and complementarity of economic resources, the character of trade, economic assistance and the nationalization of foreign property.

Political or diplomatic interactions refer to those aspects of external relationships and political networks between states that include the status of diplomatic relations and formal diplomatic channels, interstate political visits and relations within intergovernmental organizations. Such institutional relationships and processes may be cooperative, competitive, or conflictive but they are generally reflective of the relationship of power between states and the nature of influence within the

organizational structure of international political institutions. One is thus concerned here with the manner in which the pattern and degree of complementarity of types of regimes contribute or detract from the cohesion of a regional subsystem.

Social or cultural interactions indicate the mutual attitudes, beliefs, and aspirations among the governments and peoples of states directed toward the achievement of common goals. Attention is focused here upon such elements as the contributive factors of language and ethnicity, the nature of communications, transportation, migration and the consciousness of a common heritage. Social interactions generally assume the actual or potential presence of a consensus of values within a grouping, aided by the creation of intergovernmental institutions which effectively permits the development of a community consciousness. Value consensus may thus evolve over time although acute disagreement on basics may still result in various forms of international conflict. Sociocultural interactions may also assume the form of cultural exchange programs between states that are targeted at fostering intercultural appreciation and improving relations between the peoples of states in such areas as educational and cultural affairs, student and professional exchanges, and the exchange of scientists and governmental leaders. Thus, these programs are instruments of foreign policy employed to strengthen relations with friendly nations and to contribute to a relaxation of tension between the peoples of potentially hostile states.¹⁰⁹

Military or strategic interactions include such categories as armed clash, strategic alert, show-of-force and military assistance. They may assume the form of

joint military cooperation between the armies of states or outright coercive military intervention by one state in another. More often than not, such forceful and deliberate tactics as direct military conflict between troops of two opposing sides represent the means by which the status quo is challenged and changed effectively. International security relations are not always unrelated to economic issues. For instance, in the face of possible disruptions of economic exchanges, the expansion of trade, production and other interdependencies between states often increase the requirements for comprehensive security networks.

Furthermore, each action undertaken by a state may be subdivided into cooperative or conflictual, verbal or nonverbal (physical) events. Cooperative events apply in a condition of interstate consensus involving the successful coordination of foreign policies. When national interests are harmonious, states often act in concert to solve mutual problems, indicating the attainment of a state of consensus, agreement or acceptance concerning matters of importance. Conflictual events, on the other hand, apply to cases where two or more states seek to attain objectives that are incompatible with each other. When state interests conflict, competition, rivalry, tension, fear, and perhaps ultimately, war may result. Verbal events refer to those acts undertaken by states that involve the use of direct oral or written communication.¹¹⁰ They may include three possible types: (1) comments on actions or situations, (2) requests or demands for action (or inaction) by the target, and (3) intentions, that is, statements indicating that under certain conditions, the actor intends to take certain actions.¹¹¹ Nonverbal events may be assumed to indicate those

behavioral acts that include the actual physical interaction of states and that occasionally involve the expenditure of resources.¹¹² Both verbal and nonverbal events represent the declaratory and the operational aspects of foreign policies - what is said as opposed to what is done.

From the conceptual scheme presented in Figure 2.1, and the theoretical discussions preceding it, it follows that a number of major propositions about the foreign policy behavioral patterns of states can be deduced and tested. The relationships outlined in the scheme may be construed in terms of a series of interrelated propositions which can be rationalized with respect to arguments from existing theory. These theoretical propositions have been developed at various levels, in the form of generalizations relating variations in foreign policy outputs to variations in factors relevant to foreign policy undertakings. One of the criteria guiding the selection of variables contained in this study includes theoretical importance in view of our preceding review of the literature. We have thus chosen our list of variables partly because we believe that they are the most potent in accounting for decision makers' choices within a regional system.¹¹³ In addition to theoretical relevance, variables have also been selected on the more mundane basis of data availability to the individual researcher. Our central assumption is that the greater a state's attributes or capabilities, the more predisposed are its leaders to use those attributes in influencing the external environment within the context of a regional subsystem. The emphasis here is on the constraints and opportunities in the internal environment as they affect external behavior.

Research Propositions

Propositions may be defined as testable generalizations containing two or more concepts with a postulated linkage between the concepts and a prediction concerning how one relates to the other.¹¹⁴ Our first assumption in this research holds that variations in the size of a state are related to changes in the level of its interactions with other states in an international regional system.¹¹⁵ National size is generally defined in the theoretical literature as the amount of territory under a state's control in addition to the number of people supported economically by that territory. However, the term national size refers, in this research, to population size. This is defined specifically as the physical magnitude of a state in relation to the estimated number of its inhabitants at a specific point in time. This definition takes cognizance of the age-old fact that all large territories mean ample raw material resources for people to exploit economically. A large area, if unaccompanied by a large population, does not confer the status of large size on a state and should not be so interpreted by strategists and makers of foreign policy. It is therefore suggested that the greater a state's population size, the greater the likelihood, *ceteris paribus*, of its interaction with other states in a regional subsystem. It follows, then, that larger states are more likely to interact in the international environment than smaller states, and that the closer a state is to being large, the more favorable will be the conditions for societal variables to operate as salient sources of foreign policy behavior. This leads to the first proposition we have derived from our theoretical assumptions and discussions:

PROPOSITION 1: That larger, more populated, states tend to contribute more to interstate interactions than smaller, less populated states.

For states to accomplish their external objectives, they need human resources of power and influence. Indeed, the first factor to look at in considering the national power and importance of states is population.¹¹⁶ One idea behind this proposition is that a state with larger national size possesses a correspondingly greater number of individuals, groups and government officials who share a common interest in maintaining constant contacts with immediate neighbors in an international (regional) setting. Another possible rationale for the above proposition is that a state with a large, rapidly expanding population may ultimately pursue a more active and aggressive foreign policy (especially within its immediate environment) as a consequence of internal pressures, which accrue and spill over into the realm of interstate relations.¹¹⁷ Indeed, Nigeria's great size and the influence that goes along with it, is quite understandably a cause of concern and apprehension to its neighbors in the West African subregion. For example, speaking in 1974, the Nigerian External Affairs Commissioner stated "that Nigeria feels it is in a 'frightening position' in relation to other smaller African countries."¹¹⁸ These ideas underscore the argument that the great diversities in the population size of the component states is an important characteristic of the West African subregion. The West African area is indeed the most varied in Africa as to the size of the countries. "And it may well be

that in this element of diversity lies one of the main driving forces behind the current effort at regional unity and cooperation."¹¹⁹ If this proposition is proven to be correct by empirical observation, it may also reinforce the widely held view that larger, more populated states tend to monopolize the benefits of interactions particularly with respect to such controversial issues as the international migration of labor.

The next proposition assumes, firstly, that processes of political integration implies the creation and utilization of common resources by states¹²⁰ and, secondly, that foreign policy is the task of devising strategies that utilize a state's economic capabilities "to achieve the goals its leaders set."¹²¹ Decision makers often respond to demands and induce compliance with and support for authoritative outcomes by expanding financial resources for the direct provision of public goods and services to members of the system. As a concept, economic "resources" is important especially among students of power who have sought to explain one actor's ability to influence another's behavior in terms of the economic assets he possesses.¹²² Amitai Etzioni identifies "assets" available to a union and uses the concept systematically to explain successful and unsuccessful unions.¹²³ In other words, economic inequality among states in a regional subsystem, may either spur or hinder interactions depending on the availability of special payoffs (that is, economic benefits) provided by core states (the economic giants) to multinational groupings.¹²⁴ Examples exist, for instance, of the relatively integrative role of the Soviet Union in the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and the Warsaw Pact, of Argentina, Brazil and

Mexico in the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and of the United States, since 1963, in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization of American States (OAS).¹²⁵ On the other hand, it has been contended that since issues cannot easily be kept separate in Africa "national differences in size and power become divisive."¹²⁶ The second testable proposition in this research thus holds:

PROPOSITION 2: That economically stronger states tend to contribute more to regional interstate interactions than economically weaker states.

The independent variable in this proposition is the economic strength (or economic power) of states and the dependent variable is interstate interactions. Economic power is defined here as the financial and economic resource endowments of a state which relates to the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services in its economy. By stipulative conceptual definition, therefore, economically stronger states would include units of considerable economic power or capacity within the West African subsystem. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that states do in fact need material or economic resources of power, influence or a combination of both to accomplish their objectives in the international system. Indeed, whenever a state acts in pursuit of international objectives, it consumes resources, people are paid and materials are allocated.¹²⁷ Since the quantities and qualities of economic resources available to a state for foreign policy purposes index their capabilities for

international action, it follows, therefore, that economically powerful states will be more effective internationally than economically weaker states. The levels of economic power of West African states may thus be measured in terms of such readily available factors as their Gross Domestic Product (GDP), their Gross National Power (GNP) and their financial contributions to the operational budget of ECOWAS. Not only is the concept of economic power ambiguous and methods for its quantification elusive, these difficulties are often compounded when analyzing African states because of their generally relatively low level of financial power. Thus, it is obvious that rather than being equally spaced along a continuum, certain African states are decisively more economically powerful than others. In West Africa, for instance, the economically stronger states comprise, therefore, in rough rank-order, Nigeria (with distinctive economic strength), Ivory Coast and Ghana. Other relatively weaker states include, not necessarily in any order, Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Mauritania, Togo, Benin, Guinea, Gambia, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.

The next proposition holds that the level of economic development (or economic modernization) of a state is associated with the amount of its interactions with other states. Specifically, this states that:

PROPOSITION 3: The greater the extent of modernization within a state, the greater is its interactions with other states in a given subsystem. Thus, economically developed states are more likely to interact than less economically

developed states.

Although some scholars use the concepts economic power and economic development interchangeably, it is not the case in this study. Whereas economic power refers to the total economic resource endowments available to a state, economic development corrects for the effects of population by referring specifically to the quality of life of the citizenry of a state. Rosenau and Hoggard have proposed a manageable typology for differentiating among nations and have included, among other variables that would be most important in accounting for a state's foreign policy, the level of economic development.¹²⁸ In our study, this hypothesis seeks a working relationship between economic development and regional cooperation and suggests further that economic modernization could serve as a unifying force capable of generating integrative influences. Indeed, attaining national independence in Africa was only the first step in the direction of demonstrating the adequacy of their resources and potentialities to bring about a material and spiritual regeneration in the respective societies. The second step was, of course, nation-building, defined in terms of the need for these states to secure the well-being of their people. The rationale behind the above proposition is that economic development could act as a unifying force capable of generating cooperative influence. It could provide, as it were, a framework within which to build regional cooperation and solidarity. For example, an increase in the welfare of the people coupled with salient developments in science and technology can quite logically overcome existing barriers to interaction, communication and

cooperation between states. Alternatively, increasing developmental inequalities between African states may further retard inter-African cooperation and render the continent's voice discordant.¹²⁹

The traditional literature has long emphasized the primacy of military capabilities in foreign affairs. In addition to economic power, no really vigorous foreign policy can be pursued without being backed by military strength. Military capability is defined here as the coercive ability of a state to wage war or to deter other states from attacking it. It may be argued that militarily powerful states tend to deter war (thus promoting cooperative behavior) or tend to pursue aggressive foreign policies (thus promoting conflict). The fourth proposition in this research therefore posits that the military capability (or military preparedness) of a state is related to its interactions with other states in the international system. Specifically, it suggests that:

PROPOSITION 4: The stronger the military preparedness of a state, the greater is its interactions with other states in a regional subsystem. In other words, militarily stronger powers are more likely to interact internationally than weaker states.

The reasoning here is that states with highly equipped armies tend to have the resources necessary to accelerate interactions in the international system. It has also been reported that when there is a large military organization and a relatively large part of the GNP devoted to military purposes, the military is likely to be a significant

influence in foreign policy formation.¹³⁰ Conversely, one would expect small defense allocations to be related to low levels of violence for most African states. Touval finds, for instance, that the general lack of military capability of Morocco and Somalia contributed to the containment of border disputes in which they were involved in the 1960s.¹³¹ Similarly, Zartman has recently suggested that "African states' weakness has meant too that there has been a low level of conflict and aggression and also of effective pressure for cooperation in North and West Africa."¹³² Although many studies emphasize the relationship between military power and interstate warfare, military capability has also been correlated with other types of conflict besides violent conflict. One argument is that there is a positive relationship between the military capability of a state and other less violent dimensions of its foreign conflict behavior. For instance, one scholar has found that "powerful states tend to engage in much more verbal foreign conflict activity than powerless states."¹³³ In addition, Chadwick finds, in an analysis of 64 states using Dimensionality of Nations (DON) data for 1955, that "nations with large force capabilities tend to engage in more diplomatic conflict than do nations with smaller force capabilities."¹³⁴ The possible explanation and rationale for all these findings is that when there is a large military organization and a relatively large part of the GNP devoted to military purposes, the military is likely to be a significant influence in foreign policy formation.¹³⁵ With the proliferation of military regimes in the West African subsystem, this theoretical explanation is highly probable.

The next proposition in this study states that the diplomatic influence (or

diplomatic capabilities) of a country within a regional subsystem is related to its interactions with other states in the international system. As a factor that impinges on foreign policy behavior, this diplomatic influence proposition specifically asks whether interstate interactions are greater for states with relatively more diplomatic capabilities in comparison with other states. It is thus suggested that:

PROPOSITION 5: The greater the diplomatic influence of a state, the greater is its interactions with other states in the international system.

It seems quite logical that increased diplomatic representation would not only facilitate greater interstate interactions in general, but would also increase the likelihood for the coordination of foreign policies in particular. For instance, David Johns has examined the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy by focusing on power, diplomatic activity, and integration in Africa. He argues that integration (regardless of how the concept is defined and measured) "may shape the course of diplomatic activity or be affected by diplomatic activity itself."¹³⁶ In a separate study, Vincent Khapoya investigates the relationship between African diplomatic activity and a specific foreign policy decision - the support for liberation movements - and finds a positive relationship.¹³⁷ For the purpose of our analysis, diplomatic influence is measured as the establishment of a diplomatic mission. One possible defect of this reasoning, however, is that the mere presence of diplomatic missions may not really indicate influence. Indeed, embassies may be staffed by only a few

inexperienced persons and, accordingly, may be less influential than those with larger, more experienced staffs. In this sense, therefore, our measure of diplomatic influence is only a rough measure of the concept.

Finally, as a systemic variable in this research, geographical contiguity is defined here to mean the physical contact, in terms of actual border-to-border connection of the territories (or international boundaries) of either a group of states, as in the case of the ECOWAS regional subsystem, or of any one particular state to another, as in the case, for instance, of Benin and Togo. One purely geographic assumption of the theoretical literature on regionalism is that, when other things are equal (meaning, when national attributes and other dyadic attributes are controlled), cooperative or conflictual behavior between states is facilitated by their geographical contiguity (or geographical nearness). Thus, the final theoretical proposition in this study states:

PROPOSITION 6: That geographical contiguity is a determinant of foreign interactions. The closer the proximity between states, the higher the level of their interactions between their foreign policies.

This proposition has received some consideration in the theoretical literature. Rosenau and Hoggard suggest, for instance, that the degree of conflictual or cooperative behavior in which a society engages in any of its dyadic relationships depends on the extent to which it is distant from, homogenous with, or balanced by

the other party to the dyad.¹³⁸ Similarly, in their seminal study on 210 dyads in the North Atlantic region (1952-1964) and 1,176 dyads in the global system (1955), Roger Cobb and Charles Elder found a positive relationship between geographical proximity and "mutual relevance" especially in dyads with a common boundary.¹³⁹ In addition, one proposition which has received ample attention in the literature on international conflict analysis predicts a direct relationship between the number of states which border a state and the amount of conflict in which that state can be expected to engage.¹⁴⁰ However, consistent with our general theoretical formulation in this study, the specific factor of geographical contiguity becomes important only when it is analyzed within the context of the motivation of decision makers' behavior towards cooperative or conflictual interstate behavior.

The rationale behind the geographical contiguity and interstate interactions proposition are varied. It may be argued, for instance, that because geographical nearness, by definition, reduces the distance between states thus reducing both the cost of transportation and the time required to travel from one state to another, the possibilities of physical contact between the peoples of contiguous states are consequently increased. Another idea is that the foreign conflict behavior of a state is likely to be greater in its proximate relationships than in the remote ones. Proximity results in more varied and frequent points of physical contact between the dyadic partners and thus a greater frequency of irritation and misunderstanding. "The reasoning here is that states tend to engage in conflict primarily with bordering states. The larger the number of states which border a particular state, the higher the

probability that any one of the dyads will develop a conflictual relationship."¹⁴¹ In short, the closer a relationship is to the proximity extreme of the geographic distance attribute, the more favorable will be the conditions for external variables to operate as sources of foreign policy behavior between dyadic partners, and thus the greater is their relative potency likely to be.¹⁴² The geographical contiguity proposition is also justifiable on other more practical grounds in that international boundaries in Africa are largely artificially imposed and therefore often cut across homogenous ethnic groups which nevertheless engage in frequent cooperative and conflictual interactions.

References and footnotes

1. There is a distinction drawn here between highly abstract generalizations (in the form of purely arithmetical truths) and "scientific" or "empirical" theories. Alan Isaak has pointed out, for example, that a distinction exists between "an uninterpreted mathematical or logical system and a scientific theory, and the difference is in the latter's empirical nature." See Alan Isaak, Scope and Methods of Political Science: An Introduction to the Methodology of Political Inquiry (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1985), p. 167.
2. Even in the physical sciences, no specific frame of reference captures the irrefutable truth, although this is more so of the social sciences. Indeed, prevailing models may best be described as sciences of their time that may be overtaken by better models. See f.n. 4.
3. In his critique of arithmetical truths, Karl Popper contends that theories which are not refuted by events (i.e., comfortably irrefutable theories) are non-scientific. "Irrefutability," Popper concludes, "is not a virtue of a theory (as people often think) but a vice." Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 36.
4. According to the logic of political inquiry, the truth can never be known for certain. Even theories which appear to be better approximations to the truth than other theories may be described only as sciences of that time since they can never be positively justified (or established as certainly true). Scholars can therefore argue about their claims to the effect that weak theories which cannot survive critical tests will give way to stronger ones. Indeed, scientific knowledge increases and progresses through this process of continuity and change. For some of these critical and negative assessments of neopositivism see Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 91-196; Brian Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice (London: Allen and Unwin, 1975); Richard J. Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory (Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978); Karl R. Popper, op. cit. (1965).
5. The terms "models" and "approaches" may be regarded as synonymous for functional reasons. See Isaak, op. cit. (1985), p. 185. Other possible synonyms include "conceptual schemes," "paradigms," or what Eugene Meehan and James Rosenau have labeled "quasi-theories" and "pre-theories" respectively. Isaak also notes that models or conceptual schemes are more important for their suggestiveness as heuristic aids than for their explanatory power. *ibid.*, p. 179.

6. For this position see Olajide Aluko's article in Timothy M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko, eds., The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), p. 5.
7. In this study, the terms "theory" and "model" are used to refer generally to approaches in comparative international relations.
8. For some earlier attempts at integrative theoretical approaches, see Michael Brecher, Belma Steinberg and Janice Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 13, no. 1 (1969), pp. 75-101; Richard Brody, "Three Conceptual Schemes for the Study of International Relations," Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, eds., Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1963), pp. 250-274.
9. For a brief discussion on the criterion of relevance in international politics, see Abdul A. Said, "Recent Theories of International Relations: An Overview," Abdul A. Said, ed., Theory of International Relations: The Crisis of Relevance (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 18-25.
10. In his work, Singer describes apparently conflicting levels of the international system and the nation-state system and assumes that the selection of a level of analysis approximates the choice of a basic approach in international relations theory. Thus, the level-of-analysis problem would imply that since systems theories can account for behavior without treating the specific predictions states make about interstate behavior, images and other national attributes need not be the focus of analysis. For a discussion on the "level-of-analysis-problem" see J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," World Politics, vol. 14 (October 1961), pp. 77-92; James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 20-29; and James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 27-52.
11. John C. Garnett, Commonsense and the Theory of International Politics (London: The Macmillan Press, 1984), p. 39.
12. Michael P. Sullivan and Randolph M. Siverson, "Theories of War: Problems and Prospects," P. Terrence Hopmann, Dina A. Zinnes and J. David Singer, eds., Cumulation in International Relations Research, vol. 18, Monograph Series in World Affairs (Denver, Colo.: University of Denver, 1981), p. 16.
13. James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 117. Similarly, Siverson and Sullivan observe that "in terms of general theory-building it may be

profitable to combine rather than view both levels as totally distinct from one another." See Randolph Siverson and Michael Sullivan, "The Distribution of Power and the Onset of War," Journal of Conflict Resolution vol. 27, September 1983, pp. 473-494.

14. See Adu Boahen, Jacob F. Ade Ajayi and Michael Tidy, eds., Topics in West African History, Second Edition (Essex: Longman Group, 1986), p. 1.

15. For similar arguments on the complementary nature of general systems, decision-making and communication approaches, see Robert C. North, "The Analytical Prospects of Communications Theory," James C. Charlesworth, ed., Contemporary Political Analysis (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 315-316; Michael Haas, ed., International Systems: A Behavioral Approach (New York: Chandler Publishers, 1974), p. 3. In their own study, Brecher, Steinberg and Stein suggest that three major schools may be discerned in the analysis of foreign policy: power, decision-making and input-output analysis. For early insight on the combination of both systems and decision-making approaches, see Richard Brody's article in Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, eds., op. cit. (1962), p. 271.

16. A system is defined as a structure composed of united and integrated parts, what biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy defines as a set of "elements standing in interaction." For von Bertalanffy's original accounts, see "General Systems Theory," Ludwig von Bertalanffy and Anatol Rapoport, eds., General Systems: Yearbook of the Society for General Systems Research, vol. 1 (1956), p. 3; see also, vol. viii, 1962, for another of his relevant articles. One of the pioneering scholars of this approach theorizes that "a scientific politics can develop only if materials of politics are treated in terms of systems of action." See Morton Kaplan, Systems and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), p. 4. Other basic expositions of the systems approach can be found in David Easton's works: A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1956); "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," World Politics, vol. 9 (1957), pp. 383-400; and A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965). Perhaps one of the most "neutral" analysis of the various types of systems theories is the account by H. V. Wiseman in Political Systems: Some Sociological Approaches (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966).

17. We distinguish between two major versions of systems analysis: the Eastonian input-output framework stressing the internal political system, and the more international systems framework. The international system cannot be understood unless some of Easton's postulates are rejected. Hence, the international version is distinctive in two ways: (1) unlike other systems, the international system is concrete, geographically defined and closed (having no socially meaningful relationship with its external environment), (2) unlike other systems, the international system has no adequate means of regulation, and this explains and locates the dysfunctions which affect it. See Marcel Meerle, The Sociology of International Relations (New York: Berg Publishers, 1987),

p. 111.

18. We use the term "interdependence" to refer to the situation where a part of the system is related to other parts such that a change in one part triggers off a change in all other parts. Its antonym is, of course, "independence" which in our conception means that the parts are completely unrelated and do not, therefore, logically constitute a system. Depending on its degree of cohesiveness, a hypothesized relationship may fluctuate on a continuum ranging from total interdependence to complete independence.

19. The communications perspective is of importance to this research. Communications theory basically asserts that any approach to political studies is incomplete unless it considers how political information is filtered and transmitted between political systems. For example, Karl Deutsch, a leading proponent of the communications approach to politics, has identified that cybernetics, the science of communications and control, "represents a shift in the center of interest from drives to steering." See Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Communication and Control (New York: The Free Press, 1966) and Nationalism and Social Communication (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1953). For an impressive attempt to apply Deutsch's systems approach to the study of international politics, see Stephen David Bryen, The Application of Cybernetic Analysis to the Study of International Politics (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971). For other reviews of the approach, see "The Impact of Communications Upon Theory in International Relations," Abdul A. Said, ed., *op. cit.* (1968), pp. 74-92; and Harold D. Lasswell, "The Structure and Function of Communication in Society," in Lyman Bryson, ed., The Communication of Ideas (New York: Harper, 1948). See also the earlier works of mathematician Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1950) and Cybernetics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1948). For a more recent review of communications theory see Alan Isaak, *op. cit.* (1985), pp. 289-294.

20. Ludwig von Bertalanffy, *op. cit.* (1956), p. 3.

21. A. Hall and R. Fagen, "Definition of a System," General Systems, vol. 1 (1956), p. 18. Herbert Spiro suggests that a political system exists wherever people are concerned about common problems and engaged in both cooperation and conflict in order to solve such problems: "Individuals or groupings 'units' are involved in politics with one another when they are trying to solve their problems, together, because each recognizes that it cannot solve its particular problems alone without interaction with the others - even though each may be pursuing different goals." See Herbert Spiro, World Politics: The Global System (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1966), pp. 50-51.

22. Oran R. Young, Systems of Political Science (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 15-16.

23. Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 9.

24. For this argument, see Michael Brecher and Patrick James, Crises and Change in World Politics (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986). Examples of a few of such studies would include, Morton A. Kaplan, op. cit. (1957); Richard N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963); Charles A. McClelland, Theory and International System (New York: Macmillan, 1966); Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1979).
25. Michael Brecher, "International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia," World Politics, vol. 15 (1963), pp. 217-218; I. William Zartman, "Africa as a Subordinate State System in International Relations," International Organization, vol. XXI (Summer 1967), pp. 545-564.
26. William R. Thompson, "Delineating Regional Subsystems: Visit Networks and the Middle East Case," International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 13, no. 2 (May 1981), pp. 213-235.
27. For an application of the regional subsystems perspective to other areas, see Leonard Binder, "The Middle East Subordinate International System," World Politics, vol. X (April 1958), pp. 408-429; George Modelski, "International Relations and Area Studies," International Relations (London), vol. II (April 1961), pp. 143-155.
28. Michael Brecher, op. cit. (1963), p. 220.
29. *ibid.*
30. Bowman's article was initially presented at the African studies Association meeting in New York, 1967. For its publication, however, see "The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 3 (September 1968), pp. 231-261. For the above comment, see the reprinted version in Timothy M. Shaw and Kenneth A. Heard, eds., Cooperation and Conflict in Southern Africa: Papers on a Regional Subsystem (Washington, D.C.: University Press, 1976), p. 40.
31. See D. K. Orwa, "Theories of International Relations," Olatunde J. C. B. Ojo, D. K. Orwa and C. M. B. Utete, eds., African International Relations (London: Longman Group, 1985), pp. 13-14.
32. See George Abangwu, "Systems Approach to Regional Integration in West Africa," Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. XIII, nos. 1 & 2 (1975), pp. 116-135.
33. I. William Zartman, International Relations in the New Africa, Second Edition (New York: University Press of America, 1987).
34. Thomas Hodgkin, "The New West African State System," Miller Maclure and Douglas Anglin, eds., Africa: The Political Pattern (University of Toronto Press, 1961), pp. 74-82. See also, for the same article, University of Toronto Quarterly, vol. XXXI

(October 1961), pp. 74-82.

35. George Shepherd relates the international systems theory to Africa by developing the concept of a non-aligned subsystem. See his Nonaligned Black Africa: An International Subsystem (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath & Co., 1970).

36. Bruce M. Russett, International Regions and International System (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967).

37. Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).

38. For studies on dependency, see Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," Journal of Peace Research, vol. 8 (1971), pp. 81-117. See also, J. G. Gobalet and L. J. Diamond, "Effects of Investment Dependence on Economic Growth," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 23 (1979), pp. 412-422; and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

39. For more on the dependencia tradition, see Richard Harris, ed., The Political Economy of Africa (Cambridge: Schenkman, 1975); Immanuel Wallerstein, "Dependence in an Interdependent World: The Limited Possibilities of Transformation within the Capitalist World Economy," African Studies Review, vol. 18 (April 1974), pp. 1-27; and Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-colonialism (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1975).

40. In Christopher Clapham, ed., Foreign Policy Making in Developing States: A Comparative Approach (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977).

41. It is argued that economics provides the motive force for cooperative arrangements in the developing states. According to this perspective, the primary motive force is the consciousness of most LDCs of their small size and their realization that without joining others in larger groups, they will face obstacles in promoting their economic development.

42. Rosenau argues that "With the advent of nuclear stalemate and the emergence of Third World demands for a greater share of the world's wealth, issues of economic productivity and distribution have been elevated from low on the global agenda to the realm of high politics, and this shift has required a corresponding expansion of the skills and concerns of foreign policy analysts." James N. Rosenau, "Introduction: New Directions and Recurrent Questions in the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy," Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and James N. Rosenau, eds., New Directions of Foreign Policy (Boston, Unwin Hyman, 1987), p. 3.

43. For instance, East and Fauriol propose that because of limited resource capability, fewer diplomatic posts, and limited communication channels, developing states are more

likely to engage in non-verbal behavior (defined as confrontational diplomacy involving physical conflict) than in verbal behavior. See for example, Maurice A. East, "Size and Foreign Policy: A Test of Two Models," *World Politics*, vol. 25 (July 1973), pp. 556-576; also reprinted in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., Gregory A. Raymond, Robert M. Rood and Richard A. Skinner, eds., *International Events and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy* (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1975), pp. 159-178. See Georges A. Fauriol, *Foreign Policy Behavior of Caribbean States: Guyana, Haiti, and Jamaica* (New York: University Press of America, 1984), pp. 16-18. The argument here erroneously assumes that non-verbal engagements are necessarily conflictual. But non-verbal acts may be cooperative such as the establishment of radio link between Ghana and Ivory Coast, or Nigeria's generous donation of relief materials to Benin drought victims. In addition, there are many instances of conflictual verbal behavior such as the accusation levied against the Ivorian president, by the Ghanaian foreign secretary, for engaging in talks with South Africa; or severe criticisms, by Ghana and Burkina Faso, of the United States' attack on Libyan fighters. For these events, see respectively, *West Africa*, Issue Nos. 3674 (1988), 3717 (1988), 3718 (1988), 3726 (1989).

44. See Rosenau's introduction in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and James N. Rosenau, eds., *op. cit.* (1987), p. xi.

45. Marcel Merle, *op. cit.* (1987), p. 111.

46. See his introductory chapter in Hermann, Kegley and Rosenau, eds., *op. cit.* (1987), p. xi. For his earlier works pertaining to this idea, see James N. Rosenau, *Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems* (New York: The Free Press, 1969); James N. Rosenau, "Toward the Study of National-International Linkages," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *Linkage Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 44-63; *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1967); *Comparing Foreign Policies* (New York: The Free Press, 1974). For a comprehensive study of crisis-induced change which adopts a micro-level definition of international crisis by linking the unit with the system level of analysis, see Michael Brecher and Patrick James, *op. cit.* (1986).

47. James N. Rosenau in C. F. Hermann, C. W. Kegley Jr., and J. N. Rosenau, eds., *op. cit.* (1987), p. 3.

48. This distinction between the two uses of power may sometimes be blurred. However, positive power is usually used to refer to the ability of a state to exert influence over another in the direction of getting them to accede to its demands. Negative power (or deterrence) is applicable where a state possesses the ability to prevent others from achieving their objectives at the expense of its national goals. For an original account of the power school of thought, see Edward H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939* (London: Macmillan and Co. 1946). For a more central restatement, see Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power*

and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973). See also, Marshall R. Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relationships (New York: The Free Press, 1972), pp. 52-85.

49. See Richard J. Stoll and Michael D. Ward, "Grist for the Mill," Richard J. Stoll and Michael D. Ward, eds., Power in World Politics (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), pp. 1-2. See also, Kaj J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983), pp. 164-168.

50. For analysis of this fundamental concept, see Joseph Frankel, National Interest (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970).

51. Hans J. Morgenthau, op. cit. (1973).

52. For Hobbes, "the law of nations, and the law of nature are the same thing." Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil, ed. by Michael Oakshott and introd. by Richard S. Peters (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 260.

53. Thus, it is important for the prince "to be prudent as to know how to avoid the infamy of those vices that would take his state from him." Following similar logic, Machiavelli further argues that "one should not care about incurring the reputation of those vices without which it is difficult to save one's state; for if one considers everything well, one will find something appears to be virtue, which if pursued results in one's security and well-being." See Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, introd. by Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), p. 62.

54. See Orwa's article in Olatunde Ojo, D. K. Orwa, and C. M. B. Utete, eds., op. cit. (1985), p. 14.

55. ibid., p. 15. In fact, D. K. Orwa argues that African international relations "are best approached from the perspectives of power and dependency theory." For similar argument on the "paradoxical combination of power and dependency" in shaping the behavior of Arab states, see Tareq Y. Ismael, International Relations of the Contemporary Middle East: A Study in World Politics (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986), pp. 26-28.

56. This is given extensive treatment in chapter nine of Hans Morgenthau, op. cit. (1973), pp. 112-149.

57. For example, the power-factors approach cannot account for the capability of the powerless or, what Arnold Wolfer has called the "power of the weak." Hence, the attainment of political independence by virtually weak and powerless countries, for

instance, cannot be explained by power-ordered categories.

58. See Jacek Kugler and Marina Arbetman, "Choosing Among Measures of Power: A Review of the Empirical Record," Ward and Stoll, eds., op. cit. (1989), pp. 53-54. See also, Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, eds., op. cit. (1962), p. 251.

59. See Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, "Decision-Making As An Approach to the Study of International Politics," Foreign Policy Analysis Project Series, No. 3 (Princeton, N. J.: 1954). See also, Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, eds., op. cit. (1962). For an early application of this framework to a case study, see Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision (New York: The Free Press, 1968).

60. Tunde Adeniran, "The Matrix of Effective Diplomacy: Some Guidelines for Nigeria's Foreign Policy in the 1980's," Third Press Review of Third World Diplomacy, vol. 1, no. 1 (New York: Third Press International, Winter 1982), p. 28. See also, Robert C. Good, "Changing Patterns of African International Relations," American Political Science Review (September 1964), p. 638.

61. For a basic exposure to the psychological dimension to international politics, see the pioneering work of Joseph de Rivera, The Psychological Dimension to International Politics (Ohio, Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Publishers, 1968). This study attempts to explain foreign policy actions by (1) applying contemporary psychology to the behavior of foreign policy decision-makers and (2) analyzing the perennial problem of perceptual errors by proposing the necessity of independently checking these conceived misperceptions against actual reality. For an examination of the relationship between psychological variables and the study of international politics, see Lawrence S. Falkowski, ed., Psychological Models in International Politics (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979). For a much earlier collection, see Herbert C. Kelman, ed., International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965).

62. See Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, op. cit. (1962). For a more complete and detailed discussion on the role of governmental motivation in foreign policy, see Richard W. Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and a Case Study (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), especially parts 1 and 3.

63. Margaret G. Hermann, "Who Becomes a Political Leader? Some Societal and Regime Influences on Selection of a Head of State," in Lawrence S. Falkowski, ed., op. cit. (1979), p. 21. Note that in this study, the former Ghanaian leader, Kwame Nkrumah, is listed on the expansionist orientation. See also, Margaret G. Hermann, "Leader Personality and Foreign Policy Behavior," James N. Rosenau, ed., Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings, and Methods (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1974), pp. 201-234.

64. Aluko has suggested that the nature and ideology of the governing elites is a major factor in the determinants of the foreign policies of African states. "Where the rulers are militant and socialist in outlook, and where they are of humble birth without wealth such as Dr. Nkrumah, Sékou Touré, Modibo Keita, Colonel Gaddafi, one can expect a radical foreign policy stance from their countries. But where the rulers are conservative, with aristocratic background, such as King Hassan of Morocco, or with plenty of wealth such as President Félix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast and President Tolbert of Liberia, one can expect moderate, cautious foreign policy from their countries." See "The Determinants of the Foreign Policies of African States," in Olajide Aluko, ed., The Foreign Policies of African States (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), p. 10.

65. The term perception is used in this study to refer to the process by which an individual leader selects, evaluates and organizes stimuli from the internal and external environments. The salient point in this conception is that the same stimuli are often perceived differently by leaders regardless of "an objective reality," that is, assuming that an objective reality actually exists, quite apart from leaders' perception of it.

66. An attempt has been made to address some of these questions in relation to leader's perceptions in early, post-colonial Tanzania's foreign policy. It is argued that Nyerere's views were colored by "what he knew about world events (cognition), how he felt about them (affection) and how he judged them in ethical terms (evaluation). Since the cognition dimension was weak because of the poverty of information on external conditions, the significant elements were the affective and evaluative dimensions. The emotional commitment to the struggle for independence and the ethical principles underlying them became the mainspring of the new state's diplomacy." For this account, see Okwudiba Nnoli, Self Reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania: The Dynamics of the Diplomacy of a New State, 1961 to 1971 (New York: Nok Publishers, 1978), p. 40.

67. For the earliest application of this theme to international politics, see the various works of Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout entitled Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1956); "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics," Journal of Conflict Resolution vol. 1, pp. 309-328. For successive contributions by Brecher, see Michael Brecher, Blema Steinberg and Janice Stein, op. cit. (1969), pp. 75-101. See also, Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972); Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1975).

68. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).

69. Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 3 (June 1959), pp. 120-131. For the same article, see Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," in W. F. Hanreider, ed.,

Comparative Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays (New York: McKay, 1971), pp. 90-107.

70. Ole Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 4, no. 3 (September 1962), pp. 244-252; Karl Deutsch and Richard Merritt, "The Effects of Events on National and International Images," Herbert Kelman, ed., op. cit. (1965); Kenneth Boulding, The Image (New York: Harper and Row, 1960); Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1971). For other studies adopting the belief system approach, see A. L. George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 13 (1969), pp. 190-222; and P. M. Burgess, Elite Images and Foreign Policy Outcomes: A Study of Norway (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1968).

71. Charles F. Hermann, "Some Issues in the Study of International Crisis," Charles F. Hermann, ed., International Crises: Insights From Behavioral Research (New York: The Free Press, 1972), pp. 12-13; Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 28-30.

72. Michael Mandel, Weak States in the International System (London: Frank Cass, 1981), pp. 3-4. Similarly Christopher Clapham has endorsed the view that "bureaucratic approaches to decision-making derived from more institutionalised political systems clearly fail to apply" since in the foreign policy decision-making of African states, personalities of individual leaders, rather than the character of bureaucratic institutions, matter the most. See "Sub-Saharan Africa," in Clapham, ed., op. cit. (1977), pp. 88-89.

73. See James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," R. Barry Farrell, ed., op. cit. (1966), pp. 27-93.

74. For literature adopting the national attributes approach, see Rudolph J. Rummel, "The Relationship between National Attributes and Foreign Conflict Behavior," in J. David Singer, ed., Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 187-214; National Attributes and Behavior (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979); Maurice A. East, op. cit. (1973), pp. 556-576; James G. Kean and Patrick J. McGowan, "National Attributes and Foreign Policy Participation: A Path Analysis," Patrick J. McGowan, ed., Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, vol. 1 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1973), pp. 219-252; "National Attributes and Foreign Policy," in M. A. East, S. A. Salmore and C. F. Hermann, eds., Why Nations Act (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1978), pp. 123-142.

75. For an example of a multi-source and multi-level explanatory model, see Jonathan Wilkenfeld, G. Hopple, P. Rossa and S. Andriole, eds., Foreign Policy Behavior: The Interstate Behavior Analysis Model (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1980). Although it has been suggested that it falls short of establishing credible validity for its variables, this study combines many psychological, political, societal, interstate and

global elements.

76. Recent studies of international relations from the perspective of decision-making processes acknowledge that the sources of opportunities and constraints reside in both domestic and international politics. They do not, therefore, assume inherent inconsistency in the various levels of analysis. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, "Empirical Support for Systemic and Dyadic Explanations of International Conflict," World Politics, vol. XLI, no. 1 (October 1988).

77. Henry L. Bretton, Power and Politics in Africa (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1973), p. 286.

78. Michael Sullivan, International Relations: Theories and Evidence (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976), p. 67.

79. For this remark, see "Introduction: Towards a Political Economy of African Foreign Policy," in Timothy M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko, eds., op. cit. (1984), pp. 8, 14. See also, Timothy M. Shaw, "Discontinuities and Inequalities in African International Politics," International Journal, vol. 30, no. 3 (Summer 1975), pp. 369-390.

80. "The United Nations now identifies a Fourth World composed of those countries with an exceptionally small annual per capita income." See Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, The International Relations Dictionary, Third Edition (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio, Inc., 1982), p. 21. See also, Timothy M. Shaw, The Dialectics of Regionalism: EurAfrica and West Africa (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p. 228.

81. Timothy Shaw, "Conclusion: The Future of a Political Economy of African Foreign Policy," Shaw and Aluko, eds., op. cit. (1984), p. 374. See also, Timothy M. Shaw, "Introduction: Nigeria as Africa's Major Power," Shaw and Aluko, eds., Nigerian Foreign Policy: Alternative Perceptions and Projections (London: The Macmillan Press, 1983), p. 2.

82. See Handbook on the Acquisition of Technology by Developing Countries (UNCTAD, 1978), pp. 53-56.

83. See chapter on "Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries as A New Dimension of International Cooperation For Development," Agenda Item 8, in Report of the United Nations Conference on Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries (1978), p. 47.

84. See P. J. Philip, "ASEAN and Regional Cooperation in Science and Technology," R. P. Anand, ed., Cultural Factors in International Relations (New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1981), p. 196.

85. Cited by Georges A. Fauriol, op. cit. (1984), p. 15. See Douglas G. Anglin and Timothy M. Shaw, Zambia's Foreign Policy: Studies in Diplomacy and Dependence (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979).
86. Joseph Frankel, op. cit. (1970), p. 69.
87. See Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, Second Edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 42.
88. See The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Fifteenth Edition, vol. 20 (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1988), p. 828.
89. James C. Hsiung, Ideology and Practice: The Evolution of Chinese Communism (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970).
90. John Plamenatz, Ideology (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 15.
91. Lyman Tower Sargent, Contemporary Political Ideologies, Seventh Edition (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1987), p. 2.
92. Other ideologies most often encountered include Non-alignment, anti-imperialism, Pan-Negroism and Negritude.
93. Martin Minogue and Judith Molloy, ed., African Aims and Attitudes: Selected Documents (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 2.
94. George Shepherd, Jr., Non-aligned Black Africa: An International Subsystem (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath & Co., 1970), 19.
95. For this orientation, see Charles F. Hermann, "Policy Classification: A Key to the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy," in James N. Rosenau, V. Davis and Maurice A. East, eds., The Analysis of International Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1972); and Charles F. Hermann, "Foreign Policy Behavior: That Which is to be Explained," in Maurice A. East, S. A. Salmore and Charles F. Hermann, eds., Why Nations Act (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1978), pp. 25-47.
96. For the same view, see Timothy M. Shaw, "African States and International Stratification: The Adaptive Foreign Policy of Tanzania," in K. Ingham, ed., Foreign Relations of African States (London: Butterworths, 1974), pp. 213-233.
97. It is in this way that we seek to develop reliable generalizations and theories about foreign policy behavior.

98. For a basically similar idea, see Maurice A. East and Phillip M. Gregg, "Factors Influencing Cooperation and Conflict in the International System," International Studies Quarterly, vol. II, no. 3 (September 1967).

99. It is important to emphasize that this theoretical generalization, as offered, is only necessary and important for the sake of meaningful analysis. In reality, the utility of the scheme we present in this study is questionable. Its usefulness and relevance may be drastically limited to the extent that numerous facts in the real world do not fit within it.

100. It is of course further assumed, within the context of cooperation and conflict in a regional subsystem, that outside powers do not intervene and provide their own instruments of political, economic and military contention.

101. Donald G. Morrison, Robert C. Mitchell and John N. Paden, Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook, Second Edition (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1989).

102. Webster's Ninth Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster Inc., 1983), p. 915.

103. Ray S. Cline, World Power Trends and U.S. Foreign Policy Behavior for the 1980s (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 44-45.

104. Webster's Dictionary, op. cit. (1983), p. 395.

105. Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel, op. cit. (1970), p. 13.

106. Okumu states, for instance, that "the foreign relations of any African state are a function of its colonial history." See J. J. Okumu, "The Place of African States in International Relations," August Schou and Arne Olav Brundtland, eds., Small States in International Relations (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1971), p. 147. In his empirical study of 30 African states for 1963 and 1964, McGowan correlates ties through colonialism with interactions and finds that those states which follow an inactive-dependent pattern of interaction are former French colonies, those that follow a transitional pattern are of mixed colonial heritage, and those that follow an active-independent pattern are North African-Arab states. See Patrick J. McGowan, "The Patterns of African Diplomacy: A Quantitative Comparison," Journal of Asian and African Studies, vol. 4 (1969), pp. 217-218.

107. Roger Cobb and Charles Elder, International Community: A Regional and Global Study (New York: Holt, 1970), p. 40.

108. Timothy M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko, eds., op. cit. (1984), pp. 6-7.

109. Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, The International Relations Dictionary, Third Edition (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 1982), pp. 61, 378-379.
110. See Maurice A. East, op. cit. (1973); Georges A. Fauriol, op. cit. (1984).
111. Russel L. Leng and J. David Singer, "Militarized Interstate Crises: The BCOW Typology and Its Applications," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 32 (1988), pp. 155-173.
112. Maurice East, op. cit. (1973); Georges Fauriol, op. cit. (1984).
113. In other words, the variables partly constitute some of the essential conditions under which perceived stimuli from the environment are processed for decision. Consequently, they may be considered as representing the main conditions affecting choice.
114. Michael Haas, International Systems: A Behavioral Approach (New York: Chandler Publishing Company, 1974), p. 38; International Conflict (New York: The Boobs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1974), p. 52. However, Haas distinguishes between a proposition and a hypothesis where moving from a proposition to a hypothesis entails finding "variables" that can replace "concepts" through the process of index construction.
115. One major flaw in past theoretical efforts is the occasional failure to go beyond demonstrating evidence of association or simple correlation. In this study, however, we intend to indicate both associations and the direction of associations, that is, whether such associations are positive or negative.
116. Ray S. Cline, op. cit. (1980), pp. 35-36.
117. Nazli Choucri, Population Dynamics and International Violence (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1974); Choucri and Robert North, Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International Violence (San Francisco: Freeman, 1975). See also, Wilkenfeld, Hopple, Rossa and Andriole, op. cit. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1980), p. 63.
118. See Guy Arnold, Modern Nigeria (London: Longman Group Limited, 1977), p. 135.
119. See J. O. C. Onyemelukwe, Industrialization in West Africa (London: Croom Helm, 1984), p. 2.
120. Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, eds., Regional Integration: Theory and Research (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 46.
121. Richard L. Merritt, "Foreign Policy Analysis," in Richard L. Merritt, ed., Foreign Policy Analysis (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1975), p. 1.

122. See Leon Lindberg's article in Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold, eds., op. cit. (1971), p. 78.
123. See Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Conception of Leaders and Forces (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 38-39, 94-96.
124. Ernst B. Haas in Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz, eds., Regional Politics and World Order (1973), p. 108.
125. ibid. (1973), p. 109. Indeed, Olson has argued that in groups with common interests, there exists a systematic tendency for the exploitation of the great by the small, emanating from the tendency for large states to bear disproportionate shares of the burdens of multinational organizations. In unequal groups, the largest member bears a disproportionate share of the burden of providing the collective good. Since the smaller member gets a smaller fraction of the benefit he provides than a larger member, he has less incentive to provide additional amounts of the collective good. In addition, once a smaller member has the amount of collective good he gets free from the largest member, he has more than he would have purchased for himself, and has no incentive to obtain any of the collective good at his own expense. Therefore, in groups with common interests there is accordingly "a surprising tendency for the 'exploitation' of the great by the small." See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 22-36.
126. Ernst Haas in Richard Falk and Saul Mendlovitz, eds., op. cit. (1973), p. 111.
127. See Donald J. Puchala, International Politics Today (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1971), p. 18.
128. James N. Rosenau and Gary Hoggard, "Foreign Policy Behavior in Dyadic Relationships: Testing a Pre-Theoretical Extension," J. N. Rosenau ed., Comparing Foreign Policies (New York: Wiley, 1974), pp. 117-149.
129. Timothy M. Shaw, "The Elusiveness of Development and Welfare: Inequalities in the Third World," in Ronald St. John Macdonald, Douglas M. Johnston and Gerald L. Morris, eds., The International Law and Policy of Human Welfare (The Netherlands: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1978), pp. 81-109.
130. R. W. Benjamin and L. J. Edinger, "Conditions for Military Control over Foreign Policy Decisions in Major States: An Historical Explanation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 15 (1971), p. 18.
131. S. Touval, "Africa's Frontiers: Reaction to Colonial Legacy," International Affairs, vol. 42 (London, 1966), p. 647.
132. See I. William Zartman, International Relations in the New Africa (New York: University Press of America, 1987).

133. E. Weede, "Conflict Behavior of Nation-States," Journal of Peace Research, vol. 7 (1970), p. 230.
134. R. W. Chadwick, "An Inductive Empirical Analysis of Intra- and International Behavior Aimed at a Partial Extension of International Simulation Theory," Journal of Peace Research, vol. 6 (1969), p. 200.
135. See R. W. Benjamin and L. J. Edinger, "Conditions for Military Control over Foreign Policy Decisions in Major States: An Historical Explanation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 15 (1971), p. 18.
136. David H. Johns, "Diplomatic Activity, Power, and Integration in Africa," Patrick J. McGowan, ed., Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, vol. 3 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 86.
137. See Vincent B. Khapoya, The Politics of Decision: A Comparative Study of African Policy Toward the Liberation Movements, Monograph Series in World Affairs, vol. 12 (Denver, Colo.: University of Denver, 1975).
138. James N. Rosenau and Gary D. Hoggard, "Foreign Policy Behavior in Dyadic Relationships: Testing a Pre-Theoretical Extension," James N. Rosenau, ed., Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings, and Methods (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1974), pp. 124-125.
139. See Roger W. Cobb and Charles C. Elder, op. cit. (1970), p. 134.
140. Wilkenfeld, Hopple, Rossa and Andriole, op. cit. (1980), p. 78.
141. *ibid.*
142. This suggests that the closer the proximity between states, the greater the chances that external variables will constitute potent sources of foreign policy behavior. James Rosenau and Gary Hoggard in James N. Rosenau, ed., op. cit. (1974), pp. 124-125.

CHAPTER THREE

ELITE IDEOLOGY AND POWER POLITICS IN WEST AFRICA

Introduction

Inter-African relations are generally characterized by discussions about cooperation and unity at the regional and subregional levels. It could be argued that in no other continent has the theme of economic and political cooperation been so central among a wide variety of leaders as in Africa. Not only is cooperation the dominant theme in Africa's international relations, leaders of African states have constantly expressed their determination to promote inter-African cooperation by coordinating the economic, political, and social policies of African states. Hence, in the many conferences that have come to characterize African diplomacy, this theme of cooperation has protruded insistently. Rather than being dismissed off hand as a pious wish confined to the naive imagination of African leaders alone, the dynamic processes of economic and political cooperation in Africa, has long attracted the theoretical interest of scholars in international relations.¹

The reasons for this intellectual interest in cooperation range from the practical need for economic development to the more fundamental desire for political stability. In general, these reasons lay partly in the nature of interstate divisions within Africa

itself. The continent is perhaps the most divided in the world, and West Africa is certainly much more fragmented than elsewhere in the region. The subregion is characterized by frontiers often cutting across traditional ethnic and political divisions. Although arguably an abode for peace and tranquility when compared to its counterparts in North, East, Central and Southern Africa, the subregion of West Africa nevertheless shelters the largest contingent of small states, the smallest being Cape Verde and The Gambia with estimated territorial areas of 4,033 and 11,295 square kilometers, and populations of approximately 334,000 and 698,817 peoples, respectively.²

The Concept of Ideology

Although both the word and its meaning go further back as an intellectual force in history, for most scholars, the term "ideology" is closely associated with developments in Marxist philosophical thought. The elements of Marx's concept of ideology are mostly scattered, not always systematically elaborated, and are sometimes ambiguously presented. Nevertheless, for the ardent and conscientious scholar, there is a remarkable continuity and consistency in Marx's treatment of the concept. In original or classical Marxism, ideology is construed in its critical and negative connotation, that is to say, as a concept comprising those distortions that are connected with the concealment of a contradictory inverted reality.³ For example, the critique by Marx and Engels attempts to show the existence of a necessary linkage between inverted forms of consciousness and men's material existence. It is this

dialectical relationship that the concept of ideology expresses by referring to a distortion of thought which stems from, and conceals, social contradictions. One could therefore, in this unpractical and visionary sense, speak of the critical, deprecatory, or pejorative connotations of ideology.

Marx's basic contention is that "it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production... and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic - in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out."⁴ Engels, on the other hand, defines ideology as a "false consciousness," which is not in accord with reality, and which neither discovers nor expresses reality in any adequate manner. Thus, according to Engels, "ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, no doubt, but with a false consciousness."⁵ A few major conclusions can be derived from these definitions. First, in the contributions of both Marx and Engels, the idea of a double inversion in consciousness and reality is retained throughout. They argue that because of their limited material mode of activity, men are often unable to resolve pressing social contradictions in practice. Instead, "they tend to project them in ideological forms of consciousness, that is to say, in purely mental or discursive solutions which effectively conceal or misrepresent the existence and character of these contradictions."⁶ Consequently, from its very inception, because it involves a distortion and a misrepresentation of contradictions, ideology has a clear-cut denigrated, negative and critical connotation.

It was not until after Marx's death that ideology acquired new meanings that

finally displaced its original negative connotation through a process that did not necessarily represent the result of a systematic review of the concept within Marxism. The term did not lose its negative and critical connotation, but there was clearly an evolution towards a more positive conception of ideology, which tended to give its negative aspects a secondary place. Hence, it has been convincingly argued that "there are, at least, two broad and basically opposed Marxist conceptions of ideology: one negative (which refers to a kind of distorted thought), and one positive (which refers to the totality of forms of consciousness or to the political ideas of social classes)."⁷ Essentially, in the new meanings, ideology was conceived as the totality of forms of social consciousness which found expression in the concept of the ideological superstructure. Secondly, ideology was also conceived in the form of the science of political ideas and belief systems connecting the interests of a social class or community.⁸

Critics such as Karl Mannheim, Martin Seliger and Paul Hirst have already highlighted some of the most significant problems which derive from Marx's position on ideology. In what is probably the most serious, influential and systematic exposition of ideology after Marx, Mannheim has distinguished between two separable meanings of the term: the particular and the total conceptions of ideology.⁹ The particular conception of ideology, according to Mannheim, applies to critical distrust of the specific cognitive claims of an opponent who may simply be described as ideological in his position. In this case, the opponent's assertions are doubted because they are regarded by the observer to be more or less intentional distortions of the real

situation for the advantage of the person making the assertion. As Mannheim puts it, "the particular conception of ideology is implied when the term denotes that we are sceptical of the ideas and representations advanced by our opponent. They are regarded as more or less conscious disguises of the real nature of a situation, the true recognition of which would not be in accord with his interests."¹⁰ Ideology is thus viewed as a screen or veil behind which the opponent may conceal his real and implied intents. However, in the total conception of ideology, the entire Weltanschauung of the opposition is more widely interpreted as a product of a collective life in which the individual participates. In other words, ideology in this total sense is a fundamental and comprehensive ordering of a time or of a group. For Mannheim, therefore, the reference here is "to the ideology of an age or of a concrete historico-social group, e.g. of a class, when we are concerned with the characteristics and composition of the total structure of the mind of this epoch or of this group."¹¹

The similarity between the two conceptions of ideology is evident in the fact that neither relies entirely on what is actually said by the opponent in order to reach an understanding of his real meaning and intention. In other words, systems of ideas, opinions, and statements, are not accepted at their face value but are interpreted in the light of the real life experiences of one who expresses them. Both conceptions of ideology make ideas a function of him who holds them, and of the individual's position in his social setting.¹²

There are also significant distinctions between the particular and the total conceptions of ideology. Whereas the particular interpretation of ideology makes

ideas functions of interests as these are experienced by an individual, the total interpretation of ideology sees ideas as part of a broader pattern of thought that is associated with a specific group or class. In addition, whereas the particular conception of ideology deals basically with the psychology of interests at the individual, purely psychological level, the total conception of ideology concentrates on thought-systems at the structural and theoretical levels in different social settings.¹³ As in this study, Karl Mannheim prefers the total conception of ideology, which, according to him, lies at the basis of the individual's perception and judgement. Mannheim discredits the particular conception of ideology by arguing that if one confines observations to the mental processes taking place in the individual "and regard him as the only possible bearer of ideologies," it will be impossible to "grasp in its totality the structure of the intellectual world belonging to a social group in a given historical situation. Although this mental world as a whole could never come into existence without the experiences and productive responses of the different individuals, its inner structure is not to be found in a mere integration of these individual experiences."¹⁴

The primary objective of this chapter is to attempt to analyze the historical role of leaders' ideology and power configurations in the evolution of interstate relations in West Africa, from the colonial era until present times. No doubt, leaders play a crucial role in all countries by clarifying, shaping, articulating, and influencing popular demands. Certainly, the expectations of people are profoundly influenced by what leaders hold out as necessary and desirable. While the historical role of

leadership is of great importance in all societies, its primary role in developing societies cannot be overestimated, the vast majority of people in these countries being politically inactive. Hence scholars have maintained that the analysis of political systems and activity in Africa "is incomplete without reference to the ideas of those who exercise substantial practical or intellectual authority in the African continent."¹⁵

A distinction is often drawn in politics between the ideological and the pragmatic approach, the latter being construed as the framework that diagnoses and resolves problems purely on their merit without regard to doctrinal, preconceived remedies.¹⁶ For instance, Frankel restates the distinction made in world politics between a national foreign policy based upon an ideology and one predicated upon self-interest. Whereas the former concentrates upon general values, the latter is more pragmatically concerned with specific interests and issues.¹⁷ We argue, however, that the rift between ideology and tactical pragmatism may be more instructive if the two are considered within the context of a mixture on a sliding scale.¹⁸ In reality, most policies contain elements of both ideology and national interest considerations.¹⁹ Specifically, we suggest that the tendency for elite perceptions to be colored almost exclusively by ideological preconceptions, has given way to greater emphasis on more pragmatic considerations. From this perspective, one could thus speak of an ideological belief system (such as nationalism, pan-Africanism, or anti-colonialism) as lending itself to a variety of forms - that is, as being more or less ideological (or radical), more or less pragmatic. In this chapter, we generally suggest

that in spite of the gradual erosion of the undiluted or pure brand of ideology, traces of radicalist and activist philosophies are still delineable in contemporary inter-African relations. In addition, although the early post-colonial phase of African states was strongly motivated by the ideology of anti-imperialism (or anti-colonialism) in the wake of an occupying power, economic considerations have eventually tended to prevail and alter the exclusively ideological emphasis of foreign policy.²⁰

Origins of the Idea for a West African Community

The historical bases of the idea for West African economic and political cooperation go farther than are usually appreciated in the literature and are quite complex in character. Evidence of a movement toward a West African community go as far back as the mid-nineteenth century. As early as 1867, for example, Africanus Beale Horton of Sierra Leone advocated the "self-government of Western Africa."²¹ Like the West African middle class of his time, Horton perceived African nationalism within the context of the arena of West Africa. But by far the most important and influential theoretician of the idea of unity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was Edward Wilmot Blyden. Blyden was a West Indian by birth and a Liberian by adoption. He was not only the intellectual and ideological godfather of the idea of African unity, he also spearheaded the cultural nationalism that accompanied it.²²

After Blyden's death in 1912, the most outstanding political organization which took charge of pan-Africanism in the 1920s was the West African National Congress.

Founded and led by Joseph Casely Hayford, an African barrister in the Gold Coast (now Ghana), and the staunchest disciple and ideological heir to Blyden, this movement promoted cooperation throughout much of this period between the former British dependencies of West Africa. Thus, the National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA) united nationalists from Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Gambia.²³ In 1920, for example, the association sent a delegation to London to petition the Secretary of State for the Colonies and to demand for the establishment, in each territory in British West Africa, of a Legislative Council and a House of Assembly. The Congress also demanded effective African participation in their own affairs (including the appointment of Africans to judicial offices) and the establishment of a West African university.²⁴ The movement received support from West African students overseas agitating for speedy decolonization and the establishment of a "federation" of British West African Colonies. They maintained that West African unity held both political and economic implications for the area. For example, J. B. Danquah of Ghana, then vice-president of the West African Students Union (WASU) in Britain,²⁵ argued that the future of Africa could be read in the light of West African economic development and prosperity.²⁶ Although in the late 1920s, Kobina Sekyi, a Ghanaian lawyer, philosopher, and nationalist politician, advocated the extension of the NCBWA to include "our brethren in French West Africa," the organization remained an English-speaking one throughout this period.²⁷

The various pan-African congresses, from the first in 1909 to the last in 1945, proceeded from the basic premise that Africans had the unquestionable right to

participate in movements that influenced their social and political future.²⁸ It is important to note that all these conferences were held outside Africa and never advanced beyond the realm of general discussions about nationalist ideas. Thus, for lack of an active homebase, the congresses produced no concrete results within Africa. In fact, it was not until Ghana gained the status of a sovereign state, in 1957, that Pan-Africanism shifted base from an entirely abstract and ideological construct to a practical policy of the government of an independent West African state.

Specifically, it was the Fifth Pan-African Congress held in Manchester in October 1945, that traded the idea of continental unity for West African regionalism. Of the resolutions passed, one suggested, for example, that the "artificial divisions and territorial boundaries created by the imperialist Powers are deliberate steps to obstruct the political unity of the West African peoples."²⁹ Indeed many of the Congress resolutions had a sharp anti-imperialist edge. For instance, Kwame Nkrumah, back from ten years sojourn in the United States, demanded "complete and absolute independence"³⁰ for West Africa. As a result of this development, the West African National Secretariat was established in London, in 1946, with the principal objective "to maintain contact with, co-ordinate, educate and supply information on current matters to various political bodies... in West Africa with a view to realizing a West African Front for a United West African National Independence."³¹ The Secretariat also endeavored "to foster the spirit of national unity and solidarity among the various territories of West Africa for the purpose of combating the menace of artificial territorial divisions now in existence."³²

By working in concert with the West African Congress (organized in 1947), the Secretariat took a pledge to achieve self-government for West African colonies, to create a federation of independent African states, and to utilize the West African federation as a base for striving forward towards the broader goals of African unity.³³ Indeed, in December 1953, Nkrumah, then Prime Minister of the Gold Coast, organized a conference attended by nationalist movements from both Anglophone and Francophone territories in West Africa, which amplified discussions on the establishment of a national congress to promote West African unity.³⁴ One final point: it is clear the fifth Pan-African Congress specifically introduced, for the first time, the concept of "economic and social development by cooperatives"³⁵ to African international relations. Indeed, its joint secretary, Kwame Nkrumah, recommended the creation of a West African economic union.³⁶ What is less clear, however, is whether the Pan-Africanists perceived functionalism, that is, the theoretical construct that economic integration can serve as a prerequisite for political integration,³⁷ as a solid basis for the eventual political unification of Africa.

Early Developments in Francophone Africa

It was only from 1920 onwards that nationalist movements emerged among Francophone Africans and contacts were forged with the Anglophone areas of the continent.³⁸ Throughout the nineteenth century, nationalist trends were confined to the British colonies "and the Pan-African Conference of 1900 had no French-speaking participants."³⁹ However, standard accounts of early Pan-Africanism generally

justify their passing references to the role of Francophone Africa by claiming that, from 1921 until after the 1945 Manchester Congress, French-speaking African participation in the movement was virtually non-existent.⁴⁰ Few lines were devoted, instead, to what was popularly misconstrued as the development of an exclusively cultural ideology - *négritude*.⁴¹ As one scholar bitterly complains, almost "all histories of Pan-Africanism have confined attention (as far as French Negroes are concerned) to the theory of *négritude* evolved by Léopold Senghor, Jean Price-Mars, and Aime Cesaire in Paris in the 1930s."⁴² Two points are in order here: first, far from being negligible, French African participation in the Pan-African movement, after 1921, was moderately active and fairly political; second, there existed several Negro organizations in Paris between 1924 and 1936 with varying degrees of political orientation.⁴³ In 1934, Senegalese students in Paris formed L'Association des Etudiants Ouest-Africains, a students' union under the chairmanship of Senghor, perhaps conceived, as the name indicates, along the lines of WASU (although there was no clear evidence of a connection between the two unions).⁴⁴

However, the significance of these events must not be overestimated. Except in Senegal where Blaise Diagne pressed for equality and African control of municipal councils, and in largely unsuccessful revolts in Dahomey (now Benin), between the two World Wars, nationalist activities were far less extensive in French West Africa than in the Anglophone colonies.⁴⁵ Not only was official French policy one of "assimilation" and permanence of association,⁴⁶ far more than the British, France also refused to tolerate dissent. Serious challenge to colonial domination was

discouraged and the French were quite prepared to resort to force.⁴⁷

With the French constitution of 1946, elections in French West Africa in 1946 and 1947, produced three political combinations: (1) A political group led by Lamine Gueye (Senegal), which was associated with the French socialist party and which advocated a centralized federation of French West Africa with headquarters in Dakar.

(2) The more radical but not secessionist Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), led by Félix Houphouët-Boigny (Ivory Coast), who, although not a charismatic leader like Nkrumah and Touré (and did not therefore impress as an orator), was nevertheless linked with the French communist party (for practical rather than doctrinal reasons). (3) The Indépendants d'Outremer (IOM) led by Apithy and Senghor (Senegal), which did not affiliate with any party in France, but advocated autonomy for Africa within a French Union.⁴⁸ In part, the RDA allied with the French communist party because it took a strong anti-colonial line.⁴⁹ In spite of his link with the communist party, it is difficult to imagine any leader less of a communist than Houphouët-Boigny, who was then a traditional chief, medical doctor, and, as a plantation owner, a successful businessman in the private sector.⁵⁰

Unsurprisingly, the alliance of convenience with the communist party was completely broken, in 1950, and Houphouët-Boigny and his RDA colleagues were prepared to support any government in power. The RDA made an alliance with a small party, Union Démocratique et Sociale de la Résistance whose leader was Mitterrand.

Contrary to the earlier strategy, Houphouët-Boigny now believed in cooperation with the French government and the leading companies in the private sector.⁵¹

With the general election of 1956, the RDA made impressive gains over the IOM and the socialists. Naturally, this scenario enhanced the political influence of Houphouët-Boigny who, in 1957, became the Minister of Health and Population - a senior cabinet rank - in the French government of Guy Mollet. With his newly acquired position, Houphouët-Boigny influenced the passing of the controversial Loi Cadre (the framework law) by the French Parliament. The Loi Cadre was a curious piece of legislation which permitted greater decentralization and by which the French government was consequently empowered by law to change the system of government in Africa without recourse to the legislature.⁵² In short, the law broke the centralized federal structure of the French union by bringing to the fore the autonomy of each constituent territory. Through the powers of the Loi Cadre, Houphouët-Boigny exerted influence so that constitutional instruments, when issued, reflected RDA designs in West Africa. As advocates of a union with France and champions of a West African federation, the IOM and the socialists were naturally very upset by the actions undertaken under the Loi Cadre and they fought hard to repeal the law but to no avail. For example, in January 1957, a majority of trade unionists met at Cotonou under the chairmanship of Sékou Touré (who hitherto belonged to the RDA) and attacked the Loi Cadre denouncing its powers as divisive.⁵³ However, it was not until May 1958 when the Fourth Republic came to an end in France, and Charles De Gaulle acceded to power, that a new train of events were introduced into the politics of West Africa.

A brief digression is in order at this juncture. In his constitution for the Fifth

Republic, De Gaulle supported the idea that the French Union should be a federation. In other words, French West Africa was no longer to have representatives in the French Parliament and each oversea unit was to become an autonomous member of the French Community. Of course, this so-called "autonomy" of the constituent parts was limited since the government of the Community was still empowered to coordinate and harmonize certain common subjects including foreign affairs, defence, currency, economic policy, justice, university education, external transport, and telecommunications. The constitution also left it to the Africans to decide whether they (1) wanted to remain in a federation of West Africa as one unit, (2) wanted independence as separate units, or (3) wanted some intermediate grouping between the two alternatives. Indeed, De Gaulle toured the French Union seeking to explain his plans to them and to solicit their support. But his efforts also implied a clear message. Any country that rejected the constitution by a majority vote would be regarded as secessionist and treated as completely independent, meaning, an immediate and total withdrawal of French assistance, personnel, and materials. This posture stimulated debate among French West African leaders as to whether the opportunity should be seized for full independence. With the exceptions of Niger (with a slight majority) and Guinea (with an overwhelming majority), which opted for political independence, most of the Francophone colonies approved De Gaulle's constitution by large majorities. As a consequence of these events, the French federation disappeared and all the units declared to be members of the Community as separate states.

Despite their declared membership of the French Community as separate states, four colonies, namely, Senegal, Soudan (now Mali), Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), and Dahomey (Benin) met in January 1959 and declared they would form the Mali federation with headquarters at Dakar.⁵⁴ However, the legislative assemblies of Dahomey and Upper Volta flatly refused to ratify this declaration, and when the federation was formally inaugurated on May 25, 1959, both states had withdrawn. Thus, the Federation of Mali was reduced to two members, Senegal and Soudan.

A more analytical examination of the reasons behind these early efforts at political cooperation in West Africa may be relevant to one of our major theoretical arguments in this study. Elsewhere, we have argued extensively (see Chapters 1 and 2) about the roles of national (especially economic) attributes and elite perceptions (both of these attributes and of the general international situation) in influencing foreign policy behavioral patterns amongst states. An application of this framework to early cooperative and conflictual processes in French West Africa may prove instructive as case studies. Take the role of Houphouët-Boigny in the demise of the proposed Mali federation on the one hand, and the rise of the Conseil de l'Entente on the other. It could be argued without much difficulty that the perceptions of the Ivorien leader (both of the economic capabilities of the Ivory Coast and of the balance of power situation in West Africa) played a role in the formation of the Entente and, by implication, in the eventual dissolution of an early proposal for the Mali Federation.⁵⁵ Indeed, these events exemplify the strength of economics in the determination of international political processes in the subregion. Frederick Pedler,

a scholar of West African history, offers this specific but insightful explanation:

Upper Volta and Dahomey rejected the offer of a federal union with Senegal and Soudan under pressure from Houphouet-Boigny, who was determined that Ivory Coast should not be placed in the comparatively minor role which it would play in a federation with headquarters in Dakar. However, Upper Volta and Dahomey were poor and lonely, and Houphouet-Boigny had to offer them something to take the place of the Mali Federation. This necessity seems to have been the original reason for forming the Conseil de l'entente in 1959. It brought together Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey, and Niger in an association, the exact scope of which remained to be worked out.⁵⁶

While these events were unfolding at the eastern perimeter of the subregion, at the western extremity, the partners of the Federation of Mali (Senegal and Soudan) established their government in Dakar. However, because of deep perceptual differences between the two leaders, it was difficult to agree. Senegal, the richer and more developed country, wanted a loose federation while Soudan insisted on a unitary state. In addition, "Senghor and his liberal mind and strong links with France was out of sympathy with Modibo Keita, the radical man from the Soudan, whose opinions were close to those of Sekou Toure."⁵⁷ The union came to an end in August 1960 when Senegal seceded while Soudan adopted the name Republic of Mali and, consequently, attained complete independence, as was the case with the members of the Entente who had earlier left the French Community and became independent in June 1960.

Ideology and Bloc Politics in Post-Colonial West Africa

Particularly in relation to events in West Africa, the conduct of international politics between post-colonial African states focused on two main activities: first,

close collaboration with nationalist movements to liberate the continent from alien (specifically European) domination, and second, the attainment of African unity as a precondition for Africa's economic advancement.⁵⁸ Following the political independence of the majority of African states, several other major systemic events of the 1960s, for instance, the Algerian conflict, the cold war, and the crisis in the Congo, had profound impact on the patterns of international relations in West Africa.⁵⁹ While there was general agreement on principles of foreign policy, the perceptions of African leaders were nevertheless divided on the precise content and character of the search for economic development and regional cooperation. Clearly, the ideological split between those states seeking to enforce a radical (or revolutionary) answer to post-independence problems, and others seeking a more conservative (or gradual) approach, was a major determinant of the patterns of interstate interactions for West African states in much of the 1960s. If leaders' perceptions and orientations were not sufficient conditions in inter-African cooperation, they were certainly necessary ingredients in the interactive process. The ideology of the leader was, in other words, one major state attribute impinging on foreign policy behavioral patterns in the regional subsystem during the early post-independence years.

The significant role of leaders' ideology in West Africa, was vividly reflected in the emergence of radical, moderate and conservative approaches in the quest for solutions to inter-African problems. Indeed, amidst revolutionary zeal and moderate views, the Casablanca and Brazzaville-Monrovia powers represented the radical and

the moderate-cum-conservative divide in African international relations, respectively.⁶⁰ Specifically, the former French West African colonies formed the nucleus of a conservative bloc. Standing in opposition to the more radical states, former French colonies like Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta and Dahomey came together and formed the Conseil de l'Entente, in 1959, as a nucleus of systematic and structured opposition to radical movement in West Africa. By 1961, twelve Francophone territories (including members of the Conseil de l'Entente) formed a larger grouping, the African Malagasy Union (UAM), which became the cornerstone of conservatism in West African relations.

These twelve states, which comprised Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta, met to discuss whether African states could mediate in the Algerian conflict and bring it to an end without necessarily alienating France. Most Francophone African states were deeply influenced by Paris in their foreign policies. For instance, none of them had the courage to condemn or criticize France for her nuclear testing in the Sahara and they were generally very cautious in their utterances and votes in the UN especially on the Algerian dilemma. The most significant cohesive factor for this group was their common link with a metropolitan power - France. Indeed, in inter-African politics, the French regional grouping was consistently the largest and most harmonious. The Brazzaville communique, for instance, extensively dealt with long-term cooperation among the twelve states with a view to developing a common foreign policy posture, more intensive economic and

cultural cooperation, pooled diplomatic representation, the establishment of a permanent secretariat, and possibly a common defense scheme. However, the situation between French-speaking states was not always amicable and cordial. Even before independence, within the Francophone grouping, cooperation was sometimes marked by intense animosities and disagreements (especially over the precise nature of ties to be established with France) as was convincingly demonstrated by the long-standing hostility between Sékou Touré and Houphouët-Boigny⁶¹ on the one hand, and the competition for influence between Sédar Senghor and Houphouët-Boigny on the other.⁶²

The Brazzaville-Monrovia group (which later became the Lagos group in 1962)⁶³ comprised twenty conservative and moderate African states. It originated from the December 1960 Brazzaville conference of twelve conservative, former French colonies opposed to the support of African states for Patrice Lumumba's government in the Belgian Congo.⁶⁴ The Monrovia group was formed by independent African states who felt that international policies were not adequately represented by either the Casablanca or the Brazzaville group. Gathering its support from such non-West African states like Ethiopia, the Monrovia group comprised such conservative states as Nigeria (under Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa), Ivory Coast (under Houphouët-Boigny), Senegal (under Sédar Senghor), Sierra Leone (under Milton Stevens), and Liberia (under Tubman).⁶⁵

The more ideologically militant Casablanca group arose in Casablanca in January 1961, in response to the conservatism of the Brazzaville twelve whose

opposition to Lumumba's government in the Congo, recognition of Mauritania (to which Morocco had laid claim), failure to recognize the Algerian Liberation Front, and rejection of a contemplated union of African states, alienated and antagonized a section of activist and radical African states.⁶⁶ The Casablanca meeting was thus a sequel to the Brazzaville conference. In the early 1960s, therefore, African states became polarized into these two political blocs. The ideological orientations were by no means clear-cut, but they roughly represented the radical and moderate forces in West African international relations. The policies pursued within each framework by the various states have determined the patterns of interstate relations. The division arose mainly from three factors: ideological differences, personality of the leaders, and national interest considerations. On the latter, since these countries had just achieved independence, many leaders were very reluctant to surrender their power to a confederal authority.⁶⁷

In their effervescent involvement in African affairs, the radical Casablanca powers comprised Sékou Touré's Guinea, Nkrumah's Ghana, and Modibo Keita's Mali. Although the renaissance of interest in West Africa was due, in large part to Nkrumah's efforts, aspirations, and basic personal philosophy, the Casablanca movement drew outside support from such progressive non-West African states as Egypt (under Nasser), the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), the revolutionary movement of Algeria, and Morocco. The three cases of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali illustrate how leaders' ideological differences can affect foreign policy. Briefly summarized, the perceptual bases of these radical West African elites were twofold:

(1) Sékou Touré saw the Casablanca movement as a political support against France and neighboring Francophone West African colonies that had ostracized him for failing to remain within the French sphere of influence. As will be shown later, the isolation imposed on Guinea by France after the 1958 referendum created a natural and irresistible basis for resentment. Therefore, as a result of his personal background and his experience of Guinea as a colonial territory, nothing loomed larger in Touré's perception of international relations than the existence of perfidious imperialism. (2) Modibo Keita and Kwame Nkrumah basically perceived the Casablanca group as a forum for projecting a collective African position on the Congo crisis and for advancing the idea of a union of African states.

Some analysts will indeed argue that, because the Casablanca group comprised both Afro-Arab and Black African governments, they had diversified interests and were by no means homogenous.⁶⁸ It remains a documented fact, however, that a commonly held ideological preconception provided, for the Casablanca bloc, the basis for the credible coordination of foreign policies.⁶⁹ For example, in his study of Ghana, Mali, and Guinea, Thomas Hovet found that the three countries had only five percent variation in their votes on key issues in the United Nations. Hovet concluded that this cohesion was quite universal across time especially as other African groupings were considerably divided on major issues, although they generally tended to fall into patterns.⁷⁰

The nature of the ideological conflict between the Casablanca and the Monrovia alliances hinged on the policy of gradualism versus one of revolution. To

be more specific, this distinction centered on four major analytical categories: (1) the role of the state in domestic economic development; (2) the relations between African states and their former colonial (European) powers; (3) the attitude and policy towards the communist states of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; and (4) the strategy towards the broad issues of unity among independent African states. These distinct factors will be investigated in that order.

First and foremost, in adopting a strategy for internal development, the radical Casablanca powers tended to emphasize state ownership of the means of production. It was argued that only as a precondition for economic independence did political independence take significance. This meant an increased role for the public sector, state corporations, and cooperative societies. In accordance with their professed philosophy of socialism, there was an increased emphasis on industrialization and the effective nationalization of foreign firms and the commanding heights of the economy. Mazrui has pointed out that the "majority" of the Casablanca states "espoused some kind of socialism in their domestic policies."⁷¹ In Ghana, for example, many industries were established under the auspices of the state as Nkrumah held tenaciously to the belief that socialist development could most rapidly transform the traditional economy. Socialism and African nationalism necessitated that the state controlled "the new industrial sector, which was to be created through public investment. The Ghanaian business class, to Nkrumah, was too small to take on the task and would become a political menace if it were expanded. While the cooperation of foreign capital was perhaps unavoidable, the creation through industrialization of a

foreign-owned and -operated enclave was unthinkable."⁷² As Arthur Lewis puts it, nothing would satisfy Nkrumah "other than that every country in Africa break every direct link with the former imperial power. Economic links are called 'neo-colonialism.'⁷³ Similarly, in both Mali and Guinea, state monopoly reigned supreme as the states established firm control over domestic and foreign trade. It was strongly argued that authentic African development required instant industrialization within the context of self-reliance as an antidote to the evil machinations of "neo-colonialism."⁷⁴

Secondly, in relations with the metropolitan powers, the Casablanca group sought greater change in the social order inherited from the colonial era - an order which they perceived as inimical to Africa because it was neo-colonial, illegitimate, and exploitative. This second point is not necessarily in contradiction with the first one. To Nkrumah, for instance, underdevelopment and the quest for genuine economic development justified a basically anti-imperialist and, therefore, anti-Western posture. Arguing for independent (as opposed to dependent) development, the Ghanaian leader urged political nonalignment in the bipolar ideological confrontation between the East and West blocs. Nkrumah heaped accusations on Francophone African leaders, arguing that they were a political appendage of Europe with apron-strings tied to France, and suggesting that they were aligned French stooges that could not stand up for independent African interests. Indeed, educated at "assimilationist" schools and finding their parliamentary feet in the French National Assembly, there was an emotional bond between these leaders and their former

French masters which had little parallel in English-speaking West Africa. In general, by forging a position of strength independent of their former metropole, the Casablanca radicals believed that it would be possible to counter neo-colonial attempts to balkanize Africa and to foil Western designs to manipulate African states through the installation of Western "stooges" or puppet regimes.⁷⁵

Thirdly, as for their attitudes towards the communist states, the radical Casablanca movement was naturally more interested in expanding cooperation with the Eastern bloc. For example, Nkrumah, Sékou Touré, and Modibo Keita received Lenin Peace Prizes "for strengthening peace between peoples,"⁷⁶ encouraged visits from Soviet and Chinese leaders, and received significant amounts of technical assistance and economic credits from the communist states (as well as from the West).⁷⁷ This point should not be overstated, however. One should be careful not to make too much of such identification with the socialist countries. In general, although these African leaders professed to be socialist, their version of socialism differed significantly from that of the Soviet Union.⁷⁸ The leaders were, and continued to be, African nationalists whose philosophy of African socialism, though militantly anti-imperialist, was also basically incompatible with communism. For instance, Sékou Touré often expressed his belief that although "certain Marxist concepts suit African conditions," it was no less evident that Africa will have to find "its own revolutionary principles."⁷⁹ Although Touré was familiar with the theory and practice of communism, he was quite evidently not a Marxist.⁸⁰

Similarly, Nkrumah resisted pressures from within his party to forge closer

alliance with Moscow for fear that it would betray both his commitment to nonalignment, and his rejection of communism as alien to Africa.⁸¹ Much like Tito in Yugoslavia, the Casablanca leaders were most unwilling to be reduced to mere satellites since their sense of nationalism and commitment to local conditions was stronger than their adherence to Marxist principles. Thus, those who saw the scenario of widening cooperation as a foretaste of cordial Russo-African relations became disillusioned when the Casablanca governments undertook actions independent of (and even detrimental to) Moscow. When Sékou Touré discovered the extent of Russian interference in domestic Guinean affairs,⁸² he immediately expelled the Soviet ambassador, Daniel Solod, from Guinea in 1961.⁸³ In general, in their determination to change the colonial pattern of external relations, the Casablanca group consistently attempted to balance their former dependence on Western states by forging new economic, political, and cultural links with those communist states from whom they expected to benefit most directly. This stood contrary to the posture of the UAM whose shared heritage with France defined its tendency to preserve the existing order by maintaining ties with the metropole. It should be noted, however, that although the Casablanca states advocated non-alignment, they were economically aligned to the Western industrial powers; although they were interested in widening cooperation with the Communist bloc, they were not prepared to sacrifice the various aid programs launched by the Western powers in the early 1960s.⁸⁴

Last but by no means the least, the Casablanca bloc, like the Monrovia bloc, was interested in the search for pan-African cooperation and unity. However,

whereas the radicals had insisted on the immediate political union of the continent, the Monrovia bloc, more cautiously restricted its interest to seeking economic cooperation between African states. Nigeria, Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Liberia emphasized economic concerns, whereas Guinea, Ghana, and Mali gave primacy to ideological and political interests. Drawing upon the examples of both the United States and the Soviet Union to buttress their argument for political unity, the radicals uncompromisingly championed the cause for unity at the expense of functional-economic cooperation advocated by the majority of Africa's leaders.⁸⁵ A full attempt to adequately review the issue of pan-African unity in the post-colonial era would require a summary of the proceedings of some the several landmark conferences, especially those of the Conferences of the Independent African States (CIAS) and the All-African Peoples Conferences (AAPC). Content analysis of these conferences in conjunction with the expressed beliefs and values of relevant actors, it is argued, would reveal the state of mind of most of the West African leaders on the issue of African unity.⁸⁶

First Conference of Independent African States

At Ghana's independence celebrations, Nkrumah had announced his plans to hold a series of conferences for other independent African states with the specific purpose of discussing problems of common interest to all the independent African states, as well as of exploring ways of consolidating a collective foreign policy to safeguard their hard-won independence. Although the preliminary discussion and

organization of the conferences took place in London among the African ambassadors, the Ghanaian leader also made an effort to contact the leaders of the independent African states directly. For example, a three-man delegation that included the then Minister of Justice, Ako Adjei, the Minister of Defense and External Affairs, Kofi Baako, and the principal organizer, George Padmore (also Nkrumah's adviser on African Affairs), was despatched to the various African capitals and charged with that task.⁸⁷

As already noted, the most controversial theme in post-independence inter-African relations was in the area of African unity. Perhaps because most African states were still under colonial tutelage, this was less so for the first CIAS, held in Accra, Ghana, from April 15-22, 1958, and attended by leaders from all eight independent African states (excepting, of course, the Republic of South Africa): Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, the Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic (Egypt) and Ghana.⁸⁸ The conference marked the first time that representatives of independent African states were meeting together with the aim of forging closer links of international cooperation. Organized and presided over by Nkrumah, the delegations to the conference agreed to discuss the following points:

- (1) exchange of views on foreign policy, especially in relation to the African continent; the future of African dependent territories; the Algerian problem; the racial problem; steps taken to safeguard the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the independent African states;
- (2) examination of the ways and means to promote economic cooperation among African states, based on the exchange of technical, scientific, and educational information with special regard to industrial planning and development;

- (3) formulation of concrete proposals for the exchange of visiting governmental and non-governmental cultural missions among the various countries, leading to a first-hand mutual knowledge and appreciation of one another's culture;
- (4) consideration of the problem of international peace and the conformity with the Charter of the United Nations; and reaffirmation of the principles of the Bandung Asian-African Conference;
- (5) establishment, after the conference, of permanent machinery for consultation on foreign policy.⁸⁹

In general terms, the first CIAS resolved to preserve the unity of purpose and action of African states in international affairs, through joint cooperation especially in foreign policy matters.⁹⁰ The conference's speakers stressed the importance of establishing solid bases for continuing cooperation and of impressing upon the world the unity of the independent African states. It was argued that as long as fundamental unity of outlook on foreign policy was preserved, the independent African states would be able to assert a distinctive "African personality" and speak with one concerted voice. One of the milestones of the conference was the formulation of a collective agreement in foreign policy, especially in relation to the collective policy of positive non-alignment. Nkrumah insisted that it was only by avoiding entanglements in quarrels of the Great Powers that Africans will be able to assert an African personality. The conference further agreed to establish a permanent mechanism for coordinating matters of economic concern to African states.⁹¹ Apart from providing the forum for all independent African states to exchange views, the first CIAS led to the setting up, late in 1958, of an African Group at the UN which provided the early machinery for coordinating African opinions on major, international issues at the

world body.⁹² But the resolutions adopted by the conference were overwhelmingly political. Specifically, eight of the eleven resolutions adopted dealt with political matters, one with economic questions, one with cultural exchanges, and one with administrative machinery.

First All-African Peoples Conference

Although the above resolutions endorsed African unity there was no expressed commitment to a federation of African states. African unity, in the form of a strong federation of states united by a common ideology, pan-Africanism, had always remained the centerpiece of Nkrumah's African policies. The ideas of the pan-African movement as envisioned by the Ghanaian leader entailed nothing less than a complete surrender of political sovereignty for the sake of establishing a United States of Africa. This situation, therefore, left Nkrumah dissatisfied with the outcome of the deliberations, and led to the first AAPC in Accra from December 8-13, 1958. This historic AAPC was thus the result of Nkrumah's fervent desire to harness widespread nationalist sentiments towards the achievement of a Pan-African goal. The Ghanaian leader hoped to coordinate the efforts of the various African political groups. A nongovernmental assembly, the AAPC comprised African political and trade union leaders. In addition, there were observers from such non-African states as Canada, China, Denmark, India, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The AAPC produced a declaration for "a Commonwealth of African States"⁹³ and drafted a constitution which provided for "a United States of

Africa."⁹⁴

The conferees were generally supportive of the independence movement throughout Africa and expressed their conviction that African states should play a more significant role in international diplomacy. Two major themes of African interstate relations underlie many of the speeches and deliberations of the council, which dealt largely with political matters. First, the acquisition of political power by all Africans, throughout the continent, as rapidly as possible. Second, the resolution to avoid the balkanization of West Africa into small, economically unstable states. The conference denounced the artificial frontiers drawn by the imperialist powers, particularly those which cut across ethnic groups, and called for the abolition of such artificial boundaries in the soonest possible time. In short, the conference foresaw the creation of regional groupings throughout the whole of Africa and expressed the need for their ultimate linkage in one African Commonwealth or United States for Africa.⁹⁵ On the economic front, the conference advocated that regional groupings of states in Africa be based on three principles: (1) that only the independent states and countries governed by Africans should join together; (2) that the establishment of regional groupings should not be prejudicial to the ultimate objective of a Pan-African commonwealth; and (3) that adherence to any specific group should depend on the wishes of the people ascertained by referendum on the basis of universal adult suffrage. The AAPC called for the removal of customs and other restrictions on trade among African states and the inclusion of multilateral payment agreements with a view to enhancing economic exchanges and the consequent establishment of an

African Common Market.⁹⁶

Not all the themes espoused at the conference met with unanimous support from the African states and colonies. Notably, with the possible exception of Guinea, the attitudes and behavior of the French-speaking colonies towards these developments was largely one of general skepticism and passivity. In short, there was an articulated reluctance to demand political freedom from France. When interviewed about the conference in Accra, Houphouët-Boigny described it as "destined to produce idle talk and demands for illusory independence."⁹⁷

The Conakry Declaration

In the same year the Accra conferences were held, at the end of September 1958, most of the French territories voted "oui" to remain in the French Community of States in a referendum that General de Gaulle had devised to stave off the inexorable move towards independence by African leaders. However, in the Guinean plebiscite on the matter, Guinean leader Touré persuaded large numbers of Guineans - an overwhelming majority - to vote "non," and Guinea became independent after voting to break away from France. Sékou Touré called on France to recognize the new Republic in October 1958. However, in retaliation, General de Gaulle immediately withdrew French technical assistance and aid and Guinea lost all contact with France. In bitterness and with arrogance and hostility, the French recalled their administrative, technical, and military services and personnel, destroyed all important files and office equipment, cleared the hospital shelves, tore out the telephones,

cracked state dishes and even removed light bulbs from their sockets. According to one account, 4,000 French civil servants, including doctors, teachers, judges and technicians, were withdrawn within a month.⁹⁸ Naturally, this punitive act almost caused the collapse of the Guinean economic structure; it reduced Guinea's trained bureaucracy by 75 percent. In addition, by abstaining from voting for Guinea's membership of the UN in December 1958, the French government opposed its admission into the body, although without success.⁹⁹

Early Attempts at Political Union

Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union

With the base of a then buoyant Ghanaian economy, Nkrumah immediately capitalized on the event of Guinea's struggle for independence from France to advance the idea of a Ghana-Guinea political union. This is arguably another case of the use of economic resources by a state (i.e., Ghana) to advance pan-Africanist ideas. Economic factors are important in interstate cooperative processes especially where so perceived by political leaders. Among other factors, Ghana's financial strength and population, coupled with Nkrumah's strong personality and political ideas, facilitated the increased interactive processes between both countries at that critical period. Both Nkrumah and Touré held a series of negotiations shortly after Guinea had achieved independence between November 21 and 23, 1958. The outcome was the agreement by Ghana to loan Guinea ten million pounds (then equivalent to \$28 million), and the subsequent announcement that both countries had

decided to form a union of West African States.¹⁰⁰ In fact, early in December 1958, the Ghanaian government sent several top officials to Guinea who examined that country's economy, negotiated the loan, and suggested possible ways for economic cooperation.¹⁰¹ This union was indeed the first serious attempt at some form of collaboration between an English-speaking and a French-speaking West African country.¹⁰²

Following the break-up of the Mali Federation, the Republic of Mali joined Guinea and Ghana to form the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union in December 1960. This three-nation union was named the Union of African States (UAS) and was perceived by its founders as the nucleus of the United States of Africa.¹⁰³ The union brought together the three African states considered to be the most radical and most desirous of pan-African unity. In addition, through the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union, Nkrumah, Touré, and Keita planned to follow a common radical orientation and sought bravely to bridge one of the enduring divisions in the West African world - that between French-speaking and English-speaking Africa.¹⁰⁴ It is important to note the resemblance between the formation of the UAS and the establishment of the Ghana-Guinea union. In both cases, the French-speaking territory had suffered sudden economic difficulties. In the case of Guinea, the political catalyst was the total withdrawal of French financial assistance after independence. Similarly, in the Malian situation, it was the collapse of the Mali Federation. A five million pound loan from Ghana in 1960, provided the necessary working capital for Mali as it had for Guinea in 1958.¹⁰⁵ But it was difficult in realistic terms to see the potential for

such non-contiguous states as Ghana and Guinea. If Touré, Nkrumah, and Keita were unable to establish an effective political union, then one major factor was geography. For three states that did not speak a common language and which were not geographically contiguous, political unity was no small endeavor.¹⁰⁶ Thus, by mid-1963, after a limited degree of cultural, economic, and technical cooperation, the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union disintegrated as a formal political entity.

The Saniquellie Summit

In July 1959, after the Conakry declaration, Presidents Tubman, Nkrumah, and Touré met in Saniquellie province, in northern Liberia, to discuss the concepts of African unity and cooperation, after Tubman had written to both the Ghanaian and Guinean leaders on April 7, calling for a meeting to discuss these matters. During the course of the meeting, Tubman and Nkrumah clashed over their different interpretations and perceptions of African unity. Whereas the Ghanaian leader conceived inter-African relations in terms of pursuing a policy of immediate political union, the more conservative Tubman wanted a loose association of states that would concentrate on areas of mutual economic and political interests. Whenever Nkrumah pressed the issue for a union government, Tubman insisted that more time was needed and that fruitful discussions required, as a prerequisite, that more African states become politically independent. By so doing, Tubman "effectively forestalled any immediate decision on the question of political unification."¹⁰⁷

Second Conference of Independent African States

The second CIAS, held in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) from June 15-24, 1960, laid bare the ideological and perceptual differences between African countries especially on the crucial issue of pan-African unity, and the larger issues of elite ideological preferences.¹⁰⁸ It was attended by high level representatives (mostly foreign ministers and delegates) from eleven independent African states plus several dependent territories. Among other states, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, and Ethiopia met to work out a charter that would facilitate the process of cooperation between African states. Contrary to Nkrumah's ideas about continental unity, the Emperor of Ethiopia never addressed the question of political union in his opening speech. He merely emphasized, instead, the need for inter-African cooperation. Indeed, this conference was more controversial than the first CIAS in the sense that it revealed the dual (diametrically opposed) positions of the participants on the issue of inter-African cooperation. Whereas the Casablanca group (Ghana, Morocco, Guinea, and the UAR) enthusiastically advocated and endorsed political union, the Monrovia powers (Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Ethiopia) vehemently opposed it.

The Ghanaian delegation led by the Foreign Minister, Ako Adjei, insistently pressed for delegates' decision on the establishment of a "Union of African States" arguing that Nkrumah, Tubman, and Touré had, at an earlier meeting in Saniquillie,¹⁰⁹ Liberia, on July 19, 1959, agreed on the guiding principles for such an arrangement. In the words of the then Ghanaian Foreign Minister:

It is clear in this declaration of principles (the Saniquellie Declaration) that the Union of African States which the three leaders discussed and

agreed upon is intended to be a political union. Such a political union in their view will provide the framework within which any plans for economic, social and cultural cooperation can, in fact, operate to the best advantage of all. To us in Ghana the concept of African unity is an article of faith. It is a cardinal objective in our policy. We sincerely believe that the Independent African States can, and may some day, form a real political Union -- the Union of African states... It does not matter whether you start with an Association of African states or whether with economic or cultural cooperation... we must start from somewhere, but certainly the Union can be achieved in the end.¹¹⁰

Guinea was, of course, basically in agreement with Ghana's stand on the best possible interpretation of African unity. On the contrary, although he accepted pan-Africanism and closer inter-African cooperation as "the only solution to our problems in Africa," the leader of the Nigerian delegation, Yusuf Maitama Sule, openly disagreed with Ghanaian perceptions of the correct path to African unity. He cautioned that the idea of forming a Union of African States was premature and that Nigeria was not prepared to be party to such an arrangement:

Pan-Africanism is the only solution to our problems in Africa. ... No one in Africa doubts the need to promote Pan-Africanism. ... But we must not be sentimental, we must be realistic. It is for this reason we would like to point out that at this moment the idea of forming a Union of African States is premature. On the other hand, we do not dispute the sincerity and indeed the good intentions of those who advocate it. But we feel such a move is too radical - perhaps too ambitious - to be of lasting benefit. Gradual development of ideas and thought is more lasting. ... It is essential to remember that whatever ideas we may have about Pan-Africanism it will not materialize as quickly as we would like it to if we start from the top downward... We must start from the known to the unknown. At the moment we in Nigeria cannot afford to form union by government with any African states by surrendering our sovereignty...¹¹¹

These events highlight a recurring theme in this study thus far: the analysis of interstate cooperation reveals a combination of both centripetal and centrifugal forces;

the search for African unity, in particular, is full of political cleavages and incitements to controversy as soon as one attempts to examine it closely. Two main views characterized the path to African unity within the broader context of the pan-African movement. Whereas the radical leaders aimed for the complete federation of African states, the conservative leaders were only prepared to discuss issues pertaining to regional cooperation and development. In general, the principal component of pan-Africanism is a belief in the necessity for African interstate unity be it through political unity as the radicals suggested, or through economic and technical cooperation, as the moderates and conservatives preferred.¹¹²

If the conferees were generally over-sensitive to the issue of political amalgamation, they were less so inclined towards that of economic cooperation and other forms of loose association of the policies of African states. Although there was no coordinated response to the issue of African unity, there were agreements on questions of political cooperation about scientific, technical, and cultural arrangements between African states and on the necessity for a concerted policy of condemnation of South Africa's racist policy. On the question of economic cooperation between African states, the conference suggested the establishment of a council of economic cooperation to organize joint African development and commercial banks, as well as to devise other cooperative means for implementing and maintaining African economic unity. Regarding other matters, the conference also proposed the establishment of councils for educational, cultural, and scientific cooperation. However, on the overly sensitive question of political unity, the resolution reflected

the view that although cooperation among African states was essential for the maintenance of their independence and sovereignty, specific designs for unity must be deferred to a later conference.

Second All-African Peoples Conference

The second AAPC held in Tunis from January 25-31, 1960, was more supportive of the position of the radical Casablanca faction. Opening the conference, President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia appealed to Africans to eliminate artificial boundaries and unify the continent. He urged the attainment of independence by peaceful means but expressed support for the use of arms and force where necessary. At this conference, the 1958 constitution was amended but the provision for a "United States of Africa" was retained.¹¹³ The two themes - independence and unity - were re-echoed constantly in the speeches of delegates at the conference.

In terms of inter-African cooperation, the conference agreed to establish an All-African trade union, with an autonomous and central African organization. Specific recommendations for further economic unity included the proposed establishment of a transport company to provide better links between the African countries; the creation of an all-African investment bank; and the removal of customs and trade barriers wherever possible.

Third All-African Peoples Conference

Similarly, the third AAPC, held in Cairo from March 25-31, 1961, maintained

the clamor for a union state for Africa.¹¹⁴ The resolutions adopted by the conference covered the following five general points: (1) decolonization in the form of the political liberation of African states; (2) the development of new patterns of colonialism; (3) the reorganization of national liberation movements; (4) cultural, economic, and social development of the continent; and (5) the broad issue of African unity and solidarity. Concerning the last point, the conference recommended the setting up of the following: (1) an African consultative assembly composed of members representing the parliaments of independent states, which will meet periodically to formulate a common policy of African states; (2) a council of African states to study and implement recommendations of the consultative assembly; (3) a commission of experts to elaborate a common economic policy in order to consolidate African political unity; (4) a commission of African commanders entrusted with the study and organization of a joint defense scheme; and (5) a cultural commission to formulate policy in the field of education and cultural exchanges.

While the resolutions of the AAPC implied the mobilization of the African masses toward the achievement of African unity, it was clear that the real cooperation rested upon the leadership of the nation-states themselves. In the first place, the idea of unification was propounded by a group of people with greater political sophistication, education, and motivation than most of their compatriots. It was to this group of well-traveled people whose horizons spread far beyond the bounds of a village or clan, that pan-Africanism remained a meaningful abstraction. As one perceptive scholar notes:

The most significant argument holds that Pan-Africanism is a movement of the African elite; and that, as such, its ideals are not and cannot be understood by the masses of the African continent. It is, the argument goes, "a movement among governments rather than peoples." Pan Africanists must not dismiss this out of hand. It is, indeed, the African elite that is chiefly concerned with Pan-Africanism.¹¹⁵

To the extent that African leaders are generally reluctant to relinquish an iota of their sovereignty, this fact alone may largely explain why interest in cooperation have failed to produce federal governments in Africa. Simply put, for leaders who latch on to power with no intentions of abandoning it, personality and national power interests stand in direct opposition to the goals of regional cooperation and unity.

Leaders' Perceptions and Orientations

It is evident that the Monrovia leaders were in favor of closer association with the former colonial powers and that they were relatively more unenthusiastic about African unity. At Nigeria's independence, for example, the conservative northern-based Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, glowingly said he was "grateful to the British... whom we have known first as masters, and then as leaders, and finally as partners, but always as friends... We are grateful to those who have brought modern methods of banking and of commerce, and new industries."¹¹⁶ Similarly, another member of the Monrovia group and former Liberian leader, William Tubman, expressed his belief that Britain "has made tangible long-term economic contributions towards the political security and future prosperity of those areas over which she long exerted paternalistic authority."¹¹⁷ In addition, despite

his seemingly anti-European doctrine of négritude, the then Senegalese leader, Sédar Senghor, strongly and consistently advocated increased cooperative ties and unity between Africa and Europe.

On the controversial issue of pan-Africanism, the views of the Monrovia leaders were equally predictable. The ultra-conservative Ivorian leader, Houphouët-Boigny, never abandoned for one moment his ideological belief that continental African unity could never be achieved and, in fact, at the expense of inter-African cooperation and contrary to the long-standing principles of the Organization of African Unity (OAU),¹¹⁸ he consistently championed the course for "dialogue" with apartheid South Africa.¹¹⁹ Indeed, Houphouët-Boigny himself has reportedly said, quoting Goethe: "I prefer injustice to disorder: one can die of disorder, one does not die of injustice; and injustice can be repaired."¹²⁰

Similarly, reputed to be an inward-looking gradualist who believed that "drastic change makes people unhappy,"¹²¹ and that "attempts to lead others, or militancy in general, are immoral,"¹²² the former Nigerian Prime Minister replied on the issue of African unity:

I think we are not ready for it... We in Nigeria have so many other problems to solve... First we have to put our house in order and to create prosperity in our own country... The recently widely discussed plan for a United States of Africa will only create new problems. Nigeria still needs many decades to attain the level of other countries. Our most pressing problems are here and only here.¹²³

Observers generally describe Balewa as a "calm moderate man," with a knack for compromise, "his personality being more calculated to placate than to provoke."¹²⁴ It follows, then, that an innocuous perception of events coupled with domestic

problems at home militates against active foreign policy posture abroad. Although Balewa believed in Pan-Africanism, he was in favor of proceeding very slowly in cultural and economic areas and extremely slowly in political affairs. Balewa's emphasis was on cooperation rather than unity. As a result, his policies were considered by most political analysts as generally too conservative. By virtue of size, Nigeria was naturally expected to take an active, indeed a leading, role in the quest for African unity. Unfortunately, in the early post-colonial years, Nigeria was not blessed with a leader of Kwame Nkrumah's calibre who could unite the country at home¹²⁵ and play a dynamic role advancing Pan-Africanism abroad.¹²⁶

Consequently, the conduct of Nigeria's foreign policy under the first civilian government (1960-1966) was insipid and passive, largely reflecting preoccupation with post-independence domestic issues, ethnic rivalries, and economic development. In short, the conservative northern-based government of Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa was little disposed to events and initiatives beyond Nigeria's borders.¹²⁷

As suggested earlier, in addition to an active leadership, the state of the national economy plays a fundamental role in the international system. Take the case of Ghana from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s. At independence in 1957, the finances of the country were in fairly good shape. Apart from the fact that the income per head was about 50 pounds, which then was over twice that of Nigeria, Nkrumah took over foreign reserves amounting to 200 million pounds and inherited a foreign debt of only 20 million pounds. Furthermore, Ghana was producing approximately 40 percent of the world's cocoa and possessed such minerals as gold,

diamonds, and bauxite. In fact, for these resources, The Economist was to claim later, that on her independence, Ghana was "the richest looking West African country."¹²⁸ We argue that the active leadership of Ghana, coupled with the perception of a buoyant economy, greatly influenced her pan-Africanist role in the 1960s. For example, among other things, Nkrumah could make available to Guinea an interest-free loan of 10 million pounds after which both countries planned closer association culminating months later into the Ghana-Guinea union - the so-called nucleus for a United States of African states. Also, partly due to her sound economic base, Ghana made an effective ideological commitment to national liberation causes all over Africa, and was specifically the most ardent supporter of liberation movements in Portuguese Guinea, Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa. In this sense, Nkrumah's commitment to liberation was demonstrated by the financial and military aid he gave the freedom fighters. Financial assistance was also extended to nationalist organizations such as the 10 thousand pounds that was delivered to Kamuzu Banda's political movement in 1959.¹²⁹ Finally, it was largely Ghana's economic and financial strength that made it possible for her to attain the enviable status of being the first country to send troops to the Congo (now Zaire) in July 1960, to make financial concessions to Upper Volta following the Paga agreement of June 1961, and to organize the unprecedented series of pan-Africanist conferences in Accra between 1958 and 1962.¹³⁰

But national financial solvency, defined as a state's ability to match expenditure with income, subscribes to no ideology, and is essential for continued

political and organizational success. By 1965, amidst intractable economic problems, the Ghanaian reserves had all been spent and foreign debt was about 400 million pounds (approximately 300 million pounds were owed creditors in Western Europe and North America). Also, by 1965, the balance of payments had hit a record deficit of 80 million pounds and the Ghanaian economy had ground to a halt. Among other factors, we further suggest that the ailing Ghanaian economy (especially the fall in the world price of cocoa), deprived Nkrumah the necessary material base for an activist foreign policy, resulted in his overthrow from office, and "led to the collapse of Pan-Africanism as a political movement."¹³¹

Apart from this effect on the demise of pan-Africanism, another major impact of Ghanaian economic doom centered around the fact that liberation organizations in London and all over Africa were deprived of a major source of material support for their legitimate activities.¹³² Indeed, in the field of pan-Africanism, Ghana went from being the leading spirit of the movement to opposing all radical ideas that were associated with Nkrumah. The new government (under the National Liberation Council [NLC]) abdicated the status of Ghana as a haven for freedom fighters when it closed down their camps and expelled them.¹³³ Although the NLC government resumed payment of dues to the Special Fund of the OAU Liberation Committee,¹³⁴ its support was noticeably minimal. To make matters worse, following the restoration of civilian government in October 1969, the Busia government advocated "dialogue" with South Africa and other white minority-ruled territories in Africa.¹³⁵ Aggressive pan-Africanism has consequently been obliged to fall back upon Guinea

and Mali in West Africa. But since these states are generally quite poor, the movement has transformed into a more sober and pragmatic form of pan-Africanism, more defensive than dynamic, thus strengthening the argument for a construed victory of the moderates over the radicals in the pan-African movement in West Africa. Practical efforts at realizing a unionist philosophy (such as the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union) came to a grief as emphasis changed to a more gradual approach in which economic groupings are seen as forerunners of wider aims of a political nature.

New Realities: Elements of Continuity and Change

Only meaningful symbols can inspire credibility and contribute to national development. Political independence served as a symbol of legitimacy in West Africa for a time. The nature of the ideological distinctions between the radical and the moderate-cum-conservative states in West African politics has blurred considerably since the mid-60s but, in terms of a revival of ideology in West African politics, patterns still persist. From the late 1960s onward, the nature of the ideological dialogue began to change as the so-called African socialists retreated before a wide array of critics.

In the main, many African governments have had to accommodate their perceptions and preferences to the constricting realities of nation-building. With more states gaining political independence and coming of age, the new realities in the post-decolonialization era focused on how best to address the wave of rising popular expectations. With the arrival of the younger generations on the political scene, it

was inevitable that they should look for other symbols of legitimacy. The major task was the widening chasm between public aspirations and the capability of the state to deliver the expected goods. Following the process of decolonization, the masses expected the state to propound and deliver a magic formula for prosperity and increased economic growth.¹³⁶ To the majority of the people, the abstract and complex arguments for ending colonial rule and for pan-Africanist and even nationalist consciousness had to be expressed in terms of more readily related problems of daily existence. If the state of affairs was not to misfire in time into a counter-revolution of rising frustration, economic development, which would satisfy the people by providing jobs, modern amenities, and comfort, would have to be the primary goal of African states. The major solution was to be found in governmental performance particularly on the economic front, namely, how was the state to deal with the problems of limited trained personnel, capital resources, social infrastructure, and technological know-how necessary for economic development? Indeed, more recent events in many African countries have shown that people have started looking for more authentic signs of legitimacy in their rulers. In fact, the various populations have started judging the leaders in terms of their competence in satisfying their material wants and justifying their hopes for the future. Consequently, the increased trend towards a more pragmatic approach reflected the underlying realities of underdevelopment that largely affected these post-colonial states in the global system. Nevertheless, elements of African elite perceptions and political economies were still widely differentiated along two axes: the one defined by state ideology and the other

by governmental performance.¹³⁷

In the first instance, there was challenge from the left where the ideological axis was represented in a new doctrinal trend of African Marxists who gained momentum when military regimes in Benin (in 1974) and Ethiopia (in 1976) declared Marxism-Leninism (or revolutionary socialism) as their ideological guide. Perhaps more dramatic and serious was the rapid disintegration of the Portuguese African colonial empire, whose successor states (represented by Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde in West Africa) armed themselves with national liberation creeds that were somewhat vaguely informed by the Marxist-Leninist ideology. Since the mid-1970s, Marxist and radical regimes all over Africa have formed formal and informal networks of cooperation and, in West Africa, this is perhaps most evident in the friendship and cooperation treaty between Benin and Guinea, and in the defense agreement between Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.¹³⁸

At the same time, even before the beginning of the 1980s, there was a pervasive realization in Africa that Marxist-Leninist and socialist principles were simply not working as well as initially expected. Despite the apparent continuity of radical philosophies there was a significant level of change. Some academic critics (and African leaders themselves) saw that, particularly in domestic affairs, indices of development appeared to be supportive of pragmatic and eclectic rather than strikingly ideological programs.¹³⁹ As Liebenow summarizes this case, many leaders came to the realization "that the ideological commitment to central planning, nationalization of resources, and collectivization of agriculture have had disastrous results."¹⁴⁰ Many

have argued that whatever the political value derived by an African regime from a rhetorical espousal of socialism, the economies which have fared the best in post-independence Africa appear to be those in which the leaders have consciously downplayed an explicit, integrated ideology in favor of pragmatic solutions to a vast array of problems.¹⁴¹

In recent times, for the developing states of West Africa, continuity has jostled alongside change on an ideology-performance nexus. In general, to varying degrees, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, and Ivory Coast have represented and remained the conservative-cum-moderate forces in the subregion. For much of the 1980s, left-wing state activism in the area - what Claude Ake has aptly termed "defensive radicalism"¹⁴² - has occasionally persisted especially between such advocates of socialist-oriented principles as Benin, Ghana, Cape Verde, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau. Although fewer in number, the radical and populist leaders are symbolized, for instance, in the likes of the regime of Thomas Sankara, who, upon assuming office in August 1983, vehemently opposed the moral and material corruption that was prevalent in Upper Volta as at that time.¹⁴³ One year later, Sankara symbolically renamed Upper Volta, Burkina Faso (Land of Upright Men),¹⁴⁴ instituted agrarian reforms, and enacted other laws, which were effectively enforced by nationalizing all land and mineral wealth in the country. On the salient dimension of extra-African affairs, when French President Francois Mitterrand visited Ougadougou in 1986, Sankara publicly denounced French involvement with apartheid South Africa, and engaged the visitor in a spirited match of wits on the issue of "neo-

colonialism."¹⁴⁵

In addition, regional wrangling between African states in the West African subregion persists within the context of elite ideological preference and personality clashes, albeit in subtler forms. The nomination of socialist-oriented Sankara in the Abuja summit of ECOWAS, in 1987, sparked off a diplomatic row as Togo and Ivory Coast (with some measure of sympathy from Nigeria and Senegal) succeeded in blocking the Burkinabe nomination. Relations between Togo and Burkina Faso had deteriorated since the Eyadema government accused Sankara and Rawlings (ideologically compatible allies)¹⁴⁶ of complicity in the attempted coup against his government in September 1986.¹⁴⁷

It is within the context of the subregion that one needs to understand the present realities and challenges facing African governments in foreign affairs especially as their ability to find adequate solutions is manifestly limited when considering global and continental institutions. There has been a large-scale abandonment of romantic nationalism and the chimerical notion of African unity as African leaders are recognizing, at the end of the decolonization era, the importance of tailoring international behavior to match hard economic realities. The disenchantment with continental and national solutions to African problems are obvious at both the economic and political dimensions, with an emergent search throughout the continent for subregional solutions, and a corresponding effort into the organization of activities at that level. However, in terms of intra-African relations in West Africa, the mantle of leadership has recently been transferred from Ghana in the

1950s and 1960s, to Nigeria in the 1970s and 1980s. In several ways, the formation of ECOWAS, in 1975, reflected the fundamental strength of Nigeria in the subregion's affairs.

The hierarchy of states in West Africa is largely set with the progressive phenomenon of Nigeria's dominance offset by two factors: (1) the need to accommodate Francophone power centers (such as Ivory Coast and Senegal) within the affairs of the subregion, so that they do not oscillate toward France, and (2) the cyclical changes in the economic bases of Nigerian power, particularly in relation to changes in the price of petroleum. Although diplomatic initiatives, especially over regional cooperation in West Africa and the question of Southern Africa, have provided evidence of Nigeria's influence on the continent, it is necessary to consider the basis upon which this influence rests. Reminiscent of cocoa for Ghana in the 1950s and 1960s, the beginning of international energy and economic crises coupled with the sudden surge in oil prices after 1973,¹⁴⁸ had influenced the perceptions of Nigerian decision makers about the power status of the country and its implications for African foreign policy. The establishment of ECOWAS was due principally to the changing economic status of Nigeria as the dominant economic power in the West African subregion, the ending of domestic hostilities and internal crises, and the relentless diplomatic offensive of Yakubu Gowon who, in terms of sheer political effectiveness (cutting across ideologies), promptly threw Nigeria's full weight behind the new initiative. Due to its power, wealth, and enormous size, Nigeria's presence in ECOWAS has established her as a strong "core" state willing to provide the

necessary side-payments to weaker members of the coalition in order to sustain interstate cooperative arrangements in the subregion.¹⁴⁹

Balewa had underestimated Nigeria's resources and capabilities and, under his leadership, Nigeria suffered subconsciously from a curious inferiority complex which often placed her on the "response" end of the response-challenge continuum. Because Nigeria was seen as a "sleeping giant" during the 1960s, there was little impact made upon African affairs especially in light of passive leadership and factional strife in the civil war. However, contrary to Balewa's quiet, cautious, and conservative policies in the 1960s, Nigeria's change in the level of commitment in African and global diplomacy became particularly more obvious and accentuated in the 1970s with the departure of Gowon, in 1975, and the accession of Murtala Mohammed to power. The new tempo of this leadership role was not only an automatic consequence of economic power but derived also from a change of attitude towards foreign policy under the more assertive and vigorous Mohammed/Obasanjo regimes.¹⁵⁰ But clearly, Nigeria's military and economic resources gave it the opportunity to play an important mediatory role in the affairs of the continent. With a volatile mixture of oil boom and reformist military in the 1970s, Nigerian foreign policy became more Afrocentric, "'active,' bold and, to some writers, even radical."¹⁵¹ As one scholar puts it:

The buoyant economy and the increasing desire to play a role in international affairs commensurate with the country's perceived strength provided the impetus for a radical shift in both the content of policy and its implementation. The Angolan crisis, and Nigeria's rebuff of U.S. advice in recognizing the MPLA government...marked a watershed by showing a new aggressiveness in foreign policy.¹⁵²

The increased capability of Lagos - the large resources from the sale of petroleum - provided Nigeria with the economic base, and the accompanying confidence, to give more substance to its foreign policy.¹⁵³ For example, Nigeria became a small-scale source of foreign aid, particularly in the West African subregion. Recipients of generous grants and loans included Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Togo, and Gambia. If Nigeria sought to influence events and courses of action on the continent, it looked as if other states expected Nigeria to pay the economic price for the involvement. The requests were varied: to build hospitals, roads, and factories; to participate in mining projects; to participate in industrial projects; to sell petroleum at concessionary rates; and so on. There were also participations in the cement and sugar factories in the Republic of Benin, in the bauxite and iron ore projects in the Republic of Guinea; roads were wholly financed linking Nigeria and the Republic of Benin, and between Nigeria and Niger, and oil was sold at deferred payment schedules to Ivory Coast and Ghana among other states.¹⁵⁴ Finally, Nigeria made huge and generous grants to liberation movements including an outright grant of \$20 million made in the mid-1970s to the MPLA government, in addition to military hardware from rifles to jet fighters (MIGs) which were sent to Luanda in increasingly large quantities without due consideration for quid pro quo.¹⁵⁵

However, like Ghana in the mid-1960s, the 1981 glut on the world oil market made clear the dangers of relying on a single source of income. Dependence on a monocrop or monomineral economy is a threat to the economic prosperity of African states and their independent foreign policies as was the case with Nkrumah's Ghana

and its dependence on cocoa exports.¹⁵⁶ Nigeria's new dependence on oil revenue is revealed by fluctuations in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) over the 1970s. National income grew dramatically in the 1970s, after the war and before the slump of 1978-79. Revenue was again buoyant as oil prices continued to rise from mid-1979 to mid-1981 but the new plunge in sales and prices in the mid-1981 led to a rapid decline in both production - down from almost 2 billion barrels a day to 1.0 or 0.5 billion - and price - down from over \$40.00 to \$36.50 a barrel. Given Nigeria's major commitments to its continental, southern African, and West African policies, it is obvious that the state could not adjust to a more frugal life-style. For much of the 1980s, a worrisome economic situation in view of changes in the world petroleum market left little time for concerted foreign policy development. Although indications are that an active role is still desired, internal problems and domestic distractions continue to push Nigeria back towards a passive role. With a transformation from oil boom to gloom and doom, Nigeria, thus, is in a restrained period and mood of austerity and modesty, and the missionary phase of militant foreign policy is over.¹⁵⁷

References and footnotes

1. Studies about on inter-African cooperation in West Africa, in particular, and on the continent in general. See for example, William J. Foltz, From French West Africa to the Mali Federation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); Reginald H. Green and K. G. V. Krishna, Economic Cooperation in Africa (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1967); Reginald H. Green and Ann Seidman, Unity or Poverty? The Economics of Pan-Africanism (Baltimore: Penguin, 1968); Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Unity (New York: Vintage Books, 1969); Claude E. Welch, Jr., Dream and Unity: Pan-Africanism and Political Unity in West Africa (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966); Ali A. Mazrui, Towards A Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967); Edmund David Cronon, Black Moses (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964).
2. See Africa, South of the Sahara, 1989, Eighteenth Edition (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1988), pp. 344, 305. The figures for Cape Verde are based on official estimates for 1985; those for The Gambia are based on the 1983 census.
3. Marx extends the idea of an inversion to include the critique which the Young Hegelians had carried out of religion and Hegel's philosophy arguing that their critique was dependent on very Hegelian premises because they believe that the task was to liberate men from mistaken ideas. Marx argues that "they are only fighting against 'phrases.' They forget, however, that to these phrases they themselves are only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world" (p. 41). Thus, the inversion Marx now terms ideology subsumes both old and young Hegelians and consists in starting from consciousness instead of material reality. Marx affirms, on the contrary, that the real problems of humanity are not mistaken ideas but real social contradictions and that the former are a consequence of the latter. See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, part 1, ed., C. J. Arthur (New York: International Publishers, 1985).
4. See "Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy," Karl Marx, Early Writings, introd. by Lucio Colletti (New York: Vintage Books, 1975), p. 426.
5. Quoted in Franz Jakubowski, Ideology and Superstructure in Historical Materialism (London: Allison and Busby, 1976), pp. 98-111. See chapter 5 of same book on the concept of ideology.

6. Tom B. Bottomore, ed., A Dictionary of Marxist Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 220-221.
7. Jorge Larraín, Marxism and Ideology (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1983), p. 4.
8. Tom B. Bottomore, ed., op. cit. (1983), pp. 220-221.
9. Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1936), p. 55. See also, Henk E. S. Woldring, Karl Mannheim: The Development of His Thought: Philosophy, Sociology, and Social Ethics With A Detailed Biography (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), pp. 191-193; and David Kettler, Volker Meja and Nico Stehr, Karl Mannheim (New York: Tavistock Publications, 1984), pp. 63-76. For brief review of Mannheim's particular and total conceptions of ideology, see Colin Loader, The Intellectual Development of Karl Mannheim: Culture, Politics, and Planning (London: Cambridge University Press, 1985), especially pp. 102, 110-111.
10. Karl Mannheim, op. cit. (1936), p. 55. In African politics, the ideological obstacles may sometimes involve the problem of falsified reality. Ideology constructed to deal with realities is misplaced and misrepresented when leaders attribute all societal ills that may emanate from more fundamental causes to colonialism. When these ills persist after independence, the leaders attribute the failure to neo-colonialism and box the intellectual circle. Although our analysis here rests on simplistic assumptions about human behavior in politics (which cannot be proven), it is nevertheless significant to distinguish between ideology as a screen to hide reality (where ideology represents a cover-up for failure) and ideology as a guide to action within reality (where ideology serves as a means to productive actions). Whereas the former may lead to national suicide, the latter can be a rational guide to action.
11. Karl Mannheim, op. cit. (1936), p. 56.
12. ibid.
13. ibid., pp. 57-58. Henk E. S. Woldring, op. cit. (1987), pp. 191-192.
14. ibid., p. 58.
15. Martin Minogue and Judith Malloy, eds., African Aims and Attitudes: Selected Documents (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974).
16. The New Encyclopedia Britannica, Fifteenth Edition, vol. 20 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1988) p. 831.
17. Joseph Frankel, National Interest (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 116.

18. Indeed, Frankel suggests that whereas some western scholars argue about the place of ideology in the foreign policies of the Soviet Union and China, "it seems clear that all Communist decision makers are governed both by considerations of ideology and of political power and national interest." *ibid.*, pp. 116-117.
19. For a discussion of this point, see Vernon McKay, "Research Needs," in McKay, ed., African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), pp. 177-178.
20. Joseph Frankel, *op. cit.* (1970), p. 118.
21. See Africanus Horton, West African Countries and Peoples (London: W. J. Johnson, 1868), p. iii. For a recent biography of Horton, see Christopher Fyfe, Africanus Horton: West African Scientist and Patriot 1835-1883 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972). See also the original writings entitled, "Horton and the Idea of Independence," in Henry S. Wilson, Origins of West African Nationalism (London: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 157-230.
22. Hollis Lynch, Edward Wilmot Blyden: Pan-Negro Patriot, 1832-1912 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 250.
23. Casely-Hayford initiated the move toward the formation of the National Congress of British West Africa, at Accra, in March 1920. Colonial Office (Public Record Office, London) 224/54/2760: Resolutions of the Congress of British West Africa Held in Accra, Gold Coast, March 11-29, 1920. See Donald S. Rothchild, Toward Unity in Africa: A Study of Federalism in British Africa (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960), p. 179. See also, Immanuel Geiss, The Pan-African Movement: A History of Pan-Africanism in America, Europe and Africa (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1974), pp. 284-304; and Henry S. Wilson, Origins of West African Nationalism (London: St Martin's Press, 1969), especially pp. 312-380.
24. These demands by the delegation were turned down by Lord Milner, then Secretary of State.
25. The West African Students Union (WASU) was founded in London on August 7, 1925. Its president then was Bankole-Bright, and it embraced students from all four British colonies of West Africa. Although after 1928 membership was opened to all students of African descent, the West African elements in the organization predominated throughout.
26. Notable in this regard were also those activities of WASU that categorically included the demand for the independence of all the West African colonies.
27. Kobina Sekyi, "The Parting of Ways" (1927), p. 23, in "Sekyi Papers," Acc. 464/64, Cape Coast Regional Archives, Ghana. See also S. K. B. Asante, "The Politics

of Confrontation: The Case of Kobina Sekyi and the Colonial System in Ghana," Universitas, vol. 6, no. 2, New Series (November 1977), pp. 15-38.

28. See Victor T. Levine, "Africa in the World," Ali A. Mazrui and Toby K. Levine, eds., The Africans: A Reader (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986), p. 253. For historical accounts of political activity during this period, see G. Wesley Johnson, "African Political Activity in French West Africa, 1900-1940," in J. B. Webster, "Political Activity in British West Africa, 1900-1940," J. F. A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder, eds., History of West Africa, vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 542-567 and 568-595, respectively.

29. For an expose of these resolutions, see Victor Levine's article in Ali Mazrui and Victor Levine, eds., op. cit. (1986), p. 255.

30. Quoted by D. Hargreaves, Decolonization in Africa (London: Longman Group, 1988), p. 83. Specifically, Nkrumah had talked of the formation of a Union of African Socialist Republics in West Africa.

31. Quoted by Immanuel Geiss, op. cit. (1974), p. 412.

32. *ibid.*

33. See Vincent B. Thompson, Africa and Unity: The Evolution of Pan Africanism (London: Longman Group, 1969), pp. 89-90, 133. See also, Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965), pp. 153-154.

34. See Adekunle Ajala, Pan-Africanism: Evolution, Progress and Prospects (London: Andre Deutsch, 1974), pp. 12-13.

35. Vincent B. Thompson, op. cit. (1969), p. 133.

36. S. K. B. Asante, "Kwame Nkrumah and Pan-Africanism: The Early Phase, 1945-1961," Universitas, New Series, vol. 3, no. 1 (October 1973), pp. 36-49.

37. Neo-functionalists emphasize regional economic functionalism as a prerequisite for international integration. For an introduction to the various works on functionalism, see Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Integration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); "The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America," Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 5 (1967); "Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe," in Joseph Nye, Jr., ed., International Regionalism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968); Ernst B. Haas and Phillippe Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projection about Unity in Latin America," in Amitai Etzioni, ed., International Political Communities (New York: Garden City, 1966); Michael Haas, "International Integration," in Michael Haas, ed., International Systems: A Behavioral Approach (New York: Chandler Publishers, 1974).

38. Claude Welch estimates that between the World Wars, "there was practically no contact" between Anglophone and Francophone West African leaders, and that this lack of contact explains, in part, the seeming limitation of the ideology to the English-speaking areas until in the 1950s. Welch, op. cit. (1966), p. 16.

39. Immanuel Geiss, The Pan-African Movement: A History of Pan-Africanism in America, Europe, and Africa (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1974), p. 305.

40. For example, Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide, Revised Edition (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965). Padmore only treats it briefly. See George Padmore Pan-Africanism or Communism? The Coming Struggle for Africa (London: D. Dobson, 1956).

41. For example, Geiss defines Négritude as originally "an almost literary, philosophical and cultural group which did not adopt political overtones until long after World War II." Immanuel Geiss, op. cit. (1974).

42. J. Ayodele Langley, Pan-Africanism and Nationalism in West Africa 1900-1945: A Study in Ideology and Social Classes (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 286.

43. Among the most important of these organizations included Touvalou Houenou's Ligue Universelle pour la defense de la Race Noire, the Comite de la defense de la Race Negre (CDRN) led by the Senegalese Lamine Senghor and the Ligue de la defense de la Race Negre (LDRN) led by Tiemoho Garan-Kouyate and Abdou Koite (both of Soudan, now Mali). For a detailed and incisive analysis of these movements, see J. Ayodele Langley, op. cit. (1973), pp. 286-325.

44. Geiss, op. cit. (1974), p. 319.

45. Adu Boahen with J. F. Ade Ajayi and Michael Tidy, Topics in West African History, Second Edition (London: Longman Group, 1986), p. 140.

46. In West Africa, "Only France expected to 'assimilate' its colonial subjects to the point where, not only culturally but legally and politically, they would actually be Frenchmen." Edward Mortimer, France and the Africans 1944-1960: A Political History (New York: Walker and Company, 1969), p. 32. For other literature on the assimilation policy, see Raymond F. Betts, Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory (1890-1914) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 36-61.

47. For instance, in Dahomey, the passive resistance by Africans against the raising of taxes by 500 percent and the high prices of imported goods, was promptly repressed with extreme brutality and armed force in 1923.

48. Frederick Pedler, Main Currents of West African History 1940-1978 (London: Macmillan Press, 1979), pp. 55-59.

49. J. A. Webster, A. A. Boahen with Michael Tidy, The Revolutionary Years: West Africa Since 1800, Second Edition (London: Longman Group, 1980), p. 313.
50. It is significant to note that the so-called radical programs of the RDA did not even include any serious and coherent demand for political independence. Nevertheless, the organization had considerable following throughout Francophone Africa. For example, by 1950, it had 700,000 members and was the largest political organization in Africa. It was also the dominant party of the Ivory Coast, Mali, Guinea, Upper Volta and Niger (in West Africa).
51. Frederick Pedler, op. cit. (1979), p. 56.
52. The Loi Cadre reforms thus provided wholly elected territorial assemblies with an executive and chief minister and extended a large measure of internal self-government to Francophone West Africa.
53. As Delorme recounts, a split resulted within the RDA, between Houphouët-Boigny's policies and those of Sékou Touré who, like Senghor, supported a federal grouping of Francophone West African territories, with the creation of supra-national organs, a centralized Executive and a Federal Parliament. See Nicole Delorme, "The Foreign Policy of the Ivory Coast," in Olajide Aluko, ed., The Foreign Policies of African States (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), p. 127.
54. The federation was named after the ancient empire of Mali in West Africa. For a detailed study, see Foltz, op. cit. (1965).
55. An alternative explanation offered elsewhere is that the Ivory Coast played a role in the dismantling of the federations in order to preserve Ivorian revenues from being shared with poor states. See J. A. Wester, A. A. Boahen with Michael Tidy, op. cit. (1980), pp. 318-319. Whatever the case may be, these explanations underscore the significance of economics in the relations between states.
56. Frederick Pedler, op. cit. (1979), pp. 63-64.
57. ibid., pp. 64-65. Senghor accused the Senegalese leaders of receiving training from the French Communist Party. See his article in Foreign Affairs (January 1961), p. 241.
58. Adekunle Ajala, op. cit. (1974), p. 3.
59. Immanuel Geiss, op. cit. (1974), p. 421.
60. See the account of this by Colin Legum, op. cit. (1965); A. El-Ayouty, The Organization of African Unity After Ten Years (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975); Vincent B. Thompson, op. cit. (1969); J. Woronoff, Organization of African Unity (New York: Meruchen, 1970). Although the categories represent various attempts to classify African states into different camps, they can become a trap for loose thinking especially

when it is considered that African states often shift their positions on the radical-to-conservative spectrum, thus raising questions about the validity of the ideological labels.

61. The discussions between Houphouët-Boigny and Sékou Touré dates back to September 1955 in Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA) Congress in Bamako over the future of West and Equatorial African federations. Contrary to Houphouët-Boigny's position, Sékou Touré had maintained federalist views on the fate of Francophone West Africa. See Michael Crowder and Donald Cruise O'Brien, "French West Africa, 1945-1960," J. F. A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder, eds., History of West Africa, vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), especially pp. 689-690. See also, Nicole Delorme, "The Foreign Policy of the Ivory Coast," in Olajide Aluko, ed., The Foreign Policies of African States (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), p. 127.

62. From 1946 to 1958 the differences of opinion was whether or not French West Africa should become federal or confederal. Senghor wanted a federated French-speaking Africa whereas Houphouët-Boigny wanted the confederal type which later prevailed with the Loi Cadre of 1956. For a synopsis of this competition for influence in French West Africa, see J. A. Webster, A. A. Boahen with Michael Tidy, op. cit. (1980), pp. 317-319. See also, Vernon McKay, "International Conflict Patterns," in McKay, ed., op. cit. (1966), pp. 6-7. See also, Nicole Delorme's article in Olajide Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1977), pp. 62, 116-120.

63. The representatives of twenty independent African states met in Lagos, Nigeria, from January 25 to 30, 1962, to discuss proposals for inter-African cooperation. The theme at this conference was insistence upon noninterference and strict limitation of inter-African cooperation to the fields of functional cooperation. The Casablanca Five, although initially accepting invitations, decided to boycott when the Algerian government in exile was not admitted. For details, see Joseph R. L. Sterne, "The Lagos Conference," Africa Report, February 1962, pp. 3 - 6, 23; "The Lagos Decisions," West Africa, February 10, 1962, p. 149.

64. For details on Brazzaville Powers, see Hella Pick's pieces entitled "The Brazzaville Twelve and How They Came To Be," Africa Report, May 1961, pp. 2, 8, 12, 15; and "French-speaking States Seek Common Policies," Africa Report, December 1960, p. 12.

65. When the representatives of twenty independent African states met in Monrovia from May 8 to 12, 1961, they agreed to consider the means for promoting better understanding and cooperation towards attaining unity in Africa, and threats to peace and stability in Africa. Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, the Sudan, and the United Arab Republic (UAR) were unrepresented at the conference. See "The Monrovia Conference," Africa Report, June 1961, p. 5; "Independent Africa in Monrovia," West Africa, May 20, 1961, p. 539. Later, economists from nineteen of the twenty states (Ethiopia excepted, Libya added) met in Dakar from July 17-23, 1961, in pursuance of a recommendation adopted in May at the Monrovia conference, and reached common

agreement on sixteen draft resolutions covering economic, financial, social welfare, and other forms of cooperation. See Africa Report, August 1961, p. 11; and West Africa, July 22, 1961, p. 799; and July 29, 1961, p. 817.

66. See "African Leaders Converse at Rival 'Summits,'" Africa Report, January 1961, p. 11. See also, "Pan-Africa and the Congo," West Africa, January 14, 1961, p. 31; "African Summit Meeting," West Africa, January 7, 1961, p. 11.

67. Colin Legum, op. cit. (1965).

68. Immanuel Geiss, op. cit. (1974).

69. But this point should not be stretched too far. It is important to bear in mind that, within the Casablanca group, there were salient differences between the leaders of Ghana and Guinea. The strong personalities of Nkrumah and Sékou Touré sometimes made cooperation difficult. Although both leaders were generally hostile to colonialism and committed to African unity, it nevertheless did appear that they viewed unity from different perspectives. With Ghana's financial power, population, and early accession to independence, Nkrumah's notion of the concept of unity (for instance, within the context of the Ghana-Guinea union) was by far less modest than Touré's. In addition, there was also a form of "competitive radicalism" between Ghana and Guinea, and Nkrumah was occasionally careful not to be outshone on the left by Sékou Touré.

70. Put differently, whereas other African states generally disagreed on major events, the Casablanca states were very cohesive as was shown consistently over time (universally) in their votes at the UN on major issues. See Thomas Hovet, Jr., Africa in the United Nations (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1963); see also, George W. Shepherd, Nonaligned Black Africa: An International Subsystem (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1970), p. 19. For other more substantive assessments of the early role of African states at the UN, see Gwendolen M. Carter, "The Impact of the African States in the United Nations," in Robert Gardiner, M. J. Anstee and C. L. Patterson, eds., Africa and the World (Addis Ababa: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 19-27; see also, John H. Spencer, "Africa at the UN: Some Observations," in William John Hanna, ed., Independent Black Africa: The Politics of Freedom (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), pp. 542-554.

71. Ali A. Mazrui, "Africa is One: The View from the Sahara," Ali Mazrui and Toby Levine, The Africans: A Reader (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986), p. 267.

72. Crawford Young, Ideology and Development in Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 155. For this same point about post-colonial African leaders in general, see Richard Bissell, "An Introduction to the New Africa," Richard E. Bissell and Michael S. Radu, eds., Africa in the Post-Decolonization Era (New Brunswick, U.S.A.: Transaction Books, 1984), pp. 4-5.

73. W. Arthur Lewis, Politics of West Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 47. The term "neo-colonialism" was used to refer to all manifestations of foreign domination - political, economic, and cultural - of a country that has already attained sovereign status.

74. Then, as is largely the case now, former colonies which, having achieved independence, found that they could not so easily extricate themselves from the crippling economic ties with developed industrial countries, referred to their status as being victims of neo-colonialism. For an exposition of some of these views, see Kwame Nkrumah, Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (London: Nelson and Sons, 1965). Note also that the Guinean government established Comptoir Guinéen de Commerce Extérieur to take charge of import-export operations, and Mali created Société Maliène d'Importation et Exportation (SOMIEX) for the same purpose. It should be stated that efforts at state control (especially in agriculture) were generally inefficient as output was low. For example, in Ghana, Nkrumah's parastatal control body in the form of state farms stifled local initiatives and the cooperatives failed to make much progress. Similarly, in Sékou Touré's Guinea, the collectivization of farms and state control of the marketing of agricultural produce never led to the expected rise in output. In both Mali and Guinea, there was evidently lack of rural interest in such measures coupled with the general weakness of the bureaucratic and coercive structures that was needed to manage and impose such policies.

75. Nkrumah often accused Francophone African leaders of being French "stooges" instead of standing up to the African personality. See Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963); Consciencism (London: Heinmann, 1964). For some actual citing of this term, see also, Ali A. Mazrui, Africa's International Relations: The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1977), p. 53; and W. Arthur Lewis, op. cit. (1965), p. 45.

76. Robert Legvold, Soviet Policy in West Africa (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 118, 142.

77. W. Arthur Lewis, op. cit. (1965), p. 48.

78. See George Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism: The Coming Struggle for Africa (London: Dobson, 1956); Tom Mboya, Freedom and After (London: Andre Deutsch, 1963); Léopold Sédar Senghor, On African Socialism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966); Julius Nyerere, Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism (London: Oxford University Press, 1968). It was generally the contention of the Soviets that there was no socialism (including national or African) except "scientific socialism" within the discourse of Marxism-Leninism. See Robert Legvold, op. cit. (1970), pp. 113-117.

79. Cited in George W. Shepherd, The Politics of African Nationalism (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962), p. 100; see also, George Shepherd, Nonaligned Black Africa: An International Subsystem (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1970), p. 20; and W. Arthur Lewis, op. cit. (1965), p. 26.
80. See Robert Legvold, op. cit. (1970), p. 61.
81. It has been argued that Nkrumah departs significantly from Marxism-Leninism in his insistence that the African condition is unique since what is often considered to be the "normal" stages of history do not strictly apply there. For details, see Kenneth W. Grundy, "The Political Ideology of Kwame Nkrumah," in W. A. E. Skurnik, ed., African Political Thought: Lumumba, Nkrumah, and Toure, Monograph Series in World Affairs, vol. 5 (Denver, Colo.: University of Denver, 1968), pp. 55-79. See also, Colin Legum, "The Soviet Union's Encounter with Africa," R. Craig Nation and Mark V. Kauppi, eds., The Soviet Impact in Africa (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1984), p. 18.
82. The specific interference here took the form of allegedly supporting anti-government teacher's union and students' protest by distributing leaflets encouraging Guinea's departure from the policy of non-alignment to an East-bloc alliance. Whereas the Guinean government accused Soviet diplomats, the Soviets, in turn, accused the French for initiating the misconduct in order to damage the existing cordial Soviet-Guinean relations.
83. W. Arthur Lewis, op. cit. (1965), p. 49. For a detailed account of incidents surrounding Solod's expulsion, see Robert Legvold, op. cit. (1970), pp. 124-129.
84. It follows that as a matter of policy, these radical states did not intend to secure less aid from Western sources. Instead, they were preoccupied with maintaining Western economic links in addition to securing more aid from the socialist camp.
85. See Grundy's article in Skurnik, ed., op. cit. (1968), p. 70.
86. In attempting to construct a partial explanation of leaders' values and beliefs, a researcher may take "formal expressions as one piece of evidence." See Martin Minologue and Judith Malloy, ed., op. cit. (1974), p. 2.
87. See Thomas Hovet, op. cit. (1963), p. 26.
88. See Africa Report, April 1958, pp. 1, 3-4, 10-11; West Africa, May 10, 1958, p. 449.
89. Thomas Hovet, Jr., op. cit. (1963), pp. 28-29; New York Times, April 16, 1958; Adekunle Ajala, op. cit. (1974), pp. 15-16.
90. Adekunle Ajala, op. cit. (1974), p. 16.

91. Adekunle Ajala, op. cit. (1974), p. 17.
92. Olajide Aluko, "Ghana's Foreign Policy," in Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1977), p. 76.
93. Colin Legum, op. cit. (1965), p. 43.
94. *ibid.*, Appendix 22, pp. 241-243.
95. For original accounts, see Africa Report, February 1959, pp. 3-4.
96. See Bingu Mutharika, Toward Multinational Economic Cooperation in Africa (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 12.
97. See John Marcum, "French-speaking Africa at Accra," Africa Report, March 1961. See also, article by Michael Crowder and Donald Cruise O'Brien in J. F. A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder, eds., op. cit. (1973), pp. 696-697.
98. J. A. Webster, A. A. Boahen with Michael Tidy, op. cit. (1980), p. 376; Claude Welch, op. cit. (1966), p. 299.
99. France later recognized Guinea in January 1959.
100. Colin Legum, op. cit. (1962).
101. Claude Welch, op. cit. (1966), p. 302.
102. Reuben K. Udo, A Comprehensive Geography of West Africa (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1978), p. 120; Claude Welch, Jr., op. cit. (1966), p. 298. A recent example of this is the Senegambian case which is largely due to the anomalous geographical condition of the Gambia.
103. See Thomas Hovet, op. cit. (1963), pp. 71-72 for details.
104. Martin Minogue and Judith Malloy, eds., op. cit. (1974), p. 190.
105. Claude Welch, op. cit. (1966), p. 308.
106. For comments on this specific impediment, see John Ravenhill, "The Future of Regionalism in Africa," Ralph I. Onwuka and Amadu Sesay, The Future of Regionalism in Africa (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), p. 207; Webster, Boahen with Tidy, eds., op. cit. (1980), p. 377.
107. See Joseph E. Holloway, Liberian Diplomacy in Africa: A Study of Inter-African Relations (New York: University Press of America, 1981), pp. 33-35.

108. "African Political Leaders Confer in Addis Ababa," Africa Report, July 1960, p. 5; "Independent African States at Addis Ababa," West Africa, June 18, 1960, p. 697; "Addis Ababa Conference," *ibid.*, June 25, 1960, p. 725; and Richard Pankhurst, "Independent African States at Addis Ababa," I and II, *ibid.*, July 2 and 9, 1960, pp. 731, 769.

109. There were in fact two special conferences held at this time: (1) the Saniquellie Conference attended by Tubman, Touré, and Nkrumah had pledged to work together for a "Community of Independent African States"; (2) in addition, the Monrovia Conference on Algeria in August 1959 (attended by Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Guinea, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and the UAR) was convoked to formulate joint African policies on Algeria in support of the nationalists. See Africa Report, August 1959, pp. 3-4; and "African States Unite on Algeria," Africa Report, August 1959, pp. 2-4. For more detailed analysis of the Saniquellie summit in particular, see Joseph E. Holloway, *op. cit.* (1981), pp. 33-35.

110. Ako Adjei's speech at the Addis Ababa Conference of Independent African States, June 1960. The foreign minister's interpretation of events at the Saniquellie summit is interesting in that it says nothing of the perceptual conflicts of the leaders in that meeting. As Holloway argues, the result of the summit "was that Tubman's 'Community of African States,' the communique issued and the Saniquellie Declaration were more in line with Tubman's than Nkrumah's philosophy." Joseph E. Holloway, *op. cit.* (1981), p. 35.

111. Yusuf Maitama Sule, Head of the Nigerian Delegation, Speech at the Addis Ababa Conference of Independent African States, 1960. See Colin Legum, *op. cit.*, Appendix 11, pp. 190-192. Also quoted in Adekunle Ajala, *op. cit.* (1974), p. 27; and Olatunde Ojo, D. K. Orwa and C. M. B. Utete, eds., African International Relations (New York: Longman Publishers, 1985), p. 77.

112. Claude Welch, *op. cit.* (1966), p. 14.

113. Colin Legum, *op. cit.* (1965), Appendix 22, p. 243. See also Carol A. Johnson's article in William John Hanna, ed., *op. cit.* (1964), pp. 563-564. For original news reports, see "All-African People's Conference Convened in Tunis," Africa Report, January 1960, p. 6; "Tunis Conference Ends on Militant Note," Africa Report, February 1960, p. 13; "All-African Peoples at Tunis," West Africa, January 30, 1960, p. 130; "All Africa's People's Conference at Tunis," *ibid.*, February 6, 1960, p. 143.

114. "All Africa People's Condemn Neo-colonialism," West Africa, April 18, 1961, p. 389.

115. Adekunle Ajala, *op. cit.* (1974), p. 319.

116. See James Robertson, Africa in Transition (London: Hurst, 1974), p. 250. Quoted in Sesay, Ojo and Fasehun, op. cit. (1984), p. 15; and in Olajide Aluko, "Nigerian Foreign Policy," in Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1977), p. 179.

117. ibid., p. 15. See also, West Africa, June 1958.

118. President Houphouët-Boigny had initially announced on April 28, 1971, that he desired to begin a policy of "dialogue" with the Republic of South Africa. This announcement brought out the differences within the OAU where the Ivorian initiative was condemned.

119. Rudely contradicting the policy of a coordinated African response against the apartheid regime in South Africa, the Ivorian stance towards the Pretoria government has been consistently conciliatory. According to Houphouët-Boigny, once South African whites deal diplomatically with black African states as equals, it will become harder for them to continue to treat their blacks as inferior citizens and, in these circumstances, a movement towards a fairer solution can be started. See Adekunle Ajala, op. cit. (1974), p. 121; Nicole Delorme in Olajide Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1977), p. 123. For a more recent development, see "Apartheid visits Abidjan," West Africa, December 11, 1989, pp. 2056-2058.

120. Quoted by Aristide R. Zolberg, in his Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966), p. 42.

121. Quoted in Adekunle Ajala, op. cit. (1974), p. 123.

122. Frederick Schwarz, Nigeria: The Tribes, The Nation or The Race (Cambridge, Mass.: M. I. T. Press, 1965), p. 232. Quoted by Olajide Aluko, "Nigerian Foreign Policy," in Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1977), p. 179. See also, Gordon J. Idang, Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy (1960-1966) (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973), pp. 51-55.

123. See Rolf Italiaander, The New Leaders of Africa (London: Prentice-Hall, 1961), pp. 196-197. Also quoted in Adekunle Ajala, op. cit. (1974), p. 123.

124. Gordon J. Idang, op. cit. (1973), pp. 51-55.

125. For details on some of the domestic constraints in Nigeria as at that time and their impact on foreign policy behavior, see Olajide Aluko, "Nigerian Foreign Policy," in Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1977), p. 180. But the focus of international relations on the idiosyncratic and ideological effects on diplomacy may be altogether inappropriate and misleading, since weak domestic structures and underdevelopment may generate conditions which no individual charisma or ideological formulation can readily transcend. In fact, much of what appeared to be a lack of adventurism may be attributed to the built in restraints of the Nigerian domestic political environment and the fragile infant

economy. Thus, in the face of Nigeria's political weaknesses and economic vulnerabilities, it is doubtful that Balewa's margin for maneuver in foreign affairs was as great as his critics would like us to believe.

126. Adekunle Ajala, op. cit. (1974), p. 124. See also, "Ghana's Foreign Policy," in Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1977), p. 89.

127. Harold D. Nelson, ed., Nigeria: A Country Study: Foreign Area Studies (The American University, United States Government Publication, 1982), p. 224.

128. See The Economist (London), April 24, 1965. Quoted in Olajide Aluko, "Ghana's Foreign Policy," in Aluko, ed. op. cit. (1977), p. 85.

129. Francis Adigwe, Essentials of Government for West Africa (Ibadan: University Press Limited and Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 144; W. Scott Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 66-67.

130. Olajide Aluko, "Ghana's Foreign Policy," in Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1977), p. 86.

131. Immanuel Geiss, op. cit. (1974), p. 422. It is our specific argument here that these events followed a more or less systematic pattern. Of course, in reality, the collapse of the Ghanaian economy was gradual and cumulative. In like manner, it could be hypothesized that in its latter years, the Nkrumah government continued to play a vigorous even though less effective role in Africa till its eventual overthrow.

132. Immanuel Geiss, op. cit. (1974), p. 422.

133. Francis Adigwe, op. cit. (1979), pp. 145-146.

134. Until the OAU summit in Accra, in 1965, Nkrumah had refused to make any contributions to the Special Fund on the grounds that he had no confidence in the OAU Liberation Committee, its administration of the fund, and its policies.

135. The Ghanaian National Assembly approved the policy of "dialogue" with South Africa early in 1971. See West Africa, April 2, 1971.

136. Bissell, "An Introduction to the New Africa," Richard E. Bissell and Michael S. Radu, eds., op. cit. (1984), p. 4.

137. For this distinction, see Crawford Young, op. cit. (1982).

138. Michael S. Radu, "Ideology, Parties, and Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa," Bissell and Radu, eds., op. cit. (1984), pp. 35-36.

139. Kenneth Jowitt has cynically described Marxism-Leninism in Africa as resulting from "elite desperation with a consequent tendency to adopt quasi-magical solutions to overwhelming problems." See Jowitt, "Scientific Socialist Regimes in Africa: Political Differentiation, Avoidance, and Unawareness," in Carl G. Rosberg and Thomas M. Callaghy, eds., Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California, 1979), p. 146.
140. J. Gus Liebenow, African Politics: Crises and Challenges (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1986), p. 177.
141. *ibid.*, p. 175.
142. Claude Ake, Revolutionary Pressures in Africa (London: Zed Publishers, 1978).
143. For this and other events, see his biography entitled Thomas Sankara Speaks: The Burkina Faso Revolution 1983-87 (New York: Pathfinder, 1988).
144. Upper Volta was renamed Burkina Faso on August 4, 1984. The interpretation given elsewhere is "Country of Incorruptible Men." See West Africa, August 6, 1984, p. 1605.
145. Sankara had opted not to attend the year's Franco-African re-union characterizing the occasion as a "medieval" exercise where "African vassals bring their grievances to the French sovereign only to then pay him their respects." At a dinner organized in Mitterrand's honor, Sankara did not mince words, questioning a quarter of a century of Franco-African relations that have often resulted in neo-colonialism and the subservience of independent states to the former colonial power. See "Sankara and Mitterrand Go tete-a-tete," Africa Report, January-February 1987, p. 36.
146. It could be argued that Jerry Rawlings coup of December 1981 was ideologically-inspired by a desire to restructure the Ghanaian society and to end corruption and social injustice. Likewise, the coup in Burkina Faso was modelled on the example of Rawlings in Ghana. Sankara's populist leadership expressed commitment to a revolutionary program of social, economic, and political reforms as the solution to the desperate poverty of the country.
147. See "Regional Wrangling Undermines ECOWAS bid for Unity," Africa Report, September-October, 1987, pp. 10, 13.
148. For press accounts on this, see Africa Research Bulletin, November 14, 1973; "News From Nigeria Confirms Boom," Africa Report, January-February 1974, p. 22.
149. Olatunde J. B. Ojo, "Nigeria and the Formation of ECOWAS," International Organization, vol. 34, no. 4 (Autumn 1980), pp. 571-604.

150. See A. Bolaji Akinyemi, "Mohammed/Obasanjo Foreign Policy," in Oyeleye Oyediran, ed., Nigerian Government and Politics Under Military Rule, 1966-1979 (London: Macmillan Press, 1979), pp. 150-168.
151. Mark W. DeLancey, "Nigeria: Foreign Policy Alternatives," in list in full Shaw and Aluko, eds., op. cit. (1983), p. 164.
152. Stephen Wright, "Nigerian Foreign Policy: A Case of Dominance or Dependence?" in Timothy M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko, eds., Nigerian Foreign Policy: Alternative Perceptions and Projections (London: Macmillan Press, 1983), p. 94.
153. Oye Ogunbadejo, "Nigeria's Foreign Policy Under Military Rule, 1966-79," International Journal, vol. 35, no. 4 (Autumn 1980), p. 765.
154. A. Bolaji Akinyemi in Oyeleye Oyediran, ed., op. cit. (1979), p. 166.
155. Joseph Garba, Diplomatic Soldiering: Nigerian Foreign Policy 1975-1979 (Ibadan: Spectrum, 1987), p. 23. See also, G. O. Olusanya and R. A. Akindele, eds., "The Fundamentals of Nigeria's Foreign Policy and External Economic Relations," Nigeria's External Relations: The First Twenty-Five Years (Ibadan: University Press Limited for NIIA, 1986), p. 5.
156. Mark W. DeLancey, "Nigeria: Foreign Policy Alternatives," in Shaw and Aluko, eds. (1983), pp. 178-179
157. Toyin Falola and Julius Ihonvbere, The Rise and Fall of Nigeria's Second Republic, 1979-1984 (London: Zed Publishers, 1985), p. 198.

CHAPTER FOUR

INTRA-AFRICAN INTERACTIONS IN WEST AFRICA

Introduction

An adequate and scholarly understanding of regional cooperative processes in Africa "will have to be broadly based and wide in its application"¹ as to embody political, economic, socio-cultural, and military considerations. It is the purpose of this chapter to analyze, in greater depth, several dimensions - political, economic, socio-cultural, and military - that continue to characterize and shape the foreign relations of West African states. By doing so, the chapter concentrates on relations between the region's component units at the level of systemic interactions. There are two main reasons why these multidimensional systemic trends are identified and investigated: first, there is hardly any interstate interaction that cannot be usefully subsumed under at least one of the several dimensions listed; second, to consider any one dimension as the only legitimate concern of international relations is to review only a small part of a richer and more complex system of interstate interactions.

In the course of our investigation, several analytic techniques will be used in the form of descriptive indicators of international transactions flows, to assist in substantively evaluating the nature of cooperative interactions among West African states. The dimensions we posit will elucidate both interactions and the prospects for

cooperation in the area. First, for political interactions, diplomatic representation, bilateral treaty agreements, visits by Heads of State or their equivalent, and mutual memberships in regional and subregional organizations, are used to describe and evaluate the prospects for political cooperation; second, interstate trade flows are applied to show ranges of economic transactions; third, migration indicators are utilized to assess social transactions; and finally, incidence of military coups are used to illustrate the continued importance of the military dimension. In terms of the inclusion of indicators on migration, it may be argued that although the desire to extend interactions is more evident among committed statesmen in West Africa, it is nevertheless imperative that we also seek to understand and present the consequences of migration for the ordinary people in the area. By cooperative interactions, however, is meant the degree of similarity and complementarity in the properties of the political entities being considered and the degree of interaction between these units. Arguably, the establishment of an economic union by a group of states usually entails military and defence implications which transcend territorial boundaries and, by agreeing to form an economic community, the ECOWAS states have also demonstrated that they share common political, economic, and social goals.² In addition, the dimensions above were identified partly on the basis of analytical convenience. Although the categories outlined may not be totally satisfactory, they are nonetheless useful. Since this chapter attempts to ascertain the frequency of interactions in the political, economic, military, and socio-cultural areas, it will accordingly be subdivided into four parts.

1. POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC INTERACTIONS

Diplomatic Representations in West Africa

If institutionalized within the circle of collaborating powers, diplomacy is an interesting arena for the coordination of policies, and the political objective of the diplomatic concert is principally to intensify the habits of cooperation. Diplomacy is the business or art of managing international relations by means of negotiation between states. The concept may also be defined as the "practice of conducting relations between states through official representatives."³ But perhaps the first step towards clarification of its meaning is by noting the roots of the term. The term, diplomacy, is derived from the Greek verb diplom (which means "to fold"), which described any piece of paper from a passport to a tax receipt, folded in two and sewn together.⁴ In his classic work entitled A Guide to Diplomatic Practice, Satow defines diplomacy as "the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states, extending sometimes also to their relations with vassal states."⁵ As used in this study, the concept of diplomatic representation is synonymous with the term "diplomatic body" - an expression which first arose in Vienna about the middle of the eighteenth century - which signifies "the body of ambassadors, envoys and officials attached to the foreign missions residing at any seat of government," whereas "diplomatic service" indicates "that branch of the public service which supplies the personnel of the permanent missions in foreign

countries."⁶

Considerable scholarly attention has been drawn toward methods for exploring diplomatic activity as a measure of international political behavior. Theories abound, for example, on diplomatic representation, and scholars like Alger and Brams⁷ on the one hand, and Russett and Lamb⁸ on the other, have presented empirical evidence depicting and stressing significant patterns of diplomatic interactions in the global system. For the more specific case of intra-African politics, I. William Zartman,⁹ more generally, and Patrick McGowan,¹⁰ more systematically, have applied the diplomatic representation approach to international relations involving African states. Such studies basically assume that diplomats are receptors as well as effectors in the international system, in the sense that they constitute one of the few groups specialized in perfecting the feedback loop which molds policy. It appears logical, however, that other considerations of power - especially the lack of financial resources - affect and are affected by diplomatic activity. In the case of inter-African relations, evidence suggests that the availability of meager resources and the perceptions thereof, play a fundamental role in the patterns of diplomatic distribution.¹¹ For instance, in a general reduction of missions necessitated by an economic crunch, the Ghanaian government decided, in 1982, to close its embassies in Benin, Mali, Senegal, and Sierra Leone in West Africa.¹² Similarly, in Nigeria in recent times, foreign service officers have had to be "recalled home to save money."¹³ The diplomatic dimension may also be analyzed in relation to other factors. In his study of diplomatic activity in Africa, for example, David H. Johns

investigates the relationship between diplomatic activity and integration by analyzing whether such activity was greater among states with common membership of various groupings defined by geographical considerations and organizational membership. He further argues that "the scope and pattern of diplomatic activity may be a symbol or an indicator of changes with respect to power within one (or several) political systems and with respect to integration among several political systems."¹⁴ In general, patterns of diplomatic representation certainly reflect part of the picture in the international relations between two or more states.

Table 4.1 shows data on the distribution of direct diplomatic representation among West African states, other African states and non-African states. "The bulk of diplomatic activity remains bilateral and is conducted through the normal channels of the foreign ministry and the resident diplomatic mission."¹⁵ As a measure of diplomatic agility, the density of diplomatic representation between West African states is presented as the ratio of the actually observed bilateral links to all possible links. Since there are 80 actual diplomatic links and 240 overall possible links, from a structural standpoint, the total intra-systemic density of diplomatic interactions is 80:240, representing 33 percent. It may be assumed that these figures represent diplomatic importance scores, and one could thus conclude, against the background of intra-African relations, that the diplomatic communicative network within the West African area is, on this empirical basis, moderate and fairly intensive.

A country's foreign policy begins at its borders. One major noticeable trend in this regard is that each state in the West African subsystem has diplomatic relations

with at least one neighboring state in the area. To be more specific, Benin has diplomatic relations with its neighbors, Nigeria and Niger; Burkina Faso maintains contact with Ghana, Ivory Coast, and Mali; Ghana with Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, and Togo; Guinea with Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Senegal, and Sierra Leone; Guinea-Bissau with Senegal and Guinea; Ivory Coast with Ghana, Guinea, and Liberia; and so on.¹⁶ Although interesting, this trend is hardly surprising. Indeed, it could be argued that the correlation exists because it is at this level that the greatest need to deal with interstate issues arises almost on a daily basis among contiguous states, especially when one considers the flow of citizens across borders. Perhaps equally unsurprising is that the relative contributions of the states to diplomatic representation in the subsystem are unequal. In fact, a major characteristic in the international relations of West Africa is the variation among the memberstates regarding the number of embassies sent to others within the subregion. Nigeria takes the lead with the largest number of diplomatic representation on a regional basis (13 missions). In a generally related point, it has been suggested that the presence of numerous African embassies in Lagos (even more than in Addis Ababa, the home of the OAU) testifies to the status accorded Nigeria on the continent.¹⁷ Nigeria's score is followed by Guinea (8 missions); Ghana (7); Ivory Coast and Senegal (6); Benin, Liberia, and Mauritania (5 each); Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger (4 each); and Gambia (3). Three states, namely, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and Togo represent the least diplomatically active states in the regional subsystem with 2

Table 4.1

Diplomatic Representation in West Africa

	BEN	BUR	CAP	GAM	GHA	GUI	GUB	IVO	LIB	MAL	MAU	NIG	NGA	SEN	SIE	TOG	WANS	OAMR	NAHR
BENIN					X	X		X				X	X				5	4	9
B/FASO					X			X		X			X				4	3	9
C/VERDE							X							X			2	-	7
GAMBIA													X	X	X		3	-	3
GHANA	X	X				X		X	X				X			X	7	4	29
GUINEA					X		X	X	X	X			X	X	X		8	7	20
G/BISSAU						X							X				2	3	9
I/COAST					X	X			X				X	X	X		6	10	30
LIBERIA					X	X		X					X		X		5	5	18
MALI					X	X		X						X			4	4	14
MAURITANIA								X		X		X	X	X			5	7	8
NIGER	X				X			X					X				4	5	11
NIGERIA	X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	13	17	53
SENEGAL				X			X	X		X	X		X				6	10	39
S/LEONE				X		X			X				X				4	1	10
TOGO					X								X				2	5	9
TOTAL																			
MISSIONS	3	2	-	3	9	8	3	10	5	5	2	3	12	8	5	2	80	85	278

SOURCES: Compiled from Africa South of The Sahara 1989, 18th ed., vols. 1 & 2 (London: Europa Publications, 1988); The Europa World Year Book 1989, 30th ed., vols. 1 & 2 (London: Europa Publications, 1989).

WANS = West African Missions Sent
 OAMR = Other African Missions Received
 NAHR = Non-African Missions Received

missions each. In general, the relative degree of non-involvement (i.e., diplomatic non-representation) in the normal diplomatic process reflects either unwillingness or inability to sustain a representational apparatus.

With the notable exception of Ivory Coast, most states generally have approximately equal numbers of diplomatic missions sent to other West African states as they have received from them. Ivory Coast has 6 missions sent to West African capitals but has received 10 missions from the subregion. It could be argued that this represents the continued influence of Ivory Coast in the international politics of the area especially among the Francophone group of states.¹⁸ Notably, the correlation between influence and communication flows has been well established by social psychologists; the greater a group member's influence over other group members, the higher the proportion of communications he tends to receive from them rather than send to them.¹⁹ But Karl Deutsch makes an argument to the contrary for states of the developed Western systems.²⁰ As is often reflected in the characteristics of the periphery, the weight of diplomatic representation in West Africa rests more in contacts with the extra-African world than with the subregion or the continent itself. Elmer Plischke makes the point that smaller states often tend to establish diplomatic relations on a limited, selective basis, initially to major world powers, immediate, and regional neighbors before expanding their diplomatic communities gradually as warranted by their resources and needs.²¹

There are several major constraints to West African diplomatic relations and practice which have continually plagued diplomatic representation in the subregion.

While it is true that some of the criticisms levied against Africa's foreign services or particular missions have been malicious and unjustified, it is equally true that many of these missions need to address themselves to issues of professionalism and the improvement of consular functions.²² First and foremost is the question of general bureaucratic inefficiency,²³ which is exaggerated by the absence of qualified, trained personnel.²⁴ If diplomatic functions are to be conducted properly, diplomats must be both credible spokesmen for their country's foreign policy interests and dependable custodians of their state's economic interests and expatriate populations.

Unfortunately, many African missions do not perform these diplomatic tasks sufficiently and effectively. Although diplomatic missions represent the brains of foreign policy where impressions from the international environment are gathered and evaluated, rarely do some African embassies devote the required time, resources, and energy to gathering the information necessary for research and intelligence.²⁵ With rampant military coups and attendant regime turnover, the position of ambassador is more often than not perceived as an indication of personal prestige and reward for loyalty than as a serious institution serving national interests. Personal friends of the political elite are often employed in missions, with the natural result of compromising the effectiveness generated by seasoned and competent career diplomats.

A second major constraint to inter-African diplomacy revolves around the observation that there are too many diplomatic missions, which places a heavy financial burden on the resources of these generally poor states. However, it may be argued that while this is an accurate assessment of representation outside the

continent, it is difficult to prove its validity in inter-African relations. In particular, West African states have decisively more diplomatic contacts with non-African states than with countries within the continent. In fact, rather than the "misfortune" of getting posted to African capitals, it is not uncommon for influential African diplomats to lobby for postings to prestigious diplomatic missions in Europe and the United States. There is therefore an incessant or constant need for qualified, competent, and dedicated diplomats who would take their diplomatic responsibilities as seriously in Accra or Dakar as they would in Washington or Moscow.

Another problem of inter-African diplomatic representation falls within the explosive arena of international political conflict. Over the years, a few embassies have abused their access to diplomatic immunities and privileges and misconstrued them as license for misbehavior either by serving as sanctuaries for political dissidents or by actually engaging in subversion. In West Africa, for example, this diplomatic anomaly began prior to the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in 1966. As a result, Ghanaians were deported from Liberia and Ivory Coast and, in Lagos, the Nigerian external affairs ministry accused the Ghanaian mission of engaging in subversive activities. During this period, the specter of internal subversion through African missions propelled both Presidents Sékou Touré of Guinea and Tubman of Liberia to sign an accord prohibiting the use of embassy grounds for subversive activities against each other.²⁶

In addition to these problems, inter-African diplomacy is continually plagued by other serious operational weaknesses. For instance, the language division in West

Africa hampers effective diplomatic representation. Although more would be known about the socio-political development of host countries if officers spoke and understood local languages, it is not unusual that only a few diplomats are trained in the language of their country. Another weakness is the long and frequent absences of residential ambassadors from their posts, coupled with the problem of sending out envoys only when contacts of importance are necessary. In some cases, key foreign posts are left without heads for ridiculously long periods so that political appointees could be sent to fill them. However, a few of these limitations are justified on the grounds that the pressure for economic modernization and increased governmental spending has generated novel and innovative ideas with regard to diplomatic representation in West Africa. Thus, in an effort to reduce expenditure, one country's ambassador may represent several countries, through "multiple representation." However, the major problem with multiple representation is that it further creates the problem of coordination and intelligence dissemination.²⁷ Although these are obvious defects of interstate relations through diplomatic channels, these limitations are partially compensated for by the frequent visits of West African leaders to each other.

Presidential Visits in West Africa, 1975-1989

The foreign policies of many African states are largely characterized by ad hoc decision-making which, due to the occasional absence of a solid, overall foreign policy structure, often tends to be contradictory and confusing to the casual observer.

Indeed, the existence of a highly centralized political structure, coupled with the presence of a pre-eminent political leader, and the collegial nature of the decision-making process, makes the precise delineation of factors in the making of foreign policy more than usually difficult. Personalities play a significant role in African diplomacy, particularly as the central role of the leader as the formulator of foreign policy is consistently enhanced.²⁸ This emphasis on personal interactions and communication undoubtedly adds an individualistic slant to African foreign policies. In West Africa, for example, the predominant mode of leadership is more often than not exercised through governmental institutions built around long-serving popular and charismatic leaders. This personalized nature of African leadership combined with the latitude in decision-making afforded the leader (who is quite typically both President and head of a highly organized ruling party), means, in effect, that any established pattern of foreign policy decisions may sometimes be easily upset by the leader's idiosyncratic action.²⁹

In most systems of government it is the president who is the chief foreign policy official both by constitutional provision and by long-established precedent. This is especially true for bilateral political issues which are the traditional fare of foreign policies. But East and Hermann have asserted that over significant issues regarding foreign policy, a less developed country "may resort to head of state involvement more often" than a rich, industrialized state.³⁰ Unlike their counterparts in Europe and the United States, African leaders have greater control over the foreign relations of their countries and are not subjected to serious domestic institutional

restraints. A recurring feature of decision-making in inter-African politics is, therefore, that it focuses squarely on the president who is usually both a successful nationalist leader and primary symbol of the nation.³¹ He defines both the national interest and the national ideology, in the sense that what the president thinks and what he perceives to be reality, may sometimes serve as the basic philosophy of the state.³² For West African states, in particular, there is presidential dominance over foreign policy issues; more than any other person in the government, the president takes many initiatives and is recognized to have the authority to commit the country to a course of action. Where he attaches particular interest to foreign affairs, few foreign policy decisions are taken without his approval. Even minute decisions may fall within the exclusive prerogative of the head of state, whose extensive experience in interacting with other presidents gives him special competence in inter-African relations.³³ To suggest this, is to assert the notion that the president's friendship, anger, and personal convictions may indeed sometimes reflect the mood of the nation.

It has been maintained that, as relatively new states within the international system, foreign policy making in Africa is hindered by the absence of an experienced and sophisticated diplomatic corps, and the comparatively restricted representation permitted by slim national budgets. It may be counter-argued, however, that these defects are somewhat compensated for by the frequent personal interactions between African leaders. African leaders are inveterate and frequent travelers. As one scholar rightly observes, "formal or private visits to neighboring states take place almost continuously. Views are exchanged between old friends; the result of these

tours d'horizon is a much greater degree of policy coordination, particularly with the French-speaking groups, than might otherwise be expected.³⁴ One main objective of interstate visits is to strengthen the relations between states. In addition, critical issues are often negotiated at the highest level, involving heads of governments in summit diplomacy.³⁵ Consequently, one could conclude that personal diplomacy and contacts made through interstate visits by heads of state (contrasted with diplomacy at ambassadorial or ministerial level) may serve as a useful analytical barometer for testing the frequency of political relations between states. This approach is not without scholarly precedent, however. Johan Galtung calculated East-West interactions by counting the number of official state visits and trade agreements between 1948 and 1965,³⁶ and Brams has collected data on visits between heads of states in the international system in 1964 and 1965.³⁷ Naturally, heads of state visits are expected to have more impact on foreign policy than those of foreign ministers, and in turn the visits of foreign ministers are expected to have more impact than those of their assistants.

As an indication of the nature of interchange among political elites, Table 4.2 lists the number of recorded bilateral visits between West African heads of state from 1975 until 1989.³⁸ Since few actions that carry intense commitment escape the president's attention, head of state involvement provides a reasonable indicator and was therefore chosen as the level of leadership to be examined. The data presented here is certainly more revealing than the previous diplomatic representation data. For

Table 4.2
PRESIDENTIAL VISITS BETWEEN WEST AFRICAN STATES 1975 - 1989
 (number in cells refer to years)
 (column figures indicate visits received)

Country	Benin	Botswana	Cape Verde	Gambia	Guinea	Guinea Bissau	Ivory Coast	Liberia	Mali	Mali-Tanzania	Niger	Nigeria	Senegal	Sierra Leone	Togo	VISITS SENT
Benin					84						76	79,83			84	5
Botswana	83				75,81,83, 86,87,88		85,88		81,83,85	84	79,83	88			83,84,89	19
Cape Verde				81	84		80		75	78		76,84,88	79,81,81		85	11
Gambia			80		79,84							78,84,86, 84	75,79	80	78,79	15
Guinea	79,80,80, 83		88	81	80,84		78,81,84	79	81,83	88	80,87	78,80,80, 84,88			79,80,88	30
Guinea Bissau	78		78		78,79,86			78,79	82				79	79,80,85, 88		18
Ivory Coast					88			78					81			8
Liberia	78		78		84			77,79			77					4
Mali					84											
Mali-Tanzania					82											
Niger			76	76,80	84											
Nigeria	75,77,78, 80,87		88	78,85	79,89	78,81	87	75,78,88	81	77	77,80,86		87	79,88	75,77,78, 87	28
Senegal			77	75,75,76, 79,81,81	84	75,84	85,86		81	87		85				15
Sierra Leone					81	78,86		79							89	8
Togo	76			79	78	80,84	83,86				81,87	76				10
Visits Received	13	10	7	15	17	26	6	14	12	6	10	29	15	13	19	222

instance, whereas the diplomatic representation data accounts for 80 diplomatic missions between West African states (see Table 4.1), the presidential visitation data (in Table 4.2) records almost three times that number - 222 visits within a fifteen year period. A sizeable number of the total visits initiated were by West African leaders on tours d'horizon to neighboring states. Specifically, of the 222 visits recorded, 110 visits (an estimated 49.5 percent) were targeted on geographically contiguous states. Thus, there appears to be a correlation between the frequency of visits and geographical attachment to a neighboring state.³⁹

With the possible exception of the visit to Guinea in 1984, the presidential visits initiated by Benin were mainly focused on her neighbors - two visits to Nigeria in 1979 and in 1983, a visit to Niger in 1976 and another visit to Togo in 1984. Similarly, with the exception of visits to Nigeria and Mauritania, the presidential visits by Burkina Faso were with all of its contiguous states, namely, Benin in 1983; Ghana in 1975, 1981, 1983, 1986-1988; Ivory Coast in 1985 and 1988; Mali in 1981, 1983, and 1985; Niger in 1979 and 1983; and, finally, Togo in 1983, 1988, and 1989. In addition, several other states interacted with all their contiguous states in West Africa. For example, Nigerian presidents visited Benin five times (in 1975, 1977, 1978, 1980, and 1987) and Niger three times (in 1977, 1980, and 1986); Ghanaian presidents visited Burkina Faso (in 1979, 1983, 1984 [twice], and 1985), Ivory Coast (in 1978, 1981, and 1984) and Togo (in 1979, 1980, and 1988); and the Senegalese presidents visited Gambia (in 1975 [twice], 1976, 1979, and 1981 [twice]), Mauritania (in 1987), Mali (in 1981), Guinea-Bissau (in 1975 and 1984) and Guinea

(in 1984). There are similar examples of presidential visits to all bordering states for Mauritania, Liberia, Niger, and Sierra Leone.

As is obvious in Table 4.2, Ghana maintains the highest score of 30 initiated presidential visits followed closely by Nigeria with 28 visits initiated.⁴⁰ One major difference between the two states is that whereas Nigeria received 29 presidents (the highest in the subregion) Ghana attracted only 17 visits (almost one-half of the number of visits initiated). In contrast to Ghana, however, Ivory Coast received over three times the number of presidential visits initiated. Although Ivory Coast initiated the lowest number of presidential visits in West Africa with only 4 visits, it nevertheless had the highest ratio of visits sent to visits received (approximately ratio 1:4). This observation underlies the continuing significance of that state in the subregion, especially within the Francophone subgroup. Specifically, President Houphouët-Boigny still wields a tremendous influence over French-speaking states, not only in the West African subsystem, but in Africa as a whole.⁴¹ The data are skewed with respect to the number of presidential visits received by Guinea (26 visits) because of the exceptional attraction, in 1984, of 12 leaders from the West African subregion for Sékou Touré's state burial.⁴²

Finally, Table 4.2 shows that the majority of presidential visits initiated by Francophone states were to other French-speaking states in West Africa. For example, of the 100 presidential visits initiated by Francophone states, 51 percent were to other Francophone states, 40 percent were to Anglophone states and 9 percent to Lusophone states. In contrast, only 34 percent of the visits initiated by English-

speaking states were to Anglophone countries. In fact, 60 percent of these presidential visits were to Francophone states and 6 percent to the Portuguese-speaking states. This throws some light on the often held generalization that the French-speaking group maintains the highest degree of cohesiveness and policy coordination. Leaders of English-speaking states are more likely to interact politically with Francophone heads of state, and French-speaking presidents are more likely to interact with each other⁴³ than with Anglophone or Lusophone leaders.

Bilateral Treaty Commitments, 1975-1989

The word treaty in international law is a generic term applied to written instruments whereby two or more states regulate specific or general relations among themselves.⁴⁴ The terms treaty and agreements are used interchangeably in this analysis. Between sovereign states, a treaty is a "formal agreement or contractual obligation" which establishes, defines, or modifies their mutual rights and obligations in "such topics as peace, territorial cession, alliance, friendship, commerce, or matters of international concern."⁴⁵ The signing of bilateral treaties is a widely accepted practice in international relations and "bilateral arrangements are far more prevalent than multilateral ones."⁴⁶ The event itself indicates the initiation of important cooperative agreements between the governments of states and, moreover, the juridical effect of treaties is that irrespective of the name of the instrument, they are binding in nature. In general international law, this phenomenon is more commonly referred to as the principle of pacta sunt servanda (that pacts are

binding).⁴⁷ Treaties are thus one principal mean by which states interact officially with one another. In other words, it is usually through treaties or agreements, formal or informal, that independent sovereign states interact with each other and protect their interests and rights in the international society. Thus, treaties are agreements, contracts, promises, or commitments in the making of which a state reveals much about its thinking, values, hopes, fears, plans, and preoccupations. Ordinarily, it would appear that states that have extensive common interests possess the highest treaty relationship. A bilateral treaty therefore reflects the special concern of two states over a salient issue-area. Whatever the political content, it is obvious that treaties contribute to the stabilizing of political relations between states and to the intensity of such relations.

Although not necessarily a definitive barometer of its participation in international affairs, a state's engagement in treaty-making serves as a rough guideline of its involvement in international affairs.⁴⁸ Table 4.3 shows the recorded bilateral treaties and agreements concluded by West African states between 1975 and 1989.⁴⁹ For the sake of analysis, bilateral treaties may be subdivided into political, economic, military, and socio-cultural issue-areas. Although 147 treaties are recorded, 164 agreements were actually coded (the balance of 17 treaties results from overlapping issue-areas). A majority of the agreements coded - approximately 90 agreements (or 54.9 percent) - falls within the broad category of the economic issue-area. Political, social, and military agreements account for approximately 26.2 percent (43 agreements), 13.4 percent (22), and 5.5 percent (9) of the total number of agreements

and treaties, respectively. Economic treaties range from the signing of different types of bilateral trade agreements to accords on rail links between states. For example, Nigeria and Benin agreed on a joint sugar project in 1976 and a joint cement project in 1979. Nigeria also had an agreement with Ghana, in 1980, for the joint exploitation of bauxite and with Niger, in 1981, for the joint exploitation of phosphates. There was also a series of oil refinery agreements between Nigeria and Senegal, in 1975, and between Nigeria and Ivory Coast, in 1976. In addition, oil exploration agreements were signed between Nigeria and Ghana in 1979 and 1989, and between Ghana and Ivory Coast in 1979. Other examples included in the broad economic issue-area were electricity agreements (between Ghana and the Ivory Coast [1975, 1977, 1979] and between Nigeria and Niger [1989]) and various air transport and fishing agreements.

Apart from economic agreements, Table 4.3 also reveals bilateral political agreements between West African states. For instance, there are several examples of bilateral agreements to abolish visa requirements between states as was the case between Gambia and Sierra Leone in 1975; and between Ghana and Ivory Coast in 1979; and between Ghana and Benin on the one hand, and Ghana and Guinea on the other, in 1978. Another example of political agreements assumes the form of border demarcation accords, as was the case between Ghana and Togo (1976), Gambia and Senegal (1976), Ghana and Burkina Faso (1977, 1983) and Nigeria and Benin (1981, 1988). Instances of social and cultural agreements between West

Table 4.3

Bilateral Treaties and Agreements Between
West African States 1975-1989

<u>States</u>	<u>*Dates</u>	<u>Type of Treaty or Agreement</u>
1 Senegal Guinea Bissau	01/75	Defense & Economic Cooperation Award
2 Ghana - Ivory Coast	01/75	Linking Electricity Systems
3 Guinea - Guinea Bissau	04/75	Air Transport Agreement
4 Gambia - Sierra Leone	04/75	Abolishing Visa Requirements
5 Mauritania - Guinea	05/75	Export Trade Agreement
6 Nigeria - Mali	06/75	Bilateral Trade Agreement
7 Ghana - Ivory Coast	06/75	Tourism/Transportation Agreement
8 Senegal - Gambia	06/75	Joint Cooperation Agreement
9 Ghana - Burkina Faso	07/75	Joint Commercial Agreement
10 Liberia - Ivory Coast	08/75	Oil Plants Agreement
11 Nigeria - Senegal	09/75	Oil Refinery Agreement
12 Gambia - Senegal	10/75	Trade Routes Agreement
13 Senegal - Guinea Bissau	01/76	Trade, Foreign Policy, and Cultural Cooperation Agreements
14 Nigeria - Ivory Coast	01/76	Oil Refinery Agreement
15 Mali - Nigeria	02/76	Agriculture and Industrial Cooperation Agreement
16 Ghana - Ivory Coast	03/76	Abolishing Visa Requirements

<u>States</u>	<u>*Dates</u>	<u>Type of Treaty or Agreement</u>
17 Liberia - Guinea	05/76	Railway Construction Agreement
18 Ghana - Togo	06/76	Border Demarcation Agreement
19 Gambia - Senegal	06/76	Border Change Treaty
20 Niger - Benin	06/76	Rail Link Agreement
21 Nigeria - Benin	08/76	Sugar Project Agreement
22 Ghana - Ivory Coast	08/76	Joint Cooperation Agreements
23 Guinea - Guinea Bissau	08/76	Trade Commission Agreement
24 Ghana - Mali	09/76	Economic, Legal, and Social Cooperation Agreements
25 Ghana - Ivory Coast	11/76	Liberal Migration Agreement
26 Guinea - Liberia	11/76	Iron-ore Transportation Agreement
27 Ghana - Benin	12/76	Protocol Agreements
28 Nigeria - Ivory Coast	12/76	Air Service Agreement
29 Ghana - Ivory Coast	01/77	Commercial Cooperation Agreement (Air-Transport Scheme)
30 Cape Verde - Senegal	01/77	Friendship Treaty (Work Permit)
31 Nigeria - Niger	01/77	Trade, Culture and Technical Agreements
32 Nigeria - Ivory Coast	01/77	Commercial Agreement
33 Liberia - Guinea	01/77	Commerce, Fisheries, Communication, Justice, Animal Husbandry Agreements

<u>States</u>	<u>*Dates</u>	<u>Type of Treaty or Agreement</u>
34 Senegal - Gambia	02/77	Cooperation (Information) Agreement
35 Ghana - Ivory Coast	02/77	Trade & Educational Cooperation Agreements
36 Mauritania - Senegal	03/77	Joint Commercial (Ferry) Agreement
37 Ghana - Ivory Coast	03/77	Anti-Smuggling Agreement
38 Nigeria - Mauritania	03/77	Trade & Fishing Agreement
39 Liberia - Ivory Coast	05/77	Non-Agression Pact
40 Ghana - Guinea	05/77	Cooperation Agreements (Visas, Fishing, Transportation)
41 Ghana - Burkina Faso	05/77	Border Demarcation Agreement
42 Ghana - Ivory Coast	05/77	Compensation Agreement
43 Ghana - Guinea Bissau	06/77	Economic and Technical Cooperation Accord
44 Ghana - Nigeria	07/77	Trade Cooperation Agreements
45 Nigeria - Ghana	08/77	Expand Air Services
46 Mali - Ghana	09/77	Permanent Cooperation Committee Agreement
47 Ghana - Ivory Coast	10/77	Linking Electricity Systems
48 Ghana - Niger	11/77	Transportation Agreement
49 G/Bissau - Cape Verde	11/77	Joint Defense Agreement
50 Ghana - Ivory Coast	12/77	Energy Resource Agreement
51 I/Coast - Mauritania	12/77	Fisheries Agreement

<u>States</u>	<u>*Dates</u>	<u>Type of Treaty or Agreement</u>
52 Senegal - Gambia	01/78	Dam Construction Agreement
53 Mali - Burkina Faso	02/78	Air Transport Agreement
54 Gambia - Mauritania	02/78	Defense/Security Agreement
55 Guinea - Ivory Coast	02/78	Cocoa Production Agreement
56 Nigeria - Guinea	05/78	Economic Cooperation Agreement
57 Ghana - Sierra Leone	06/78	Fishing Agreements
58 Ghana - Guinea	09/78	Waiving Visa Requirements
59 Ghana - Benin	09/78	Waiving Visa Requirements
60 Ghana - Mali	10/78	Development, Tourism Agreements
61 Ghana - Nigeria	01/79	Oil Exploration Agreement
62 Ivory Coast - Ghana	01/79	Linking Electricity Systems
63 Guinea - Liberia	01/79	Non-Agression Treaty
64 Nigeria - Benin	02/79	Scientific, Technical and Economic Cooperation Agreements
65 Ghana - Ivory Coast	02/79	Abolishing Visa Requirements
66 Ghana - Ivory Coast	02/79	Financial (loan) Agreement
67 Nigeria - Benin	03/79	Joint Cement Agreement
68 Mali - Niger	07/79	Joint Cooperation Agreement

<u>States</u>	<u>*Dates</u>	<u>Type of Treaty or Agreement</u>
69 Nigeria - Benin	08/79	Joint Cooperation Agreements
70 Ghana - Ivory Coast	09/79	Oil Exploration Agreement
71 Ghana - Nigeria	10/79	Resumption of Oil Supplies
72 Ghana - Liberia	10/79	Bilateral Pact/Agreement
73 Senegal - Mali	01/80	Scientific/Technical Research
74 Nigeria - Ghana	02/80	Exploitation of Bauxite
75 Sierra Leone - Ghana	04/80	Joint Cooperation Commission
76 Nigeria - Senegal	04/80	Joint Economic Cooperation Commission
77 Liberia - Ghana	08/80	Transportation Agreement
78 Burkina Faso - Ghana	08/80	Dam Construction Agreement
79 Liberia - Nigeria	09/80	Trade Restoration Agreement
80 Nigeria - Niger	02/81	Exploitation of Phosphates
81 Nigeria - Benin	04/81	Reactivate Boundary Commission
82 Ivory Coast - Senegal	09/81	Sports and Educational Cooperation Agreement
83 Guinea - Nigeria	09/81	Economic (Fishing) and Cultural Cooperation Agreements
84 Mali - Liberia	11/81	Economic, Scientific and Cultural Cooperation Agreements

<u>States</u>	<u>*Dates</u>	<u>Type of Treaty or Agreement</u>
85 Liberia - Gambia	11/81	Confederation Agreement
86 Senegal - Gambia	01/82	Senegambian Confederation Treaty
87 Ghana - Senegal	01/82	Cultural, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreements
88 Gambia - Senegal	02/82	Public Transportation Program
89 Ghana - Nigeria	04/82	Rescheduling Oil Payments
90 C/Verde - G/Bissau	06/82	Resumption of Diplomatic Relations
91 Senegal - Gambia	07/82	Senegambian Protocols Agreements
92 Nigeria - Ivory Coast	08/82	Trade Agreement
93 Senegal - Gambia	04/83	Armed Forces Integration Protocol
94 Nigeria - Niger	06/83	Agricultural Cooperation Agreement
95 Gambia - Nigeria	07/83	Scientific, Technical and Economic Cooperation Agreement
96 Ghana - Benin	09/83	Exploitation of Mineral Resources
97 Nigeria - Mauritania	11/83	Economic (Fishing) Agreement
98 Nigeria - Guinea	11/83	Economic (Fishing) Agreement
99 Ghana - Burkina Faso	11/83	Border Demarcation Agreement
100 Ghana - Burkina Faso	02/84	Trade (Livestock & Agriculture) Agreement
101 Nigeria - Niger	04/84	Bilateral Trade Agreement

<u>States</u>	<u>*Dates</u>	<u>Type of Treaty or Agreement</u>
102 Ghana - Ivory Coast	05/84	Reactivate Cooperation Commission
103 Ghana - Burkina Faso	06/84	Economic Cooperation Agreement
104 Liberia - Gambia	06/84	Revive Friendship Treaty
105 Liberia - Senegal	07/84	Create Cooperation Commission
106 Liberia - Senegal	07/84	Exchange Media Programs
107 Ghana - Nigeria	07/84	Resumption of Sporting Ties
108 Ghana - Burkina Faso	09/84	Trade and Migration Pact
109 Ghana - Ivory Coast	12/84	Security Agreement (Dissidents)
110 Ghana - Burkina Faso	12/84	Security Agreement (Dissidents)
111 Liberia - Guinea	12/84	Revive Friendship Treaty
112 Nigeria - Gambia	03/85	Fisheries and Technical Cooperation
113 Niger - Burkina Faso	03/85	Reactivate Joint Commission
114 Ghana - Togo	03/85	Finance African Highway
115 Gambia - Senegal	05/85	Free Trade Agreement
116 Ghana - Guinea	05/85	Sports and Culture Agreement
117 Senegal - G/Bissau	10/85	Territories Arbitration Agreement
118 Ghana - Nigeria	12/85	Restore Immigrants' Entitlements
119 Ghana - Togo	05/86	Border Security Agreement
120 Ghana - Burkina Faso	06/86	Establish Air Links

<u>States</u>	<u>*Dates</u>	<u>Type of Treaty or Agreement</u>
121 Ghana - Mali	06/86	Expand Trade/Economic Cooperation
122 Ghana - Gambia	06/86	Tourism, Culture, Information Agreement
123 Guinea - S/Leone	12/86	Non-Agression Security Treaty
124 Ghana - Gambia	01/87	Air Services Agreement
125 Nigeria - Liberia	01/87	New Airways Agreement
126 Nigeria-Liberia	02/87	Economic/Technical Cooperation Agreement
127 Ghana - Burkina Faso	02/87	Education Protocol Agreement
128 Ghana - Burkina Faso	04/87	Post and Telecommunications
129 Nigeria - I/Coast	07/87	Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement
130 Ghana - Burkina Faso	07/87	Air Services Agreement
131 Nigeria - Mali	12/87	Joint Cooperation Commission
132 G/Bissau - C/Verde	02/88	Closing Navigation Company
133 Benin - Niger	05/88	Financial (Construction) Agreement
134 S/Leone - Gambia	05/88	Commerce and Educational Agreements
135 Nigeria - Benin	05/88	Border Demarcation Accord
136 Nigeria - Benin	10/88	Prisoners' Exchange Agreement
137 Nigeria - Cape Verde	10/88	Air, Maritime and Telecommunication Agreements

<u>States</u>	<u>*Dates</u>	<u>Type of Treaty or Agreement</u>
138 Nigeria - Ghana	12/88	Prisoners' Exchange Agreement
139 Ghana - Burkina Faso	12/88	Friendship Treaty
140 Ghana - Nigeria	03/89	Trade and Migration Agreements
141 Sierra Leone - Togo	03/89	Economic, Technical and Cultural Cooperation Agreements
142 Mali - Niger	04/89	Refugee Repatriation Agreement
143 Liberia - Nigeria	04/89	Establish Cooperation Commission
144 Ghana - Nigeria	07/89	Oil Venture/Survey Agreement
145 Nigeria - Niger	08/89	Electric Power Deal
146 I/Coast - B/Faso	11/89	Maritime Transport Agreement
147 Nigeria - Togo	12/89	Economic, Scientific, Technical and Cultural Agreement

*Data presented indicate dates in which the visits were reported.

SOURCES: West Africa (London), 1975-1989.
Africa Research Bulletin (Exeter), 1975-1989.

African states include the sports and educational agreements between Ivory Coast and Senegal (1981), the cultural agreement between Nigeria and Niger (1977), and the sports and culture agreement between Ghana and Guinea (1985). Finally, specific examples of bilateral military agreements in West Africa include the non-aggression defense treaties between Liberia and Ivory Coast (1977), Ghana and Liberia (1979), and Guinea and Sierra Leone (1986). Other examples of military agreements include defense and mutual security accords between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau (1975), between Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (1977), between Gambia and Mauritania (1978), and the Armed Forces Integration Protocol between Gambia and Senegal (1983).

It has been suggested, with significant exceptions, that major treaty partners are predominantly neighboring countries and that "geographical location, and proximity bear a direct relationship to bilateral treaty relationship."⁵⁰ In other words, contiguous states represent a special area of concentration of diplomacy and the security of the state is unavoidably dependent upon that of its neighbors. It is also quite evident from Table 4.3 that the majority of the treaties and agreements signed are between geographically contiguous states in West Africa. Of the 147 treaties and agreements signed, 79 agreements (or 54 percent) were signed between states sharing a border. The best example of this lies with the Ghana-Ivory Coast dyad with a total of 18 bilateral (mostly economic) agreements followed by the Ghana-Burkina Faso dyad with 13 bilateral agreements. In descending order, the Gambia-Senegal dyad has 10 agreements, the Nigeria-Benin dyad 7 agreements and the Nigeria-Niger and

the Liberia-Guinea dyads have 5 agreements each. The Senegal-Guinea-Bissau dyad has 3 agreements and both the Ghana-Burkina Faso and the Mali-Niger dyads have 2 agreements each. The other remaining contiguous states each have 1 agreement. But important as they are, treaties are means not ends. For cooperation to take root and grow, actions have to be taken by interacting states within the context of regional organizations.

Mutual Memberships of Regional Organizations

The concept of IGO used here is restricted to public institutions in the traditional sense and does not include non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, and similar participants in world affairs. Regional organizations are usually restricted to states that meet specified geographical qualifications in the international system.⁵¹ For an IGO to qualify as such, it must comprise at least two purposive states, it must have been established by formal agreement, and must have a permanent secretariat, headquarters, and a regular budget. In addition, it must hold regular conferences. IGOs generally seek to strengthen bonds between leaders and states through multilateral diplomacy. Although affiliation with IGOs poses innate and positive appeal to states regardless of their size, in general, weak and small states rationally choose to join them for the benefits they expect to enjoy. Consequently, a considerable proportion of the energy of African leaders is devoted to activity in IGOs which, in turn, "affects changing patterns of international integration and regionalization, changing patterns of international conflict and influences, and

changing constraints on the autonomous development of individual nations."⁵²

The policy formation dimensions of international political cooperation relate to the proliferation of political interactions between organizational groupings in a supranational arena. If the prospects of regional cooperation in West Africa are high, this means that one could expect, in addition to the expansion of institutional channels, an increase in intraregional transactions through subregional (defined as West African) institutional networks, and increasing cooperation and conflict resolution among states through wider pan-African efforts. As a pattern variable, the degree of common memberships in international organizations is a useful indication of interactions between states in a given regional subsystem. "The most obvious and undifferentiated indicator of the extent to which international organization has been instituted among the members of the system is a gross reflection of magnitude: How many organizations are there in existence each year and how many nations do they embrace?"⁵³

In an attempt to investigate such questions with respect to political interactions in the West African subsystem, Table 4.4 presents two sets of descriptive data. First, the mutual membership of West African states in West African organizations (located in the upper portion) and second, the mutual membership of West African states in other pan-African organizations (lower portion). The proliferation of IGOs has been marked in West Africa. Although some of the IGOs overlap in functions, the membership of an IGO is nevertheless significant since it represents the political

Table 4.4

Frequency of Joint Membership in West African And Pan-African Organizations - 1985

COUNTRIES	BURKINA FASO		CAPE VERDE		GAMBIA		GHANA		GUINEA		BISSAU		COAST		LIBERIA		MALI		TAHIA		NIGER		NIGERIA		SENEGAL		LEONE		TOGO	
	BENIN	12	3	7	9	5	6	12	7	10	6	13	8	11	7	11														
B/FASO	11	-	4	8	5	6	14	7	12	8	14	7	12	8	14	7	12	7	11	7	11									
C/VERDE	4	3	-	4	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
GAMBIA	4	4	4	-	8	6	6	7	8	8	5	8	8	10	8	7	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	
GHANA	5	4	4	5	-	5	6	8	8	8	4	8	9	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	
GUINEA	6	4	4	4	5	-	5	5	6	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	
G/BISSAU	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	
I/COAST	13	12	4	5	8	6	4	-	7	12	7	14	7	12	7	14	7	12	7	12	7	12	7	12	7	12	7	12	7	
LIBERIA	4	12	3	3	5	4	3	5	-	7	4	7	8	7	9	7	9	7	9	7	9	7	9	7	9	7	9	7	9	
MALI	10	12	4	6	5	4	11	3	-	9	13	7	13	7	13	7	13	7	13	7	13	7	13	7	13	7	13	7	13	
MAURITANIA	10	11	4	5	5	4	4	11	3	11	-	8	4	9	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	
NIGER	12	14	4	6	5	5	4	13	3	14	12	-	7	13	7	12	-	7	13	7	12	-	7	13	7	12	-	7	13	
NIGERIA	5	4	4	6	8	5	4	8	5	6	5	7	-	8	8	7	-	8	8	7	-	8	8	7	-	8	8	7	10	
SENEGAL	11	11	4	6	5	4	4	13	3	11	11	13	6	-	7	10	13	6	-	7	10	13	6	-	7	10	13	6	-	
S/LEONE	5	4	4	5	6	5	4	6	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	
TOGO	11	10	4	5	7	5	4	13	4	9	10	11	7	11	6	5	7	11	6	5	7	11	6	5	7	11	6	5	7	

Source: Calculated from data presented in Olatunde Ojo, "Regional Cooperation and Integration" in Olatunde Ojo, D.K., Orwa and C.W.B. Utege, eds., African International Relations (London: Longman Group, 1985), pp. 146-147.

Note: The top portion indicates mutual membership of states in West African organizations whereas the lower portion indicates joint membership of states in pan-African organizations. The table shows, for example, the number of the same West African organizations to which Benin and Burkina Faso belong (12) and the number of the same pan-African organizations to which both states belong (11). It also shows the number of same West African organizations to which Liberia and Gambia belong (8) and the number of same pan-African organizations to which both states belong (3).

decision of a government. With the interesting exception of Guinea,⁵⁴ all the French-speaking states demonstrate a highly remarkable growth of joint organizational links both in the West African subregion and in continental Africa (generally scoring values of 10 and above). Whereas Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone are members of only a few regional organizations, the highest interactive levels are among the Francophone states. These facts reassert an earlier suggestion that, relative to their English-speaking counterparts, French-speaking states tend to interact more with each other in the subregion and throughout the continent while maintaining the minimum possible contact with Anglophone countries.⁵⁵ Colonial experience has its consequences for the foreign policies of African states; it is rational and easier to mix, and work closely, with people whose language, education, legal and administrative system one understands. For the Francophone African states, the impact of colonial heritage is more pronounced, as is evident in the continued establishment of IGOs to promote their mutual cooperation.⁵⁶ On this basis, one could argue that the prospect for formal channels of routine political and economic transactions may be greater for Francophone states than for Anglophone West Africa.

2. ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL INTERACTIONS

As a consequence of the severity and complexity of the economic problems

facing them, the concept of regional economic cooperation has figured prominently in the international relations of West African states. To many African leaders, political independence was viewed basically as a mechanism for the eventual development of the economies of the various states. Since economic independence did not automatically accompany political independence,⁵⁷ there was renewed struggle to attain that objective. There was a general recognition that, while political independence was the primary goal, real independence required economic integration and development since African states were too small to be economically viable.⁵⁸ In contemporary times, this specific issue has come to represent a cornerstone in the foreign policies of Third World states. While cooperation as an ideal and in practice is not entirely new to the West African subregion, it could be confidently suggested that presently there is a more systematic and analytical discussion of the scope of economic regionalism, the various advantages it entails, and the several institutional constraints that accompany it on a constantly expanding basis.

Both internal constraints and external factors constitute the source of lagging growth in West Africa. In an attempt to uncover these endogenous and exogenous dimensions to economic interactions in the area, the primary objectives of this section are threefold: first, to examine the general structure and trends of West African economies; second, to investigate the structure and patterns of economic interactions among West African states as actors in a regional subsystem; and third, to analyze the frequency of economic interactions between West African states and other selected regions in the world. These objectives are necessarily interwoven. Thus, to show the

frequency of economic interactions among West African states along with their interactions with selected regions of the world is to provide a basis for assessing the prospect for economic cooperation in the subregion. In an analysis of economic interactions in West Africa, therefore, one must analytically distinguish between efforts towards intraregional trade or horizontal exchange on the one hand, and inherited, vertical integration with the former metropolises on the other. In this section, we argue that a reduction in the latter category and an increase in the former one necessarily results in greater self-reliance at both national and collective levels. Although the emphasis here is on West African economies, needless to say, many of the problems and developmental structures of the area that are treated here are applicable to Africa in general.

The Structure of West African Economies

An analysis of the structure of West African economies reveals, first and foremost, that they are generally small and fragile, much too small as markets to utilize the advantages of large-scale economies. The poverty evident in these states present severe strains in their autonomous development. Yet, the level of development of any region is to some degree a function of the structure of its economy. Since West Africa is, in the socioeconomic sense, a typically underdeveloped area, it follows that the level of economic development in the subregion may be expected to exhibit the common characteristics of underdevelopment.⁵⁹ Stated differently, because West African economies are

generally weak, these states lack the wherewithal required for improved services in health, education, and transportation, which are necessary ingredients for higher productivity and a better standard of living. Although the defining characteristics of underdevelopment in West Africa are many, it will suffice here to identify those salient structures upon which other factors hinge in matters of regional economic cooperation. These include such features as the predominance of agriculture and the general weakness of the industrial sector.

Overdependence on Agriculture

The main economic feature of West African states is the predominance of agriculture. By far, the greatest number of Africans are farmers. In addition to being agricultural, most West African economies are dependent on only two or three primary commodities. With the possible exception of Ivory Coast, all ECOWAS states depend on one single product. As shown in Table 4.5 for instance, Gambia's economy is predicated on groundnuts, Nigeria's on crude oil, and Liberia's on rubber. It is further estimated that the average share of agriculture, including livestock, forestry, and fishing, in the total GDP of the subregion is between 50 and 55 percent.⁶⁰ However, since mining accounts for an equal or larger portion of the estimated national product of some countries, the average figure presented here covers significant variations between the countries.⁶¹ For example, West African states vary in the extent to which they are rich in oil and mineral resources, as in the case of Nigeria and Guinea, and the extent to which they are entirely dependent on

agriculture. Therefore, in Liberia, Nigeria, and Senegal, the contribution of agriculture is generally lower (in the order of 30 percent of the total GDP).⁶² This is because extractive industries are generally very important in Liberia and Nigeria, and, as demonstrated in Table 4.6, Senegal is reputed as having one of the most highly developed industrial and manufacturing sectors in West Africa.

That notwithstanding, in the so-called mineral-exporting countries of Africa, the majority of the population - at most 80 percent but rarely less than 70 percent - still work in agriculture,⁶³ and subsistence-oriented production still accounts for half or more of total agricultural output.⁶⁴ Indeed, in addition to the predominance of the agricultural sector, a further general feature of West African states is the glaring dichotomy between the non-monetized (or subsistence) and the monetized subsectors. In all the countries under discussion, the non-monetized subsector accounts for more than half of agricultural production, on the average. When compared with subsistence agriculture, the monetized subsector is usually smaller and is mainly oriented towards exports. This, in fact, is a reflection of the general colonial policy on land and trade in West Africa during the first half of the twentieth century where farmers were encouraged to grow cash crops for export trade and food crops for subsistence. Part and parcel of the French policy, for instance, entailed "the encouragement and, sometimes, enforcement of the cultivation of cash crops. Prominent in the cash crop economy were coffee, cocoa, oil palm and bananas in the wetter areas of the forest zone, and cotton as well as groundnuts in the drier interiors."⁶⁵

Table 4.5

West Africa: Dependence on Major Export
Categories, 1978

<u>Food & Beverages</u>		<u>Minerals & Metals</u>		<u>Fuels</u>	
	%		%		%
Guinea Bissau	96	Guinea	98	Nigeria	91
Gambia	90+	Mauritania	87		
Ivory Coast	74	Liberia	63		
Ghana	73	Togo	49		
Senegal	72	Niger	40		
Upper Volta	49				
Mali	47				
Sierra Leone	47				
Benin	40				

SOURCE: World Bank Report, 1981, p. 152.

Table 4.6

Proportional Shares of Mining and Manufacturing
Activities in GDP of West African Economies (%)

	Manufacturing		Mining	
	1960	1977	1979	1977
Benin	3	na	8	6.8
Cape Verde	na	1.8	na	0.3
Gambia	na	na	na	1.1
Ghana	10	13.1	na	1.3
Guinea	na	6.3	5	18.0
Guinea-Bissau	na	1.0	na	0.0
Ivory Coast	7	10.7	12	0.2
Liberia	na	8.8	6	22.8
Mali	5	na	6	12.6
Mauritania	na	4.7	8	17.1
Niger	4	5.2	10	8.4
Nigeria	5	5.4	6	28.4
Senegal	12	16.5	19	2.5
Sierra Leone	na	7.4	5	10.2
Togo	8	na	14	11.9
Upper Volta	8	9.5	14	0.1

Sources: World Bank, World Bank Report, 1981 and UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1980.

Weakness of the Industrial Sector

The second most important characteristic of West African economies is the weakness of the industrial sector. Any industrial development is rudimentary and does not involve the development of intermediate and capital goods and consumer durables. Modern manufacturing in the area is still dependent on foreign expertise, and progress is at a relatively low rate.⁶⁶ This second characteristic is derived from the first. With the notable exception of Senegal, the share of the manufacturing sector in the total production of West African states is generally below 15 percent (see Table 4.6). In Francophone West Africa, Senegal and the Ivory Coast are the only two states with a significant industrial sector,⁶⁷ and there are serious efforts towards greater participation by the private industrial sector.

There is obviously some variation in the share of the industrial sector in the GDP of individual states in West Africa. For example, although industries in Ghana and Nigeria started well in the 1960s, the manufacturing sector has deteriorated in both countries ever since. On the other hand, the manufacturing sectors of Ivory Coast, Niger, and Burkina Faso have done relatively well. In Guinea, there are some manufacturing enterprises but their contribution to the national economy has been minimal. Togo, Niger, Benin, and Mali have only small industrial sections although, as already indicated, Niger is exceptional since it is experiencing some industrial growth, mainly due to the country's mineral (uranium) base. Although Nigeria has one of the most advanced industrial sectors in the region in the absolute sense, the ratio of manufacturing output to GDP has decreased significantly, largely because of

the dominance of the oil sector.⁶⁸

Perhaps as a consequence of a policy of industrialization based upon import-substitution, the manufacturing sector in West Africa depends to a great extent on agricultural production. Indeed, this desire to develop the local industrial sector from the same agricultural resource base has been growing since political independence in the late 1950s and the early 1960s.⁶⁹ The structure of manufacturing output is heavily biased toward the processing of agricultural raw materials.⁷⁰ From the agricultural angle, then, the development of land as a resource base is along the same lines for both the long-existing primary export trade and the relatively new industrial economy. For instance, the food, beverages, and tobacco component of output accounts for between one-third and one-half of total manufactured output in West Africa. Textile, clothing, and footwear constitute the second most important component of manufacturing production. In many West African countries, chemicals and chemical products are also significant, accounting for between 10 and 20 percent of total output.⁷¹ With the exception of the cement industries, other industrial groups are usually not significant. One final point: because the move toward greater industrialization requires a wide market, which individual African countries do not possess, economic integration in West Africa is a sine qua non for industrial development.⁷²

General Trends: Economic Decline and Harsh Realities

During the past two decades, economic development has been slow in most of

the countries in sub-Saharan Africa. But many of Africa's economic problems are imported from abroad. When in the mid-1970s, the world economy experienced inflation and recession, nowhere did the crisis hit with greater impact than in this region. Most West African countries, such as Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Togo have suffered low per capita growth since 1970. Indeed, by the end of the 1970s, economic crises were battering even high-growth countries in West Africa like Ivory Coast where per capita GNP growth had averaged an annual 2.7 percent between 1960 and 1979.⁷³ The economic crisis is especially evident in agriculture, and is reflected in output figures. For example, export crop production stagnated over the past two decades. In fact, a 20 percent increase in production registered during the 1960s was wiped out by a decline of similar proportions in the 1970s. Consequently, amidst the rising prices of imported oil and the declining growth of primary commodities, Africa's share of the world market dwindled considerably. Not only did West African states have to deal with the question of the industrialized countries paying less for their exported primary commodities, ECOWAS countries also had to address the problem of decreasing volume of exports of these commodities vis-à-vis paying more for expensive imports.

As for food crops, while data are uncertain, they leave no doubt about the general tendencies. Since 70 to 90 percent of the population earns its income from agriculture, the drop in production in this sector resulted in a real income loss for many of the poorest. In Ghana, during the past 15 years there has been a dramatic and steady decline in cocoa production - from a peak of 556,000 metric tons in 1965

to 249,000 tons in 1979. Ghana's share of world production shrunk from one-third in the 1950s and 1960s to one-sixth in 1979; from first in cocoa, Ghana has fallen to third place, behind Ivory Coast and Brazil. British geographer Ievan Griffiths reports Ghana's president as lamenting in 1983: "Not only has our [cocoa] production level fallen by almost half, but the price of our cocoa demands has fallen to one-third of its average price five years ago."⁷⁴ Also, in Sierra Leone, there has been an appreciable decline in the output of cocoa since 1970. Thus, agricultural output is the single most important determinant of economic growth and its sluggish record of recent years is one principal factor underlying the poor economic performance of the countries of the region. Almost every sub-Saharan economy declined in virtually every measurable way during the 1970s and early 1980s.

West Africa has also witnessed a de-escalation in mineral prices. In Sierra Leone, the mineral exports by the National Diamond Mining Company (DIMINCO) dropped significantly from \$44 million in 1980 to \$32 million in 1981, \$20 million in 1982, and \$17 million in 1983.⁷⁵ In 1988, according to the UN International Fund for Agricultural Development, economic indicators have either remained at unacceptably low levels or continued their downward spiral in most categories, including trade earnings and industrial output.⁷⁶ Finally, even for oil-rich Nigeria, the oil glut has produced a negative trend evident especially from the early 1980s onwards.⁷⁷ As shown in Table 4.7, from 1980, there has been marked progressive decrease in both the production of crude oil and its price. Indeed, by 1983, the

Table 4.7

Nigeria's Oil Statistics, 1966 - 1982

Year	Average barrels per day (millions)	Annual total (millions)	Average price per barrel (US \$)
1968	0.4	152	?
1969	0.5	197	2.2
1970	1.1	396	2.3
1971	1.6	569	3.1
1972	1.8	665	3.4
1973	2.1	750	4.8
1974	2.3	823	14.7
1975	1.8	651	12.2
1976	2.0	758	13.8
1977	2.1	766	14.6
1978	1.9	695	14.2
1979	2.4	840	20.7
1980*	2.1	753	35.2
1981	1.4	526	38.8
1982	1.3	472	35.7
1983	1.2	452	30.0
1984	1.3	470	28.0
(estimated)			

Sources: Anthony Kirk-Greene and Douglas Rimmer, Nigeria Since 1970 (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1981); Douglas Rimmer, The Economics of West Africa, 1984; Financial Times (London), 23 January 1984.

average barrels of oil produced per day was half the figure registered for 1979, and the average price per barrel dropped significantly.

Patterns and Directions of Intra-regional Trade

The patterns of trade in West Africa is of considerable interest to both developmental economists and African leaders alike.⁷⁸ Inter-territorial trade has a very important bearing on the entire question of regional economic integration in West Africa. As mentioned elsewhere, one major suggestion for circumventing the small size dilemma of many African economies is for the pooling of their national markets in a regional or subregional common market. But intra-subregional trade in West Africa has one outstanding feature. Available evidence strongly suggests that West African countries are not each other's principal customers.⁷⁹ The low volume of trade among these states indicates that concrete achievements in regional economic integration is almost non-existent. Trade between the states accounts for a very small percentage of their total trade, specifically, "a mere 3.6 percent for the subregion as a whole."⁸⁰ Table 4.8 shows this trend, with a different set of data. The dependence of the subregion on trade with the developed states for the seven-year period 1968-1974 averaged 87.0 percent while the intraregional economic exchange for the same period averaged only 3.4 percent.⁸¹

But it could be argued that this table covers the period before the formation of ECOWAS and does not, therefore, capture certain realities generated with the

Table 4.8

<u>Share of Intra-West African Trade* in Total External Trade (US \$million)</u>						
Description of Trade	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
(a) Total trade with countries of the world	3,846.6	4,546.6	5,683.4	6,684.5	7,503.5	10,548.5
(b) Intra-regional trade (ECOWAS)	144.8	133.9	162.3	236.4	241.9	428.3
(c) (b) as % of (a) [average for the period]	3.8	2.9	2.9	3.5	3.2	4.1
(d) Exports with all countries of the world	2,017.6	1,392.2	2,954.3	3,397.2	4,126.4	6,094.5
(e) Exports within countries in the sub-region (ECOWAS)	75.1	66.1	86.2	140.4	127.1	231.1
(f) (e) as % of (d)	3.7	2.8	2.9	4.1	3.1	3.8
(g) Imports from all countries of the world	1,829.1	2,154.5	2,728.5	3,287.3	2,277.1	4,454.0
(h) Imports from countries in the subregion (ECOWAS)	69.7	67.8	76.1	96.0	114.8	197.1
(i) (h) as % of (g) [average for the period]	3.8	3.1	2.8	2.9	3.4	4.4
						5.1

*Data excludes Guinea-Bissau Sources: I.M.F., I.B.R.D., Direction of Trade 1968-1972, 1969-1973, 1970-1974. Cited also in S.K.B. Asante, The Political Economy of Regionalism in Africa: A Decade of the Economic Community of West African States, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986) p. 41.

establishment of the Economic Community. However, the picture did not change much despite the formation of ECOWAS in 1975. For example, by one estimate, for the years 1974, 1976, and 1978, the value recorded intra-community exports were \$409 million, \$479 million, and \$616 million respectively, representing 3.0-3.5 percent of total exports.⁸² In addition, according to Douglass Rimmer, of the recorded exports of West African states in 1979, less than 3 percent represented their exports to one another.⁸³

Analyzing specific cases, Gambia's trade with her neighbor is almost non-existent. Although trade with Senegal has been rising, it is still at a low and unimpressive level.⁸⁴ For instance, out of her total exports, Gambia's export trade with Senegal for the periods 1967-1967 and 1967-1968 was nil. This figure increased to 6.5 percent but recorded zero again in 1967-1970. It increased slightly in 1970-1971. In the years 1970-1971, 1971-1972, and 1972-1973 export trade with Senegal amounted to 0.3, 0.3, and 0.8 percent (of total exports), respectively. Gambia's imports from Senegal also amounted to a meager 0.8 percent of total imports for the 1972-1973 period.⁸⁵ Ghana's exports to the rest of Africa is equally negligible, amounting to about 1.0 percent of total trade in recent years.⁸⁶

More impressive is Ghana's record on imports from other African states, which increased from 0.4 percent of total imports in 1968 to about 0.8 percent in 1972. The explanation here is that a large portion of Ghana's imports comprise trade in crude oil, mainly from Nigeria (but also from North Africa). The balance of Ghana's imports accrue from trade in cattle, especially from Burkina Faso and Mali.

Intra-African trade figures for Liberia and Sierra Leone are not readily available, but there is little doubt that they are similarly low. Togo has a significant non-recorded trade with Benin which may exceed 10 percent of her exports to the franc zone and, as expected, members of the franc zone are also Togo's major customers. Figures for Nigeria's intra-African trade show that trade with the continent has been very low. One scholar has roughly estimated that it "never exceeded 2 percent of total trade."⁸⁷ Similarly, the value of Nigeria's trade with ECOWAS states throughout the period 1979-1983 has remained low. As Table 4.9 shows, the main trading partners remain the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Ghana, and Sierra Leone and, in each case, Nigeria was exporting more to these states than it was importing.

A sizeable majority of Niger's foreign trade is routed through the sea ports of Cotonou (in Benin) and Lagos (in Nigeria). It is difficult to estimate the traffic load of this trade with precision. However, if groundnut exports trade is accepted as a prototypical trade pattern, in the periods 1962-1963 and 1965-1966 about 80 percent of Niger's groundnut exports were transacted through Nigeria. Despite the adverse effects of the Nigerian civil war on Niger's trade routes, in 1966-1967, an estimated 104,000 tons of groundnuts (representing a total of 64 percent of total exports) and 59,000 tons of groundnuts were transported through Lagos and Cotonou, respectively. Indeed, with the closer proximity of Niger's major groundnut-producing areas to the Kano railhead, Lagos sea ports provide the natural and rational outlet for Niger's trade (especially for south-central and eastern Niger) particularly as this routes offer

Table 4.9
Nigeria's Trade with West Africa, 1979-1983

State	Imports (N '000)					Exports (N'000) ^a				
	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Ghana	2,717	2,508	2,347	1,886	1,054	75,163	132,890	190,708	112,598	43,599
Togo	501	397	5,859	1,667	3,291	35,129	48,468	6,517	37	65
Guinea	2	--	--	--	7	7	--	--	--	--
Liberia	454	1,502	9,016	2,854	1,536	126	2	143	535	44
Gambia	6	302	673	622	708	1	7	8	--	--
Niger	1,498	5,961	130	655	5,334	3,069	16,657	59	6,725	9,582
G/Sissau	73	15	237	157	500	7	--	--	--	--
Mali	8	102	137	330	488	42	7	--	--	5
I/Coast	3,988	15,988	15,368	17,356	15,224	31,565	47,152	52,905	53,828	63,509
B/Faso	1,150	77	1,314	1,308	521	23	--	--	--	18
Senegal	4,646	9,566	559	2,934	2,812	19,036	30,835	18,118	28,814	23,519
Cape Verde	200	493	115	310	98	2	15	56	470	--
Mauritania	--	--	1,683	344	92	--	--	--	--	--
Benin	2,484	1,179	1,372	1,178	2,401	1,549	3,043	3,886	4,354	43
S/Leone	20	841	1,374	35	44	220,727	35,929	26,945	23,723	25,627
Total	22,746	38,931	38,184	31,636	34,110	186,468	315,001	299,355	236,018	166,001

^a Exports include re-exports

SOURCE: Review of External Trade, Nigeria 1983. Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos, Nigeria.

cheaper transport costs than transportation through Cotonou.⁸⁸ In addition, partly because of being landlocked, Nigeria is second (only to France) as a market for Niger's export products.⁸⁹ Nigeria's share of total exports based on available trade data was 23 percent of total exports in the 1967-1968 period. Recorded trade between Niger with its other West African neighbors are negligible although figures would have been much higher if unrecorded border trade were taken into account.⁹⁰

There are other scattered traces of intra-African trade in the subregion. Senegal's imports from West African states have increased slightly in recent years. There are imports of fruits from Ivory Coast, fabrics from Benin, cotton from both Mali and Burkina Faso, and livestock from Mauritania. Burkina Faso's products are mainly exported to Ivory Coast, which remains the leading export market for her products, absorbing 53 percent of total exports in 1968. In addition, whereas Burkina Faso's exports to Ghana represented 10 percent of recorded exports in 1968,⁹¹ Ivory Coast ranked second (after France) as a supplier in her import trade, with a share of 16 percent of total imports.

Although intra-West African trade is generally reputed to be small, critics argue that uncontrollable frontiers encourage traditional and clandestine trade, estimates of which are not recorded.⁹² In other words, unofficial trade in West Africa is not accounted for, which skews available data. Statistics on intra-African trade are unreliable in many instances. Although smuggled goods are less than 1 percent of Senegalese imports, illegal border trade with Gambia (in transistors and groundnuts) has been a feature of the relations between the two states.⁹³ Likewise,

the unofficial export of Sierra Leonean diamonds via Liberia has continued,⁹⁴ and Togo exports a quantity of gold it does not produce.⁹⁵ Due to price differences in the 1970/71 season, Ghana lost 57,000 tons of cocoa through smuggling to immediate neighbors.⁹⁶ In Nigeria, smuggling was the best known avenue for unrecorded trade since sizeable proportions of merchandise ultimately found their way to neighboring countries as re-exports in gross violation of government regulations aimed at registering such transactions.⁹⁷ There are several counter-arguments to these points. First, even if unrecorded trade is allowed for, which is quite significant for several states,⁹⁸ intra-Community trade is not likely to exceed 5-6 percent of total trade, which is still low for the subregion.⁹⁹ Second, even if local commerce across frontiers were sometimes three times the value recorded, smuggling in West Africa is usually in goods destined for (or obtained from) overseas. Such unrecorded trade is hardly relevant to intra-African interactions and "would do little to remove the impression of a predominantly overseas orientation in the exports of West African trade."¹⁰⁰

It has been reported that colonial heritage is strongly related to the trade and transaction flow of subgroups.¹⁰¹ One interesting feature of intra-subregional trade is the dominant role of trade within the Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO).¹⁰² Although both IGOs are still in their infant stages, the CEAO is more advanced than ECOWAS, especially in the organization and promotion of interstate trade as well as in the area of economic cooperation within the Community.¹⁰³ For example, intra-CEAO exports, as a proportion of total intra-

ECOWAS exports, amounted to one-half in 1975, and if trade in petroleum is excluded this share would rise to about two-thirds. In addition, as regards trade within the Franc zone, Ivory Coast accounts for one-half of this two-thirds while Senegal accounts for one-quarter.¹⁰⁴ This is partly due to discriminatory tariff barriers. Within the Francophone area, existing Ivorian levies discriminate in favor of raw materials from inland states. Likewise, Senegalese tariffs on goods from Anglophone neighbors are approximately 30 to 50 percent higher than those within the franc zone, thus making it difficult for Ghana and Nigeria to export legally to the Francophone states. Also, it is cheaper for Francophone states to import from Europe than from their Anglophone neighbors, and the reverse is true as well.¹⁰⁵

Another major feature of intra-ECOWAS trading is the considerable imbalance recorded in intra-territorial trade. For instance, in 1975, four countries - Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Niger - recorded positive balances, while the remaining twelve countries all recorded deficits to varying degrees. The overall position is, however, considerably affected by trade in crude oil, which accounts for most of Nigeria's favorable intra-Community balance and a large proportion of intra-Community deficits and surplus. In fact, the only important crude resource in intra-zonal economic exchange is petroleum and, with Nigeria's oil bonanza, the commodity has become an important item in West African trade. Nigeria supplies crude oil to refineries in Ivory Coast, Ghana, Senegal, Liberia, and Sierra Leone and the proportion may increase in the immediate future.¹⁰⁶ In the manufacturing industry, only two countries - Ivory Coast and Senegal - consistently record positive

trade balances.

In 1975, Ivory Coast and Nigeria (one-third each) and Senegal (one-sixth) accounted for the bulk of intra-Community trade. There are great differences between ECOWAS states regarding trade and it is important to note that the level of exports and imports and, indeed, the relative significance of West African states in overall regional trade vary widely. Figures available for 1977 reveals that whereas Nigeria accounted for approximately two-thirds of the total exports and imports of the subregion, Cape Verde recorded approximately 0.01 percent and 0.26 percent of total exports and imports, respectively.¹⁰⁷ In 1979, exports to other African states were generally important for Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Senegal (over 15 percent of total exports), whereas imports from African countries were important for Mali, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso.¹⁰⁸ Of the afore-mentioned intra-Community trade registered by Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and Senegal in 1975, the landlocked states together with Benin and Ghana made up most of the balance. Landlocked states appear to depend relatively more on intra-Community trade than do other members of ECOWAS.¹⁰⁹ Although there appears to be a strongly positive relationship between landlockedness and economic interactions, the inevitable difficulty of precisely ascertaining the correct origin and destination of this specific trade may almost certainly result in an overstatement of that dependence.

Overall, the problems and constraints of African economic cooperation are quite complex and seemingly intractable. Why is intraregional trade so low among West African states? Several explanations may be offered in response to this

question. First, intra-West African trade is low because the states are not economically complementary in any marked degree. The structures and demands are not such that can provide important sources of supply for one another since memberstates produce a fairly similar range of manufactures. Second, such trade barriers as export taxes, import restrictions, and high tariffs limit exchange by serving as disincentives to intra-regional trade. By their very nature, tariff measures create barriers between states. One scholar summarizes the implication of these measures:

It must be emphasized that currently most ECOWAS countries depend heavily on customs receipts for government revenue. All this, together with the desire to protect domestic industries, results in an inordinately high level of tariffs. In most ECOWAS countries, no distinction in tariff application is made in favor of imports from other ECOWAS member countries. Accordingly, the current tariff structure does not appear to provide any special incentive to import from countries in the sub-region rather than from outside.¹¹⁰

Other obstacles include export controls and payments difficulties, which, to varying degrees, affect trade flows in most West African states (except Liberia where exchange control regulations are absent, and where the American dollar is almost universally acceptable). Furthermore, the absence of an integrated money and banking system is an institutional obstacle to inter-African trade in West Africa.¹¹¹ Although several bilateral payment arrangements exist between states belonging to different monetary zones, there are still operational difficulties posed despite the cooperation and support of the various national central banks to compensate for fluctuations in payments.¹¹² The external monetary and exchange controls imposed by the former colonial powers still regulate the currencies of West African states. Finally, since the transportation system is not historically geared towards intra-West

African trade, this constitutes an additional constraint. These are among the many institutional obstacles which keep intra-African trade down to 5 percent or less of the total value of external trade of African societies.¹¹³ Overall, since the various states are highly competitive in agricultural products, and industrialization is generally low, the demand for each other's exports within the subregion is considerably limited and dependent upon extra-African trade. Indeed, West Africa's demands for import rests primarily on processed foodstuffs, consumer durables, and intermediate and capital goods, which are imported from the advanced industrialized states.

Trade Patterns With Extra-African States

Trade is one of the most important instruments for the domination of subordinate systems by intrusive powers.¹¹⁴ Despite the continued predominance of the subsistence sector in West Africa, the regional subsystem is still highly dependent on foreign trade. To contend that intra-regional trade is low in the area is to suggest that most economic relations are geared toward extra-regional actors. A dominating feature of the region's trade structure is, therefore, the contrast between the strong trade links with the former metropole, on the one hand, and the weak intra-regional trade, on the other. West African economies are still dominated and largely organized around foreign trade, with production for, and investment aid from, Western Europe and North America. This has been the historical trend. External trade dependence is a characteristic feature of developing states in general and such dependence is chronic among the states of the West Africa.

Table 4.8 shows that the dependence of the subregion on trade with developed states for the 1968-1974 period averaged 87.0 percent of total trade, while intraregional trade economic interactions for the same period averaged approximately 3.4 percent. The figures prove that the channels of West African states are geared toward enhancing trade with former colonial powers and western industrial countries. This direction of trade follows the lines of classic economic dependence. In fact, since independence, the economies of West African states have exhibited a variety of structural characteristics that reflect the subregion's dependence on the world capitalist system. The economies are still largely based on the production of a few tropical agricultural products and minerals for export to the industrialized countries, chiefly those of Western Europe. The high rate of economic dependence has been further aggravated by the limited range of primary exports in most of the countries in contradistinction to the wide range of their imports of manufacture and foodstuffs. A significant aspect of this structural dependency is therefore that West African states exhibit the presence of the metropole in most sectors.

Although there are noticeable trends, an analysis of the individual cases of extra-territorial trade flows in West Africa depicts one-directional trade from these African states to former colonial (and other metropolitan) powers. Notably, compared with earlier times, there has been considerable diversion of trading connections and, in some states, the trading predominance of the former metropolitan power has been reduced since independence. For example, the major trading partner of Gambia is still the United Kingdom (UK) although prevailing trends reveal that

there was a conspicuous decline of trade with Britain after 1968-1969. Earlier, in the periods 1966-1967 and 1967-1968, Gambia's trade with Britain averaged 64 percent. However, the share of exports to the UK declined to 28 percent in the 1972-1973 period, indicating the effects of a reduction in the proportion of groundnut oil and cake in total exports.¹¹⁵ As regards trade exports, Gambia's purchases from the UK stood at 28 percent of total imports in 1972 and 1973, a decline from an earlier 36 percent of total purchases in 1966 and 1967.¹¹⁶ For Ghana, another former British colony, there was a conscious attempt to increase both exports and the sources of imports especially from 1972. At independence in 1957, the UK supplied 42 percent of Ghana's imports and received 37 percent of the country's exports.¹¹⁷ Although the UK has remained Ghana's chief export customer, purchasing about 20 percent of total exports, in 1972 there was a conspicuous decrease in both exports to and imports from Britain. Hence, in 1977, the UK provided only 14 percent of Ghana's imports, and took 19 percent of her exports.¹¹⁸ The United States (U.S.) is the next major importer of Ghana's exports, followed by the Federal Republic of Germany (among the world's major processor of cocoa). On the import side, up until 1972, the UK's predominance gave way to the U.S. (15 percent of total trade) as the latter became Ghana's principal trading partner (with 18 percent) followed by West Germany (with 12 percent).

A former British colony, Sierra Leone's trade records show that the UK still maintains the lead as the most important export market for her goods, which consists mainly of diamonds. Between 1967-1972, exports to the UK amounted to 68 percent

of total exports. However, due to a drop in diamond sales, this estimate decreased to 63 percent in 1971. With the government's conscious policy on trade diversification, both the U.S. and Japan have increasingly absorbed Sierra Leone's exports. The UK also maintained predominance in imports until 1971, with a leading share of over 28 percent of Sierra Leone's annual imports. This figure dropped in 1972 to 23 percent by losing momentum to Sierra Leone's trade with the rest of the Commonwealth states, which increased from 8 percent in 1967-1969 to 13 percent in 1971-1972.¹¹⁹

The extra-African direction of Nigeria's trade changed since 1970 because of the exportation of crude oil. Although the UK and members of the European Economic Community (EEC) were the largest importers of Nigerian petroleum, the share of the resource to the U.S. increased from 14 percent in 1970 to 24 percent in 1972, while that of Japan, formerly negligible, amounted to over 4 percent in 1972.¹²⁰ In 1980, nearly 60 percent of Nigeria's exports of crude oil went to refineries in the U.S. and the Caribbean while another 30 percent was shipped to the Netherlands, France, and West Germany. As regards imports, although the most expansive proportionate gain during the three-year period 1970-1972 was made by Japan,¹²¹ the UK remained Nigeria's principal trading partner, accounting for at least 30 percent of total imports in 1972. In 1980, 22 percent of Nigeria's imports came from the UK and only 2 percent exports went to that destination.

Although English-speaking, Liberia's economic interactions with the UK are not pronounced. Instead, there are significant transactions with the U.S. and Japan, its two major trading partners. In 1960, over 50 percent of Liberia's import and

export trade was with the U.S. However, in 1972, the U.S. bought 21 percent of Liberia's exports whereas the European Common Market accounted for 64 percent, and Japan 8 percent. The main buyer of Liberia's imports is still the U.S., although this has decreased since 1960 to 30.3 percent of total imports in 1972. Other major sources of imports in the same period include West Germany (11.6 percent), UK (9.2 percent), Japan (7.8 percent) and the Netherlands (5.4 percent).¹²² The U.S. provided 24 percent of Liberia's imports in 1979 and took 20 percent of her exports.¹²³

Although the trend is changing and an undeniable diversification is taking place in the wider Euro-African market, the importance of France in the trade of French West African dependencies is greater than Britain's. With the exception of Guinea, Francophone West African states generally have France as their major trading partner. For instance, France is still the primary market for Niger's exports and during the periods 1965-1966, 1966-1967 and 1967-1968, it absorbed 54 percent, 69 percent and 57 percent of Niger's total exports, respectively. When France is excluded from the analysis, other EEC members absorbed approximately 9 percent of Niger's total exports. By the early 1970s, although France was still the primary international partner, its share of Niger's imports demonstrated a marked decline, dropping to 43 percent in 1971, but still accounting for over half of all Niger's imports in the first decade of independence. The decrease in France's stake was more than offset by the increase in that of the EEC as a whole (excluding France) from 6 to 17 percent by 1971.¹²⁴

Similarly, within the franc zone, France remains by far the major market for Senegalese exports. In 1960, 69 percent of the imports came from France and 82 percent went to that destination.¹²⁵ However, a decline in imports from the franc zone countries from 29.7 billion CFA (*Communauté Financière Africaine*) or 74 percent of total imports, in 1965, to CFA 27.4 billion (or 62 percent of imports) in 1968, is attributable mainly to the decreasing share of France in Senegal's supplies. In general, the states with the greatest ability to diversify in French West Africa are the relatively powerful states like the Ivory Coast (which registered 61 percent of its exports in 1971 outside the franc zone) and states like Mauritania with valuable minerals (which registered 71 percent). Although France is the single most dominant customer of Togo, in general, the EEC, including members of the franc zone, are also primary customers, accounting for a total of CFA 8.3 billion (or 87 percent of registered exports) in 1968, and CFA 8.2 billion (or 54 percent of registered exports) in 1969. France is also Togo's leading supplier of goods, constituting 32 percent of total registered imports in 1968.

Finally, Burkina Faso traded mostly with the Francophone group of states. In 1968, exports to Burkina Faso contributed 74 percent of total export value, whereas imports contributed 77 percent of the total import value.¹²⁶ France is also the largest exporter of Burkina Faso's imports. The Ivory Coast ranks second as a major supplier in the import trade, with a share of 16 percent of total imports. However, France's share in the import trade has declined due to an increase in imports from West Germany and the Netherlands. In short, the share enjoyed by non-France EEC

countries rose from 5 percent in 1962 to almost 12 percent in 1968.¹²⁷ Although by the early 1970s French West African exports grew by 185 percent and imports by 141 percent, there was a decrease in France's role as the major trader in the area. French West African exports to France declined from 59 to 39 percent and imports from 64 to 52 percent while Francophone imports and exports to the rest of the EEC grew from 8 to 20 percent and 14 to 28 percent, respectively.¹²⁸

In conclusion, one could argue that since the ex-colonial powers in West Africa maintain neo-colonial control, it is useful to group ECOWAS states according to the metropolitan power with which they are linked. France and Britain are the most dominant ex-colonial powers in West Africa, so our analysis has concentrated mostly on them and their former colonies, although France is perhaps most pervasive and intensive. The franc zone is composed of the former French colonies whose monetary system, with the exception of Guinea, are very closely linked to the French franc. It is this link which has so far given Paris almost total economic and financial control. On the other hand, the second group of West African states, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, and Nigeria, have been members of the sterling bloc, and still retain membership in the Commonwealth. However, with independence, each of these countries acquired independent currencies issued by their respective central banks. Although the strength of each economy depends on levels of foreign exchange reserves and balance of payments, each country still maintains a sterling link. The British have not chosen the technique of continued direct involvement in their former colonies, but it could be argued that they have contributed indirectly to exploitation

through the activities of Multinational Corporations (MNCs). Consequently, resources are extracted and employed for the benefit of Britain in particular, and international capitalism in general, without the overt use of direct national power over the internal affairs of former dependencies. Although the former colonies of Britain give the appearance of having greater control over their destinies than do those of France, this economic illusion is rapidly dispelled by the realization that the degree of economic dependence of both groups on international capital is close.¹²⁹

3. SOCIAL AND CULTURAL INTERACTIONS

One modest and comprehensive definition of culture is that it represents the way of life of a people. Culture reflects both the material and the physical expression of the interaction between individuals and their environment.¹³⁰ In this study, social and cultural interactions are defined in terms of the growth and expansion of communications and inter-personal transactions across national borders. Representing a relatively new and largely unexplored area of academic research, the cultural dimension in the foreign policy behavior of states is often overlooked in most of the international relations literature.¹³¹ Ever present and persistent among the wide spectrum of foreign policy events, the sociocultural angle is generally considered trivial or largely irrelevant in the scheme of things. Of course, in reality, this

position is at best incorrect. Indicating group consensus on opinion and behavior, the sociocultural notion that people of different historical experiences and regions come to think, value, organize, and behave in different ways has been long observed and recorded.¹³² Although West African states have mainly been preoccupied with attempts at enhancing political and economic cooperation, it may be argued that these attempts are usually preceded by social and cultural interaction, which is specifically defined here in terms of peoples-to-peoples contact within the framework of an evolving transnational community.¹³³

The social factors affecting transactions in the West African subsystem - such as language, communication, transportation, migration, and various cultural differences - set the parameters within which the leaders and decision makers have to operate. By analyzing the growth of transnational society among these states, we can discover the extent to which the subsystem is socially integrated and, therefore, estimate the possibility for cooperation in the area. We are concerned with social interaction only to the extent that it serves as a precondition for regional cooperation. Furthermore, by examining the growth of communications and contacts¹³⁴ at the West African level and those within separate states, we can get an idea of the problems which African leaders have to overcome, and to some extent, the changes in those interactions that can take place outside the arena of conscious political decisions.

In many ways, informal interactions in the form of peoples-to-peoples contact may be more determinant of interstate relations than formal interactions in the form of elite contacts.¹³⁵ As Michael Haas puts it, "Informal interactions, in which private

citizens exchange ideas or goods across borders, are often thought to be more influential in softening international rivalries than formal interactions between political representatives of various governments" (emphases in original).¹³⁶ Aside from official boundaries, therefore, the composition of functional political communities can be determined through the identification of continuities and discontinuities in the flow of mutually rewarding transactions between members of a given set of states.

Language and Interstate Cooperation

An integral part of any regional and cultural grouping is its language. In Western Europe, for instance, there is a strong correlation between language and statehood. But even here there are significant variations. Whereas some states (such as Belgium) have more than one language, some languages (for example, German) are spoken in more than one state. Linguistically speaking, Africa is one of the most complex areas of the world and the continent's international boundaries have little relevance to the distribution of African peoples and their languages.¹³⁷ Although many linguists estimate the number to be higher, according to Jan Knappert, there are over 1,000 indigenous languages on the continent.¹³⁸ By another count, it is estimated that there are over 2,000 languages in Africa that are distinguishable by individual names although "this number may be reduced by almost half if inter-intelligible languages are treated together."¹³⁹ There is clearly a conceptual problem in this regard. The question of language distribution is always difficult to define and assess accurately in Africa because scholars often disagree on whether a particular

designation refers to the dialect of a language, a single language, or a group of closely related languages.¹⁴⁰ What is less unclear, however, is that there is a profound proliferation of indigenous languages in most states on the continent.

It goes without saying, therefore, that language is an important policy issue for almost all African states. Even in terms of non-African languages, African decision makers and intellectuals are aware that "they need access to one of the world's languages, preferably English."¹⁴¹ In fact, a colonial language may sometimes also serve as a unifying factor among the speakers of different African languages. For example, in order to facilitate communication in such multi-ethnic states as Nigeria, it is not uncommon for official business to be transacted in a single language, most often based on the language of the former colonial power.¹⁴² In the West African subregion, the various colonial administrations established certain groupings within which administration was coordinated and similar types of institutions were established. The most important factor in this regard was the impact of such languages as French, English, and Portuguese, which represented the colonial languages in the subregion.

But it is equally important to note that the artificial frontiers imposed on Africa involving the use of different official European languages were bridged at many points by African languages, and that this provided an opportunity for the increasing use of African languages in inter-governmental contacts. Thus, contrary to popular belief, the importance of European linguistic considerations in Africa per se is often exaggerated. In West Africa, for example, this phenomenon is reflected in

the informal use of Wolof between Senegal and Gambia, or of Hausa between Nigeria and Niger. In addition, it is also important to note that although most individual states retain a major European language as their official and main educational language, African languages still play an increasingly important role as in West Africa, where indigenous languages have been designated for use in education, broadcasting, and so on. At the informal level, among West Africa's traders, clandestine border trade has always been conducted in local dialects. In addition, the legal livestock trade is not inhibited by language problems especially where economic problems can be overcome.¹⁴³ It can thus be argued that "while English, French or Portuguese are used widely as second languages by educated elites of Africa, they have no where supplanted any indigenous African language."¹⁴⁴

Be that as it may, one major feature of interstate socio-cultural interactions in West Africa remains the extent to which colonially inherited languages influence international interactions. In this respect, language is an important determinant of African foreign policy. Indeed, even after political independence, there was a clear tendency for the established colonial arrangements to continue to influence interstate cooperation and behavior. Especially important is the fact that the French language and culture, in particular, provided the basis for considerable interaction among the elites of West Africa's French-speaking states. As already noted elsewhere, most Francophone states tend to belong to the same regional organizations and are linked to the EEC through this special French connection. Not only are Francophone, Anglophone, and Lusophone countries flocking together, there is a strong impact of

language on education and the professions.¹⁴⁵

In Francophone West Africa, for example, except perhaps in Mauritania where Arabic has priority, French is still the instructional language throughout the area, from primary through the university level and also in official business. The pattern is not all that radically different for interactions between the Anglophone states. Taking advantage of the convenience of a common language and an outgrowth of a commonwealth experience, Gambians often take courses in Ghanaian institutions¹⁴⁶ and, at a more professional level, it is not unusual for Nigerian, Ghanaian, and Sierra Leonean officials to be appointed judges and magistrates of the Gambian courts of justice.¹⁴⁷ Similar cases abound especially on the educational front. For instance, in 1976, the Sierra Leonean government offered to assist Nigeria in recruiting teachers for the latter's Universal Primary Education (UPE) scheme;¹⁴⁸ a year later, in 1977, Ghana similarly agreed to Liberia's request for teachers;¹⁴⁹ the Nigerian government has provided maps and books to the Gambian National library,¹⁵⁰ and the Sierra Leonean and Liberian governments jointly run a 3-week teachers' course.¹⁵¹

Transport and Communications

Physical distances hinder cooperation. One main objective of the units of any regional subsystem is, therefore, the effective linking of the members of the community in order to harmonize and facilitate intra-community economic and social activities. To achieve this salient task, a community must be prepared to develop and

modernize its transport and communications infrastructures (roads, harbor installations, railways, and so on) especially where, as in the case of the West African subregion, such strategy makes it possible for land-locked countries to be accessible as rapidly as possible. In general, the harmonization of transport and mass communications will facilitate the movement of physical goods, services, and populations internationally. It is a well-established fact that West African states are woefully ill-served by almost every form of transport and communications, traffic and telecommunications included. These states still lack good means of communication and efficient postal systems, which acts as a barrier to unity and cooperation. The major preoccupation of West African states in this regard, therefore, will include making available reliable and regular means for the promotion of trade, free movement of persons, goods, ideas, and, by implication, decreasing dependence on the external by eliminating the traditional, triangular south-north-south communications.

The circulation and flow of information (communications) and the movement of physical goods, services, and persons (transportation) is well researched in the theoretical literature of socioeconomic and political development.¹⁵² In terms of socioeconomic development, for example, it may be argued that communications play a critical and fundamental role in creating demands for the goods and benefits of industrializing societies and the associated "revolution of rising expectations" and the transmission of norms and values compatible with an integrative and developing economic system. To be sure, the growth in communications and transportation

networks in a regional setting entails additional economic ramifications since they represent a major aspect of socioeconomic overhead capital. In this sense, once constructed, facilities for mass communication and transportation may initiate considerable economies of scale in the movement of goods and information, providing increasingly large pay-offs as usage increases without concomitant increases in the investment in infrastructure. Thus, extensions of communications and transportation systems can magnify available markets while at the same time diminishing the size and characteristic isolation of subsistence sectors and satisfying minimum conditions necessary for the establishment of manufacturing industries.

In terms of theories of political development, however, the growth of communications and transportation systems can be linked to the shift from traditional to modern societies, the development of democratic decision-making structures and processes, and the integration of national and international political communities. A unifying explanatory concept related to these hypothesized developments is Daniel Lerner's notion of empathy defined as the capacity of the individual to put himself in another's place. In his study, Lerner emphasizes the role of communications in changing the traditional habits and world-view of individuals and thus effecting a transition to modern society.¹⁵³ This position is clearly reflected in the work of political scientists who see the rise of modern society as the result of a multidimensional process of social mobilization. Indeed, Karl Deutsch has described social mobilization as the overall process of change involving large segments of the population, "in which major clusters of social, economic and psychological

commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior."¹⁵⁴ Deutsch further emphasizes the role of such media as radio and newsprint in mobilizing populations into an awareness of new styles of life.¹⁵⁵ Almond and Powell argue, in addition, that social mobilization is "in large part a communication phenomenon" that must occur before the development of political and economic capabilities.¹⁵⁶ As social mobilization dislocates people from their habitual environment and provides for the intensification of formerly unexpressed demands and inter-group conflicts, so the development of communications and transportation may facilitate the integration of political communities. Integration is thus the increasing linkage, interdependence, cohesion, unification, and consensus characteristic of social groupings, and the use of communication facilities for increasing transactions between spatially and socially disparate political actors is generally recognized as a crucial aspect of interstate interactions.¹⁵⁷

In terms of communications and transportation, there are few man-made West African highways (roads and railways) which cut across national boundaries. No internal transport network was independently developed to connect different parts of the same territory. In fact, the development of modern transportation in the area started with the establishment of colonial administrations at the beginning of this century, when the centers of economic and political activity shifted to the coastal areas, which became the main outlets for produce from the forest belt. The activity was not well adapted to African needs. Modern transportation thus consisted

primarily of railways and roads to link the coast with those parts of the interior which produced crops or minerals required in the metropolitan markets of Western Europe. In positive but uncritical terms, these transportation routes led from the hinterland to the Atlantic coast and thus stimulated the development of agriculture and mining in various parts of West Africa. The negative and more critical effect, however, was that vast areas did not benefit from these colonial transportation routes since they were restricted to those areas that were of economic interest to the colonial powers. Hence the fact is that even today there are still extensive parts of the countries which are not served by roads suitable for motor vehicles.

Transport developments in West Africa have generally followed similar patterns, beginning with a first phase that was characterized by the dominance of river and inland waterway transport and a multiplicity of small ports. The second phase was essentially one of railway and road construction to link the coastal ports with the hinterland market centers, while the third phase involved the construction of feeder roads running in an east-west direction and, much later on, the establishment of air transportation. These developments will be considered in order.

The creeks and rivers of West Africa were naturally the first and earliest means of penetration from the coast into the interior. In Nigeria, for example, the Niger-Benue system and the Cross River provided important highways, just as the Senegal and Gambia Rivers did in Senegal and Gambia respectively. The River Niger is, of course, the most important river in West Africa and the third longest in Africa. If the river were navigable throughout its length, it would have provided a natural

international highway linking the countries through which it flows, namely, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria. However, there are a number of physical handicaps, which have generally restricted the use of rivers for transportation in West Africa, such as the occurrence of rapids and falls, which limit navigation to only a few stretches.

The River Niger itself is interrupted at many places by rapids and waterfalls which impede navigation. It has been suggested that navigation is only possible from Kouroussa to Bamako, Kulikoro to Ansongo, Niamey to Yelwa and Jebba to the sea. A word of caution is in order. The mere existence of impediments to navigation should not excuse the apparent reluctance and general insensitivity of the colonial powers towards the development of international highways in the West African area. Thus, the failure of French-speaking Senegal to utilize the River Gambia waterway, which flows into another country, suggests that the Niger would not have been exploited and developed in the colonial period, even if its course were not interrupted by rapids and falls.¹⁵⁸ That apart, even in the navigable sections of West African rivers, the contribution to interstate socioeconomic and cultural interactions is minimal because the rivers often flow through districts which produce very little for export or for internal exchange especially as such localities are very sparsely populated. The culminating result is that traffic on West African rivers is extremely light and, in some cases, the waterways can only be used by canoes and small boats that are important for local traffic. It is accurate to conclude, therefore, that in terms of long-distance traffic across West Africa, the river system has lost considerably to the railways and road networks in the subregion.

In most West African states, prior to the First World War, the railway was established before the road to aid general economic development and to establish effective political control. For instance, in the French-speaking territories which were administered as a federation by France, there was an overall plan to link all the territories to the sea. This plan involved the construction of four main-line railways to tap the navigable reaches of the Niger, which enters the sea in Nigeria even though most of its course is in French-speaking West Africa. The four main routes were: 1) the 1,280 kilometers Dakar-Niger line from Dakar to Bamako; 2) the 660 kilometers Conakry-Niger line; 3) the 1,140 kilometers Abidjan-Niger line from Abidjan (Ivory Coast) to Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso); and 4) the Benin-Niger railways. Similarly, the British colonial administrations of Sierra Leone, Ghana, and Nigeria also aimed at linking the productive hinterland areas with the Atlantic ports. For instance, in Sierra Leone, the railway was built to tap iron ore and diamond mines while, in Ghana, the railway was restricted to the rich cocoa belt and highly mineralized districts of the south. In addition, in Nigeria, the extension of the railway to the far north was prompted by the existence of rich groundnut and cotton fields in the Kano and Katsina Emirates and the discovery and mining of tin in the Jos Plateau. Thus, in the Anglophone areas, major railways included 1) the 350 kilometers Freetown to Pendembu line; 2) the railways of southern Ghana which serve gold mines, diamond mines and bauxite mines, as well as rich timber forests and cocoa belt of southwestern Ghana; and 3) the 3,200 kilometers Nigerian railway which consists of a western main line from Lagos to Kano and an eastern main line from Port Harcourt to

Maiduguri.

Obviously, the situation in East Africa where the former British colonial territories of Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda were linked together by road and Uganda and Kenya by rail suggests that a similar pattern would have occurred in West Africa if Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Gambia shared a common border. However, since these countries are separated by French-speaking countries, each tended to develop as if it existed in isolation, with the result that there were no transportation links between the neighboring countries. As already noted, French-speaking West Africa, which covers a continuous area of land, benefitted by the development of cross-frontier roads, particularly in the days of the Federation of French West Africa. There were, however, no railway links between the territories except for that linking Ivory Coast to Upper Volta, which was formerly administered as part of Ivory Coast. The Dakar-Kouli Kore railway which links Senegal with Mali was also built when both countries were colonial territories of France. In general, however, in West Africa, the degree of redundancy of the communication system approaches the absurd since many states (for example, Ghana and Nigeria) have north-south lines that are flanked by, but unconnected with, additional north-south lines.

The development of road transport in West Africa began in earnest in the independence decade from 1960, which featured rapid road development including the building of new earth roads and the tarring of some of the major trunk roads. As already specified, until 1960, long-distance traffic was controlled by the railways.

Since 1961, however, long-distance road haulage has increased, resulting in greater loss for railway. In Nigeria and Ghana, for instance, the road distance between towns was generally longer than the distance by rail, and while the railway ran from north to south, the roads followed an east-west direction. Finally, in view of the general poor state of land transportation in West Africa, the importance of air transport, especially for mail, passenger, and high-value cargo cannot be over emphasized. But it was only recently that air transport and telecommunications began to reduce fragmentation across international boundaries unresolved by other methods of communication. There is thus daily air traffic between most countries. However, since only a few people can afford the air fares, people crossing the frontiers are still obliged to do so by road and by sea. In so far as sociocultural interstate interactions are concerned, this is an unhealthy situation.

Nevertheless, there have been many attempts in West Africa to improve communications and transportation links between members of the subregion. With specific regards to telecommunications, for example, Ivory Coast has signed a loan agreement for the establishment of a direct telephone line linking the extreme north of its border with southern Mali. This is important because telephone lines between the two countries currently pass via Paris.¹⁵⁹ In addition, Nigeria and Benin have decided to establish a direct telephone link to eliminate the London-Paris route often used by callers,¹⁶⁰ and the Nigerian government has specifically awarded contracts for a pan-African telecommunications link with that country.¹⁶¹ Direct telecommunications arrangements have been established between Senegal and such

neighbors as Mauritania¹⁶² and Gambia¹⁶³ on one hand, and with such non-contiguous but important states as Ivory Coast¹⁶⁴ on the other. There has also been separate attempts by Nigeria for a joint communications link with such Francophone states as Ivory Coast, Mali, and Niger.¹⁶⁵ Finally, Sierra Leone has approved a pan-African telecommunications link with Liberia and Guinea.¹⁶⁶

In transportation, examples of interstate cooperation abound especially in relation to interactions between the relatively powerful states in the subregion. Following the Lagos port congestion in 1975, for instance, a visit by a Nigerian transport delegation to the Ghanaian government,¹⁶⁷ prompted the latter to provide for the transportation of Nigerian goods via Accra¹⁶⁸ by using Ghanaian berths to unload cargoes.¹⁶⁹ In addition, Ghana and Nigeria have concluded several transport, communication, and trade cooperation agreements¹⁷⁰ including an accord by both countries to expand air services¹⁷¹ and a discussion on possible bus link.¹⁷² Also, Nigeria and the Ivory Coast have signed an air-service agreement,¹⁷³ including agreements for increased flights.¹⁷⁴ The Ghana State Transport Service has begun direct bus service to the Ivory Coast,¹⁷⁵ and both countries have signed agreements for increased air flights.¹⁷⁶ There have also been transport arrangements between big and small neighboring states such as the initiation of bus-service by Ghana to Togo,¹⁷⁷ the exchange and ratification of transport agreements between Ghana and Niger,¹⁷⁸ and the initiation of air service by Nigeria to Niger.¹⁷⁹

Migration and Social Interaction

As a social phenomenon that is probably as old as recorded history itself, migration refers here to physical population shifts and communication across international borders and between states which results in residential change. It consists of "immigration" which is the movement viewed from the perspective of the receiving state, while population movements out of a state are called "emigration."¹⁸⁰ The sociocultural processes of migration entail both benefits and disadvantages for the sending and the receiving states. From the view-point of the sending state, the migration of its citizens considerably reduces such social hazards as unemployment and peasant poverty which, more often than not, is nuisance to society. Advantages include the likelihood that emigration remittances may prove helpful economically and that the departure of malcontents and national minorities may create an environment for social and political stability. The demerits of emigration include the inevitable loss of energies and potential skills of, quite possibly, young and vibrant migrants. Indeed, the emigration of trained professionals (brain drain), by definition, involves the economic loss of trained manpower to the recipient states. Whereas on the one hand immigrants may well provide the necessary skills and manpower, and occupy empty territories thus accelerating economic development, on the other hand, they may create problems of social assimilation, instigate increasing pressure on the job market, and even complicate political relations between sending and receiving states.¹⁸¹

In Africa, migration is a natural phenomenon emanating from the contiguity of

nations whose boundaries are rather artificial. Far from being a recent phenomenon, the influx and efflux of labor on a large scale was already taking place in such West African territories as Senegal and The Gambia as early as the middle of the nineteenth century. Thus, international migration in the area predates the colonial governments and was at this time mainly a vertical movement from the south to the north within ill-defined political boundaries. It was with the colonial era that boundaries between the territories of the European powers and movements across the West Africa became international in the strict sense.¹⁸²

Several characteristics in the subregion contribute to the relative ease of contact between peoples in the area. The first obvious factor is the geographical spread in terms of the considerable homogeneity among the various ethnic identities in West Africa. The Fullahs, for example, are known to live in Guinea. But there are also thousands of Fullahs in neighboring Sierra Leone as well. In like manner, the Wollofs are found both in the Gambia and in neighboring Senegal, and, finally, as primary commercial immigrants, the Hausas, Yorubas, and Dioulas are found across states and have traded across West Africa for over a century. There is a natural flow of people into and out of boundary areas who are kith and kin in language and culture, hence the exchange of units and prospecting for better conditions. "The Mossi of the Upper Volta migrated in large numbers to work in Ghana, the Ivory Coast, and parts of Dahomey and Mali, chiefly for economic reasons."¹⁸³ Not only has migration remained, for decades, a characteristic feature of West Africa's societies, it is also obvious that the colonially-imposed geographical boundaries do not

impede social and cultural interaction. Migration was almost inevitable arising from the geographical contiguity of the states and the marked tendency for migrants to move where they could better their lot in life.

There are two main types of migrations in Africa - temporary (seasonal) migration and permanent migration. Temporary migration dates back to the colonial era when mines, plantations, and other European-administered farms, required and hired laborers for as long as (but no more than) they needed them. The emphasis here was on north-south moves which conformed to the needs of the colonial powers in terms of their export-oriented economy and the development of more centers in the coastal belt than in the interior parts of the countries. These centers were attractive for labor absorption. This trend led to the widespread practice of labor mobility and migration. Since the colonial employers rarely paid enough for a migrant worker to move his entire family and establish new permanent residence, workers generally moved for shorter periods, leaving their families behind. Sometimes, especially in the case of agricultural labor, temporary migration assumed the form of seasonal migration, contingent upon weather conditions. The rain, and hence the farming season, was limited to three or four months in a year, beyond which farmers were underemployed and would wander elsewhere in search for work. In fact, this form of migration was most pronounced in the West African subregion, where the savanna belt permitted conditions for seasonal underemployment, but work was available in the mines of the forest belt or in the cash crop farms producing coffee, cocoa, or cola nuts.¹⁸⁴

Over the decades, however, tropical migration patterns in West Africa have partly assumed a more permanent feature. "A man in Burkina Faso might go south to the Ivory Coast to work for three dry-seasons in a row. Finally, he might be able to move his family as well."¹⁸⁵ This phenomenon has naturally generated profound changes in the population distribution of West Africa over time. For instance, whereas in the 1920s, for all of West Africa to the west of Nigeria, the population of the forest belt comprised approximately 33 percent of the regional total, by 1985, it was more than 50 percent. Indeed, more than 25 percent of the new-permanent population of the forest belt had migrated from the savanna belt and, in fact, for relatively more prosperous states like the Ivory Coast, this figure stood well over 50 percent.¹⁸⁶ Migration movements have also caused a new mixture of languages and since West Africa has no well-developed African lingua franca to serve the place of Swahili, the tendency, especially for migrants in Ivory Coast, is for these people to switch to French as a language.¹⁸⁷

A large segment of migration shifts in West Africa is seasonal or semi-permanent and has a significant influence on the populations of these states which is especially difficult to handle. In general, the direction of migration is towards the more developed coastal areas where the sea ports, industrial centers, tree-crop plantations and mines provide greater opportunity for employment. Therefore, as a general trend, the landlocked states - Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger - supply seasonal migrants to relatively more prosperous coastal states like Ghana, Nigeria, and Ivory Coast. The social impact of these movements on specific countries is profound

indeed. For example, the sparsely settled agricultural districts of southern Ivory Coast attract thousands of labor migrants from Burkina Faso and Mali. Ivoriens have maintained a traditional *laissez faire* attitude towards immigrants and estimates are that Ivory Coast receives about 200,000 semi-permanent immigrants from both Mali and Guinea, and 400,000 from Burkina Faso, annually. Put together, these figures are equivalent to approximately 25 percent of the total Ivorien labor force,¹⁸⁸ thus making Ivory Coast one of the main receiving areas of foreign workers in West Africa.

In addition, for Ghana, not only did the national head-count of March-April 1960 show that 12 percent of the population were immigrant aliens, it has been suggested that if the census had been conducted earlier in the year, estimates would have been higher since many immigrants had returned to their home states after the harvest.¹⁸⁹ In a 1970 census of a population of about 8.6 million, there were 562,000 foreign nationals, and 350,000 of these were foreign-born. They included 247,000 Togolese, 157,000 nationals of Upper Volta, and 56,000 Nigerians.¹⁹⁰

The positive impact of migration in West Africa may be evident in such measures as the bilateral and multilateral agreements on the free movements of persons, the abolition of visa requirements, and the ECOWAS protocol on free movement of persons. For example, as a result of the establishment of ECOWAS and its protocol on free movement of peoples, the spatial mobility of West Africans has assumed higher proportions than ever before in the present decade.¹⁹¹

Table 4.10

Arrival of ECOWAS Citizens into Nigeria Through
Recognized Routes from 1979-1982

Country	Year				
	1979	1980	1981	1982	
Benin	11,255	49,814	27,724	25,495	
Cape Verde	--	2	4	--	
Guinea	2,856	2,378	2,196	2,640	
Gambia	2,755	944	3,355	2,800	
Ghana	38,229	80,583	80,686	86,366	
Guinea-Bissau	--	--	3	--	
Ivory Coast	1,763	4,052	3,486	2,091	
Liberia	2,574	2,001	1,871	1,589	
Mali	3,983	10,989	5,608	2,364	
Mauritania	266	5	566	597	
Niger	1,334	17,474	14,894	26,249	
Togo	4,845	25,970	9,101	13,258	
Senegal	3,275	6,488	1,208	2,740	
S/Leone	2,118	1,873	1,498	2,636	
Upper Volta	989	676	955	442	
Total	76,202	203,258	153,155	169,267	

Source: Statistics Section, Immigration Department Alagbon Close Ikoyi. See Also, A.A. Afolayan, "Immigration and Expulsion of ECOWAS Aliens in Nigeria," International Migration Review 22, 1 (1988): 11.

However, negative feedback is generated by the mass exodus of aliens expelled from several West African states. The Ghanaian Aliens' Compliance Order of 1971 witnessed mass expulsions of 600,000 West Africans without valid residential permits between December 1969 and late 1971,¹⁹² which led to anti-Ghanaian feelings in Nigeria, Benin, Togo, and Burkina Faso. Other incidents were reported in Sierra Leone where approximately 8,000 Ghanaians were deported to protect local jobs in 1968.¹⁹³ More recently, because of growing economic hardships, Nigeria expelled all illegal immigrants in an unprecedented mass movement of peoples in the subregion, first, between January 17 and 31, 1983,¹⁹⁴ and then on a lesser scale, between April and May 1985.¹⁹⁵ The free movement of wage-labor and self-employed migrants suffered a considerable set-back as a result of these expulsions; these events may damage efforts to build cooperation in West Africa.

4. MILITARY AND STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS

In addition to political, economic, and social problems, the West African subregion has military and security concerns as well. One argument in this regard is that the establishment of an economic community of states usually entails defence implications which transcend territorial borders.¹⁹⁶ The social and economic conditions of members of any community can only be effectively improved in an

atmosphere of peace and tranquility at both the regional and extra-regional levels. Indeed, the nature of perceived threat on the continent is usually such that every African state is confronted with the dual dilemma of devising a security system that can serve to protect the regime from internal subversion, domestic uprising, or military coup, and to offer protection against possible outside attack.¹⁹⁷ This military dimension in African politics has intensified since the mid-1970s and has been so acute as to warrant heavy security expenditure on the continent at large. Per capita military spending on the continent varies from \$9.4 in Tanzania to \$163 in Libya, and, in 1981, total military expenditure by African states registered between \$14 billion and \$16 billion.¹⁹⁸

Although Africa is the poorest of the continents, it is estimated that the region has spent a higher percentage of its earnings on defense than any of the other continents. Whereas in 1968, Africa was a lightly armed region representing 4 percent of all developing countries' arms imports, ten years later, estimates had risen to 32 percent. In fact, spending on security had virtually doubled in real terms every two years and, by 1977, Africa's military expenditure per soldier (\$8,383) exceeded that of Latin America (\$5,621), South Asia (\$2,380), and the Far East (\$5,134).¹⁹⁹ One possible explanation for this trend is that more pressing than the problem of external security, there is protection needed against internal insurrection, whether deriving from purely domestic dissatisfactions or internal insurgency in the form of popular revolts, military coups, or even the impulsive action of an armed group of dissidents. However, military interactions in West Africa are generally quite low and

very dependent upon relations with states in the extra-African world.²⁰⁰ This fact has obviously militated against the development of high levels of interstate cooperation in military affairs in the subregion.

The significance of military influences as important ingredients in the determination of foreign policy decisions should not be underestimated, even in West Africa. The importance of the military in the area is underscored by the high number of coups in the subregion. With the exception of Ivory Coast, Senegal, Cape Verde, and the Gambia, all West African states have experienced at least one successful coup d'état from 1956-1984 (see Table 4.11). Of all the subregions in Africa, West Africa recorded the highest number of military coups, counter coups, and threats of coup between 1956-1984. Only three West African states, namely Senegal, Gambia, and Ivory Coast have avoided a successful military takeover while Benin, Ghana, Nigeria, and Burkina Faso represent four of the eight most coup-prone states in Africa. The observation that West Africa is "the region par excellence of the military coup d'état"²⁰¹ is further supported by the fact that of the 16 memberstates of ECOWAS, no less than 11 were under military rule as of May 1985. Even more significantly, this number represented more than one-half of the military regimes of the whole of Africa. The result is that in this kaleidoscopic atmosphere, West African leaders, military or civilians, progressive or conservative, feel very insecure.²⁰² On April 3, 1984, for example, the Guinean armed forces announced that they had seized power three days after the burial of President Sékou Touré, then chairman of ECOWAS.

Table 4.11

Rank Order of West African States by their Total
Military Involvement Scores (T.M.I.S.),
1 January 1956 to 30 April 1984

Rank	State	T.M.I.S.	Coups	Attempted Coups	Reported Plots
1	Ghana	55	5	6	13
2	Benin	42	6	3	3
3	Burkina Faso	30	5	1	2
4	Nigeria	25	4	1	2
5	Niger	18	1	4	1
6	Mauritania	16	2	1	3
7	Sierra Leone	16	2	1	3
8	Guinea	16	1	1	7
9	Togo	14	2	-	4
10	Liberia	13	1	-	8
11	G/Bissau	9	1	1	1
12	Mali	9	1	-	4
13	Ivory Coast	3	-	-	3
14	Senegal	3	-	1	-
15	Cape Verde	0	-	-	-
16	Gambia	0	-	-	-

Source: Adapted from Africa Coup Project Event Files, Tempe; see also Patrick McGowan and Thomas Johnson, "African Military Coups d'Etat and Underdevelopment: A Quantitative Historical Analysis," Journal of Modern African Studies 22, 4 (1984): 638.

Such unpredictable events have significant implications for ECOWAS since states that suffer from chronic instability will probably have serious difficulty in pursuing any solid strategy for economic development and growth.

There are other aspects of military behavior which may influence the foreign policies of West African states. An example is the international implication of military coups and its overall effects on intra-African diplomacy. Will military coups, for instance, spill over frontiers to protect friendly regimes, or will they be confined within domestic borders? It can be argued that military coups may lead to tensions and strains between states as was the case of the Ghanaian coup of 1966. There is also the issue of the encouragement of subversive activities by a neighboring state. Military training camps were established by Nkrumah in the 1960s to train opponents of governments in Cameroon, Niger, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria how to subvert these governments.²⁰³ Similarly, in more recent times, the Ghanaian and Burkinabe governments have been accused by Togo (amongst counter-charges) of subversive activities. It is reported that the Ghanaian leader, Jerry Rawlings, has survived at least 10 abortive coup attempts by Lome-based Ghanaian dissidents since assuming power in 1981.²⁰⁴

Thus, military coups may also influence interactions in West Africa by reinforcing the feeling of insecurity of political leaders and making them more inward-looking and less likely to regard any attempts at increased regional cooperation in their favor. For example, Liberia's long delay in ratifying the ECOWAS protocol on free-movement of persons was largely due to that state's

general feeling of insecurity following the bloody overthrow of President Tolbert - a popular leader in West Africa and then chairman of the OAU - in April 1980. Likewise, the same feeling of insecurity constrained Ghana to capriciously close its borders after the December 1981 coup d'état in flagrant breach of the spirit and letter of the ECOWAS idea. The same can be said about the prolonged closure of Nigeria's borders by the military leaders that overthrew the civilian administration in December 1983.

Successful military coups may lead to various forms of international resistance that may hamper the effectiveness of a regime internationally. In West Africa, an example of such difficulties was the 1966 military coup in Ghana and the subsequent dispute concerning the legitimate representatives of Ghana at the OAU conference in Addis Ababa. A similar example was the difficulty Liberia encountered in gaining international recognition following the 1980 coup. In short, the overthrow of a government belonging to a regional grouping may result in other memberstates treating the new regime as a pariah, particularly where close personal links had been maintained by the former leader.²⁰⁵ The Liberia coup precipitated a series of events that estranged Liberia from ECOWAS and also strained relations between Liberia and other West African states. ECOWAS heads of state excluded the new Liberian leader, Samuel Doe, from the May 1980 summit meeting in Lome, even though Doe was already in the Togolese capital. In retaliation, Doe announced the suspension of Liberia's membership of ECOWAS and recalled the country's envoys to Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. Therefore, under certain conditions, a change in regime

by military overthrow may negatively affect interstate relations within a subregion.

It is possible to distinguish between two forms of military interactions: negative (or conflictual) interactions involving the use of force, and more positive interactions involving cooperation in strategic matters. In negative military interactions, the show of force and direct invasion are familiar techniques by which nations can influence the behavior of others. Organized violence in terms of frequent border clashes is one more visible form of military interaction in a region. The military strength of states in West Africa is almost generally equal except in situations like Senegal in relation to Gambia or Nigeria in relation to Benin. With the more or less equal military weakness of African states, one could justifiably conclude that the prospect of any one state mounting a successful attack upon its neighbor is very remote. However, to suggest this is not to argue that there are no sporadic outbreaks of warfare (in the form of border incidents involving troops) in the West African subregion, especially when such issues as the settlement of specific border claims are involved. Examples of states that have made territorial claims against other states abound. Threats concerning territorial and boundary disputes have arisen from the lack of properly delimited boundaries by the former colonial map-makers of the nineteenth century. Burkina Faso has been subjected to pressure from both Mali and Ghana; Togo and Ghana have had a continuing border dispute relating to ethnic claims; and attempts by Benin and Niger to resolve a dispute over possession of a five-mile-long Lete Island in the River Niger led to a near rupture in relations.²⁰⁶ In addition, there have been several offshore boundary conflicts, including the dispute

between Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, and Senegal over the control of waters believed to contain exploitable oil deposits and fish stocks. There is also a general increase in the ability of national armed forces to take action outside their own countries. The border crisis between Sierra Leone and Liberia in March 1983 almost developed into a war. Furthermore, colonially drawn maps led to warfare between Mali and Burkina Faso twice - in 1975 and in 1986.²⁰⁷

Positive military interactions, on the other hand, take the form of cooperative military engagements between African states. Although there are intra-regional pledges of military assistance between Francophone states, these are generally quite low.²⁰⁸ There are examples of bilateral defense accords and security agreements such as the one between Sierra Leone and Guinea. In 1971, Guinean troops assisted the faltering regime of Siaka Stevens in Sierra Leone by intervening to restore order. Guinean troops were also used to help restore order in Liberia during riots in 1979.²⁰⁹ More recently, in 1980, Senegalese troops intervened in the Gambia (at the request of ousted President Jawara) to quell a coup.²¹⁰ Within the wider context of ECOWAS, there was the multilateral adoption of a non-aggression pact in April 1978²¹¹ and a protocol relating to mutual assistance in matters of defence in June 1981.²¹² Collective defence is based here on the proximity of members to one another and their susceptibility to common security problems. The defense protocol will allow an ECOWAS allied defense force to be called into existence to meet any aggression from outside the subsystem against an ECOWAS memberstate.²¹³

But military interaction among West African states is limited by the fact that

most of these states have defense pacts with the major powers, especially with France. There is a proliferation of a network of military alliances with foreign powers in Africa especially among the Francophone group of states. Although they continue to stress the necessity of developing an independent intra-African security system, African states, in general, and the Francophone states, in particular, are considerably dependent upon European-based and oriented security systems of which the former colonial powers are members. Most of the West African states turn to the great powers for arms and ammunition and for security against domestic upheavals. Interstate relations in West Africa have therefore been marked by greater dependence on the outside world which has militated against the development of intra-African cooperation in military affairs.²¹⁴ Among other matters, this external dimension of regional cooperation is the focus of the next chapter.

References and footnotes

1. Since the issues involved are complex, it is necessary to analyze the political, economic, strategic, and socio-cultural elements of interstate cooperation. See S. K. B. Asante, The Political Economy of Regionalism in Africa: A Decade of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986), p. 8. Cantori and Spiegel apply a similar categories. In their analysis of "elements of cohesion" in systems, they review social, political, economic, and organizational cohesiveness. Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 10-13.
2. In fact, Article 2 of the ECOWAS Treaty makes it clear that a central objective of ECOWAS is the promotion of cooperation and development in virtually all fields including economic, political, social, and cultural matters.
3. Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, The International Relations Dictionary, Third Edition (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clilo, 1982), p. 234.
4. See Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy, Second Edition (Oxford University Press, 1950).
5. See Sir Ernest Satow, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice, Third Edition (London: Longman's, 1932). For a more recent definition, see John Der Derian, On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement (New York: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1987), p. 6. In this study, diplomacy is widely defined as "a mediation between estranged individuals, groups and entities, which will be defended and become more specific in due course."
6. Ernest Satow, op. cit. (1932), p. 3.
7. See C. F. Alger and S. J. Brams, "Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Intergovernmental Organizations," World Politics, vol. 19 (July 1967), pp. 646-663.
8. See Bruce Russett and W. Curtis Lamb, "Global Patterns of Diplomatic Exchange, 1963-64," Journal of Peace Research, vol. 1 (1969).
9. I. William Zartman, International Relations in the New Africa, Second Edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1988).
10. Patrick J. McGowan, "The Pattern of African Diplomacy: A Quantitative Comparison," Journal of Asian and African Studies, vol. 4 (July 1969), pp. 202-221.
11. In other words, constrained financial resources and the various perceived uses to which they may be subjected, influence the stationing of diplomatic personnel (and indicates some measure of concern) over mutual relations of the African states involved.

12. In addition to the West African states listed, other embassies affected were located in Angola, Zambia, Zaire, Kenya, Iran, Rumania, Denmark, Holland, and Pakistan. See West Africa, March 29, 1982, p. 896.
13. See article by 'Sola Ojo in Timothy M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko, eds., Nigerian Foreign Policy: Alternative Perceptions and Projections (London: Macmillan Press, 1983), p. 72.
14. David H. Johns, "Diplomatic Activity, Power, and Integration in Africa," Patrick J. McGowan, ed., Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, vol. 3 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 86.
15. Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, op. cit. (1982), p. 234.
16. Further evidence of this point exists in the fact that Liberia has diplomatic relations with its neighbors, Guinea and Sierra Leone; Mali with neighboring Guinea, Ivory Coast and Senegal; Mauritania with Mali and Senegal; Niger with Benin and Nigeria; Nigeria with Benin and Niger; Senegal with Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Mauritania; Sierra Leone with Guinea and Liberia; and Gambia with Senegal.
17. Stephen Wright, "Nigerian Foreign Policy: A Case of Dominance or Dependence?" in Shaw and Aluko, eds., op. cit. (1983), p. 110.
18. Although such influence is often politically decisive in Francophone African affairs, it is not without its limits in general intra-African politics. None of Ivory Coast's Francophone partners followed it in recognizing "Biafra" during the Nigerian civil war and, furthermore, as far as the policy of "dialogue" with South Africa is concerned, the Ivorien initiative is not popular among the Francophone states especially where one considers those that have decided to maintain their freedom of action.
19. Steven J. Brams, "The Structure of Influence Relationships in the International System," James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 336-345.
20. According to Karl Deutsch (1960) two points are worth noting in this regard: first, that larger states decrease their percentage of international transactions as they continue to grow in size and, second, that major industrialized powers such as the U.S. continue to dominate the absolute number of all types of transactions, being initiators far more often than recipients.
21. Elmer Plischke, Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Problems and Options (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977), p. 47.

22. On the structures and functions of African foreign service offices, see Olajide Aluko, "The Foreign Service," Quarterly Journal of Administration, vol. 5, no. 1 (October 1970), p. 34; Timothy M. Shaw, "The Foreign Policy System of Zambia," African Studies Review, vol. 19, no. 1 (April 1976), pp. 31-66; I. William Zartman, "Decision-Making Among African Governments On Inter-African Affairs," Journal of Development Studies, vol. 2, no. 2 (January 1966), pp. 98-119; Peter J. Boyce, "Foreign Offices and New States," International Journal, vol. 30, no. 1 (Winter 1974-1975), pp. 141-161; Maurice A. East, "Foreign Policy-Making in Small States: Some Theoretic Observations Based on A Study of the Uganda Ministry of Foreign Affairs," Policy Sciences, vol. 4 (December 1973), pp. 491-508.

23. For example, in mid-1976, the Nigerian leader, Olusegun Obasanjo, told a gathering of all Nigerian ambassadors in Africa that they should be more imaginative "rather than spending their time in their posts 'wining and dining.'" See Olajide Aluko, "Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Nigeria," in Shaw and Aluko, eds., op. cit. (1983), p. 78. In addition, the habit of late-coming is notoriously evident in some of the large missions, and Aluko has claimed that some ambassadors are ignorant of the goings-on in their missions, and are not even informed by their attachés about despatches to Lagos. See 'Sola Ojo, "The Administration of Nigeria's Foreign Service, 1960-80," in ibid., pp. 66-67.

24. On the training and education of African foreign service officers, see Anthony H. M. Kirk-Greene, "Diplomacy and Diplomats: The Formation of Foreign Service Cadres in Black Africa," Kenneth Ingham, ed., Foreign Relations of African States (London: Butterworths, 1974), pp. 279-319; Benedict V. Mtshali, "The Zambian Foreign Service, 1964-1972," African Review, vol. 5, no. 3 (1975), pp. 306-314. In the Nigerian foreign service, because reflecting a "federal character" is one important criterion for the appointment and promotion of officers, this has had a demoralizing effect on the more educated, experienced and competent career diplomats. See 'Sola Ojo in Shaw and Aluko, eds., op. cit. (1983), pp. 64-66, 69, 73.

25. One scholar has pointed out that the Research Department of the Nigerian foreign service is ineffective and not equipped with the right type of personnel to perform research. The ministry's library is so poorly stocked that even its own publications cannot be found there. Consequently, there is the need to reorganize the department and to recruit proper manpower. See 'Sola Ojo, in Shaw and Aluko, eds., op. cit. (1983), pp. 62, 74.

26. In the immediate post-independence era, there was also the practice by Guinea, Ghana, and the Ivory Coast, of arresting and confining foreign envoys as a means of pressurizing their governments. See Jackson and Rosberg, "Pax Africana and Its Problems," Richard Bissell and Michael Radu, eds., Africa in the Post-Decolonization Era (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1984), p. 167.

27. In general, the reluctance "to rely upon multiple accreditations" tends to further "the development of a high quality foreign service corps" in Africa. This point is well made about Tanzania's diplomatic policy in Africa until 1972. See David H. Johns, "The Foreign Policy of Tanzania," in Olajide Aluko, ed., The Foreign Policies of African States (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), p. 199.
28. See Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982). The scholars specifically argue that "like Machiavelli's Prince and personal rulers in general, the Ivorian ruler has treated foreign policy as his personal domain" (p. 151).
29. Although this is obviously a generalization since foreign policy decision-making in Africa is rarely ever the exclusive preserve of a single leader, nevertheless, in the strictest sense, it is often the case that for many African states, the decision-making processes are relatively less complex and very heavily influenced by the man at the top. Aluko has argued that, under the Balewa regime in Nigeria, the Prime Minister maintained a near monopoly of foreign policy which was never seriously challenged. More generally, Clapham suggests that the immediate decision-making setting of foreign policy remains highly personalized even when other important tasks in the domestic system are delegated, since it is viewed as a salient attribute of sovereignty. For these points, see Olajide Aluko, ed., "Nigerian Foreign Policy," in Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1977), pp. 178-179. See also, Christopher Clapham, "Sub-Saharan Africa," in Clapham, Foreign Policy Making in Developing States: A Comparative Approach (Farnborough: Saxon House, 1977), p. 87.
30. See Maurice A. East and Charles F. Hermann, "Do Nation Types Account for Foreign Policy Behavior?" in James N. Rosenau, ed., Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings and Methods (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1974), p. 278.
31. Olajide Aluko, "The Determinants of the Foreign Policies of African States," in Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1977), p. 10.
32. *ibid.* In their study of Zambia's foreign policy, Anglin and Shaw make a similar point: that "The foreign policy, indeed the political process, in most African states has tended to be personalized both by politicians, publicists, and scholars. In the case of Zambia, there continues to be the common assumption that the president 'makes' foreign policy, that he conceives, articulates, and symbolizes Zambia's external ideology and relationships." See Douglas G. Anglin and Timothy M. Shaw, Zambia's Foreign Policy: Studies in Diplomacy and Dependence (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), p. 72.
33. Hence, Delorme stated over a decade ago that, it was impossible to study Ivorian foreign policy "without speaking of the politician who has led the destiny of the Ivory Coast for nearly thirty years." Nicole Delorme, "The Foreign Policy of the Ivory Coast," in Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1977), p. 118.

34. L. Gray Cowan, "Political Determinants," Vernon McKay, ed., African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), pp. 121-122.
35. Plano and Olton, op. cit. (1982), pp. 234, 246.
36. Johan Galtung, "East-West Interaction Patterns," Journal of Peace Research, vol. 3 (1966), pp. 146-177.
37. Steven J. Brams, "The Structure of Influence Relationships in the International System," in James N. Rosenau, ed., op. cit. (1969), pp. 583-599.
38. For specific presidential visits, see the following issues of West Africa (London). For 1975, issue nos. 3002-3004, 3006, 3013, 3018, 3021, 3023, 3026, 3038, 3049; 1976, issue nos. 3053, 3056, 3059, 3062, 3063, 3078, 3079, 3081, 3084, 3088, 3097, 3100; 1977, issue nos. 3108, 3114, 3116, 3118, 3133, 3153; 1978, issue nos. 3157, 3163, 3164, 3166, 3171-3173, 3178, 3179, 3182, 3186, 3188, 3192, 3193, 3199, 3200, 3202, 3205, 3206; 1979, issue nos. 3208, 3209, 3215-3219, 3221, 3225, 3228, 3236, 3246, 3248, 3251, 3253, 3254; 1980, issue nos. 3259, 3260, 3265, 3268, 3270-3272, 3279, 3280, 3283, 3293, 3308; 1981, issue nos. 3316-3318, 3321, 3322, 3324-3326, 3329, 3331, 3334, 3342, 3348, 3349, 3353, 3355, 3358; 1982, issue nos. 3366, 3372, 3399; 1983, issue nos. 3412, 3419, 3424, 3429, 3430, 3441, 3445, 3449, 3450, 3455, 3457, 3459, 3460; 1984, issue nos. 3464, 3466, 3468, 3470, 3472, 3476-3478, 3489, 3493, 3496, 3500, 3511; 1985, issue nos. 3515, 3521-3523, 3526, 3540-3542, 3555, 3561, 3563; 1986, issue nos. 3569, 3572, 3577, 3584, 3590, 3596, 3611, 3615; 1987, issue nos. 3619, 3633, 3646, 3648, 3661, 3662, 3669, 3670; 1988, issue nos. 3676-3678, 3680, 3681, 3687, 3689, 3702, 3704, 3705, 3714, 3719, 3721, 3723, 3724; 1989, issue nos. 3726, 3733, 3767. Also contained in Africa Research Bulletin (Exeter) 1975-1989 (index).
39. As stated earlier, foreign policy begins at the borders. Nigerian leaders have learnt (with the experience of the civil war) to cultivate friendly relations with neighboring states and to take an interest in their internal affairs. Nigeria, thus, successfully secured the support and sympathy of her neighbors and none of them recognized the "Biafran" government. In fact, although a staunch supporter of France, Hamani Diori was categorically critical of that country and the Ivory Coast in 1968 for supporting the secessionist regime.
40. This historic persistence of Ghana's activism despite acute economic problems at home may be attributed to what Aluko calls the first-to-be-independent complex. "Because their country was the first to be independent in black Africa the Ghanaians have always believed that their country must play a leading role in Africa, irrespective of its economic and military strength." See Olajide Aluko, "Ghana's Foreign Policy," Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1977), p. 92.

41. See Cyril Kofie Daddieh, "Ivory Coast," in Timothy M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko, eds., The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy: Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), p. 124.
42. Sékou Touré was then chairman of ECOWAS.
43. Since one is dealing with absolute frequencies, some caution should be applied to the interpretation here. It may be argued that since there are more Francophone states in the West African subregion, one should statistically expect that in terms of absolute frequencies, there will be more visits between them *vis-à-vis* Anglophone states. However, especially where one considers the small size, weakness, and colonial experience of Francophone African states, this type of thinking confuses the mere existence of a state with real influence generated by that state.
44. See The Encyclopedia Americana, International Edition, vol. 27 (Danbury, Conn.: Grolier Inc., 1988), p. 51.
45. Plano and Olton, *op. cit.* (1982), p. 247.
46. Cantori and Spiegel, *op. cit.* (1970), p. 27.
47. The term pacta sunt servanda refers to the principle of general international law that treaties are binding and should be obeyed.
48. See Elmer Plischke, *op. cit.* (1977), f.n., p. 62.
49. Specific treaties and agreements are contained in the following issues of West Africa (London). For 1975, issue nos. 3004, 3005, 3015, 3016, 3022, 3024, 3026, 3030, 3034, 3037, 3043; 1976, issue nos. 3055, 3059, 3061, 3064, 3073, 3076-3078, 3084, 3086-3088, 3098, 3100, 3103; 1977, issue nos. 3104, 3106, 3107, 3111-3113, 3115, 3116, 3121-3123, 3127, 3132, 3138, 3140, 3147, 3149, 3151, 3153; 1978, issue nos. 3158, 3161-3163, 3172, 3180, 3190, 3196; 1979, issue nos. 3207, 3209, 3212, 3214, 3215, 3218, 3224, 3237, 3238, 3244, 3246; 1980, issue nos. 3260, 3265, 3271, 3273, 3279, 3290, 3291, 3293; 1981, issue nos. 3316, 3326, 3345, 3346, 3355, 3356; 1982, issue nos. 3361, 3362, 3368, 3375, 3386, 3390, 3395; 1983, issue nos. 3426, 3436, 3438, 3450, 3456, 3459; 1984, issue nos. 3469, 3478, 3482, 3487-3490, 3492, 3499; 1985, issue nos. 3523, 3525, 3526, 3532, 3533, 3557, 3562; 1986, issue nos. 3586, 3588, 3589, 3591, 3600, 3613; 1987, issue nos. 3617, 3620, 3621, 3624, 3632, 3649, 3650, 3670; 1988, issue nos. 3676, 3690, 3693, 3716, 3721, 3723; 1989, issue nos. 3733, 3737, 3740, 3750, 3756, 3768, 3774. Also contained in Africa Research Bulletin (Exeter) 1975-1989 (index).
50. Elmer Plischke, *op. cit.* (1977), p. 62.

51. *ibid.*, pp. 93-94. For recent articles on international participation in IGOs, see Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, "International Organizations and Foreign Policy: Influence and Instrumentality," in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and James N. Rosenau, eds., New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy (Boston, Mass.: Allen and Unwin, 1987), pp. 454-474; Francis W. Hoole, "Evaluating the Impacts of International Organizations," International Organization, vol. 33 (1977), pp. 541-563; Harold K. Jacobson, Network of Interdependence: International Organizations and the Global Political System, (New York: Knopf, 1984); James M. McCormick, "Intergovernmental Organizations and Cooperation among Nations," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 24 (1980), pp. 75-98; and Karen Mingst and Michael G. Schechter, "Assessing Intergovernmental Organization Impact: Problems and Prospects," Review of International Studies, vol. 11 (1985), pp. 199-206.
52. Donald G. Morrison, Robert C. Mitchell and John N. Paden, Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook, Second Edition (New York: Irvington Publishers, Inc., 1989), p. 173.
53. J. David Singer and Michael Wallace, "Intergovernmental Organization and the Preservation of Peace, 1916-1964: Some Bivariate Relationships," International Organization, 24, 3 (Summer 1970), pp. 520-547.
54. Sékou Touré's continued opposition to France is a major obstacle in Francophone African politics. The sudden and rough way in which Guinea became independent in September 1958 virtually turned her into a pariah state in Francophone West Africa. In terms of the broader goals of African nationalism, Guinea is perhaps the only French-speaking state that can compare with Anglophone states. References to the possibility of enlarging the CEAO to include English-speaking neighbors were favorably received in Guinea. In Guinea's view, it was to West Africa's advantage that its countries would emerge from their colonialist structure and take into account geographical realities as well as their people's interests.
55. Cantori and Spiegel, op. cit. (1970), p. 51. The problem with the Francophone groupings is that they attempt to structure Africa's international relations around a non-African factor - the French language. The cohesiveness of the Francophone groups demonstrate the enduring impact of France and, by implication, French interests in African politics especially within the CEAO. It is also widely believed that the CEAO operates as a pressure group within ECOWAS to counter the influence of Nigeria.
56. Olajide Aluko, "The Determinants of the Foreign Policies of African States," Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1977), pp. 7-10. Adebayo Adedeji, "Inter-African Economic Cooperation in Light of the Final Act of Lagos," Adebayo Adedeji and Timothy M. Shaw, eds., Economic Crisis in Africa: African Perspectives on Development, Problems and Potentials (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1985), p. 63.

57. The attainment of political independence by African states has not substantially altered their trade pattern which is strongly geared towards the industrialized countries of Europe, the United States, and Japan. A common feature of West African states, therefore, is that most of the foreign trade of the individual countries in the subregion is conducted with the Western industrial markets.
58. S. K. B. Asante, *op. cit.* (1986), pp. 26-27.
59. Uka Ezenwa, ECOWAS and the Economic Integration of West Africa (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 19.
60. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Economic Co-operation and Integration: Three Case Studies, 1969 (ST. ECA/109), p. 50. Cited in Uka Ezenwa, *op. cit.*, p. 18. Note that his figures here differ significantly from the between 23 and 49 percent of GDP offered elsewhere (Ezenwa, *ibid.*, p. 138). But for statistics on Africa as a whole, it is estimated that agriculture is "the main economic sector, generating in most countries 30 to 60 percent of GDP, or even more, if national accounts value it properly." Apparently, "this is an underestimate, since agricultural output is valued at the prices governments pay to producers, which are below export or import parity prices, and since the value of production in the secondary and tertiary sectors is overstated due to subsidies and protection." See Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1981), pp. 5, 45.
61. Uka Ezenwa *op. cit.* (1983).
62. *ibid.*, pp. 18-19.
63. Only about 20 percent of the African population is urban, and modern wage employment absorbs a very small segment of the labor force - in most countries less than 10 percent. Ezenwa has offered that the agricultural sector in West Africa employs 50 - 91 percent of the labor force. See Uka Ezenwa, *ibid.* (1983), p. 138.
64. Accelerated Development, *op. cit.* (1981), p. 2.
65. J. O. C. Onyemelukwe, Industrialization in West Africa (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), p. 16.
66. *ibid.*, p. 23.
67. Peter Robson, Integration, Development and Equity: Economic Integration in West Africa (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1983), p. 93.
68. Uka Ezenwa, *op. cit.* (1983), p. 20.
69. J. O. C. Onyemelukwe, *op. cit.* (1984), p. 27.

70. Uka Ezenwa, *op. cit.* (1983), p. 20.
71. Rather than reflecting the existence of integrated petrochemical or chemical industries, this reflects the existence of oil refineries in the area.
72. Uka Ezenwa, *op. cit.* (1983), p. 21.
73. Per capita income in the Ivory Coast has grown faster in the past 20 years than in the continent's poorest countries. See Lloyd Timberlake, *Africa in Crisis: The Causes, The Cures of Environmental Bankruptcy*, ed. by Jon Tinker (Philadelphia, PA: New Society Publishers, 1986), p. 33. More recently, the decline in commodity prices which began in late 1986, and the depreciation of the dollar against the CFA franc, have continued with serious implications for public finances and balance of payments.
74. Originally in Ievan Griffiths, *An Atlas of African Affairs* (London: Methuen, 1984). Cited in Lloyd Timberlake, *op. cit.* (1986), pp. 33-34.
75. See *West Africa*, February 6, 1984, p. 263. For earlier decline in production, see *West Africa*, January 15, 1979, p. 109.
76. Donald L. Sparks, "Economic Trends in Africa, South of the Sahara, 1988," *Africa, South of the Sahara, 1989*, Eighteenth Edition (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1988) p. 25.
77. For Nigeria, the oil glut phenomenon was the result of competition from North sea crude in European markets and from Alaskan and Mexican supplies in the United States. For reports on early signs of declining trends, see *West Africa*, January 22, 1979, p. 134.
78. It is of utmost interest to African leaders who, at a meeting of the OAU, endorsed objectives and goals for African states to achieve a more self-reliant, more economically developed and integrated economy by the year 2000, thus signifying a greater move toward economic cooperation. See Organization of African Unity, *The Lagos Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Monrovia Strategy for Economic Development of Africa*, adopted by the Second Extraordinary Assembly of the OAU Heads of State and Government, Devoted to Economic Matters (Lagos, Nigeria: April 28-29, 1980). Also, in the November 1984 OAU summit, African leaders reaffirmed in a resolution their "solemn commitment to put together" their collective effort to implement the *Lagos Plan of Action* through the process of regional economic cooperation and integration. See OAU Doc., *Resolution on Inter-African Economic Co-operation and Integration*, Addis Ababa, AHG/Res. 131 (20), November 1984.
79. This phenomenon is reflective of inter-African trade as a whole, which is generally quite low. From 1960 to 1970, inter-African trade was about 6 percent whereas the percentages in other regions were higher - an average of 9 percent for Latin America and

23 percent for Asia. Furthermore, since 1970, inter-African trade has even declined from 5.5 percent in 1970 to 3.8 percent in 1974. See W. A. Ndongko, Economic Cooperation and Integration in Africa (Dakar, Senegal: Codesria, 1985), pp. 61-65.

80. Ezenwa, op. cit. (1983), pp. 27-28.

81. S. K. B. Asante, op. cit. (1986), p. 40. Elsewhere (p. 92), the author puts the figure for intraregional trade at less than 3 percent, in 1977, for either exports or imports. The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) notes that intra-African trade declined from 8 percent of the continent's total trade in 1975 to under 4 percent in 1985. See "ECOWAS Special Report," West Africa, July 6, 1987, p. 1286.

82. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Trade Among Developing Countries by Main SITC Groups and by Regions (Geneva: UNCTAD, 1981).

83. Douglas Rimmer, The Economies of West Africa (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 15, 124, 142.

84. See Survey of African Economies (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1970), p. 78.

85. *ibid.*

86. *ibid.*, p. 188.

87. See Okwudiba Nnoli, "A Short History of Nigerian Under-development," in Okwudiba Nnoli, ed., Path to Nigerian Development (Dakar, Senegal: Codesria Books, 1981), p. 122.

88. A major obstacle for Niger is transportation costs. Commodities to and from eastern Niger are transported by Nigerian railways for 1,150 kilometers (between Lagos and Kano) and then to urban Niger by road. Likewise, merchandise to and from Niger is sent by rail from Cotonou to Parakou (438 km) and by road to Niamey (620 km). Noel V. Lateef, Crisis in the Sahel: A Case Study in Development Cooperation (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), p. 26.

89. Samir Amin describes Niger as an "artificial colonial cut-out crippled by its failure to integrate economically with its austral neighbor, Nigeria." See Samir Amin, Neocolonialism in West Africa (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 66.

90. Referring to Henri Bourguinat's study, Lateef estimates that when clandestine and traditional trade is considered, Nigeria absorbs 75 percent of Niger's total exports and provides 20 percent of its imports. See Noel Lateef, op. cit. (1980), pp. 35-36.

91. Survey of African Economies, op. cit. (1970), p. 740.

92. The argument here is that a huge number of unrecorded goods are moved through numerous unofficial points and bush paths along borders with memberstates. For references to this phenomenon on the Nigeria-Niger border, see Richard A Higgott, "Niger," in Timothy Shaw and Olajide Aluko, eds., The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy: Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 171-172; Noel Lateef, op. cit. (1980), pp. 35-36.
93. Ezenwa, op. cit. (1983), p. 112.
94. ibid., p. 123.
95. ibid., p. 134
96. See report entitled "The Way Ahead for ECOWAS," West Africa, August 4, 1980. In August 1970, while the price of cocoa in Ghana was \$292.56 per long ton, the corresponding prices of cocoa in Ivory Coast and Togo were \$294.48 and \$324.00, respectively. See also, A. Kumar, "Smuggling in Ghana: Its Magnitude and Economic Effects," Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, vol. 15, no. 2 (July 1973), pp. 285-303.
97. See "Impact of Nigeria's Austerity Measures on ECOWAS," Afriscopes (June 1982), p. 21.
98. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Study of Recorded Trade Flows (Addis Ababa: ECA, 1978).
99. Nevertheless, the question of the unreliability of data is still an important one. Statistics on intra-regional trade sometimes include re-exports of goods originally imported from outside the continent. That apart, figures presented often excludes trade that traverses the borders of African states. In particular, the movement of cattle southwards from the savannah belt in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad towards the West African Atlantic coast is difficult, if not impossible, to estimate accurately.
100. Douglas Rimmer, op. cit. (1984), pp. 15-16.
101. See the dyadic analysis by S. J. Brams, "Transaction Flows in the International System," American Political Science Review, vol. 60 (1966), p. 889.
102. The six-nation West African Economic Community (CEAO) comprises Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Burkina Faso.
103. S. K. B. Asante, "ECOWAS/CEAO: Conflict and Cooperation in West Africa," Ralph I. Onwuka and Amadu Sesay, eds., The Future of Regionalism in Africa (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), pp. 84-85.
104. Peter Robson, op. cit. (1983), p. 92.

105. Noel V. Lateef, op. cit. (1980), p. 36.
106. Ezenwa, op. cit. (1983), p. 28.
107. See report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) entitled Currency Convertibility of West African States, pp. 27-35. Cited by S. K. B. Asante, op. cit. (1986), p. 92.
108. Douglas Rimmer, op. cit. (1984), p. 124.
109. ibid., p. 124.
110. S. K. B. Asante, op. cit. (1986), p. 93.
111. The monetary and exchange regimes in West Africa range from virtually complete convertibility in Liberia to inconvertibility in Ghana. See chapter entitled "Monetary Cooperation and West African Integration" in Robson, op. cit. (1983), pp. 141-165.
112. Lateef contends that many West Africans view the lack of efficient payment arrangements among the various monetary zones as the single most important constraint on regional trade. See Noel Lateef, op. cit. (1980), p. 34.
113. David Carney, Agenda for Development in Arms and African Development: Proceedings of the First Pan-African Citizens' Conference, ed., Frederick S. Arkurst (London: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 114.
114. Cantori and Spiegel, op. cit. (1970), p. 27.
115. Survey of African Economies, op. cit. (1970), p. 77. Current and complete statistics for all West African states are hard to find. However, for annual statistics showing the direction of trade for these states, see Direction of Trade Yearbooks (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund). Since 1977, however, annual statistics showing the five principal importing and exporting partners of each developing country have appeared in the UN Statistical Yearbook and the November and December issues of the UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics.
116. Survey of African Economies, op. cit. (1970), p. 78.
117. Rimmer, op. cit. (1984), p. 122.
118. ibid. p. 123.
119. Survey of African Economies, op. cit. (1970), p. 446.
120. ibid. p. 364.

121. *ibid.*, p. 366. See also, Anthony Kirk-Greene and Douglas Rimmer, Nigeria Since 1970: A Political and Economic Outline (New York: Africana Publishers, 1981), p. 135.
122. Survey of African Economies, *op. cit.* (1970), p. 188.
123. Rimmer, *op. cit.* (1984), p. 123.
124. Richard A. Higgot, "Niger," in Timothy M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko, eds., The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy: Comparative Analysis (1984), p. 176.
125. Rimmer, *op. cit.* (1984), pp. 122-123.
126. Survey of African Economies, vol. 3 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1970), p. 684.
127. *ibid.*, p. 744.
128. Richard Higgot in Shaw and Aluko, ed., *op. cit.* (1984), pp. 175-176.
129. West Africa serves as a source of raw materials for the Western industrial nations. One-third of the imports of the French-speaking states originate in France; over 40 percent of the imports of the Lusophone states originate in Portugal; and about 25 percent of the imports of former British colonies are from the UK. Although Liberia obtains a similar proportion from the U.S., ECOWAS trade with the socialist economies averages only 3-5 percent of exports and imports. For these figures, see Michael Idi Obadan, "Regional Trade of the ECOWAS: Characteristics, Problems and Prospects," (Unpublished Paper, 1982). Cited in S. K. B. Asante, *op. cit.* (1986), pp. 92-92.
130. A major foreign policy concern is the social and cultural renaissance of the African personality. Since the colonial period had undermined traditional values, African states consider it necessary to reverse this trend. For example, the Second World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC) celebrations in Nigeria, in 1977, was an attempt to rejuvenate interest in traditional culture. FESTAC attracted 15,000 performers from almost 60 countries and thousands of visitors from all over.
131. The cultural view is a new and relatively unexplored aspect of international relations. But for several dimensions highlighting the role of cultural variables on foreign affairs, see R. P. Anand, ed., Cultural Factors in International Relations (New Delhi, India: Abhinav Publications, 1981); and A. Iriye, "Culture and Power: International Relations as Intercultural Relations," Diplomatic History, vol. 3 (1979), pp. 115-128. For a more recent analysis of the role of culture on Foreign Policy decision making, see Martin W. Sampson III, "Cultural Influences on Foreign Policy," Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and James N. Rosenau, eds., New Dimensions in the Study of Foreign Policy (Boston, Mass.: Allen and Unwin, 1987), pp. 384-405.
132. R. P. Anand, ed., *op. cit.* (1981), p. 10.

133. As one scholar puts it, "the buying and selling of commodities is almost always accompanied by the contact of cultures, the exchange of ideas and the mingling of peoples." See Ezenwa, op. cit. (1983), p. 2.
134. To adopt Ithiel de Sola Pool's broad definition, communication is "any transmission of signs, signals, or symbols between persons." See Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Communication, Political: Introduction," in David L. Shils, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 3 (New York: The Free Press, 1968), p. 90.
135. For an example of studies dealing with peoples-to-peoples interaction across state boundaries, see the collection of articles in Richard L. Merritt, ed., Communication in International Politics (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1972).
136. Michael Haas, International Systems: A Behavioral Approach (New York: Chandler Publishers, 1974), p. 17.
137. For literature on the role of languages in African societies, see Alexandre Pierre, Langues et Langues en Afrique Noire (Paris: Payot, 1967); trans. F. A. Leary, as An Introduction to Languages and Language in Africa (London: Heinemann Educational, 1972); David Dalby, ed., Language and History in Africa (London: Cass, 1970); J. Spencer, ed., Current Trends in Linguistics, vol. vii (The Hague: Mouton, 1971).
138. Jan Knappert, "Language Problems of the New Nations of Africa," Africa Quarterly, vol. 5 (1965), pp. 95-105.
139. David Dalby, "African Languages," Africa, South of the Sahara, 1990, Nineteenth Edition (London: Europa Publishers, 1990), p. 95.
140. Black Africa Handbook, op. cit. (1989), p. 25.
141. Paul Bohannon and Philip Curtin, Africa and Africans, Third Edition (Prospect Heights, Illinois: Waveland Press, 1988), p. 73.
142. See article by Marie D. Strazar in R. P. Anand, op. cit. (1981), pp. 86-87.
143. Noel Lateef, op. cit. (1980), p. 34.
144. David Dalby, op. cit. (1990), p. 95.
145. In his capacity as the chairman of ECOWAS, Nigeria's President Babangida re-emphasized that one of the most obvious examples of the barriers left behind by colonial rule was "the continuing language barrier in the region." For this report, see West Africa, July 13, 1987, p. 1364.
146. See for example, West Africa, September 1, 1975, p. 1035.

147. See West Africa, June 4, 1979, p. 1000.
148. West Africa, October 25, 1976, p. 1601.
149. West Africa, April 25, 1977, p. 838.
150. West Africa, January 10, 1977, p. 89.
151. West Africa, August 15, 1977.
152. See, for example, Lucian Pye, ed., Communications and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962); Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communications: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationalism (New York: John Wiley, 1953); and Everett Rogers, Modernization Among Peasants: The Impact of Communication (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969).
153. Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958).
154. Daniel Lerner, op. cit. (1958), pp. 47-65.
155. Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, vol. 55 (September 1961), p. 494.
156. Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), p. 177.
157. See Karl Deutsch's article in Philip Jacob and James V. Toscano, eds., op. cit. (1964), pp. 46-74, 75-97.
158. Until recently, the River Niger was considered to be unnavigable by French colonial studies on the subject. However, Canadian hydraulics expert, Jacques Cordeau, has shown that the river is navigable for seven months in the year. This discovery has implications for Niger's economy especially as the seven months during which the river is navigable correspond to the months following the groundnut harvest. For goods imported through Nigeria, using the river for transport purposes may reduce transport costs by 60 percent. Noel V. Lateef, op. cit. (1980), p. 26.
159. West Africa, September 1, 1975.
160. West Africa, October 18, 1976, p. 1559.
161. West Africa, April 4, 1977, p. 669.
162. West Africa, April 11, 1977, p. 729.

163. West Africa, March 14, 1977, p. 534.
164. West Africa, May 2, 1977, p. 1849.
165. African Research Bulletin (1976).
166. West Africa, September 5, 1977, p. 1849.
167. West Africa, July 28, 1975, p. 877.
168. West Africa, August 4, 1975, p. 904; August 25, 1975, p. 997.
169. *ibid.*
170. West Africa, July 18, 1977, p. 1498.
171. West Africa, August 29, 1977, p. 1794.
172. West Africa, December 19/26, 1977; Africa Research Bulletin (1977).
173. West Africa, December 20, 1976, p. 1988.
174. West Africa, January 17 1977, p. 133.
175. West Africa, August 25, 1975, p. 1008.
176. West Africa, January 3 1977, p. 38.
177. West Africa, August 25, 1975, p. 1008.
178. West Africa, November 14, 1977, p. 2329; Africa Research Bulletin (1977).
179. West Africa, October 18, 1976, p. 1559. For similar examples, see West Africa, Issue Nos. 3072, 3094, 3064, 3068, 3073, 3078, 3113, 3132.
180. Plano and Olton, op. cit. (1982), p. 99.
181. *ibid.*
182. For significant studies on migration in West Africa, see Wallerstein's article entitled "Migration in West Africa: The Political Perspective," in H. Kuper, ed., Urbanization and Migration in West Africa (1965), pp. 148-150. See also, article by Elliot P. Skinner entitled "Labour Migration Amongst the Mossi of Upper Volta," in *ibid.*, pp. 60-84; A. L. Mabogunje, Regional Mobility and Resource Development in West Africa (Toronto: McGill/Queen's University Press, 1972); Samir Amin, ed., Modern Migrations in Western Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1974); K. C. Zachariah and Julien Conde, Migration in West Africa: Demographic Aspects (London:

Oxford University Press, 1981).

183. Elliot P. Skinner, "Labor Migration and National Development in Africa," Beverly Lindsay, ed., African Migration and National Development (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 1985), p. 29.

184. Bohannon and Phillip Curtin, op. cit. (1988), p. 74.

185. ibid., p. 75.

186. ibid., pp. 75-76.

187. ibid., p. 76.

188. Black Africa Handbook, op. cit. (1989), p. 9. The 1975 census estimates 1.43 million foreign nationals of whom 1.054 were foreign born. Half of the foreigners were from Upper Volta, and there were 350,000 Malians, 100,000 Guineans, 50,000 Nigerians and 40,000 Ghanaians. Douglas Rimmer, op. cit. (1984), p. 14.

189. Estimates are possibly 15 percent at the peak of the seasonal immigration that year. See B. Gil, "Immigration into Ghana and Its Contribution to Skill," UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Proceedings of the World Population Conference, vol. 4 (New York: United Nations, 1967), pp. 202-203. In late 1969, the Ghanaian government expelled many of the two million aliens then resident in the country. For additional commentary, see Samir Amin, ed., op. cit. (1974).

190. Douglas Rimmer, op. cit. (1984), p. 14.

191. The ECOWAS treaty on the free movement of peoples was signed by the heads of state and government in Dakar in 1979. It broadly states that "citizens of member states shall be regarded as community citizens and accordingly member states undertake to abolish all obstacles to their freedom of movement and residence within the community." The treaty further recommends that "member states shall, by agreements with each other, exempt community citizens from holding visitors' visas and residence permits and allow them to work and undertake commercial and industrial activities within their territories."

192. See West Africa, May 16, 1970.

193. See A. A. Afolayan, "Immigration and Expulsion of ECOWAS Aliens in Nigeria," International Migration Review, vol. 22, no. 1 (Spring 1988), pp. 6-7.

194. See African Research Bulletin, January and February 1983, pp. 6624, 6697, and 6734.

195. West Africa, July 27, 1987.

196. Tom Imobighe, "ECOWAS Defence Pact and Regionalism in Africa," in Sesay and Onwuka, op. cit. (1985), p. 116. For this reasoning, see the section on military interactions.
197. L. Gray Cowan, "Political Determinants" in Vernon McKay, ed., op. cit. (1966), p. 133. The West African area has been the object of previous external violations in security terms. For example, in November 1970, there was an abortive invasion of the Republic of Guinea by Portuguese-led mercenaries. In addition, in January 1977, the Republic of Benin experienced another mercenary assault.
198. See D. K. Orwa, "African States and the Superpowers" in Orwa, Ojo, and Utete, eds., African International Relations (London: Longman Group, 1985), p. 100.
199. See World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers 1968-78 (Washington: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1983).
200. Although defense comes high on the list of spending priorities in most African states, with the exception of Egypt and South Africa, all African states have to import their military requirements. In addition, many West African officers and non-commissioned specialists are continually trained abroad.
201. Pat McGowan and Thomas H. Johnson, "African Military Coups d'Etat and Underdevelopment: A Quantitative Historical Analysis," The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 22, no. 4 (1984), pp. 648-649.
202. S. K. B. Asante, op. cit. (1986), p. 144.
203. Olajide Aluko, "Ghana's Foreign Policy," in Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1977), p. 75; Richard Bissell and Michael Radu, eds., op. cit. (1984), p. 3.
204. See "Western Africa: Reconciliation Summit Falls Apart," Africa Report, March-April 1987, pp. 34-35.
205. Staffan Wiking, Military Coups in Sub-Saharan Africa: How to Justify Illegal Assumptions of Power (Uppsala: Scandanavian Institute of African Studies, 1983), p. 107.
206. McKay, op. cit. (1966), p. 9.
207. See Africa Research Bulletin, December 1-31, 1974, pp. 3452C-3454A.
208. There is a Francophone forces pact (non-aggression and defense assistance pact) between six members - Mauritania, Senegal, Niger, Ivory Coast, and Burkina Faso. See West Africa, September 18, 1978, p. 1861.
209. See West Africa, May 14, 1979, p. 865.

210. For these and other examples, see Roger Tangri, Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa (London: James Curry, 1985), p. 134; I. William Zartman, "Issues in African Diplomacy in the 1980s," in Bissell and Radu, eds., op. cit. (1984), p. 142.
211. West Africa defines this non-aggression pact as "the first purely political decision of ECOWAS." See West Africa, May 1, 1978, p. 831.
212. See Raymond W. Copson, "African Flashpoints: Prospects for Armed International Conflict," Bissell and Radu, eds., op. cit. (1984), p. 186; Sunday Babalola Ajulo, "The Economic Community of West African States and International Law," The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 27, no. 2 (1989), pp. 238-239; Sheila Harden, ed., Small is Dangerous: Micro States in A Macro World, Report of a Study Group of the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), pp. 31-32.
213. S. K. B. Asante, op. cit. (1986), pp. 180-181.
214. Intra-African cooperation and solidarity continues to be bedeviled and undermined by post-independence military pacts which African states have contracted with their former colonial masters. See presidential address to the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Third Press Review of Third World Diplomacy, vol. 1, no. 1 (New York: Third Press International, Winter 1982), pp. 21-22.

CHAPTER FIVE

EXTERNAL INFLUENCES IN WEST AFRICAN COOPERATION

Introduction

As a subregion of the African continent, West Africa is not an isolated area and does not therefore operate in a vacuum. It interacts actively with other areas in the international system. The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate these external linkages in West Africa by reviewing the relations between the subregion and extra-African powers.¹ Consequently, the chapter will analyze the economic, political, and military linkages between West African states and selected great powers. The basic assumption here is that the role of the great powers is very significant in the area. The great powers are, of course, not a monolithic entity. While they are generally industrialized countries with various levels of technological development, the fact remains that they are not all equally relevant in terms of the colonial experiences of African states.² Furthermore, they are broadly split into two major blocs in terms of their socioeconomic systems. The Sino-Soviet split has led to a further division within the communist bloc. To accommodate this and other indicators of heterogeneity, this chapter will examine the role of six world powers in terms of a series of case studies. Specifically, we will concentrate on relations of West African states with France, Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and West Germany.³

The nature of external relations in West Africa is bidirectional, indicating movements from extra-African actors to West African states, and from African states to the great powers as well. But there is considerable intrusion of the developing states by foreign powers. The general tendency has been for African states' foreign policies to attempt to limit external penetration and constrain external pressures while seeking sources of support, often at the cost of compromising elements of autonomy.⁴ Despite the occasionally conflictual process of transition to independence, relations between the newly independent African states and former colonial powers have remained close and cordial. This observation is manifested politically through the regular diplomatic consultation, multilateral diplomatic exchanges both through the British Commonwealth of nations and the Francophone grouping of states; formal military agreements which grant permission to station military personnel and bases on African territory; and cultural exchanges (including immigration and citizenship). African states are not equally attached to their former colonial centers. In fact, post-colonial relations show considerable variation in that some African states are more heavily dependent on their former colonial mentors than others. Notably, the former French colonies in Africa have remained linked to France by tighter institutional arrangements than states previously controlled by other European powers. Most former French colonies concluded direct military and security agreements with France as part of the independence bargain, and accepted economic, technical, and financial arrangements "that formally institutionalized French control of their development as newly independent states."⁵

French Policies in Africa

France is probably the most active and influential non-African power in the West African subregion. The country has an organic and "special relationship"⁶ with its former African colonies since the latter represent a significant sphere of influence solidified by a complex and close network of political, economic, cultural, and military relationships.⁷ From the onset, France appeared to lay a determined siege on African states in general and Francophone West Africa in particular. For instance, in the 1960s and 1970s, France was involved in the struggle for power, all over the continent, especially in the French-speaking areas. In 1964, under a special clause providing for assistance in the maintenance of law and order, French troops intervened in Gabon after President Leon Mba was overthrown in what initially was a successful military coup.⁸ Earlier, in 1958, French policy included semi-official interventions designed at de-stabilizing such regimes as that of Sékou Touré, whose courageous demand for independence was resented as an ideological challenge to continuing French presence in Africa.⁹

Another well documented policy-move concerned Nigeria during its civil war (1967-1970). De Gaulle's policy of support for Biafra in 1968-1969 was largely motivated by geopolitical considerations and was intended to dismantle the Nigerian state, which was considered as a pole of attraction (and thus a potential threat) to the preservation of French influence in the neighboring Francophone states.¹⁰ There has been an increase in French military involvement over the years. For example, France was involved in the Chadian crisis (from 1977 onwards); in the Central African

Empire (where, in 1980, it dislodged the tyrannical regime of Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa); and in Zaire's Shaba invasions (first indirectly in 1977, and more directly a year later) where French assistance facilitated the deployment of about 250 Belgian paratroopers mainly to quell political disturbances; in Mauritania (during 1978); and French complicity was also strongly alleged when a group of mercenaries attempted to invade Benin in 1977. A proposal was made by France following the Shaba invasions for the establishment of a pan-African intervention force.¹¹ More recently, when the Togolese army reportedly thwarted a coup attempt orchestrated by two of its "radical" neighbors, France sent 150 men from its rapid deployment force to Lome as military assistance.¹² The multiplicity of French interventions in Africa reflect the persistence of a strong French interest in the affairs of the continent. "Of all the major non-African powers, France has been most disposed to impose its will on independent OAU states and the least inclined to be concerned about African reactions."¹³ It is indeed one strange fact of international politics that France's blatant and most casual interference in Africa's affairs earns it less opprobrium than that of other external powers, especially Britain.

French Political Influence in West Africa

With the exception of Guinea which, under Sékou Touré, in September 1958, had voted "non" to a proposition that it should plunge into the French West African Community, French policy in the subregion in the late 1950s and in the 1960s involved cultivating friendly and close relations with African states.¹⁴ Since 1960,

successive French presidents have considered it particularly important to preserve the close relations with Africa; a remarkable continuity may be observed in this respect. French diplomatic policy in Africa focused on ensuring the political unity of Francophone Africa. This was particularly true of De Gaulle who, in the 1960s, advocated the unity of French-speaking states, which was reflected in the regional alliances in West Africa in the Brazzaville Group. One measure of the ties between France and her satellites in Africa is the annual Franco-African summits which serve as an avenue for socialization among the various elites, French and African. Another measure of the historical ties between France with Francophone Africa is reflected in the incessant and frequent visits undertaken by French presidents and ministers to their satellites in West Africa.

Political relations range from such acts as the occasional visits of the French president to Benin, Senegal, and Mauritania to the actual resumption of diplomatic relations with Guinea after 10 years of suspension. The pattern of presidential visits was maintained in the 1970s although, more recently, there has been a token attempt at including non-Francophone African states. For example, in a rapprochement with that country, President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing visited Guinea (the first state visit since De Gaulle's 20 years earlier) at the end of 1978¹⁵ while his Foreign Secretary, Oliver Stirn, visited Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, and Cape Verde Islands.¹⁶ As was reportedly expressed by an official of the French Foreign Ministry, the presidential tour of West Africa represented "the new orientation of French policy in Africa [which] was to extend beyond the hitherto limited confines of

francophone Africa."¹⁷ There was also the visit by President Mitterrand, in 1986, to Niger, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Senegal, which was primarily aimed at reassuring traditional partners in the Francophone countries of continuity with past policies.¹⁸ These interactions are not one-sided, however. Almost all the Francophone African leaders visited Paris. It is not an exaggeration, therefore, to suggest that in terms of political influence, France is probably the most important non-African actor in the West African subregion today.

French Economic Influence

Within the economic sphere, both France and the Francophone West African states are "cemented together by the Franc zone, French budgetary aids and the extent of trade relations."¹⁹ French economic and financial ties in Africa are thus strongly enhanced by the fact that Francophone African states operate within the franc zone, through which France maintains and preserves a firm control over the economic and monetary policies of her former colonies.²⁰ At independence, the French government created two multilateral central banks as a mechanism to group and control the economies of its former colonies in West and Equatorial Africa - the Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO), grouping Senegal, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Dahomey (now Benin), Niger, and Mauritania, and the Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique Equatoriale et du Cameroun, later renamed the Banque des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale, grouping Congo, Gabon, the Central African Republic, Chad, and Cameroon. These banks

created a uniform currency tied to the French franc and were placed under the overall control of the French treasury. In terms of financial operations, while the two central banks regulated the currencies of the countries listed above, each of the states maintained a separate account with the French treasury for the purposes of international financial transactions, including the financing of trade.²¹ The obvious implication of this is that these states have become financially dependent on the franc monetary system controlled from Paris. For example, in 1969, when France devalued the franc all her former colonies except Guinea²² followed accordingly. Thus, the CFA franc guaranteed by France remains the currency of international transactions, while foreign exchange earned by exports is secured by the French treasury.²³

French aid and loans are another instrument of influence and control over Francophone West African states. France operates two main agencies in this regard: the Fonds d'Aide et Coopération (FAC) and Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique (CCCE), the distinction here being that FAC is a state budgetary agency while the CCCE is a public financing body on commercial lines. French aid and loans go principally to Togo, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Benin, Mauritania, and Ivory Coast. In absolute terms, France is the second largest aid donor of the OECD countries (after the United States) followed by West Germany, Britain, and Japan. As a percentage of GNP, however, figures for 1980 place it in the first position (0.64 percent), followed by West Germany (0.44 percent), Britain (0.35 percent), Japan (0.32 percent), and the United States (0.27 percent).²⁴ In fact, in the Mitterrand government, pledges to an overall increase in overseas aid from 0.36

percent of France's GDP in 1980 to 0.7 percent by 1988 were reiterated.²⁵

Nevertheless, African states should exercise caution since bilateral foreign aid may be a mixed blessing as its cost may indeed outweigh its perceived benefits. Indeed, foreign aid may compromise national interest by permitting, on the basis of quid pro quo, the establishment of foreign military bases thereby leading to partial surrender of a state's right to pursue independent domestic and foreign policies.²⁶

In terms of trade relations, France also maintains significant ties with Francophone states including Niger where, in 1982, France accepted to buy uranium at a price above that of the international market. Earlier, together with the Ivorian president, French President Georges Pompidou had publicly supported the Francophone initiatives towards the establishment of the Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) which took place in Abidjan in 1973, mainly in order to counterbalance Nigeria's mounting influence in the subregion.²⁷ The economies of France's African colonies are notoriously bound to the metropole with hoops of iron. Colonial agricultural products are subsidized and provided with a guaranteed market and France, in turn, monopolizes these markets through the CFA franc.²⁸

In recent times, however, there has been a subtle shift in French economic policy in the subregion (and indeed in the entire continent) from the Francophone states to any state at all. Thus, France has been courting Anglophone West African states assiduously and, more recently, France has tended to pay less attention to "traditional" linguistic barriers. "French ministers have been making more frequent visits to Anglophone countries in East and West Africa; Nigeria has now become

France's major trading partner in Africa south of the Sahara and north of South Africa".²⁹ The French Minister of industry visited Nigeria, in 1975,³⁰ specifically for the purpose of trade promotion, and this was later reciprocated by the Nigeria industries commissioner in the same year³¹ which finally culminated, several years later, into the signing of trade agreements.³² In 1975, Nigeria became France's biggest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa and then Senegal's President, Sédar Senghor, "complained the year before that 'France is more dynamic in Nigeria than in francophone black African countries.'³³ French exports to Nigeria doubled between 1975 and 1978. By 1980, Nigeria had become France's thirteenth biggest customer in the world and, in 1981, France's third largest oil supplier.³⁴

French Military Interests

It is perhaps in its military relations with African states that France is strongest and most notorious "with troops still stationed in several African countries."³⁵ Indeed, one of the most difficult aspects of French policy in Africa is the military aspect, particularly the question of whether intervention should be initiated in a state to support a regime against threats of internal subversion.³⁶ Unlike other external actors, and in a manner that depicts outright contempt for African states, France has no qualms about military intervention in support of her satellites in Africa. France and the various Francophone West African states are joined by a series of bilateral military accords which may be subdivided into two categories. First, bilateral defense treaties, which include an entire gamut of military activity such as the use of French

institutions for training military personnel, weapons supply, intervention of French troops to restore order and to defend governments during crises, and a wide spectrum of military aid activities. Such agreements, which have endured, include those signed with the Central African Republic and Gabon (1960), Ivory Coast (1961), Comoro Islands (1973), and Senegal and Cameroon (1974). On the dimension of actual commitment of troops in the continent, France has prevented the governments of Mauritania, Chad, and Zaire from falling. Indeed, some of the countries in which France maintains military bases are in West Africa. France maintains military bases in Senegal,³⁷ Ivory Coast,³⁸ Gabon, and Djibouti, and it is in the process of constructing another base (at Bouar) in the Central African Empire.

The second variety of bilateral military accord with France is technical cooperation agreements, the basic distinction being that this facet does not cover direct French military involvement. In West Africa, Burkina Faso (1961), Benin (1975), Mauritania (1976), Mali (1977) and Niger (1977) have signed agreements of this nature. French military activities range from the signing of cooperation and military assistance agreements, for example, with Senegal in 1975,³⁹ to the actual engagement in joint military maneuvers with Togo,⁴⁰ Senegal,⁴¹ and Ivory Coast.⁴² In the 1980s, defence agreements were still in force between France, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Gabon, the Central African Republic, Reunion, Mayotte, Senegal, and Togo. In West Africa, French troops are also stationed in military bases located in Senegal and Ivory Coast, at their own request, but essentially to serve the political, economic, and cultural interests of France.⁴³

But France has no qualms about extending this second variety of military cooperation agreements to include direct military activity involving the actual application of force. For instance, although it has no direct defence treaties with Zaire and Chad, France has been conspicuously involved in those countries in recent years. Indeed, France has a special force d'intervention in southern France and has, since 1964, developed this mobile interventionist force, on call at short notice, to serve as reserve in case of emergency. The 11th Airborne Division also maintains a forward element on permanent alert in Senegal, complete with paratroop, marine, infantry, and artillery brigades. It is also equipped with seaborne, amphibious, and armed elements and has approximately 220 aircrafts at its disposal.⁴⁴ Based at Pau in the south of France, the Forces d'Action Rapide (FAR), comprising 47,000 men, can be mobilized under 48 hours for action anywhere in Francophone African region and in little more time the French Foreign Legion in its bases in France, Djibouti, and Mayotte can also be ready.⁴⁵

British Policies in West Africa

In their approach to bilateral relations with West African states, the national styles of British and French post-colonial policies are in sharp contrast with one another. Whereas the "special relationship" between France and Francophone Africa continues to be guaranteed by a series of bilateral political, economic, and military treaties, since the abrogation of the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact, there has been no British equivalent in West Africa.⁴⁶ Irrespective of the nature of contemporary

Anglo-African relations, there are certainly no residual imperial commitments that compare with those that exist in the Falkland Islands and which, under foreseeable circumstances, will appear likely to lead to the projection into Africa of British military power.⁴⁷ In addition, whereas France remains the powerful pivot of a cultural area that is predicated upon the French language, by contrast, Britain has surrendered its global preeminence to another English-speaking nation, the United States, whose traditional anti-colonialist posture was compatible with the "economic and cultural competition with Britain to influence Commonwealth Africa. Indeed, much of the recent historiography of the post-war period suggests that it has positively acquired it."⁴⁸ For political reasons, the former British colonies set about consciously diversifying their external relations, in order to reduce dependence on Britain. In addition, since the United States had greater resources at its disposal, it established in educational as well as in economic and political matters a rival, and in some cases a much stronger, magnetic field of attraction.⁴⁹

Nevertheless, Britain still occupies an important place in the foreign policies of Anglophone West African states sharing some measure of economic links, political relations, and cultural affinity. Since granting independence to Ghana in 1957 and to Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Gambia in the early to mid-1960s, a large chunk of Britain's political relations with West Africa is still reflected within the Commonwealth of Nations. Although it may be suggested that the Commonwealth represents an English language post-imperial association,⁵⁰ equal emphasis may be placed on the multilateral character of the organization. Rather than merely serving

as a forum for maintaining and perpetuating British privileges and post-colonial influence, the Commonwealth is most active as an informal lobby on general north-south economic and political issues.⁵¹ In the Lusaka Commonwealth conference of August 1979, for example, pressure was applied on Britain by Anglophone African states on the issue of majority rule in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). Among the countries that pressured Britain was Nigeria which, through its oil weapon, announced at the eve of the conference the acquisition of all the 22.5 percent equity shares of the British Petroleum (BP) marketing company in addition to expelling its expatriate staff.⁵² Although the official reason for this nationalization was to prevent Nigeria's oil from being shipped to South Africa,⁵³ it was clear that the action was taken to coincide with the Lusaka conference in order to pressure the new British conservative government into revising its Rhodesian policy. It is uncertain whether Nigeria's action singularly caused the later reversal in British policy, since pressure from other members of the Commonwealth may have influenced the British decision, and since London may have been unwilling to lose its economic position in Nigeria to other Western competitors.⁵⁴

In terms of trade relations, Britain has its largest investment in Africa (perhaps outside the Republic of South Africa) in West Africa. Britain is the single largest foreign investor in Nigeria providing 40 percent of total investment (and 28 percent of all British exports to OPEC countries) in 1978.⁵⁵ British aid and private investments are heavily concentrated in Nigeria (approximately 500 million pounds) and South Africa. Nigeria jumped from being Britain's 12th largest market in the world to

being its 5th outside Europe with the emergence of oil, and the Nigerian market has become even more important than South Africa's.⁵⁶ However, within Commonwealth Africa, Southern and East African countries have obtained the lion's share of British aid transfers. Whereas Southern and East African countries took 38.5 million and 23.4 million pounds, respectively, in 1977, West Africa received 13.5 million pounds.⁵⁷ Similarly, of all World Bank loans to developing countries in 1980, the UK share was just over 6 percent; in East Africa, it was 16.4 percent and, in West Africa, 9 percent. This relatively low aid figures for West Africa reflect two realities: first, that countries like the Gambia and Sierra Leone, which have been highly dependent on British assistance have very small budgets, and second, that Nigeria decided after the quadrupling of the oil prices in 1974 against seeking capital aid from the UK and other major donors.⁵⁸

U.S.- African Relations

Although the trend is currently changing, for historical reasons, the U.S. has long deferred to its NATO allies on African matters, relying instead on the sub-imperial role of the former colonial powers.⁵⁹ Contrasted with Britain, France, and Germany, U.S. interaction with West Africa was largely limited before World War II to episodic links with Liberia and to distortions inherent in the trans-Atlantic slave trade.⁶⁰ The U.S. had three full-scale diplomatic posts south of the Sahara, in Addis Ababa, Monrovia, and Pretoria (plus a consulate-general in Cape Town) before World War II.⁶¹ The basic elements of America's policy during the colonial period

generally included the priority of international (specifically European) political alliances for the U.S., while at the same time urging the wisdom of decolonization on Europe.⁶² The U.S. was generally opposed to radical political movements in Africa.⁶³

However, the experience of Africans in World War II,⁶⁴ coupled with the Allied Powers war time declaration to respect the fundamental rights of all peoples to choose their form of government, intensified nationalist aspirations for self-determination and independence in Africa. Specifically, Franklin Roosevelt had criticized the colonial powers (particularly Britain) for their role in Africa and, with its own history of rebellion against a colonial power, America was perceived as a natural supporter of nationalist aspirations in the region. With the Truman administration, however, the U.S. policy in Africa was brought back in line with European thinking. For example, Truman's Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, saw Africa as a pawn in the Cold War that was primarily Western Europe's responsibility to control.

Truman's successor, Dwight Eisenhower, did not even mention Africa in his first inaugural address in 1953, and his State department (under his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles) cut U.S. diplomatic representation on the continent by 40 percent.⁶⁵ It was not until after independence began that the U.S. moved to increase its direct diplomatic ties with various African states. Leading the U.S. delegation for the celebration of Ghana's independence on March 6, 1957, the then Vice President, Richard Nixon, proceeded to tour various independent African states (few in number

at that time). In his report to President Eisenhower on April 7, 1957, Nixon recommended the creation within the U.S. Department of State of a bureau of African affairs. Admit some opposition from Congress and within the State Department itself, such a bureau was created on August 20, 1958.⁶⁶ In December 1960, acting upon the request of Harold Macmillan (who was himself edging many colonies toward independence), the Eisenhower Administration abstained on a general vote in the United Nations condemning colonialism. Even after the independence of African states, Eisenhower chose not to name separate ambassadors to each of the newly independent states. This was the case especially in the French African territories and was done partly out of deference to French sensibilities.

The arrival of John F. Kennedy in the White House, in 1961, changed U.S.-African relations considerably. Kennedy already had a reputation for understanding the African perspective during his tenure as chairman of the Senate African Affairs Subcommittee. One of the first measures of the Kennedy Administration was to decide that each African state would have its own ambassador. Espousing a policy of "Africa for Africans," Kennedy asserted that "the people of Africa are more interested in development than they are in doctrine. They are more interested in achieving a direct decent standard of living than in following the standards of either East or West."⁶⁷ Consequently, the U.S. sent Peace Corps volunteers to aid development in Africa (and elsewhere in the developing world) and, in return, there was a deluge of visits by African leaders to the White House.

But for most part of the 1960s, the U.S. generally supported those African

states which expressed commitment to liberal democracy and a conservative inclination - a counterpoise to the more radical movement of Kwame Nkrumah whose professed philosophies of non-alignment and pan-Africanism it interpreted as overlaid Marxism.⁶⁸ Similarly, for several years, partly in deference to the French position, pan-Africanist Guinea was cautiously perceived as a potential African bridgehead for world communism. The U.S. was consequently "tardy in recognizing Guinea's independence, and also ignored its request for a shipment of arms."⁶⁹ However, this verdict was called into question when, in 1961, Guinea expelled the Soviet ambassador for alleged involvement in its internal affairs. Consequently, American aid rapidly increased. By 1964, the U.S. had granted economic and financial aid of about \$24 million to Guinea and American companies were also showing keen interest in the rich deposits of Guinean bauxite. However, in 1966, when U.S. economic and financial aid was at its peak,⁷⁰ Touré ordered the American ambassador, Robert Mellvane, in Conakry placed under house arrest for U.S. refusal to secure the release of a Guinean delegation detained in Accra during a stop-over of a Pan-American Airways on which they were traveling.⁷¹

In the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. had still not properly understood the inappropriateness of imposing bipolar ideological labels on African nationalism. For example, President Ford's bid (through a confidential letter) to persuade African states not to recognize the Soviet-backed MPLA movement in Angola on the eve of the OAU special summit scheduled for January 1976 deeply offended several African countries, including Nigeria, whose government actually published contents of the

letter.⁷² On three occasions during 1976 the U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, proposed visiting Nigeria to discuss initiatives for solution to the southern African conflict and on three occasions, the Nigerian government refused. In addition, Ghana also withdrew an earlier agreement to receive Kissinger after the Nigerian decision not to do so.⁷³ "The issue was clear then, as it has been since: Nigeria will see the South African government as the foremost enemy of Africa; and it will not support any government or movement in Africa who supports South Africa. It will not understand the American argument, that comes and goes like the tide, that the main threat to Africa is a communist southern Africa, and the most important enemies are the Soviet Union and Cuba. Whenever that argument gains primacy over majority rule and human rights issues then relations between the U.S. and Nigeria (and other African states) will worsen."⁷⁴

U.S.-African rapprochement emerged after Jimmy Carter's election in November 1976 and the appointment of Andrew Young as the first black ambassador to the UN. The Carter Administration had assumed office intent on emphasizing north-south relations, and with the view that Africa's problems be seen first as African, whatever other perspectives might later come into play.⁷⁵ In late March 1978, the U.S. President went on a state visit to Africa - the first time ever for an American president - which included several countries in West Africa. At the end of the Carter administration, however, U.S.-African relations changed and there was a reassertion of the old bipolar system with vengeance. The incoming Reagan administration found this reassertion congenial with the world view that emphasized

the transcendent salience of east-west relations. The Reagan administration was resolutely ideological in its view of international relations and in its approach to Third World issues and north-south issues were considered relevant only to the extent that they were a function of east-west relations.⁷⁶

Trade and investment between the U.S. and West Africa concentrates heavily on Nigeria. After Asia (Japan), West Africa (Nigeria) gave the U.S. the largest balance of payments deficit over oil imports.⁷⁷ Although receiving only passing mention in the economic missions in 1961, the Arab oil boycott and the subsequent quadrupling of oil prices spurred Nigeria to second place among U.S. oil suppliers providing nearly 14 percent of imports in the early 1970s. By 1972, "Nigeria was already the United States's third largest supplier of crude oil, moving by 1974 into second place, a position it occupied until 1982." By 1975, one scholar could note that "U.S. economic stakes in Nigeria are now as great as in South Africa and growing faster,"⁷⁸ thus suggesting the potential of a Nigerian-South African economic counterpoise. Ghana, Guinea, and particularly Liberia also rank very highly among African states in terms of American investments and economic importance largely due, in the latter's case, to the Firestone interests, foreign ship lines, and other investments as well.⁷⁹ The importance placed on Liberia is underscored by the fact that the U.S. has granted it extensive credit including a grant of \$12 million in 1984 for debt services.⁸⁰ In the latter phase of the Reagan administration, economic relations with West Africa were determined mainly by economic size and the ideological compatibility. Thus, in January 1987, a visit by

then Secretary of State, George Shultz, was carefully confined to Senegal, Ivory Coast, Liberia, and Nigeria with the object of extolling the virtues of free market and opposition to Libya's subversion.⁸¹

In terms of military relations, after World War II, "the United States entered into a military agreement with Liberia by which the United States promised to come to the defence of Liberia in case of an external attack."⁸² At least one major factor for the harmonious Libero-American relations since the end of the World War was the long tenure of President William Tubman, who was Liberia's Chief Executive for nearly a quarter of a century, until his death in 1971. Liberia is the one African nation with which the U.S. has signed a defense agreement and continued military assistance to Liberia was increased, especially from 1981-1982. Whereas in 1981 Monrovia received little or no aid from the U.S., in 1983, U.S. military assistance was \$5 million and, in return for this new agreement, Liberian government would grant landing rights for U.S. Air Force planes at Robertsfield airport.⁸³ During the Nigerian Civil War, however, Washington "refused to provide arms and ammunition to either side." In fact, while Britain agreed to sell limited arms and ammunition to Nigeria (despite the opposition of the majority of the British public) the U.S. totally prohibited supplies and "instead permitted the propagation of a pro-Biafran campaign during and after the war." As a consequence of this, Nigeria went to the Soviets in August 1967 to buy arms - a situation that the U.S. State Department later called "a matter of regret."⁸⁴ At least from Nigeria's perspective, this event dampened relations especially when considered against the background of its being undertaken

by a country that more than any other should know the hazards and perils of civil war.

West Germany and Africa

Although West Germany actively participated in the scramble for African empires,⁸⁵ contemporary German foreign policy concentrates on two interrelated objectives: countering Soviet expansionism in the Third World, and, by implication, defending Western interests. Perhaps the most dramatic political incident in Bonn's relations with West Africa was in 1971, when the Guinean government broke off diplomatic relations with and unilaterally canceled the existing technical assistance agreement with West Germany because of that country's alleged involvement in the abortive Portuguese-led invasion of Guinea in November 1970. Immediately, both officials of the German embassy and the German technical assistance personnel were summarily requested to board any available aeroplane for Frankfurt. With some of the German diplomats dressed only in pyjamas, they proceeded to Frankfurt where they alighted at the height of winter in January 1971.⁸⁶ A similar event occurred in Ghana, in 1982, when the Rawlings government deported alleged spies from West Germany and the United States for engaging in espionage.⁸⁷

However, most of West Germany's interests in Africa are primarily economic interests. "West Germany is a country which depends to a great extent on her exports of manufactured goods and on imports of raw materials; this has made her the second largest trading nation in the world."⁸⁸ Obviously, this has significant consequences

for Africa. In terms of West Germany's economic interest in West Africa, for example, Nigeria serves as an oil-exporting country, Liberia provides much needed raw materials (iron ore and copper) and Ivory Coast serves as the role of an agriculturally-based country with good investment opportunities in industries. German military relations with West African states are basically economic and assume the form of arms sales. Nigeria, in West Africa, ranked the fourth largest receiver of German military equipment in 1978 (after Iran, Argentina, and Saudi Arabia) and, by 1982, large arms deals were being negotiated with West Germany for Franco-German Alfa jets and West German Leopard tanks.⁸⁹

Soviet Objectives in West Africa

Since African institutions are historically based on western models, the political, economic, and cultural ties between the Soviet Union and Africa are relatively more recent. With very few exceptions, the official languages and the political and economic structures of African states were inherited from the former colonial powers. In fact, until the death of Stalin in 1953 and the beginnings of the collapse of the Western colonial empires in Africa in the mid-1950s, the Soviets developed virtually no political or economic ties with Africa. In 1955, for example, the Soviet Union had no formal diplomatic relations with any country south of the Sahara,⁹⁰ and no African country had diplomatic relations with the USSR on the day of its independence.⁹¹ Consequently, after independence, Moscow lacked the political clout required to influence events in Africa actively. Indeed, it was often the

case that whether African states established close links with the Soviet Union depended upon the national ideology of individual African states and the reaction of the West to that ideology. The few successes of the USSR to date are less attributable to the appeal of the Soviet model as the "vanguard" of socialism and more to the mistaken policies of Western powers. Radical and nationalist regimes that fell out of favor with the West often turned to the Soviet Union for political, military, and economic support. For instance, from the late 1950s until the first half of the 1960s, Ghana and Guinea were closer to the Soviet Union because the West had ostracized them for pursuing socialist policies.⁹² The opportunity for Soviet involvement in Guinea was provided by the rough and unfriendly manner in which De Gaulle severed France's relations with Guinea at its independence in 1958. Completely cut off from its traditional source of economic aid and isolated within the Western community, Guinea's leaders had the choice of either crawling back to Paris or invoking an anti-Western factor. It was partly Soviet support which made it possible for Guinea to weather the economic storm following its independence.⁹³

Construed in this sense, therefore, many of the alliances between African states and the Soviet Union were characterized by erratic and relatively short-lived relationships. Emanating largely from temporary coincidence of interests, these alliances signified international marriages of convenience that suffered severe setbacks when occasions so warranted.⁹⁴ Hence, the Soviets lost their economic and political investments in Ghana, in 1966, when Nkrumah was overthrown.⁹⁵

Although Nkrumah had earlier sought Soviet military aid to provide him with palace

guard, he never completely broke his ties with the West. He even resisted pressures from the young radicals within his party to enter into alliance with Moscow, partly because of his commitment to nonalignment, his rejection of communism as a doctrine alien to Africa, and his strong interest in developing African Consciencism as a model for African socialism. In addition, in Guinea, the Soviet Ambassador there was unceremoniously kicked out, in 1961, for interfering in domestic politics.⁹⁶ "Since Sekou Toure sent the Russians packing from Guinea and Nkrumah's overthrow in Ghana, the Soviets had lacked a foothold in West Africa."⁹⁷ "The outstanding feature of the Soviet Union's encounter with Africa is that after more than a quarter of a century of active diplomacy, political and military involvement, it has made so little impact on the continent and failed to consolidate even the few initial gains it had made to advance its strategic interests as a superpower."⁹⁸

But the Soviet Union does have significant and delineable interests in Africa. Four key objectives appear to underlie Soviet activities in Africa since the mid-1960s. First, to win local acceptance by Africans of a lasting Soviet political, economic, and even military presence on the continent much in line with the fulfillment of the interests and requirements of a world power. Second, to gain a voice in the continent's affairs, especially by establishing close ties with governments and political (especially national liberation) movements. Third, to undermine and disrupt, without necessarily eliminating, Western political and economic positions in Africa, thus taking advantage of the fact that Western powers are, for historical reasons, generally associated with protecting status quo positions and established governments. Fourth,

to limit and, to the extent possible, diminish and counteract the influence of the Peoples Republic of China on the continent.⁹⁹ Properly speaking, Moscow's pursuit of these objectives have been flexible, tactical, pragmatic, and opportunistic. Rather than simply reflecting any grand strategy of a professed communist ideology, the Soviets have tended to be contradictory, particularly when judged purely in terms of their expressed commitment to strengthening the progressive forces in the anti-imperialist struggle of the international working class.¹⁰⁰ Indeed, the Soviet Union's African policy can only be adequately understood within the framework of a superpower whose behavior is "no different from that of any other major power whose priority concern is to pursue its own state interests. This is well understood in Africa, where the USSR is seen and treated not as the world leader of revolutionary internationalism, but as a power contesting for supremacy with the United States."¹⁰¹

For much of the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet Union's policies in West Africa focused on both "revolutionary democracies" and ruling African parties without a "socialist orientation." Revolutionary democracies in West Africa were Marxist-oriented states and parties that professed a substantial degree of ideological affinity with the USSR such as Benin, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Cape Verde.¹⁰² States without a socialist orientation included Nigeria, where in 1976, Moscow consented to assist constructing an iron and steel project that was envisaged to become the largest of such enterprise in Africa. Similarly, in the 1980s, Moscow had for the first time heightened its interaction with both African parties that purported to be socialist in

nature and those that rejected the socialist label altogether. For example, in May 1981, a member of the Soviet Political Bureau of Togo's ruling party, the Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais, visited Moscow at the initiative of the USSR. Two months later, a delegation of the ruling conservative National Party of Nigeria (NPN), also visited Moscow.¹⁰³ In 1984, even small non-socialist states in West Africa like Gambia, Togo, Niger, and Mauritania had received at least one significant overture from the USSR. A deputy chairman of the Soviet Praesidium met with Gambia's President Dauda Jawara in mid-September of that year, and in November the USSR entered into a new cooperation with Gambia that restored the cultural relations severed in 1980 (following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan). In April 1984, the Soviets concluded a cultural and scientific accord with Togo which provided for an increase of aid in the training of Togolese and for exchanges of scientific delegations, exhibitions, films, and radio and television programs. Earlier, in February, the Nigerien leader had visited Moscow to attend Yuri Andropov's funeral and had met privately with Soviet representatives and, in March and November respectively, Soviet representatives had presented agricultural equipments and relief supplies for flood victims to Mauritania.¹⁰⁴

But Moscow's relations with West African states have remained largely at a formal and diplomatic level. Indeed, in terms of economic relations, partly because the currency of the USSR is non-convertible, the Soviet Union has been unable to penetrate Africa commercially. In 1966, the most significant of the Soviet Union's trading partners in West Africa were members of the Casablanca group, especially

Ghana and Guinea. Although it has been suggested that only Ghana had a significant export trade with the Soviet Union,¹⁰⁵ an agreement with Guinea in 1969 (that was scheduled to last 30 years), resulted in the shipment of two million tons of bauxite to the Soviet Union each year.¹⁰⁶ Further agreements were signed in 1977-1978 to assist in developing Guinean bauxite in exchange for long-term purchases.¹⁰⁷

Although Soviet exports to Nigeria have more than trebled between 1974-1979,¹⁰⁸ by and large, West African countries appear to prefer maintaining Western economic links to whatever extent possible, presumably due to the higher quality of these goods and the availability of Western capital for supporting their economies.¹⁰⁹ As a challenging superpower, the Soviet Union has suffered highly because of its inability to compete with Western powers in terms of offering favorable conditions for trade and aid programs. However, the economic field in West Africa that has shown tremendous Soviet activity is fishing. Largely generated by the growing need for protein in the Soviet Union, coupled with the comparative cost advantage of Soviet fishing fleet in the world market, fishing along the West African coast is an economic boom and the USSR has signed fishing pacts with a number of African littoral states.¹¹⁰

In Soviet agenda, economic assistance and trade are closely related phenomena since assistance normally takes the form of credits for the purchase of machinery and equipment repaid by shipments of the recipients' exports.¹¹¹ Soviet economic aid and trade do constitute a significant, even though secondary, element of the overall relationship of the Soviet Union and the countries of West Africa. Since in the

1960s, Soviet aid was mostly concentrated on those states that professed to follow a noncapitalist path of development; Ghana, Guinea, and Mali featured prominently in Soviet assistance list.¹¹² In the 1980s, the "revolutionary democracies" (Guinea, Benin, Cape Verde, and Guinea-Bissau) have received a far larger share of Soviet resources together with populist military elements in Ghana and Burkina Faso. Soviet technicians assisted in the operation of new plants and in the training of Africans both in the recipient countries and in the Soviet Union. It should be mentioned, however, that the Soviets are often consistently criticized for the poor quality of their goods, the tardy deliveries made under trade agreements, and the general delays in implementing aid promises. In fact, one general experience of African leaders who took up the Soviet option is the frustration often felt over Moscow's apparent failure to produce adequate economic, technical, and military assistance.¹¹³ In addition, African frustrations have been accentuated by troubled personal relations between Soviet advisers and resentment felt against apparent insensitive and domineering attitudes of Soviet diplomats.¹¹⁴

Soviet efforts to acquire naval and air bases in Ghana and Guinea in the 1960s failed because Nkrumah and Sékou Touré were leading advocates of the policy of nonalignment and no military bases in Africa.¹¹⁵ Also, there was the prevailing African view of such installations as "colonial" and "imperialist" in nature. However, Soviet military interest in the area has not waned. Largely because of its North Atlantic coastline, West Africa figures in the calculations of military strategy. Moscow has secured naval and aerial staging facilities in Guinea-Bissau and the Soviet

Union has increased its visitation privileges in West Africa. Not only does the USSR deem it important to protect its large fleet of fishing vessels in this area,¹¹⁶ there has traditionally been the need to counter the presence of NATO warships in the North Atlantic, and long range Soviet surveillance aircrafts taking off from points along the West African coast are able to reach the Caribbean to monitor U.S. naval activities in the area.¹¹⁷

Soviet military involvement in West Africa was also evident during the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) when the USSR supplied Nigeria with weapons that helped ensure the defeat of the secessionists. In fact, the Soviet airforce provided Nigeria with almost all the military aircraft thus establishing a long-standing relationship with the Nigerian airforce. Soviet military support and assistance has continued since the war. The USSR has sold Mig 17s and later Ilyusin 128 and, in October 1975, the first batch of Soviet Mig 21 fighters were delivered with Soviet advisers for training.¹¹⁸ In addition to the possession of Mig 21 fighters, in 1979, Nigeria purchased T-55 combat tanks.¹¹⁹ In fact, between 1974 and 1978, the Soviet Union provided 40 percent (or \$80 million) of the total arms transfer to Nigeria.¹²⁰ Of the \$10.15 billion worth of arms delivered to African states in 1975-1979, \$540 million went to "revolutionary democracies" including Benin, Cape Verde, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau in West Africa.¹²¹ The USSR has concluded various sorts of agreements with African states that would involve the presence of Soviet personnel on the continent. It has sought African acquiescence to strictly military matters such as visits by Soviet warships at local ports or access to facilities

of military relevance.¹²²

Chinese Influence in West Africa

China's policy aspirations in Africa in the 1960s ran parallel and often rivalled those of the Soviet Union and the United States. Since China had built a reputation as a revolutionary anti-colonial power, early relations were centered upon the three militantly nationalist states in West Africa - Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. The close relations between China and these West African states grew from the closeness of their ideological viewpoints. Apart from seeking solidarity based upon a common adherence to anti-colonialism, China also made strong and steadfast efforts at increasing the anti-Western stance of these radically nationalist African states by encouraging them to assume similar positions on crucial international issues of disarmament, anti-colonialism, the Congo, and economic independence. In terms of political relations with China, the first contacts between the Peoples Republic and West Africa was at the Asian-African Conference of Heads of States and Governments in Bandung, Indonesia, on April 18-27, 1955, where the Gold Coast and Liberia were among six African states that were represented (others included Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, and Sudan).¹²³ China was also present and supportive at the CIASs and the AAPCs.

China's early attempts to attain her objectives in Africa involved efforts at obtaining diplomatic recognition and extending trade and cultural exchanges with Africa. Of the 17 African states that gained independence in 1960, only Mali and

Somali Republic recognized Peking. Senegal and Nigeria did not recognize China in 1960. Although Ghana later granted recognition to China, Nkrumah refused to recognize China after Ghana's independence on March 6, 1957, a decision that was not reversed until July 5, 1960, as a result of internal pressures from young Ghanaian radicals and the need to outshine Guinea on the left (within the context of a developing competitive radicalism). Guinea had earlier established relations on October 4, 1959 and a Chinese embassy, headed by Ambassador Ko Hua, opened in Conakry in December of that year. When Guinea attained independence by voting against a French referendum in 1958, it was promptly recognized by China; Guinea, in response, recognized China. But a number of conservative West African states recognized Taiwan, namely, Gambia, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Senegal, Togo, and Upper Volta.¹²⁴ Indeed, for the majority of Francophone states, the issue of the Algerian war of independence (and Peking's anti-France commitment and support for the FLN), the Congo crisis and French attitudes on these two questions played a decisive role in non-recognition. Although Francophone states generally abstained in the talks of October 1961 on the issue of Taiwan, in the UN debates of 1962, following the French lead, they voted against China (with the exception of Niger and Togo abstaining).¹²⁵ It was not until after the 1970 vote that Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone extended diplomatic recognition to China.

Political and economic links between the Casablanca states and China took the form of trips undertaken by the various African leaders to Peking which, more often than not, led to the signing of bilateral treaties and agreements. For instance, in

Sékou Touré's visit to China in September 1960, which was the first visit ever made by an African head of state, a treaty of friendship was signed. In addition, there was an agreement on economic and technical cooperation which was to make a non-interest-bearing loan of 100 million roubles (\$26 million) available to Guinea.¹²⁶

Like Sékou Touré before him, Nkrumah also visited China in August 1961 in an extensive tour of socialist countries, and was much impressed by his reception. The Ghanaian leader signed the symbolic treaty of friendship with China as well as other numerous economic and cultural agreements.¹²⁷ Finally, after the break-up of the Mali Federation into Senegal and the Mali Republic in October 1960, Modibo Keita, then President of Mali, decided to grant official recognition to China and diplomatic relations were established on October 27 of the same year after successful talks between the two governments in Bamako. Since Mali officially joined the caucus of militantly nationalist African states, her political ideas naturally grew closer to China's; delegations were sent there thus preparing grounds for the extension of Chinese economic aid.¹²⁸ Modibo Keita was later to visit Peking in 1964 and signed a friendship treaty with China.¹²⁹ In response, there were also early visits by important Chinese dignitaries to African states the most important of which was the visit by the late Premier Chou En-Lai from December 1963 to February 1964 to ten African countries. He received positive response from Ghana, Guinea, and militantly progressive Guinea. "Chou and the leaders of the three Western African States he visited agreed that the greatest danger facing mankind emanated from imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism."¹³⁰ More recently, from December 1982 to

January 1983, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang visited eleven African countries, emphasizing China's support for Africa's liberation struggles and efforts at economic development.¹³¹

It would be incorrect to attribute the radical, nationalist and "left wing" orientations of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali in the 1960s to Chinese influence per se. Such an attribution over-estimates Chinese capabilities in the West African subregion and misrepresents the positions of African leaders themselves. Although Sékou Touré's Partie Démocratique de Guinée was very much run along Leninist lines, he always rejected "atheism, historical materialism and class struggle as did nearly all African leaders."¹³² What bound China to the African leaders, therefore, was less a shared interest in anti-feudalist or class-conscious positions than it was a commonly shared perspective of anti-colonialist sentiments. The more tension increased in Africa as a result of the actions of Western powers, the closer the views of African nationalists drew closer to China's. This was particularly so after the murder of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo crisis. In like manner, political relations between Guinea and China benefitted from the debacle over Solod, the Soviet Ambassador to Guinea, who, at the end of 1961, was allegedly involved in encouraging subversive activities against the Guinean regime, and was subsequently expelled by Sékou Touré for political interference.¹³³ "On Guinea's next anniversary of independence, the Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi supported her in her efforts to crush all 'subversive activities.'¹³⁴

In terms of economic and trade relations, the non-complementary nature of

Chinese and African economies has not discouraged China from attempting to improve trade relations with West African countries. Although some early trade relations with China could better be described as aid since some African states like Mali had relatively little to export to China in return,¹³⁵ a rigorous review of early Chinese economic relations in the subregion will necessarily center on economic and technical assistance to radical states governed by "bourgeois nationalists." Despite the shortage of grain at home, Ko Hua, the Chinese Ambassador to Guinea, presented, twice in 1960, thousands of tons of rice to Sékou Touré as a gift from the China.¹³⁶ Agricultural and technical experts from China were working in Guinea on rice cultivation and the construction of cigarette and match factories, which were expected to make Guinea self-sufficient in 1964. In that year, the Chinese had begun the construction of a hydro-electric station in Guinea¹³⁷ and in Mali, Chinese agronomists were working on rice cultivation and sugar-cane plantations. Whereas most external actors limited their activity to supplying the equipment with which Mali was supposed to embark on economic development, China went further to build factories which they only handed over after completion.¹³⁸ Much to the embarrassment of the Soviets, Chinese experts working in Guinea¹³⁹ and Ghana¹⁴⁰ had maintenance allowances and standards of living not exceeding that of personnel of the same rank in the host countries. Indeed, if the Chinese were far behind the Soviets in aid pledged to West African countries, they at least impressed African leaders with the generous terms of their aid and the unpretentiousness of their personnel. This is not to say, of course, that Chinese aid was devoid of "interests"

considerations. China stood to gain in terms of political influence by offering economic assistance to African states since recipients were expected to give greater consideration to Chinese views on international issues.

On military matters, although Peking has no immediate strategic interest in Africa, the continent is regarded as a major forum in the global struggle against Western "imperialism" and Soviet "hegemony," where China can enhance its revolutionary credentials by supporting liberation movements and "peoples' wars." But China's revolutionary aims in Africa, like that of the Soviet Union, has been revolutionary and pragmatic, and seeks to reconcile state interest with revolutionary tendencies. In October 1964, Chinese experts in guerrilla warfare arrived at a secret camp in Ghana and remained there until the coup of 1966. The instructors trained African nationalists from the Portuguese territories as well as from such independent states as Cameroon, Congo-Kinshasha, Ivory Coast, and Niger. Early Chinese involvement in West Africa also took the form of interference in the Nigerian Civil War when, in September 1968, they called on the rebels to persevere in the struggle and wage a people's war until victory was achieved. China saw the war in the context of the triangular relations with the superpowers especially within the context of the Sino-Soviet split. The Chinese took issue not so much with the Nigerian government as they did with the military support the Nigerians were receiving from the Soviets.

In conclusion, although critics may be concerned that they may attempt to advance their brand of communism in West Africa, on the whole, in recent times, the

Chinese appear to have shown little interest in direct proselytism. One of the primary virtues of Chinese policies in the subregion is on the economic front where their credits in every instance are longer-term, interest-free, and with a more generous period of grace. Since Africa, like China in the 1920s, is largely underdeveloped, there is considerable scope for cooperation and development especially as both actors attach great importance to agriculture. The Chinese readiness to teach by doing, not just demonstrating, is an asset in cordial economic relations in West Africa. As one report puts it, Chinese agricultural experts "are out in the fields day after day displaying in the most practical manner the agricultural techniques, for example, which they have to offer West Africa. There is no pretence of a Chinese magical method, what they do offer is a better way of doing things which is vindicated at harvest time."¹⁴¹

References and footnotes

1. In this regard, Cantori and Spiegel suggest that the major external powers play a politically significant role in defining the international relations of subordinate systems by constituting "the intrusive system." See Louis J. Cantori and Steven Spiegel, The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 6, 25.
2. Notably, foreign intrusion has polarized the region into two principal colonial cultures, the French and the British.
3. The first Europeans in West Africa were the Portuguese who began their activities in the second decade of the 15th century. However, Portugal is excluded in this study because its role is relatively inconsequential to the general pattern outlined above.
4. Sam C. Sarkesian, "African Community Building," Gavin Boyd, ed., Regionalism and Global Security (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1984), p. 55.
5. C. M. B. Utete, "Africa and the former Colonial Powers," Olatunde J. C. B. Ojo, D. K. Orwa and C. M. B. Utete, eds., African International Relations (London: Longman Group, 1985), pp. 109-110.
6. This term is customarily applied in the study of relations between France and French tropical Africa. Although the label is recognized as "cooperation" by some scholars and denounced as "neocolonialism" by others, it is possible to delineate both cooperative and neocolonial phases in Franco-African relations. See 'Ladipo Adamolekun, "France and the Francophone African States: Co-operation or Neo-colonialism," Nigerian Journal of International Studies, vol. 1, no. 2 (December 1975), pp. 3-15.
7. Olajide Aluko, "The Determinants of the Foreign Policies of African States," Olajide Aluko, ed., The Foreign Policies of African States (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), p. 9.
8. Chester A. Crocker, "France's Changing Military Interests," Africa Report, June 1968, p. 24.
9. There were at least three charges that France had plotted to overthrow the Guinean regime of Sékou Touré. In April 1960, Touré announced the discovery of "a monstrous plot" and denounced the "blind obstinacy of French colonialism." Six Frenchmen were expelled and one sentenced to 25 years in prison. In March 1969, Radio Conakry accused France of being the origin of another plot and in January 1971, Guinea accused Paris (and Bonn) of being involved in the invasion attempt of November 1970.

10. Daniel C. Bach, "France's Involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Necessary Condition to Middle Power Status in the International System," in Amadu Sesay, ed., Africa and Europe: From Partition To Interdependence Or Dependence? (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 76-77. Hoepi argues that the series of meetings between French-speaking countries following the Nigerian Civil War "were efforts to reassert Francophone unity in the face of a reunited Nigeria." See Nancy L. Hoepi, West Africa Today, vol. 42, no. 6 (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1971), p. 157.
11. See West Africa, June 5, 1978, p. 1090. For various African reactions, see West Africa, July 3, 1978, pp. 1312, 1318; July 27, 1978, p. 1411.
12. African Report, March-April 1987, p. 52.
13. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Pax Africana and Its Problems," Richard Bissell and Michael Radu, eds., Africa in the Post-Decolonization Era (News Brunswick, U.S.A.: Transaction Books, 1984), p. 176.
14. After the intense hostility that marked Franco-Guinean relations during the early years of Guinea's independence, diplomatic relations were established in 1963, only to be broken off in November 1965, when the Guinean government expelled the French Ambassador (with a 48-hour notice) for alleged involvement in the "Traders" Plot. Diplomatic relations resumed 10 years later in July 1975.
15. At this meeting, it was made plain that rapprochement was in no way to be mistaken for a restoration of the status quo ante. Guinea's attitude was that there was to be no interference in its internal affairs and President Giscard d'Estaing accepted that attitude. See "Giscard in Guinea," West Africa, January 1, 1979, pp. 6-7.
16. See "France's Rediscovery of West Africa," West Africa, December 25, 1978, p. 2575.
17. *ibid.*
18. See West Africa, November 24, 1986, pp. 2289, 2470; December 1, 1986, p. 2524.
19. Jinmi Adisa and Adigun Agbaje, "Africa's Strategic Relationship with Western Europe: The Dispensability Thesis," Amadu Sesay, ed., *op. cit.* (1986), p. 140.
20. R. H. Green and Ann Seidman, Unity or Poverty (London: Penguin, 1968), pp. 136-137.
21. C. M. B. Utete, "Africa and the former Colonial Powers" Ojo et al., *op. cit.* (1985), p. 110.
22. Guinea quit the franc zone in March 1960 and France halted all financial transactions with her.

23. See article by Adisa and Agbaje in Amadu Sesay, ed., op. cit. (1986), p. 140.
24. Guy Arnold, Aid in Africa (London: Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 39.
25. Daniel Bach in Amadu Sesay, ed., op. cit. (1986), p. 83.
26. El-Issawy puts it thus: "evidence suggests that, in general, benevolence has not been a major motive in the aid process and that foreign aid has not been politically neutral. Rather, aid has frequently been used by donors as a means of exerting political leverage over recipients, for creating or strengthening economic, political, and military relations beneficial to the donors." (emphases in original). Ibrahim H. El-Issawy, "The Aid Relationship and Self-Reliant Development in Africa," Adebayo Adedeji and Timothy M. Shaw, eds., Economic Crisis in Africa: African Perspectives on Development, Problems and Potentials (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1985), p. 136; D. K. Orwa, "African States and the Superpowers," Ojo et al., op. cit. (1985), p. 101.
27. Daniel C. Bach in Amadu Sesay, ed., op. cit. (1986), p. 78.
28. James Mayall in Olajide Aluko, op. cit. (1987), p. 103.
29. See article entitled "France's Role in Africa," in West Africa, February 19, 1979, p. 279.
30. See West Africa, March 24, 1975, p. 353; May 5, 1975, p. 513.
31. See West Africa, May 12, 1975, p. 552.
32. For one of such agreements, see West Africa, May 21, 1979, p. 907.
33. Daniel C. Bach in Amadu Sesay, ed., op. cit. (1986), p. 78.
34. *ibid.*, p. 79.
35. Nancy L. Hoepi, op. cit. (1971).
36. See Chester Crocker, "Evolution of France's Military Role in Africa," in Yashpal Tandon, ed., Readings in African International Relations, vol. 1 (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1972).
37. The military base in Senegal is the oldest French base in Africa. However, President Senghor has argued defensively that since March 29, 1974, there are no more bases but only "facilities" granted to France. See West Africa, January 9, 1978, p. 81.
38. Since the country has remained closest to France, Ivory Coast is the best place to analyze the role of French forces in Africa. The French base is home to the 43rd battalion of marine infantry (43 BIMA) which officially comprises 600 men. In reality,

estimates are between 800 and 1,000 men armed with light armored vehicles. See lead story entitled "Shades of Empire: French Military Stranglehold Investigated," West Africa, August 28, 1989, p. 1408.

39. See West Africa, October 6, 1975, p. 1196.

40. See West Africa, May 20, 1985, p. 1023.

41. See West Africa, December 6, 1982, p. 3181.

42. At any given time, up to half of the French forces in the Ivory Coast are on maneuvers up-country in one of the restricted zones. In addition, approximately 100 French officers and NCOs (non-commissioned officers) are seconded to the Ivorian forces. But for several reported instances of joint military exercises, see West Africa, March 24, 1975, p. 350; November 19, 1984, p. 2361; November 24, 1986, p. 2475.

43. D. K. Orwa, "African States and the Superpowers" in Olatunde Ojo et al., op. cit. (1985), p. 104; Daniel C. Bach in Amadu Sesay, ed., op. cit. (1986), p. 83, and in Olajide Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1987), p. 8.

44. Adisa and Agbaje in Amadu Sesay, ed., op. cit. (1986), p. 142.

45. See "Shades of Empire," op. cit. (1989), p. 1408.

46. Although this defense agreement lasted between 1960-1962, largely because of internal criticism, it was repudiated by Nigeria on January 22, 1962. See James Mayall, "Britain, Africa and International Order," in Olajide Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1987), p. 107. See also, James Mayall, "Britain and Anglophone Africa," Amadu Sesay, op. cit. (1986), p. 60. See also, Ray Ofoegbu, "Foreign Policy and Military Rule," in Oyeleye Oyediran, ed., Nigerian Government and Politics Under Military Rule, 1966-1979 (London: Macmillan Press, 1981), pp. 125-126.

47. James Mayall in Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1987), p. 102.

48. *ibid.*, p. 107-108. See also, Mayall Africa, the Cold War and After (London: Elek, 1971).

49. James Mayall in Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1987), p. 108.

50. For instance, since its creation in 1966, Britain has remained the largest contributor to the Secretariat.

51. In fact, a West African was recently appointed the chairman of the body.

52. Ironically, Nigeria's British Petroleum (BP) take-over provoked a hostile response in the Ivory Coast as was shown by a report in Fraternite Matin (the government-

controlled daily). See "Ivory Coast: Hostile Response to Nigeria BP Action," West Africa, August 13, 1979, p. 1484.

53. The specific official charges were that North Sea oil had been sent by British companies to South Africa, and that British companies were exporting oil to the apartheid regime. See "British Government 'Deeply Shocked,'" West Africa, August 13, 1979, p. 1478; "Nigeria Flexes Her Muscles," West Africa, August 6, 1979, p. 1399.

54. For example, Japan was eager to buy the BP shares although Nigeria said it was reserved for the Third World.

55. Reported in The Guardian (London), September 23, 1978.

56. James Mayall in Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1987), p. 112.

57. A large proportion of British foreign aid - an estimated 65.8 percent in 1977 - are tied to the procurement of British goods and services. See James Mayall, in Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1987), p. 110.

58. ibid., pp. 109-110.

59. For instance, former U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, stated at the start of the Nigerian Civil War that since Nigeria was "the primary responsibility of Great Britain," the U.S. would sell arms to neither side. Quoted in West Africa, July 22, 1967, p. 970. See also, article by Jean Herskovits in Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1987), p. 20. Even after the war, relationship "worsened by the refusal of the U.S. [the Nixon Administration] to see General Gowon who was in New York to address the United Nations as the OAU Chairman." See Jean Herskovits, "Democracy in Nigeria," Foreign Affairs, vol. 58, no. 2 (1979), p. 332.

60. Helen Kitchen in Rotberg, ed., 1988, p. 14. Following the end of the Second World War, the U.S. entered into a military agreement with Liberia by which the U.S. promised to defend Liberia in the event of external attack. See article by D. K. Orwa in Olatunde Ojo, et al., eds., op. cit. (1985), pp. 96-97.

61. There were also consulates in Johannesburg, Durban, and Port Elizabeth (in South Africa), plus Dakar, Lagos, Nairobi, and in Portuguese Mozambique. See Sanford J. Ungar, Africa: The People and Politics of an Emergent Continent (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986).

62. The dilemma then was how the U.S. could fashion out a policy that could meet America's security concerns and yet address nationalist aspirations.

63. See Immanuel Wallerstein, "Africa, the United States, and the World Economy: The Historical Bases of American Foreign Policy," Frederick S. Arkhurst, ed., U.S. Policy Toward Africa (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), pp. 16-17.

64. African soldiers fought alongside British and French forces, and had believed strongly that they fought for allied freedom in exchange for being granted their own.

65. President Eisenhower rarely bothered to court African leaders; in addition, he generally appeared uninterested in their problems and uninformed about their nations.

66. Thus, it was not until 1958 that the State Department created a bureau of African affairs. Similarly, the Senate created an Africa subcommittee of its Foreign Relations Committee in 1958 with then Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts as its first chairman. For a brief description of early composition of the African Bureau, see Thomas J. Woer, Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948-1968 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1985), p. 49.

67. Quoted in Sanford Ungar, op. cit. (1986), p. 59.

68. Early relations were characterized by bitterness and suspicion. From 1960 until the 1966 coup, there were sustained criticisms of the U.S. role in the Congo. Furthermore, in February 1964, there was an anti-American demonstration in Accra and Ghanaians stormed the American Embassy following the allegation that the U.S. had been involved in the assassination attempt on Nkrumah's life on January 1, 1964, and that the Embassy officials had earlier sought to investigate the exact relations between Nkrumah and Ghanaian army. As is to be expected, the U.S. recalled its ambassador and Ghanaian-American relations remained in the doldrums.

69. Edward W. Chester, Clash of Titans: Africa and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Orbis Books, 1974), p. 225.

70. W. A. E. Skurnik, "Ghana and Guinea, 1966 - A Case Study in Inter-African Relations," The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 5, no. 3 (1967), p. 376.

71. See ibid., pp. 369-384 for details of this incident.

72. The Ford administration had sent circular letters to African heads of state, urging all of them to insist in the forthcoming OAU extraordinary meetings on Angola on the complete withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban military advisers as a quid pro quo for the withdrawal of racist South African occupation forces. The Nigerian communique which accompanied the release of the letter considered it to be "an attempt to insult the intelligence of African nations." For text of the letter and communique, see Yusufu Bala Usman, For the Liberation of Nigeria (London: New Beacon Press, 1979), pp. 287-291.

73. See West Africa, April 19, 1976, p. 552. See also articles by Daniel Bach in Timothy M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko, eds., Nigerian Foreign Policy: Alternative Perceptions and Projections (London: Macmillan Press, 1983), p. 40; Jean Herskovits in Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1987), p. 27; A. Bolaji Akinyemi, "Nigerian-American Relations

Re-examined," Oyeleye Oyediran, ed., Survey of Nigerian Affairs 1976-1977 (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1981), p. 106.

74. Jean Herskovits, in Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1987), p. 27. For another analysis of U.S.-Nigerian relations, see Daniel C. Bach, "Nigerian-American Relations: Converging Interests and Power Relations," Timothy Shaw and Olajide Aluko, eds., op. cit. (1983), pp. 35-55.

75. For example, in 1977, U.S. Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, said: "We proceed from a basic proposition: that our policies must recognize the unique identity of Africa. We can neither be right nor effective if we treat Africa simply as one part of the Third World or as a testing ground for East-West competition." See West Africa, August 1, 1977, p. 1573. See also, "Africa in a Global Perspective," Africa Report, January-February 1978, pp. 44-48.

76. Robert W. Tucker, "Reagan's Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, vol. 68, no. 1 (1989), p. 20.

77. In 1980, for example, Nigeria was America's largest balance of trade creditor - a close second to Japan. See Sanford Ungar, op. cit. (1986), p. 122; and Henry F. Jackson, From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960 (Newark: William Morrow and Company, 1982), pp. 170-171.

78. Jean Herskovits, "Nigeria: Africa's New Power," Foreign Affairs, vol. 53, no. 2 (January 1975), p. 314.

79. Edward W. Chester, op. cit. (1974), p. 225. Stewart Smith, U.S. Neocolonialism in Africa (New York: International Publishers, 1974), p. 68.

80. See West Africa, April 2, 1984, p. 730.

81. See West Africa, January 19, 1987, pp. 126, 131; February 2, 1987, p. 235; Africa Research Bulletin, February 15, 1987, p. 8380.

82. D. K. Orwa, "African States and the Superpowers," Olatunde Ojo et al., op. cit. (1985), pp. 96-97. See also, Edward W. Chester, op. cit. (1974), pp. 224-225.

83. D. K. Orwa, "African States and the Superpowers," Olatunde Ojo et al., op. cit. (1985), pp. 96-97. See also, African Research Bulletin, February 1983. Despite these events, in 1987, the Liberian President asked the U.S. to pay for facilities enjoyed in Liberia. See West Africa, February 2, 1987, p. 235.

84. Quoted in Jean Herskovits, Aluko, op. cit. (1987), p. 21.

85. Germany's colonial role in West Africa is highlighted by the fact that the 1884 treaty made Togo its protectorate by establishing what was then known as German Togoland. The territory was later lost to France after the First World War. West Germany sent a delegation to Togo, in 1984, to participate in the celebration marking the 1884 treaty. See West Africa, July 23, 1984, p. 1507.
86. 'Ladipo Adamolekun, "The Foreign Policy of Guinea," in Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1977), p. 103.
87. See West Africa, March 15, 1982, p. 748.
88. Rainer Tetzlaff, "West Germany and Africa: What Africa can Expect from the Conservative Government in Bonn," Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1987), p. 123.
89. *ibid.*, p. 134; see also, Olatunde Ojo, in *ibid.*, p. 69.
90. Roger Kanet and Ipatov, "Soviet Aid and Trade in Africa," in Weinstein and Henriksen, eds., op. cit. (1980), p. 18. See also Robert Legvold, Soviet Policy in West Africa (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970) for a study of Soviet foreign policy in six West African states, namely, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal.
91. Christopher Stevens, The Soviet Union and Black Africa (London: Macmillan Press, 1976), p. 28.
92. This was initially less true for Ghana than for Guinea. Until late 1960, Ghana remained close to Western powers maintaining what Nkrumah called "special relationships" while maintaining "normal relationships" with the Eastern bloc. While Ghana had by independence in 1957 established diplomatic missions in Washington, London, Paris, and Bonn, no such mission was opened in any East European capital until March 1960. The Soviets were not permitted to establish an embassy in Accra until mid-1959 and whereas no limitation was placed on the embassy staff of any of the Western powers in Accra, the number of Soviet Embassy staff was limited to 18.
93. Soviet support included an immediate loan of 12 million pounds and 1,500 technical advisers.
94. There were still some permanent features in the nature of the relationships such as the mutually shared ideological and political views on major international issues especially colonialism and neo-colonialism. In fact, all African governments, regardless of political complexion, share a commitment to ending colonialism and racial domination on the continent; this is an aspiration with which the Soviets identify themselves without ambiguity.

95. After Nkrumah's overthrow, the new National Liberation Council (NLC) government in Ghana expelled all Soviet technical experts and cut down the Soviet Embassy staff (numbering approximately 100) to the 18 originally allowed it in 1959.
96. D. K. Orwa, "African States and the Superpowers," Olatunde Ojo et al., op. cit. (1985), p. 98.
97. Olatunde J. B. Ojo, "The Soviet Union and Nigeria," Olajide Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1987), p. 47.
98. Colin Legum, "The Soviet Union's Encounter with Africa," R. Craig Nation and Mark V. Kauppi, eds., The Soviet Impact in Africa (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1984), p. 9.
99. David E. Albright, Soviet Policy Toward Africa Revisited (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1987), p. 4. See also Colin Legum, "African Outlooks toward the USSR," David E. Albright, ed., Communism in Africa (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1980), pp. 7-8.
100. Colin Legum, "The Soviet Union's Encounter with Africa," R. Craig Nation and Mark V. Kauppi, eds., op. cit. (1984), pp. 12-13.
101. ibid., p. 13.
102. David E. Albright, op. cit. (1987), pp. 11-12.
103. ibid., p. 31.
104. ibid., p. 34.
105. Weldamar Nielsen, The Great Powers and Africa (London: Pall Mall Press, 1969), pp. 210-214.
106. See Roger E. Kanet and Boris Ipatov, "Soviet Aid and Trade in Africa," Weinstein and Henriksen, eds., op. cit. (1980), pp. 17-18.
107. R. Craig Nation, "Soviet Engagement in Africa: Motives, Means, and Prospects," in Nation and Kauppi, eds., op. cit. (1984), p. 40.
108. See "Increasing Ties With Moscow," West Africa July 2, 1979, p. 1183.
109. Richard E. Bissell, "Soviet Interests in Africa," Weinstein and Henriksen, eds., op. cit. (1980), p. 8.
110. For example, for reports on fishing agreements with Mauritania, Gambia, and Sierra Leone, see West Africa, January 27, 1975, p. 114; October 5, 1975, p. 1196;

May 31, 1976, p. 789.

111. Christopher Stevens, op. cit. (1976), p. 29.

112. Roger Kanet and Ipatov in Weinstein and Henriksen, eds., op. cit. (1980), p. 18.

113. Robert Legvold, op. cit. (1970), pp. 123-124. Colin Legum, "The Soviet Union's Encounter with Africa," Nation and Kauppi, eds., op. cit. (1984), p. 14.

114. This problem is reflected by African leaders who have broken ties with the USSR (e.g., Sékou Touré of Guinea). The problem also served in Ghana as the reason for replacing two Soviet guerrilla instructors in June 1962. The Ghanaians had complained about the patronizing behavior and overbearing manner of the Russians and were glad to see them leave. More recently, in August 1979, Nigeria ordered a reduction in Soviet military advisers (on a Mig deal) from 40 to 5 (the West Africa source reports from 38 to 5) due to their "inefficient performance" and "condescending attitudes." See Africa Report, November-December 1979; and West Africa, September 3, 1979, p. 1620. See also, Colin Legum, "The Soviet Union's Encounter with Africa," in Nation and Kauppi, eds., op. cit. (1984), p. 14.

115. But the first arms deal between the Soviets and a sub-Saharan state was in 1958 when Moscow pledged a number of weapons to Guinea and started training programs for the Guinean armed forces. See Joachim Krause, "Soviet Arms Transfers to Sub-Saharan Africa," in Nation and Kauppi, eds., op. cit. (1984), p. 126.

116. Christopher Coker, "The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Patterns of Competition and Collaboration in Southern Africa," Nation and Kauppi, eds., op. cit. (1984), pp. 72-73.

117. The Soviets have staged long-range maritime reconnaissance flights from airfields mostly in West Africa, which afforded them surveillance coverage of U.S. naval forces over large expanses of the Atlantic. See D. K. Orwa, "African States and the Superpowers," Olatunde Ojo et al., op. cit. (1985), p. 103; Richard B. Remnek, "The Significance of Soviet Strategic Military Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa," Nation and Kauppi, eds., op. cit. (1984), pp. 149-150.

118. D. K. Orwa, "African States and the Superpowers," Olatunde Ojo et al., op. cit. (1985), p. 98.

119. Allegedly, the order was for 100 tanks although only 64 were actually delivered. See West Africa, October 22, 1979, p. 1963.

120. Olatunde Ojo in Olajide Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1987), p. 52.

121. David Albright, op. cit. (1987), p. 13.

122. For visits to West African ports, see West Africa, November 10, 1975, p. 26; August 17, 1987, p. 1608.
123. Bruce D. Larkin, China and Africa 1949-1970: The Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 16-21. See also, Alaba Ogunsanwo, China's Policy in Africa 1958-71 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 8-9.
124. Bruce Larkin, op. cit. (1971).
125. Alaba Ogunsanwo, op. cit. (1974), pp. 75-76.
126. ibid., pp. 76-77. Article 1 of the agreement stated that "China is willing to grant the Government of the Republic of Guinea within the period from September 13th 1960 to June 30th 1963 a non-interest bearing loan without any conditions or privileges attached. The amount of the loan is 100 million Roubles." Quoted in Ogunsanwo, op. cit. (1974), p. 90.
127. ibid., p. 80. On this visit, a non-interest bearing credit of 7 million pounds was made out to Ghana for five years from July 1, 1962 to June 30, 1967, and repayable, as in the case of Guinea, either in export goods or in the currency of an agreed third country. Ogunsanwo, op. cit. (1974), p. 91.
128. ibid., p. 81. In the Sino-Mali economic and technical cooperation agreement of September 1961, "the aid promised Mali was equal to that promised Ghana and slightly lower than Guinea's - \$19.6m compared with Guinea's \$26m or 100 million roubles." Ogunsanwo, op. cit. (1974), pp. 92-93.
129. ibid., p. 118.
130. ibid., p. 124.
131. Huan Xiang, Chinese Modernization Strategy: China's Foreign Policy, Lecture Series, no. 39 (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1986); David Albright, op. cit. (1987).
132. Robert C. Wesson, Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1969), p. 264. 'Ladipo Adamolekun, "The Foreign Policy of Guinea," in Olajide Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1977), pp. 100-101.
133. Robert Wesson, op. cit. (1969), p. 264.
134. Alaba Ogunsanwo, op. cit. (1974), pp. 77-78. The Soviet desire to resume normal diplomatic relations with Guinea after the 1961 incident was due to an interest in preventing a rise in Chinese influence as leader of world communism in Guinea. See 'Ladipo Adamolekun in Aluko, ed., op. cit. (1977), pp. 100-101.

135. In West Africa, because of its strong economy, Ghana was the only country with which appreciable trade was being conducted. Ogunsanwo, op. cit. (1974), p. 152.

136. Hsinhua News Agency, May 6, 1960; December 28, 1960. In Ogunsanwo, op. cit. (1974), p. 90.

137. ibid., p. 158.

138. ibid., p. 159.

139. ibid., p. 90.

140. ibid., p. 91.

141. See "The Chinese Connection," West Africa, December 25, 1978, p. 2576.

CHAPTER SIX

METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH AND SOURCES OF DATA

Introduction

This chapter addresses the issue of measurement and the research design applied to the comparative study of foreign policy behavior in West Africa. Consequently, its aims are threefold: (1) to discuss the techniques and types of data used in the study for analyzing the dependent variable (that is, interstate interactions in the form of foreign policy output behavior); (2) to outline the operationalization of the independent variables (that is, such national attributes as size, economic strength, economic development, diplomatic capability, military capability, and geographic contiguity); and (3) to specify the sources of aggregate and events data applied in the study for both sets of variables, and to describe the scientific methods applied for generating data. In addition to devising operational measures for both the behavior of states and the determinants of that behavior, we will attempt to address such questions as source coverage, and the reliability and validity of the measures used for the construction of various conceptual categories. It is of course important for categories to be evaluated in terms of such standard criteria as reliability and validity in empirical foreign policy research.

Conceptually, the term "events data" refers to systematically recorded words

and deeds that international actors direct toward their international environment. The collection and analysis of regional events data focusing on West Africa has several objectives. First and foremost, such machine-readable action data will provide a more systematic and quantitative dimension to the foreign relations of African states by indicating what these states do, with whom, and over what issues. Attempts to capture African foreign policy behavior in a comparative and quantitative fashion are few. In addition, events data can be employed to support (or refute) common assumptions based on more conventional and traditional modes of analysis about inter-African relations. Finally, since the area of measurement in interstate relations is still relatively underdeveloped, the development of a West African events data set can contribute to the generation of both global and regional events data sources and consequently further the debate over the validity, reliability, and drawbacks of this method of inquiry.¹ It is thus one of our aims to reinforce the trend within the events data movement towards the use of local or regional data sources.² In fact, most existing research data banks either focus on great-power and cold-war issues or, by implication thereof, neglect north-south concerns. African states consequently suffer from having comparatively less accessible data sources. Since we are interested in a specific geographic area, we see in events data the opportunity for a systematic analysis of international interactions presented within the context of a specific regional subsystem.

Conceptual Definition: Scaling of Foreign Policy Events

This study construes the dependent variable - interstate interactions in the form

of foreign policy behavior - as the external actions of West African states in terms of their overt, observable behavior rather than as broad goal-seeking policies, since the former applies to a limited and clearly defined concept that is more empirically verifiable.³ We have therefore adopted a definition of foreign policy that emphasizes the discrete actions of the authoritative decision makers of states (statesmen and other public elites) intended to influence the behavior of international actors external to their own polity. Through the method of measuring publicly reported actions of authoritative officials (i.e., documented interstate communications and movements), it is possible to identify international signals and to estimate the levels and trends of foreign policy interactions in West Africa over a period of time. Generalizations about state behavior in this international environment may thus be attained by seeking information flows which, when clearly defined, link interstate interactions between the component units of any system.

A standard scale that could transform foreign policy events into numerical quantities along a conflict-consensus continuum was derived for this study from Edward Azar's Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB). This scale was chosen because it is relatively newer and more helpful than most of the other data sets. In other words, it was perceived to be the most suitable "thermometer" for foreign relations in the West African subregion. First, the COPDAB scale was considered to be more sensitive and less biased than previous scales for facilitating an understanding of the cooperative and conflictual content of international events. The scale is mutually exclusive in that no event falls into more than one category. In addition,

since events in COPDAB are not time-bound and cover many cases, the scale may be used reliably with any data base a researcher might possess. It is only economical that researchers apply existing coding rules to more specialized sources, thereby augmenting available resources to suit their own needs.

A foreign policy event represents an activity in the international system which an actor undertakes at a specific time. It is generally directed towards another actor over an issue of common interest (or noninterest). Thus, the discrete and purposeful foreign policy actions of states directed toward one another constitute "events data," and these activities may be verbal or physical actions, reactions, and interactions. An inter-nation event in COPDAB comprises five elements: an actor (a nation-state), a specific target state, a time period, an activity, and an issue-area of mutual concern about which the activity revolves.⁴ An event, thus, represents an observation of a communication process that minimally records who says (or does) what to whom and when.⁵

Although not central to our major research propositions, the Azar-Sloan interval scale for international events will be applied in this study to map out the aggregate cooperative and conflictual interactions between West African states and specific dyadic relationships in the subregion (consult, for example, the graphs in Chapter 7). In other words, the discussion of the COPDAB scale here represents a contribution to the conceptual definition of the general approach based on events data, and not to the specific dependent variable in this study. This scale comprises 15 points with point 1 being the value given to the most cooperative event between two

nations (e.g., nations A and B unite to form a nation-state), and scale value 15 representing the most conflictual event between two or more nations (e.g., total bilateral war). The interaction scale has also been subjected to a series of experiments in which scholars and practitioners of international politics were asked to represent in numerical terms, the amount of cooperation and conflict represented by each of the points on the scale in relation to the neutral mid-point. In this task, scale point 15 (hostile total war actions) was considered (by expert judges comprising psycho-physicists and social statisticians) to be 102 times as conflictual as level 8 (neutral behavior), and scale point 1 (voluntary unification of two independent nation-states) was judged 92 times more cooperative than scale value 8, and so on (see Table 6.1 and Appendix I).⁶ Through this technique, the structure, content, and flow of foreign policy communication in West Africa could be assessed, by assigning COPDAB scale values to each event and aggregating them.

Operational Definition: Measuring the Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in this research is measured in two broad ways. First and foremost, in terms of testing our major research propositions, the dependent variable is measured as the number of discrete foreign policy events initiated by a state towards other members of the West African regional subsystem (see Table 6.2). The main dependent variable is thus measured as interval level data and each country's score is calculated as the number of foreign policy events initiated to other

TABLE 6.1
Azar-Sloan Internation Scale

ITEM	SCALE POINT	WEIGHTED VALUE
Nation A engages in very hostile war against Nation B	15	102
Nation A engages in limited hostile acts against Nation B	14	65
Nation A engages in subversion against Nation B	13	50
Nation A breaks diplomatic relations with Nation B	12	44
Nation A uses diplomatic/economic resources to counter B	11	29
Nation A engages in verbal threats against Nation B	10	16
Nation A expresses mild disaffection toward B's policies	9	6
Nation A or B demonstrate indifference to each other's policies	8	1
Nation A and B communicate or meet regarding mutual interest	7	6
Nation A supports B's policies, recognizes B's regime, etc.	6	10
Nation A establishes friendship and cultural agreement with B	5	14
Nation A extends economic and commercial aid to Nation B	4	27
Nation A extended military and strategic aid to B	3	31
Nations A and B establish regional or bilateral alliances	2	47
Nations A and B unite voluntarily into one nation-state	1	92

West African states in a 15-year period (i.e., from 1975-1989).⁷ The emphasis here is specifically upon the behavioral profiles of West African states construed as initiators of foreign policy events towards other members of the subregion. Our overall reasoning is that there is a relationship between how often an actor attempts to influence processes in its immediate international environment and variations in its internal structures.

However, in an attempt to analyze cross-sectional relationships between the independent and dependent variables at different time periods, events initiated to West Africa were grouped for 1975-1979, 1980-1984, and 1985-1989. Although the various sources of the data will be discussed later in this chapter, the events initiated by West African states to other members of the subregion at these three different time periods were summed and their values treated as distinct dependent variables (see Table 6.2). In addition, since events may be broadly sub-divided into categories on the basis of various types of actions, foreign policy activities may be constructed accordingly through simple frequency counts of cooperative and conflictual behavior types initiated and received from both African and non-African actors.⁸

Second, in a sense not directly relevant to the testing of our major propositions, the content of interactions is measured as interval level data, and is cognizant of the weighted values of the identified foreign policy events in the COPDAB scale (see Table 6.1 for column on weighted values). In sum, therefore, calculating the aggregate frequencies of behavior, which entails a simple count of the

TABLE 6.2

Events Initiated towards other West African
States (1975-1989)

Years States	1975-1979	1980-1984	1985-1989	Total Events
BEN	36	27	30	93
BUR	17	46	53	116
CAP	10	19	7	36
GAM	54	32	27	113
GHA	111	83	92	286
GUI	67	22	24	113
GUB	19	20	13	52
IVO	61	32	20	113
LIB	43	49	32	124
MAL	27	25	27	79
MAU	15	15	20	50
NIG	32	22	20	74
NRA	115	73	82	270
SEN	76	42	45	163
SIE	24	17	32	73
TOG	36	31	38	105
Total Events	743	555	562	1,860

BEN = Benin; BUR = Burkina Faso; CAP = Cape Verde; GAM = Gambia; GHA = Ghana; GUI = Guinea; GUB = Guinea-Bissau; IVO = Ivory Coast; LIB = Liberia; MAL = Mali; MAU = Mauritania; NIG = Niger; NRA = Nigeria; SEN = Senegal; SIE = Sierra Leone; and TOG = Togo.

number of events directed by one nation to another, does not reveal the intensity of an action, that is, the extent to which interstate interactions or links represent varying degrees of conflictual or cooperative behavior.⁹ This second measure of the dependent variable thus assigns an event a point on the COPDAB scale on the basis of its intensity. Furthermore, in line with COPDAB procedures, and with data available on both the frequency and the intensity of international behavior, variables may be combined into a single Dimension of Interaction (DI) measure. Conflict and cooperation dimensions of interactions are calculated mathematically as follows: $DI_{conf/coop} = \Sigma (f) (i)$ (where f represents the number of events at a specific scale point and i is the weighted value of the intensity of that scale point). DIs may then be computed on a yearly or monthly basis by employing this method. As is demonstrated in descriptive and graphic form in the next chapter, the result of this measure is that cooperative and conflictual Dis can be calculated and mapped separately using the formula specified above.¹⁰

Nature and Sources of Primary Data

In order to test propositions rigorously in international relations, researchers have been led on an intensive search for relevant and adequate empirical data. The principal methodology employed in this study is content analysis¹¹ since it was thought that by this tool, the distance between concept and measure could be drastically reduced. Indeed, events data research has its methodological roots in content analysis, which may be defined as a technique for the systematic study of

written and verbal communications. To acquire such document-generated empirical data in a systematic fashion, we turn to publicly available sources such as periodicals and magazines dealing with international affairs. By using such sources as a base, we employ measures that identify, abstract, and code the reported actions of states along a range of variables. Since publicly available data may omit common events that do not appear particularly interesting, international events may be defined as those "newsworthy" activities which reputable publications tend to report.¹²

Our interest here is focused upon the non-routine (i.e., extranormal or unconventional) foreign policy activities of states. We are not therefore interested in such routine measures (i.e., transaction data) as trade, tourism, travel patterns, mail flows, diplomatic exchange, and so on, which are typically valid as measures of international integration. Whereas transactions represent the constant exchanges of goods, services, and interests between states, events data are comprised of out-of-the-ordinary activities which require relatively turbulent and unpredictable political indicators of international behavior. International behavior is thus viewed as the result of the great flow of events among states that are subject to both minor and major disturbances.¹³

Specifically, through content analysis, daily foreign policy events in the West African subregion were gathered and coded from such publicly available and reputable sources as West Africa (London) and Africa Research Bulletin (Exeter).¹⁴ These two sources of data were chosen for several reasons. First, they represent detailed news sources devoted exclusively to African affairs. Most scholars rely on them

(especially the latter) for information about the African interstate system. In addition, the sources (particularly the former) are very relevant for our investigation of the West African subregion. Based upon our knowledge of the area, it is assumed that these two sources contain a reasonable sample of the population of events that are needed for analysis in this study. Finally, both sources were seen as convenient especially in terms of document availability. Whereas West Africa is published weekly, the Africa Research Bulletin (ARB) appears monthly, but it has an index that appears annually.

Since our study is longitudinal, it focuses specifically on directed dyadic relations between West African states during the period January 1975 through December 1989, thus entailing a time dimension of 180 months.¹⁵ Both sources of data yielded a large and extensive collection of 4,365 directed events initiated by 22 (16 African and 6 non-African) states for the 15-year period.¹⁶ This time span is chosen specifically because it indicates the period marking the establishment of ECOWAS, in 1975, until present times. Furthermore, we argue that an extensive period of data collection increases the probability that additional periods will not significantly alter the basic features of the data. In terms of source validity, the more events one has, regardless of source, the closer one gets to the total number of events in the real world.

Events collection for several years were duplicated at various intervals during the study for data quality control and in order to check for such factors as researcher fatigue and collection error. Although intra-coder reliability was generally high, after

a thorough examination of the events, many duplicates and events of questionable nature were eventually eliminated. Covering the full range of interstate activity, the events were collected, screened, and coded by the researcher using Azar's COPDAB scale in a manner that would allow for their replicability. The necessity of replicability in foreign policy studies cannot be overemphasized. Indeed, if scholars are to develop a science of international relations which can be used with confidence, measures applied in foreign policy studies should be systematic, comparative, and replicable. In addition, if researchers cannot replicate the events data collection and analysis of a study with considerable accuracy, the results tendered based on the data are of dubious value.

Following standard convention, the account of an event was recorded in a format that indicated who (nation) did what (action) to whom (nation). The researcher also recorded when (the date) an event was reported in addition to the precise location and source of the report. No rigorous scores of reliability were established (in terms of intercoder agreement).¹⁷ It is of course important to understand the context within which an event occurs since no event occurs in a vacuum. Although the events in this study were consistently rated according to an objective scale, coding was undertaken with informed sensitivity to the type and quality of relations between the international actors. Without question, such considerations ultimately influence the manner by which a certain event or number of events are interpreted and assessed. In addition, since the events focused on non-routine dyadic (bilateral) relations, the data collected excluded multinational actions as

well as actions by and towards IGOs and NGOs.

It is common knowledge that the major prestige newspapers and documents do not adequately provide coverage for the developing areas, or, where they do, cover mostly conflictual events to the detriment of cooperative ones.¹⁸ This fact underscores the importance of utilizing regional sources of information for the generation of events data and as a means of addressing the problem of uneven news coverage. Since it appears more frequently and because it concentrates strongly on the West Africa area (i.e., more region-specific), most of the events extracted were from West Africa. But because the publication lacks comprehensive yearly indexes, the interested researcher must endeavor to review laboriously individual pages of 773 issues (i.e., issue nos. 3002 through 3775).¹⁹ A typical West Africa publication has an introductory editorial, a commentary entitled "Matchet's Diary," a handful of news stories which nominally cover West Africa, but range all over the continent (including ample dispatches from Francophone Africa), and cultural news which concentrates mostly on African culture. The final third of the magazine is devoted to various economic and news briefs for selected African states. One discerns great attention paid to how these states relate to one another directly. Because of its annual indexes, the ARB is relatively more inexpensive to use. Although its annual indexes were also consulted for the benefit of broader source coverage, it was discovered that many of the events recorded there either focused on other subregions in Africa (especially on Southern Africa), or merely duplicated events reported earlier in West Africa.

Both West Africa and ARB record events in Africa in detail, drawing with

great care upon national dailies, newspapers, and periodicals of African and non-African states, local correspondents, local and foreign radio and television broadcasts, government publications, news agency transmissions, and several other sources (see Table 6.3 for selected local periodical and newspaper sources). The importance of using multiple sources for generating events data cannot be overemphasized since such research methods reduce the problems of source coverage and the systematic falsification of reports, and enhances the reliability of news sources. Many source comparison studies have shown that the frequency of events reporting varies greatly according to source, which indicates the general desirability and adequacy of using more than one source for generating events data. Although critics may argue that a reliance upon English-language sources tends to overrepresent certain states, in contrast to its Francophone cousin *Jeune Afrique*, the 73-year old *West Africa* magazine "takes a much more studied and sober look"²⁰ at events in the subregion, "makes a favorable impression by its relatively high level of attributed quotes," and tends to cover the continent in a much broader fashion.²¹

Methods of Analysis and Category Construction

The measurement techniques and research methods used in this study estimate both the strength and the direction of relationships between the assumed determinants of state behavior (national attributes) and the dependent variable (interstate interactions). In addition, estimates among indicators of the separate variables are

TABLE 6.3

Selected West African Newspapers and Periodicals

Benin	-	L'ACTION POPULAIRE (weekly); EHUZU (daily)
Burkina Faso	-	L'OBSERVATEUR (daily); BULLETIN MENSUEL D'INFORMATION STATISTIQUE ET ECONOMIQUE (monthly)
Cape Verde	-	BOLETIM OFICIAL DA REPUBLICA DE CABO VERDE (weekly); BOLETIM INFORMATIVO (monthly)
Gambia	-	GAMBIA NEWS BULLETIN (3 weeks)
Ghana	-	THE GHANAIAN TIMES (daily); THE MIRROR (weekly); PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC (daily); SUNDAY MIRROR (weekly)
Guinea	-	HOROYA (weekly); BULLETIN MENSUEL DE LA CHAMBRE ECONOMIQUE DE GUINEE (monthly)
Guinea-Bissau	-	NO PINTCHA (3 weeks); BOLETIM TRIMESTRAL DE ESTATISTICA (quarterly)
Ivory Coast	-	FRATERNITE MATIN ET IVOIRSOIR (daily); IVOIRE DIMANCHE (weekly)
Liberia	-	DAILY OBSERVER (daily); FOOTPRINTS (monthly)
Mali	-	JOURNAL L'ESSOR LA VOIZ DU PEUPLE (daily); BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN (daily)
Mauritania	-	LE PEUPLE (weekly); AL-WASIT (annual)
Niger	-	LE SAHEL (daily); SAHEL DIMANCHE (weekly)
Nigeria	-	DAILY TIMES (daily); THE GUARDIAN (daily); NATIONAL CONCORD (daily); SUNDAY CONCORD (weekly); DAILY SKETCH (daily); DAILY STAR (daily); NEW NIGERIAN (daily); NIGERIAN HERALD (daily); NIGERIAN OBSERVER (daily); THE AFRICAN GUARDIAN (weekly); NEWSWATCH (weekly); AFRICAN CONCORD (WEEKLY); THE NEW NATION (monthly)
Senegal	-	LE SOLEIL (daily); SUD HEBDO (weekly); AFRIQUE NOUVELLE (weekly); LE MONITEUR AFRICAIN (weekly)
Sierra Leone	-	DAILY MAIL (daily); THE GLOBE (Freetown)
Togo	-	JOURNAL OFFICIEL (monthly); TOGO-DIALOGUE (monthly)

established by means of Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficients since data are analyzed at the interval (continuous) level of measurement. Representing one of the most widely used indicators, Pearson's correlations (Pearson's r) range from +1.00 to -1.00 and summarize the degree to which any two variables co-vary. Pearson's r will indicate a score close to +1.00 and the regression line will slope upward (positive) when the values for both variables are high. When one variable has a high value and the other registers a low value, Pearson's r will have a score close to -1.00 and the regression will slope downward (negative). However, if no systematic relationship exists between two variables, Pearson's r will have a score close to 0.00 and the regression will be horizontal.²²

Another indicator applied in this study is the level of statistical significance which is set at .05 or better. Significance tests are usually applied in correlation and regression analysis. But such tests are generally considered irrelevant unless the research represents a sample. Therefore, there is debate as to the relevance and meaning of tests of statistical significance when no sample is involved.²³ Such tests are designed specifically to indicate the extent to which statistical correlations are a result of chance factors in a random sample. If the probability is approximately small, the correlation coefficients are accepted as statistically significant. But the units of analysis in this research - the 16 West African states - do not represent a random selection of a larger universe of states. Since our list of countries includes all West African states, tests of statistical significance, appropriate where population samples are drawn, may not be necessary. However, it can be argued that since these

states are drawn from a much larger number of continental African states, the use of a statistical significance test may be justified. In this somewhat arbitrary sense, for the "sample" of 16 states, Pearson's r is considered significant at the .05 level or better.²⁴

The reliability of an indicator refers to the extent to which that measure yields the same results upon repeated trials. In other words, reliability means an indicator produces consistent results across repeated measurements. In order to demonstrate the reliability of our measurements, an intercorrelational analysis was carried out for separate estimates of the dependent variable (see Table 6.4, and note that only the first column is directly relevant to the point made here). Table 6.4 represents an exploratory account of the frequency of various foreign policy dimensions coded from the events data generated for our dependent variable.²⁵ Notably, the specific indicator for our dependent variable, EVINITWA (events initiated to West African states), is highly correlated with the other dimensions of foreign policy behavior which partly justifies its selection in this study. Both the high level of intercorrelations among the indicators in this table and their uniformly positive directionality attest to the reliability and validity of our measures (a function of category construction). By implication, this also confirms the effectiveness of the coding procedures adopted for the various dimensions of the dependent variable. In general, the relevant correlations identified in Table 6.4 are statistically significant at the .05 level or better.

TABLE 6.4

Correlation Matrix of the Dependent Variables

Items	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
1.	1.00	.96	.99	.93	.95	.93	.99	.96	.84	.78	.98	.90	.81	.90	.79	.84	.80
2.		1.00	.99	.93	.88	.90	.97	.99	.77	.84	.94	.86	.86	.88	.86	.73	.71
3.			1.00	.94	.92	.92	.99	.98	.81	.82	.97	.89	.84	.89	.83	.79	.76
4.				1.00	.80	.77	.93	.95	.79	.70	.92	.85	.76	.86	.74	.75	.71
5.					1.00	.92	.94	.87	.81	.77	.92	.84	.73	.82	.71	.83	.81
6.						1.00	.93	.89	.78	.76	.92	.85	.79	.84	.77	.81	.78
7.							1.00	.97	.79	.77	.98	.90	.83	.90	.81	.83	.79
8.								1.00	.75	.77	.95	.88	.85	.89	.84	.75	.72
9.									1.00	.70	.81	.73	.54	.70	.51	.77	.74
10.										1.00	.74	.63	.75	.65	.75	.51	.52
11.											1.00	.96	.85	.96	.83	.90	.87
12.												1.00	.87	.99	.84	.93	.92
13.													1.00	.90	.99	.69	.71
14.														1.00	.88	.89	.88
15.															1.00	.65	.67
16.																1.00	.97
17.																	1.00

N=16; * significant at .05 level; others significant at .01 or better.

Events are: 1=initiated to West African states; 2=received from W/African states; 3=initiated and received from W/African states; 4=initiated to W/Africa 1975-79; 5=initiated to W/Africa 1980-84; 6=initiated to W/Africa 1985-89; 7=cooperation initiated to W/African states; 8=cooperation received from W/African states; 9=conflict initiated to W/African states; 10=conflict received from W/African states; 11=initiated to W/African and non-African states; 12=initiated to non-African states; 13=received from non-African states; 14=cooperation initiated to non-African states; 15=cooperation received from non-African states; 16=conflict initiated to non-African states; 17=conflict received from non-African states.

The reliability and unidimensionality of the dependent variables were further established by factor analysis which represents a consolidating technique that simplifies all the indicators applied in the study into more manageable clusters (see Table 6.5). In addition to discovering clusters of interrelated indicators, factor analysis represents a statistical technique that assesses the reliability of multi-item measures and validates them.²⁶ The main purpose here was therefore to demonstrate, on an exploratory basis, the degree of the consistency of our indicators in order to justify their combination for further statistical analysis. Typologizing the events data (encompassing a total of 17 indicators in the study) produced a grouping of overall indices which was treated as a category of variables in the research. As expected, all the items have substantial loadings on the first component in the extracted (i.e., unrotated) factor matrix,²⁷ which means that the various items of the dependent variable are measuring the same underlying phenomenon.

If indicators are to provide an accurate representation of abstract concepts, in addition to being reliable and unidimensional, they must also be valid. In theoretical terms, indicators are valid to the extent that they measure what they purport to measure. There are three basic types of validity in data that can be evaluated: content validity, construct validity, and criterion-related validity.²⁸ Since events data cover the full spectrum of external behavior - cooperative as well as conflictual; political as well as economic, social, and military; verbal as well as nonverbal - our classifications demonstrate a certain amount of content validity (sometimes called face

TABLE 6.5

Factor Scores for Foreign Policy Categories

	Variables	Variable Communality	Extracted factor matrix 1
1.	EVINITWA	.972	.986
2.	EVRECDWA	.936	.967
3.	EVINRDWA	.969	.984
4.	EVNT7579	.845	.919
5.	EVNT8084	.868	.931
6.	EVNT8589	.875	.935
7.	CPEVINWA	.969	.984
8.	CPEVREWA	.930	.965
9.	CNEVINWA	.676	.822
10.	CNEVREWA	.637	.798
11.	EVINEXWA	.990	.995
12.	EVINIEXT	.907	.952
13.	EVRECEXT	.781	.884
14.	CPEVINEX	.907	.953
15.	CPEVREXT	.749	.865
16.	CNEVINEX	.766	.875
17.	CNEVREXT	.731	.855

% Total Variance = 85.3%

Eigenvalue 14.5

For labels to the 17 categories, see Table 6.4.

validity).²⁹ By their very nature, events data represent a coding unit for categories that are sufficiently comprehensive to include any possible behavior that an actor might initiate; this comprehensive nature of events data categories permits the researcher to monitor a wide range of behavior. In addition, the COPDAB scale used in this study seems to approximate events found in the actual world of foreign policy behavior and, in this sense, appears to be measuring what it is intended to measure.

In terms of construct validity, our dependent variables also appear to fare reasonably well, which can be determined by their correlation with theoretically relevant variables. Data have been presented earlier on the basis of theoretical considerations and, as expected, the variables within each of the clusters of the dependent variables tend to be positively correlated (consult Table 6.4). First, there is a positive correlation, as expected, for every pair of variables; there is no negative correlation in the matrix. Second, one can observe that the correlations are generally strong; several are over .90. Finally, all the variables are statistically significant at the .05 level or better and are therefore unlikely to be due to chance.

Independent Variables and Sources of Secondary Data

The independent variables applied in this research involve claims of probable associations with interstate interactions (or foreign policy behavior) in West Africa and includes typical ways of classifying states along dimensions of economic, social, ecological, and political attributes. Actor capability profiles that are selected from the environment in which policy is made are assessed to be related to foreign policy

outcome. National attribute data describe actor capabilities and it is assumed that, since states are ranked according to a number of dimensions, there is a relationship between foreign policy behavior and such national attributes as size, wealth, military power, diplomatic capability, the level of economic development, and so forth.

While events data may explain a great deal of the foreign policy output of states or the patterns of actions in the international system, there is some recognition that events data alone may be inadequate especially where other types of supplementary data are needed. In addition to events data, a list of 14 indicators derived from six major predictor variables are used in this study. The independent variables are measured as interval level data and, in order to test our theoretical propositions, they will be itemized and operationalized as follows:

1. As stated earlier in this research (in Chapter 2), the term, national size, refers specifically to the population of a state. The concept of size as a factor affecting foreign policy has received an increasing amount of attention in recent times as several empirical studies have shown size to be an important factor underlying variations in the international behavior of states.³⁰ For states to accomplish their external objectives, they need human resources especially in terms of population.³¹ A state with large national size possesses a correspondingly greater number of individuals, groups, and government officials who share a common interest in maintaining constant contacts with immediate neighbors.³² Conversely, a state with a large, rapidly expanding population may ultimately pursue a more active and

aggressive foreign policy (especially within its immediate environment) as a consequence of internal pressures, which accrue and spill over into the arena of interstate relations.³³

Given that the specific indicator of the national size variable is the population size of states, it is measured in terms of millions of people inhabiting the territory of a given West African state at a specific point in time. While territorial size is discussed in the theoretical literature, it is not employed here as a determining standard especially because it is weakly correlated with the population of West African states. If both indicators were combined and applied, they will dilute the meaning of size and in the process distort reality and bias our results.³⁴ Therefore, the selection of population size as an indicator of national size assumes that a large area, if unaccompanied by a large population, does not automatically confer the status of large size on a state. The 16 ECOWAS states were thus scored solely on the basis of their total population.

2. The concept of economic strength (or wealth) is ambiguous and methods for its quantification are elusive especially for African states that generally have relatively low levels of financial power. Economic strength may be defined in terms of the financial and economic resource endowments of a state which relates to the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services in its economy. The notion of economic strength is especially important among students of power who have explained an actor's ability to influence another's behavior in terms of the

economic assets he possesses.³⁵ The concept of the economic assets available to a union has been used systematically to explain successful and unsuccessful unions.³⁶ For instance, economic inequality among states in a regional subsystem, may either spur or hinder interactions depending on the availability of special payoffs (that is, economic benefits) provided by core states (the economic giants) to multinational groupings.³⁷ Since the qualities and quantities of economic resources available to a state for foreign policy purposes index their capabilities for international action, it follows, therefore, that economically powerful states will be more effective internationally than economically weaker states.

Scholarly opinions generally favor using as many indicators as possible to index categories and variables in foreign policy research. Consequently, the levels of economic power (wealth) of West African states may be measured in millions of dollars in terms of such readily available factors as their gross national product (GNP), their gross domestic product (GDP), and their financial contributions to the operational budget of the major subregional organization (specifically, memberstates contributions to ECOWAS fund). In West Africa, due to their wealth, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, and Ghana are distinctively the most powerful actors in terms of GNP and GDP, and are also the largest contributors to the ECOWAS budget (see Appendix IV for relevant data).

3. The level of the economic modernization of a state represents the second economic cluster in this study and it refers to the degree of a nation's economic

development and its quality of life. As an analytical concept, the economic modernization of a state is associated with the amount of its interactions with other states in the international arena. In this study, the concept differs from economic power in that it corrects for the effects of population by specifically referring to the average quality of life of the citizenry of a state.³⁸ Although per capita incomes cannot fully inform scholars of distribution, equity, and use, it could be argued that, in the realm of foreign affairs, modernization seeks a working relationship between economic development and regional cooperation. In other words, it may be suggested that economic modernization could serve as a unifying force capable of generating integrative influences. This proposition suggests that an underdeveloped state may be inwardly directed and too preoccupied with internal problems to be concerned with foreign policy. On the contrary, relatively developed states possess the means to be active in international politics and will define both their internal and external problems in ways that allow them to use their capability. An economically developed state may therefore extend its influence in search of resources and to assure an environment suitable for its continued growth.

To index this specific dimension of the welfare of people, three inter-related indicators were selected: the GNP per capita, the GDP per capita, and the energy consumption per capita of the individual states in West Africa.

4. The literature has long emphasized the primacy of military capabilities in foreign affairs. Indeed, in addition to economic power, no really vigorous foreign

policy can be pursued without being backed by military strength. The concept has been defined as the coercive ability of a state either to wage war or to deter others from attacking it. By deterring war (promoting relative stability) or by pursuing an aggressive foreign policy (promoting conflict or instability), the concept of military capability as it stands is related to interactions in the interstate system. To pursue active foreign policies states generally need large numbers of military personnel and resources to support the military in terms of acquiring highly equipped force capabilities.

Such factors as military size, preparedness, and armaments form the most important elements of national power in Africa where armies range from very few soldiers in Gambia to very many in Nigeria. Consequently, the measures of our concept of military capability include the size of the armed forces (estimated as the number of personnel in the army, navy, and air force) and governmental military expenditures.³⁹ Whereas the size of the armed forces is measured in thousands of soldiers, the defense expenditure of West African states is measured in millions of dollars (see Appendices IV and V).

5. It is assumed in this research that by increasing the likelihood for the coordination of foreign policies the concept of diplomatic influence (or diplomatic capability) is related to interstate interactions. The notion of diplomatic capabilities is measured through the indicators of diplomatic representation in West African states. Specifically, indicators of diplomatic capability and influence include the number of

embassies maintained in and received from West African states, and the diplomatic missions received from both African and extra-African states (see Appendices IV and V). These indicators are conceptualized in this study as an aspect of the establishment attributes of West African states.

6. Finally, defined as a systemic concept, geographic contiguity is construed as the physical contact, in terms of actual border-to-border connection of territories (or international boundaries) of either a group of states, as in the case of the ECOWAS regional subsystem, or of any one particular state to another, as in the case, for instance, of Senegal and Gambia.⁴⁰ The geographic contiguity attribute is measured as the number of common boundaries shared with other West African states. Among other possible indicators a researcher may use to measure contiguity are physical distance separating states from one another, using boundary to boundary (or center to center), distance between major world capitals, time to travel from one community to another by available transportation, the possibility of physical contact between peoples, and the cost of transportation between states.

For the purpose of conducting a cross-sectional study at different points in time, the same measures for the independent variables in this research were collected repeatedly from the late 1970s to the late 1980s. The specific periods chosen for data collection in this regard depended upon two major criteria. First, measures were collected for the years 1977, 1982, and 1987 because they were present for most

variables in those years especially for such small states as Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and Gambia about which reliable data are not always readily available. Second, data for these years coincided with the mid-points of the time intervals covered by the dependent variables. Since events data collection for the dependent variable cover 1975 through 1989, in terms of testing our major research propositions, data collection for the independent variables was for 1982 - the mid-point of the 15-year period for which data on foreign policy events were collected.⁴¹ In addition, since events data for the dependent variable were sub-divided into three 5-year periods (i.e., 1975-1979, 1980-1984, and 1985-1989), data for the independent variables were collected for the mid-points of the 5-year periods (i.e., 1977, 1982, and 1987) respectively (see Appendices IV and V).

Although it has been contended that data on African states are more open to error than those from developed countries,⁴² the figures presented in this study for the attributes of West African states are contained in various reputable publications. Statistics on the attributes of African states are generally contained in various World Bank publications, journals, and other relevant materials. However, in this specific research, for 1977, estimated measures of population size, military size, military expenditure, GNP, and GNP per capita were taken from World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1971-1980.⁴³ Estimated indicators of GDP, GDP per capita and energy consumption per capita were taken from Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook.⁴⁴ Estimates of FUND represent memberstates contributions to ECOWAS budget as at 1979.⁴⁵ Finally, records of data for diplomatic representation were

taken from The Europa Year Book 1978: A World Survey⁴⁶ and Africa, South of the Sahara 1977-78.⁴⁷

For 1982, indicators of population size, GNP per capita, GDP, and energy consumption per capita are drawn from The World Bank reports.⁴⁸ Consequently, GNP and GDP per capita were calculated from the above figures. Measures of military size and military expenditure for 1982 were taken from World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1987.⁴⁹ The data for contributions of states to ECOWAS fund represent called-up capital as at October 19, 1983.⁵⁰ Diplomatic representation indicators are taken from The Europa Year Book, 1982: A World Survey⁵¹ and Africa, South of the Sahara 1982-83.⁵²

For 1987, measures of population size, GNP, and GNP per capita were obtained from The Europa World Year Book, 1989.⁵³ Indicators for GDP, GDP per capita, and energy consumption per capita were obtained from World Facts and Figures.⁵⁴ Indicators for diplomatic representation were extracted from Africa, South of the Sahara, 1989 and similar raw data are also available in The Europa World Year Book, 1989.⁵⁵ Data for size of the military and annual military expenditure are from World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1988.⁵⁶ Similar data are available in the World Defense Forces handbook on military information for states.⁵⁷ Measures for funds (that is, contributions for ECOWAS budget) are percentage contributions to ECOWAS funding for 1987.

Category Construction for the Independent Variables

As already stated, the measurement techniques and research methods used in this study estimate both the strength and the direction of relationships between the assumed determinants of state behavior (national attributes) and the dependent variable (interstate interactions). In addition, estimates among indicators of the separate independent variables are established by means of Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficients since data are analyzed at the interval (continuous) level of measurement.

In order to demonstrate the reliability of the measures of our independent variables, intercorrelational analyses were carried out for 1977, 1982, and 1987 (see Tables 6.6, 6.7, and 6.8). For example, the three tables show that our independent variables can be indexed by combining more basic indicators in a theoretically justifiable fashion. Some of the indicators are highly intercorrelated and may be tapping the same dimension.⁵⁸ When considered in addition to our earlier theoretical discussions, the empirical results here tend to confirm our substantive expectations. For example, for 1977, 1982, and 1987, the hypothesized indicators of the economic strength variable are highly intercorrelated and significant. For 1977, GNP is strongly correlated with FUND ($r = .94$) and GDP ($r = .98$), and FUND is strongly correlated with GDP ($r = .95$); for 1982, GNP is strongly associated with FUND ($r = .92$) and GDP ($r = .93$), and FUND is strongly related with GDP ($r = .95$); finally, for 1987, GNP is highly correlated with FUND ($r = .95$) and GDP ($r = .99$), and FUND is well associated with GDP ($r = .92$). Similarly, the indicators for

TABLE 6.6

Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables (1977)

Items	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1.	1.00	.99	.97	.92	.61	.18	-.06	.56	.60	.63	.52	*.98	.98	-.12
2.		1.00	.98	.94	.64	.24	-.00	.54	.59	.60	.48	*.99	.99	-.20
3.			1.00	.95	.68	.38	.06	.54	.57	.65	.47	*.97	.97	-.21
4.				1.00	.84	.43	.24	.59	.67	.67	.52	*.90	.90	-.16
5.					1.00	.68	.57	.58	.61	.65	.50	*.56	.55	-.06
6.						1.00	.68	.16	.15	.34	.06	.19	.19	-.02
7.							1.00	.03	.11	.07	-.09	-.04	-.05	-.14
8.								1.00	.80	.82	.86	.48	.47	.23
9.									1.00	.75	.79	.54	.53	.14
10.										1.00	.84	.56	.55	.35
11.											1.00	.45	.44	.40
12.												1.00	.99	.21
13.													1.00	.22
14.														1.00

N=16; ^a not statistically significant. * Significant at .05 level. Others significant at .01 level or better.

1. population size
2. gross national product
3. gross domestic product
4. contributions to ECOWAS funds
5. gross national product per capita
6. gross domestic product per capita
7. commercial energy consumption per capita
8. missions sent to West African states
9. missions received from West African states
10. missions received from other African states
11. missions received from non-African states
12. size of the military
13. annual military expenditure
14. number of international borders

Values are Pearson Correlation Coefficients

TABLE 6.7

Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables (1982)

Items	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1.	1.00	.99	.94	.92	.57	.22	.07	.60	.75	.80	.78	.97	.99	-.14
2.		1.00	.93	.92	.61	.18	.11	.57	.72	.80	.77	.98	.99	-.19
3.			1.00	.95	.55	.51	.15	.69	.81	.76	.83	.89	.91	-.27
4.				1.00	.75	.47	.33	.74	.81	.85	.87	.89	.90	-.16
5.					1.00	.28	.54	.60	.54	.71	.65	.60	.59	-.16
6.						1.00	.32	.58	.51	.24	.52	.13	.14	-.17
7.							1.00	.31	.24	.37	.42	.08	.10	-.25
8.								1.00	.90	.72	.86	.60	.55	.22
9.									1.00	.76	.92	.75	.71	.10
10.										1.00	.87	.84	.79	.15
11.											1.00	.79	.76	.06
12.												1.00	.98	.10
13.													1.00	-.20
14.														1.00

N=16; ^a not statistically significant. * Significant at .05 level. Others significant at .01 level or better.

1. population size
2. gross national product
3. gross domestic product
4. contributions to ECOWAS funds
5. gross national product per capita
6. gross domestic product per capita
7. commercial energy consumption per capita
8. missions sent to West African states
9. missions received from West African states
10. missions received from other African states
11. missions received from non-African states
12. size of the military
13. annual military expenditure
14. number of international borders

Values are Pearson Correlation Coefficients

TABLE 6.8

Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables (1987)

Items	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1.	1.00	.99	.99	.91	.05	.67	.31	.61	.81	.75	.75	.97	.67	-.14
2.		1.00	.99	.95	.17	.75	.37	.68	.83	.80	.80	.96	.75	-.14
3.			1.00	.92	.09	.69	.34	.61	.81	.75	.74	.98	.68	-.19
4.				1.00	.33	.86	.50	.78	.85	.79	.84	.88	.78	-.18
5.					1.00	.69	.64	.41	.26	.42	.45	.05	.60	-.05
6.						1.00	.58	.78	.73	.75	.81	.63	.81	-.12
7.							1.00	.40	.40	.45	.48	.32	.47	-.28
8.								1.00	.84	.75	.90	.60	.77	.25
9.									1.00	.83	.85	.83	.72	.12
10.										1.00	.87	.79	.87	.21
11.											1.00	.74	.84	.16
12.												1.00	.64	-.14
13.													1.00	.25
14.														1.00

a N=16; not statistically significant. * Significant at .05 level. Others are significant at .01 level or better.

1. population size
2. gross national product
3. gross domestic product
4. contributions to ECOWAS funds
5. gross national product per capita
6. gross domestic product per capita
7. commercial energy consumption per capita
8. missions sent to West African states
9. missions received from West African states
10. missions received from other African states
11. missions received from non-African states
12. size of the military
13. annual military expenditure
14. number of international borders

Values are Pearson Correlation Coefficients

the military capability variable are strongly correlated for these three years ($r = .99$, $.98$, and $.64$ respectively). So also are the measures for diplomatic capability and, to a lesser degree, those for the level of economic development. Since these respective indicators are positively intercorrelated, they may be reliably combined to index the four dimensions of our independent variables (i.e., economic strength, level of development, diplomatic capability, and military capability).

To seek associations between each of the 14 independent variables and the dependent variables will produce an unnecessarily large number of correlations, thus resulting in ambiguous interpretation problems. Therefore, factor analysis was also used as a consolidating technique to simplify the indicators of the independent variables applied in the study into more manageable clusters. The main purpose here was to demonstrate, on an exploratory basis, the degree of the consistency of the various indicators in order to justify their combination into artificially produced variables for further statistical analysis.³⁹ Typologizing attributional data (encompassing a total of 14 indicators in the study per year) produced smaller groupings of overall indices which were then treated as categories of variables in the research. Most of the items have substantial loadings on the first component in the extracted (i.e., unrotated) factor matrix. But since the items of the independent variables in our research are measuring more than a single underlying phenomenon, it was necessary to rotate the extracted components in order for them to be optimally interpretable. Tables 6.9, 6.10, and 6.11 show how each factor identifies those items that are more highly correlated with one another than with the other items. Thus,

after rotation, most items have higher factor loadings on their hypothesized relevant components than on other components. Specifically, for the national attributes of 1977, 1982, and 1987, when the three factors extracted are rotated to a varimax solution, they show a fairly distinct clustering of items.

Some of the phenomena of the period of relative economic boom in West Africa are depicted in Table 6.9. Factor 1 is defined principally by items 1-4 and 12-13, and the traditional attributes of economic, social, and military power for 1977 appear to have the highest positive scores on this factor. In addition, Factor 2 is most clearly defined by items 8-11 and by item 14, representing a unique cluster of the diplomatic capabilities and contiguity dimension. It is perhaps surprising that the diplomatic capability indicators do not load highly on Factor 1. This may be indicative of the trend in the early post-independence era when large numbers of diplomatic missions were maintained even by relatively poor states as symbols of newly acquired statehood. Despite the problems of underdevelopment, most African states found it psychologically necessary to organize foreign offices, establish diplomatic relationships, and develop external policies within this extraordinary period. Thus, it could be argued that in the 1970s, diplomatic missions were not constrained by the realities of economic, social, and military power.

That diplomatic influence loads highly with contiguity on Factor 2 is initially puzzling. But this does not defy interpretation especially as it is consistent with some of our earlier findings (see subsection on diplomatic representations in Chapter 4). A nation's foreign policy begins at its borders, and West African states tend to maintain

diplomatic ties with neighboring states since it is at this level that the greatest need to deal with interstate issues arises almost on a daily basis. For 1977, therefore, the correlation between diplomatic capability and contiguity may be understood within the context of the need by diplomatic establishments to address the various implications of the flow of citizens across international borders. Finally, items 5-7 load highly on Factor 3 (the level of development dimension). This factor is quite homogenous and exhibits no overlap with any of the other domains.

The strength of Factor 1 accounts for a preponderance of the common variance in the items and the indicators here suggest a national capabilities component. For illustrative purposes, this factor will be designated the "power" dimension since the indicators of economic strength or wealth (items 2-4), population size (item 1), and military capability (items 12-13) appear to load highly on it. As indicated in Table 6.9, the total contribution of Factor 1 to the variances of all the variables is 59.4 percent. That of Factor 2, labeled here as the "diplomatic/contiguity" dimension, is a relatively less imposing 15.3 percent, and includes 5 of 14 indicators. Also, the total contribution of Factor 3, labeled the "development" dimension, to the variances of all the variables is 14.5 percent. Significantly, when considered together, the dimensions delineated in the factor analysis for 1977 account for over 89.2 percent of the total variance, which is a reasonably high percentage for behavioral science data.

In support of our arguments, the results of the factor analyses on the national attributes of West African states for 1982 and 1987 are remarkably similar; however,

TABLE 6.9

Factor Analysis of the National Attributes
of West African States (1977)

Variables	Variable Communality	Unrotated factor matrix			Rotated factor matrix		
		1	2	3	1	2	3
1. POP77	.985	.940	-.165	-.271	<u>.947</u>	.296	.025
2. GNP77	.993	.946	-.226	-.217	<u>.960</u>	.252	.094
3. GDP77	.970	.951	-.229	-.112	<u>.929</u>	.263	.193
4. FUND77	.979	.965	-.211	.067	<u>.870</u>	.305	.359
5. GNPK77	.913	.787	-.078	.536	.504	.382	<u>.717</u>
6. GDPK77	.808	.375	-.231	.784	.142	.073	<u>.885</u>
7. ENERGY77	.867	.136	-.261	.883	-.078	-.061	<u>.926</u>
8. EMBREC77	.887	.742	.575	.082	.338	<u>.872</u>	.111
9. EMSNT77	.733	.762	.384	.068	.442	<u>.717</u>	.153
10. EMBRAF77	.885	.812	.455	.137	.429	<u>.810</u>	.211
11. EMBRNA77	.919	.679	.676	-.021	.277	<u>.917</u>	-.027
12. MISIZE77	.982	.912	-.257	-.289	<u>.970</u>	.200	.025
13. MIEXP77	.982	.908	-.269	-.293	<u>.973</u>	.187	.024
14. CONTIG	.589	-.126	.750	.099	-.466	<u>.594</u>	-.136
% Total Variance		59.4 + 15.3 + 14.5 = 89.2%					
Eigenvalue		8.3 2.1 2.0					

For labels to the 14 indicators, see Table 6.6 and Appendix V.

these results, considered together, also differ from those for 1977 (representing the economic boom years). Tables 6.10 and 6.11 show that items 1-4, 8-11, and 12-13 load highly on Factor 1, which suggest "power" dimensions comprising the population size, economic strength, military capability, and diplomatic capability of West African states. That the diplomatic missions indicators load highly on this factor suggest the realities of general economic hardships. Due to increased socioeconomic constraints, the establishment of diplomatic missions is now increasingly contingent upon other indices of state power (rather than on more symbolic factors as was the case in the 1960s and 1970s).⁶⁰ Put differently, the diplomatic policy of West African states is now associated with their resource base; that is, their foreign policies are now based more upon their material capacity to act. The situation here reflects the position that the domestic resource base of the disposition of the diplomatic capability variable is meager. For both 1982 and 1987, the indicators of the level of "development" variable load highly on Factor 2 thus suggesting the increased importance of the modernization items, while the geographic "contiguity" variable loads highly on Factor 3.⁶¹ The dimensions shown on the factor analyses for 1982 and 1987 account for 87.5 percent and 91.3 percent of the total variances for the two years, respectively (see Tables 6.10 and 6.11).

In sum, both intercorrelational and factor analyses for 1977, 1982, and 1987 show that several multiple indicators may be combined reliably to index common concepts in this study. First, within the framework of testing bivariate relationships

TABLE 6.10

Factor Analysis of the National Attributes
of West African States (1982)

Variables	Variable Communality	Unrotated factor matrix			Rotated factor matrix		
		1	2	3	1	2	3
1. POP82	.987	.936	-.331	-.035	.986	.097	-.064
2. GNP82	.995	.936	-.334	-.092	.986	.096	-.120
3. GDP82	.913	.948	-.104	-.063	.901	.308	-.083
4. FUNDS2	.973	.981	.013	-.102	.880	.430	-.117
5. GNP82	.651	.740	.271	-.172	.550	.564	-.172
6. GDP82	.611	.432	.652	.006	.116	.773	.026
7. ENERGY82	.719	.318	.694	-.369	-.017	.775	-.344
8. EMBREC82	.887	.802	.371	.328	.581	.665	.330
9. EMSNT82	.875	.879	.172	.268	.733	.519	.261
10. EMBRAF82	.822	.898	.004	.124	.816	.380	.110
11. EMBRNA82	.948	.930	.228	.176	.752	.594	.170
12. MISIZE82	.987	.931	-.348	.007	.990	.078	-.022
13. MIEXP82	.995	.925	-.361	-.097	.987	.067	-.127
14. CONTIG	.883	-.185	.011	.921	-.142	.097	.924
% Total Variance		66.4 + 12.0 + 9.1 = 87.5%					
Eigenvalue		9.3 1.7 1.3					

For labels to the 14 indicators, see Table 6.7 and Appendix V.

TABLE 6.11

Factor Analysis of the National Attributes
of West African States (1987)

Variables	Variable Communality	Unrotated factor matrix			Rotated factor matrix		
		1	2	3	1	2	3
1. POP87	.987	.902	-.414	-.046	<u>.988</u>	.073	-.075
2. GNP87	.986	.945	-.301	-.060	<u>.973</u>	.191	-.047
3. GDP87	.990	.908	-.396	-.099	<u>.982</u>	.109	-.118
4. FUND87	.960	.964	-.113	-.134	<u>.902</u>	.380	-.054
5. GNP87	.930	.420	.827	-.264	-.018	<u>.962</u>	.064
6. GDP87	.899	.881	.303	-.178	.635	<u>.703</u>	.029
7. ENERGY87	.755	.532	.473	-.498	.233	<u>.797</u>	-.257
8. EMBREC87	.831	.840	.224	.275	<u>.657</u>	.467	.425
9. EMSNT87	.864	.910	-.065	.179	<u>.847</u>	.291	.250
10. EMBRAF87	.871	.904	.107	.208	<u>.764</u>	.421	.332
11. EMBRNAS7	.912	.926	.162	.170	<u>.757</u>	.489	.316
12. MISIZES7	.967	.891	-.415	-.040	<u>.979</u>	.065	-.070
13. MIEXP87	.886	.873	.297	.187	<u>.649</u>	.573	.369
14. CONTIG	.950	-.018	.260	.939	-.089	-.108	<u>.965</u>
‡ Total Variance		67.5 + 13.2 + 10.6 = 91.3%					
Eigenvalue		9.5	1.9	1.5			

For labels to the 14 indicators, see Table 6.8 and Appendix V.

as specified in our research propositions (see Chapter 2), such indicators as GNP, GDP, and FUND may be combined reliably to index economic strength, whereas GNP per capita, GDP per capita, and energy consumption per capita may be combined to index the level of development. Furthermore, diplomatic missions sent and received from West African states, missions received from other African states, and missions received from non-African states can be combined to index diplomatic capability, while the size of the military and annual military expenditure may index the military capability of states. Second, to test more complex multivariate relationships, and in order to avoid problems of multicollinearity, the major different dimensions revealed by the factor scores in the factor analyses above will be adopted. Consequently, on the basis of conceptual and theoretical judgment, indicators that load highly on the various factors will be combined to index three dimensions. Faced with this new empirical reality, the major independent variables in our multivariate analyses would include power, diplomatic contiguity, and development for 1977, and power, development, and contiguity for 1982 and 1987 measures.

This chapter has outlined some of the basic considerations in measurement applied to the study. An additional objective in this research (taken up in the next chapter) is to establish simple correlations between each of the independent variables and the dependent variable. Considering the weaknesses inherent in "soft data" (defined as publicly available document data analyses), the aim here is not to posit hard or definitive causal relationships although implications for these are obvious in the study, since we ultimately desire explanation. One general problem is making

causal inferences from observed correlations. The correlation of independent and dependent variables implies no ultimate conclusion about the true causation of one variable by another. Thus, correlative knowledge does not constitute causation, properly defined. The former merely enables a researcher to see which variables are significantly related and to suggest the possibility of causal relationships.⁶²

Causality, on the other hand, raises serious questions of prediction, and is beyond the claims of this analysis.⁶³ Not only is demonstrating the likelihood of causation more of a logical than a statistical matter, but even in terms of statistical manipulations, much more refined and sophisticated multivariate procedures and models are required than are presently employed in this study.⁶⁴ In the next chapter, therefore, we intend to find out if, in which direction, and to what extent, the independent variables account for the variation in the dependent variable.

References and footnotes

1. See Don Munton, ed., Measuring International Behavior: Public Sources, Events and Validity (Halifax, Canada: Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1978).
2. For a similar example, see Douglas G. Anglin and Timothy M. Shaw, Zambia's Foreign Policy: Studies in Diplomacy and Dependence (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 353-354. Another scholar has suggested in an evaluation of events data sets that regionally oriented data banks are more promising than globally oriented ones. See Joseph D. Ben-Dak, "Some Directions for Research Toward Peaceful Arab-Israeli Relations: Analysis of Past Events and Gaming Simulation of the Future," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 16 (1972), pp. 281-295.
3. Depending upon the theoretical and empirical considerations of the researcher, events data may also be used as indicators of independent behavioral variables in comparative studies that seek to address nonevent-based dependent measures of foreign policy.
4. See Edward E. Azar, "Ten Issues in Events Research," Edward Azar and Joseph Ben-Dak, eds., Theory and Practice of Events Research: Studies in Inter-Nation Actions and Interactions (New York: Gordon and Breach Publishers, 1975), p. 2; and Edward E. Azar, "Conflict Escalation and Conflict Reduction in An International Crisis: Suez, 1956," William D. Coplin and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., eds., Analyzing International Relations: A Multimethod Introduction (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), pp. 183-184. For an early but essentially similar formulation of the international communicative process, see Harold D. Lasswell, "The Structure and Function of Communication in Society," Lyman Bryson, ed., The Communication of Ideas (New York: Harper and Row, 1948), p. 37. See also, Jonathan Wilkenfeld et al., eds., Foreign Policy Behavior: The Interstate Behavior Analysis Model (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1980), p. 36.
5. In fact, in Azar's formulation, an event represents "who does or says what to whom." See Edward E. Azar, "Analysis of International Events," Peace Research Reviews, vol. 4, no. 1 (November 1970), pp. 12-13.
6. Specifically, eighteen scholars and practitioners of international relations were asked to represent in numerical terms the amount of conflict and cooperation represented by each of the points of the scale in relation to the neutral point, which was given an intensity value of 1.

7. Indeed, the various dimensions of our dependent variable are measured in terms of the frequency of international behavior. This is simple to calculate on the basis of our data - a researcher simply counts the number of events (within the dimension in question) directed by one nation towards another for any particular time period.

8. Thus, the dependent variables include various aspects of the foreign policy event itself; whether the event was cooperative or conflictual, intra-African or extra-African, and so on. Various dimensions of foreign policy behavior are coded and examined accordingly for exploratory purposes. In addition to the various types of events initiated to West African states (EVINITWA, EVNT7579, EVNT8084, EVNT8589), these categories include events received from West African states (EVRECDWA), events initiated to and received from West African states (EVINRDWA), cooperative events initiated to West African states (CPEVINWA), cooperative events received from West African states (CPEVREWA), conflictual events initiated to West African states (CNEVINWA), conflictual events received from West African states (CNEVREWA), events initiated to non-African and West African states (EVINEXWA), events initiated to non-African states (EVINIEXT), events received from non-African states (EVRECEXT), cooperative events initiated to non-African states (CPEVINEX), cooperative events received from non-African states (CPEVREXT), conflictual events initiated to non-African states (CNEVINEX), and conflictual events received from non-African states (CNEVREXT). (See Tables 6.4 and 6.5).

9. As Burgess and Lawton put this, the measurement techniques for coding the content of the event interaction are divisible between those that categorize events and those that scale them. See Philip M. Burgess and Raymond W. Lawton, "Evaluating Events Data: Problems of Conception, Reliability, and Validity," Charles W. Kegley, Jr., Gregory A. Raymond, Robert M. Rood, and Richard A. Skinner, eds., International Events and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1975), pp. 117-118.

10. To compute the annual cooperation dimension of interaction value from Ghana to Togo, for example, the procedure is as follows: (1) multiply the yearly frequency of events at each cooperation scale point (levels 1-7 on the interaction scale) by the weighted value at that point, and (2) add all the values of the cooperation behavior together for the yearly cooperation DI value. Similar procedures will provide the yearly conflict DI value for the relations of Ghana to Togo.

11. Bernard Berelson describes content analysis as the "objective, systematic and quantitative description" of communication content. For several extensive treatments of this subject see Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communications Research (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952). See also, Ithiel de Sola Pool, ed., Trends in Content Analysis (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1959); Robert C. North, Ole R. Holsti, M. George Zaninovich, and Dina A. Zinnes, Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1963); R. Budd, R. Thorp and L. Donohew, Content Analysis of

Communications (New York: Macmillan Press, 1967); Deborah Welch Larson, "Problems of Content Analysis in Foreign Policy Research: Notes from the Study of the Origins of Cold War Belief Systems," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 2 (June 1988), pp. 241-255.

12. Indeed, no monitoring instrument can successfully record all interstate interactions that are fit to observe. In this regard, one is often reminded of the puzzle that asks whether a tree falling in a forest actually makes a noise if no one hears it.

13. See "Preface" in Azar and Ben-Dak, eds., op. cit. (1975), p. ix.

14. The various issues of these periodicals were reviewed for data collection at the Universities of Wisconsin (Milwaukee and Madison). Additional issues were reviewed at Northwestern University (Evanston) and at the University of Rochester (New York).

15. In this study, the date of an event is defined as the day that the signal is reported by a reputable or publicly available source.

16. As specified in the earlier chapters, these states include the 16 states of West Africa, plus Britain, France, West Germany, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. It has been noted that when conducted on an extensive scale, content analysis "remains a costly undertaking, a consideration which must be borne in mind when assessing the value of the results." See "Content Analysis," in John E. Mueller, ed., Approaches to Measurement in International Relations: A Non-Evangelical Survey (New York: Meredith Corporation, 1969), p. 218.

17. The COPDAB scale was used in the coding process; a degree of judgment was involved. Intercoder reliability tests were not conducted partly because of the difficulty of finding competent and qualified judges for such large amounts of data. However, in an earlier Master's thesis (using Calhoun's conflict-consensus scale with 28 action categories) involving similar data collected for a 12-month period, reliability coefficients between the scores of 10 judges were reasonably high. Events collected by the researcher for this earlier study were generated from West Africa (London) and Africa Report (New York), and were restricted solely to interactions between West African states as reported from January to December 1975. See Michael O. Anda "Integration in West Africa: An Analysis of Foreign Policy Interactions in a Regional Subsystem," Unpublished M.A. Paper, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, (1985), pp. 90-92, 150-166. See Appendix II for Survey Questionnaire and Appendix III for Foreign Policy Events Scores. Since Azar's scale has a lower number of categories (15), one would expect decreased variance among judges and, consequently, higher intercoder reliability.

18. For instance, a study of the New York Times (NYT) and the Middle East Journal (MEJ) chronology of events between key Middle Eastern states from 1955 to 1958 showed that the NYT index reported a significantly greater amount of violence than did the MEJ chronology. See Edward E. Azar, op. cit. (1970).

19. There is a missing publication as a result of a mis-numbering of the issues. Thus, issue no. 3686 (April 1988) was never published.
20. See Howard French, "On the Newstands," in Africa Report, March-April 1987, p. 49. West Africa was first issued on February 3, 1917. See editorial entitled "70 Years of Service," West Africa, February 2, 1987, p. 187. The Africa Research Bulletin is relatively younger, and has been published monthly since 1964.
21. Howard French, "On the Newstands," op. cit. (1987), p. 50.
22. For this same description see Patrick J. McGowan and Howard B. Shapiro, The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1973), pp. 29-30. For another methodological treatment of this measure of correlation, consult Albert M. Liebtrau, Measures of Association: Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1983), pp. 44-49. See also, Patrick J. McGowan and Michael K. O'Leary, "Methods and Data for the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., et al., op. cit. (1975), p. 257. Indeed, Pearson's $r = 0.00$ may also indicate that there is a hidden relation in the data, for example, a curvilinear rather than the predicted linear relationship tested for (or a line perpendicular to the X axis and a random scatterplot to which a meaningful least squares line cannot be fitted).
23. See Michael Haas, "Social Change and National Aggressiveness, 1900-1960," in J. David Singer, ed., Quantitative International Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1968), p. 226. See also, John E. Mueller, ed., op. cit. (1969), p. 308.
24. This indicates that for this study the probability of a chance association is at least five in 100.
25. The frequency of the occurrence of 17 categories of foreign policy behavior was recorded, thus capturing all the reported events which intuitively involved cooperative and conflictual behavior initiated and received by West African states. Thus, coded categories sought to capture clear empirical differentiation between such mutually exclusive events.
26. For a discussion of the use of factor analysis in reliability and validity assessments, see Edward G. Carmines and Richard A. Zeller, Reliability and Validity Assessments: Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1983), pp. 59-70. But for an analysis of the methodological problems in consolidating and simplifying a large domain of variables with reference to foreign conflict behaviors of African states, see John Collins, "Factor Analysis and the Groupings of Events Data: Problems and Possible Solutions," Azar and Ben-Dak, eds., op. cit. (1975), pp. 121-128.
27. In other words, since the solution could not be rotated, only one factor was extracted.

28. Content (or face) validity indicates the extent to which an empirical measurement represents a specific domain of content. Criterion-oriented (or predictive/empirical) validity is relevant when a researcher applies an instrument to estimate some important form of behavior that is external to the instrument itself. The operational indicator of the degree of correspondence between the test and the criterion is usually estimated by the size of their correlation (i.e., the "validity coefficient"). Construct validity refers to the extent to which a particular measure relates to other measures consistent with theoretically derived hypotheses concerning the concepts (or constructs) that are being measured. This type is most theoretically central to the social sciences since it relates to the measurement of abstract theoretical concepts. See Edward Carmines and Richard Zeller, *op. cit.* (1983), pp. 12-23. For an alternative discussion on the use of the various types of validity, see Thomas L. Brewer, "Foreign Policy Process Events: Problems of Concept and Data," Azar and Ben-Dak, eds., *op. cit.* (1975), pp. 203-204.

29. As already indicated, this type of validity, which is normally determined by the judgement of informed observers, refers to the extent to which measurements adequately sample the universe of dimensions of the behaviors being measured. For instance, the unhealthy tendency to equate "international relations" with "international conflict" is invalid. It ignores the cooperative content of interstate interactions, and valid events research cannot adequately assume that conflictual and cooperative factors are independent. By assessing international coexistence and coalition behavior in addition to conflict, this study reduces such inadequacy in previous research considerably.

30. Maurice A. East, "Size and Foreign Policy: A Test of Two Models," *World Politics*, vol. 25 (July 1973), pp. 556-576.

31. Ray S. Cline, *World Power Trends and U.S. Foreign Policy Behavior for the 1980s* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 44-45.

32. It should be noted here that although population is an element of national power because of its usefulness as a source of military strength and productive, exportable skills, in Africa, raw figures are generally tempered by considerations of illiteracy, underemployment, and apathy. Nevertheless, a valid generalization that can be made is that states with the smallest populations tend to be the weakest.

33. Nazli Choucri, *Population Dynamics and International Violence* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1974); Choucri and Robert North, *Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International Violence* (San Francisco: Freeman, 1975); Jonathan Wilkenfeld et al., eds., *Foreign Policy Behavior: The Interstate Behavior Analysis Model* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1980), p. 63.

34. Again, in Africa, territorial size alone is no direct index of national power. As an indicator, it is invalid and illusory since many of the largest states include large areas of desert and inadequate transportation and communication systems.

35. See Lindberg's article in Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, eds., Regional Integration: Theory and Research (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 78.
36. Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Conception of Leaders and Forces (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 38-39, 94-96.
37. Ernst B. Haas in Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz, eds., Regional Politics and World Order (San Francisco, Calif.: W. H. Freeman, 1973), p. 108.
38. Economically powerful (wealthy) states such as India may have low levels of development. For while there are more goods and services in India than, for example, in Sweden, there is a greater demand for such goods and services by the large Indian population. This implies that the measure of modernization should include not just GNP, but other variables such as GNP, divided by total population. For similar views, see Patrick J. McGowan and Michael K. O'Leary, "Methods and Data for the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., et al., op. cit. (1975), pp. 251-252. For a typology that includes economic development as a predictor of foreign policy behavior, see James N. Rosenau and Gary Hoggard, "Foreign Policy Behavior in Dyadic Relationships: Testing a Pre-Theoretical Extension," J. N. Rosenau, ed., Comparing Foreign Policies (New York: Wiley, 1974), pp. 117-149.
39. For a similar application of defense expenditures and size of the armed forces as measures of military power, see David H. Johns, "Diplomatic Activity, Power, and Integration in Africa," Patrick J. McGowan, ed., Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, vol. 3 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 90.
40. On both findings and propositions on the geographical proximity variable see Roger Cobb and Charles Elder, International Community: A Regional and Global Study (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. 134; and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, et al. eds., op. cit. (1980), p. 78.
41. This method has been adopted in similar studies on African foreign policy behavior. For instance, one scholar gathered data within a 5-year period on a specific dependent variable - support for national liberation movements - and chose the year 1969 for data collection on the independent variables. According to this scholar, the year 1969 was chosen since "it marks roughly the middle of the period for which the data on liberation support were recorded (1966-71)." See Vincent B. Khapoya, The Politics of Decision: A Comparative Study of African Policy Toward the Liberation Movements (Denver, Colo.: University of Denver, 1975), p. 17.
42. See Patrick McGowan and Helen E. Purkitt, Demystifying "National Character" in Black Africa: A Comparative Study of Culture and Foreign Policy Behavior, Monograph Series in World Affairs, vol. 17, Book 1 (Denver, Colo.: University of Denver, 1979), p. 17.

43. See World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1971-1980 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1983).
44. See Donald G. Morrison, Robert C. Mitchell, John N. Paden, and Hugh M. Stevenson, et al., Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1989).
45. For the total budget of the Community, see Official Journal of ECOWAS, vol. 2 (1980), p. 12. The different time-span chosen for some of the independent variables should not constitute problems since capabilities do not change significantly over five to ten years (or even more for certain actors). Many of the variables here are relatively non-manipulable. For example, because they are insensitive to social control over the short term, a state's population size and international borders cannot be changed easily.
46. The Europa Year Book 1978: A World Survey, vols. I & II (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1978).
47. Africa, South of the Sahara 1977-78 (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1977).
48. Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Joint Program of Action (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1984), pp. 57, 59, 62.
49. World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987 (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1988).
50. For this data on contributions to ECOWAS fund, see A. A. Afolayan, "Immigration and Expulsion of ECOWAS Aliens in Nigeria," International Migration Review, vol. 22, no. 1 (Spring 1988), p. 15.
51. The Europa Year Book 1982: A World Survey, vols. I & II (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1982)
52. Africa, South of the Sahara 1982-83, Twelfth Edition (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1982)
53. The Europa World Year Book, 1989, Thirtieth Edition, vols. 1 & 2 (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1989).
54. See Victor Showers, World Facts and Figures, Third Edition (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1989), pp. 66, 72. But for 1984 estimates of commercial energy production per capita, see The World in Figures (Boston, Mass.: G. K. Hall & Co., 1987).
55. Africa, South of the Sahara, 1989, Eighteenth Edition, vols. 1 & 2 (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1988).

56. See World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1988 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1989).
57. For similar data, see Barbara H. Pope, ed., World Defense Forces: A Compendium of Current Military Information for All Countries of the World (Santa Barbara: Calif.: ABC/Clio, 1987).
58. Indicators that are highly correlated among each other can be assumed to represent the same variable or phenomenon. The objective here is primarily to isolate those groups of indicators, and to reconstruct variables from these indicators that represent concepts which are by themselves not directly measurable.
59. Although factor analysis is fraught with statistical hazards, it is adopted here mainly for exploratory purposes as an analytical tool for the consolidation of indicators. See Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Gerald W. Hoppole, Paul J. Rossa, and Stephen J. Andriole, Foreign Policy Behavior: The Interstate Behavior Analysis Model (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1980), pp. 91-107.
60. Thus, although the items of diplomatic capability load highly on Factor 2 in Table 6.9, they now load highly on Factor 1. This development is not necessarily inconsistent since it basically reveals that there is strong intercorrelation between other indices of state capability (e.g., population size, wealth, and military capability) and the diplomatic capability variable.
61. The most puzzling item in the 1982 matrix is EMBREC82. Since it loads more highly on Factor 2 than on Factor 1, it exhibits some overlap with another domain. Thus, because it registers highly (approximately .6) on the two factors, there is difficulty in placing it in any one factor. We place EMBREC82 in Factor 1 for two reasons: first, it is fairly highly intercorrelated with the other indicators of diplomatic capability (see Table 6.10) and therefore indexes a national power dimension; second, it is theoretically justifiable as an indicator of diplomatic capability and is thus a valid measure of the concept.
62. Ernst Haas, International Systems: A Behavioral Approach (New York: Chandler Publishing Company, 1974), p. 39.
63. Since contingency generalizations disclose covariation, it is impossible to adequately infer the necessary and sufficient conditions for a given occurrence. See Gregory A. Raymond, "Introduction: Comparative Analysis and Nomological Explanation," Charles W. Kegley, Jr., et al., eds., International Events and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1975), pp. 47-49.
64. Albert M. Liebetrau, op. cit. (1983), p. 88.

CHAPTER SEVEN

DATA ANALYSIS AND SYSTEMATIC FINDINGS

Introduction

In order to arrive at empirical generalizations, the principal objectives of this chapter are twofold: first, to explore the patterns of interactions between West African states and, second, to test theoretical propositions about the determinants of foreign policy behavior in the area.¹ Our initial objective analyzes the systemic behavior of West African states by providing a "mapping" of the wide range of interactions among selected actors in the subregion. Findings at this level will support the major theoretical arguments advanced in the previous sections of this study, especially with respect to the nature of changing patterns of relations in West Africa. In addition to this, we seek to determine whether foreign policy behavior varies systematically with the explanatory or independent variables. With support drawn from existing scientific findings, this chapter aims at providing some explanation as to how and why regional actors behave the way they do toward one another. We seek to determine how much of the variation in interstate interactions is accounted for by the independent variables singly and collectively.²

General Characteristics

Utilizing the events data approach, a total of 4,365 directed events were recorded for a 15-year period for both African and non-African actors alike. This figure represents an average of 291 events per year and 198.41 events per actor (see Table 7.1). Of the total dyadic events, 1,860 events (or 42.61 percent) were initiated exclusively by West African countries towards each other. Table 7.2 shows the distribution of these inter-African events, which represent our measure for the dependent variable (see Table 6.2 in the preceding chapter). As the table indicates, there are substantial inequalities between the states with respect to the number of events initiated by any given state. At one end, Ghana (with 286 events) followed closely by Nigeria (with 270 events) appear to be the most active in this regard. Both states are way ahead the third most active state, Senegal, which has 163 events. Other relatively active states include Liberia (124 events) Guinea (113) Ivory Coast (113) and, surprisingly, Burkina Faso (116) and Gambia (113). Cape Verde (with 36 events) and Guinea-Bissau (with 52 events) are among the least active states in the subregion. This is not too surprising and confirms that significant differences occur between relations in terms of the frequency with which the states initiate foreign policy actions.

Standing apart from this intra-regional picture, data reported in Table 7.3 presents a breakdown of the extra-African dimension of interactions in West Africa. What is immediately evident is the dominance of this sphere of relations in the

Table 7.1

Events Initiated by all 22 Actors (180 months)

Months	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total Events
Years													
1975	22	18	27	17	15	26	31	30	46	33	26	37	328
1976	16	20	3	3	41	50	14	22	14	30	1	12	309
1977	23	26	38	44	40	21	25	27	34	25	25	47	375
1978	30	31	22	29	34	23	38	21	28	43	12	21	332
1979	49	26	31	28	38	14	23	12	17	18	15	24	295
1980	18	29	27	11	26	20	15	22	20	17	9	21	235
1981	5	11	27	28	13	17	21	25	24	14	21	23	229
1982	19	17	15	15	17	15	20	26	14	18	26	8	210
1983	28	23	17	10	16	21	40	16	26	24	26	26	273
1984	23	21	25	43	12	23	37	15	20	21	21	35	296
1985	14	21	30	24	23	17	24	22	13	21	13	20	242
1986	28	29	8	21	18	32	26	28	35	37	29	27	317
1987	24	13	25	28	28	50	32	34	13	14	26	27	314
1988	13	30	26	25	23	27	19	29	26	36	15	36	305
1989	16	20	17	33	28	24	30	31	26	44	21	15	305
Total													4,365

 \bar{x} per actor = 198.41 events

 \bar{x} per year = 291 events

Table 7.2

Events Initiated towards other West African
States (1975-1989)

Years	1975	'76	'77	'78	'79	'80	'81	'82	'83	'84	'85	'86	'87	'88	'89	Total Events
BEN	7	9	6	4	10	1	4	7	8	7	1	6	5	12	6	93
BUR	6	2	1	2	6	4	4	3	20	15	8	19	15	8	3	116
CAP	2	3	3	1	1	3	10	3	1	2	1	1	-	5	-	36
GAM	19	10	9	11	5	5	5	10	8	4	9	8	2	4	4	113
GHA	25	19	31	15	21	18	13	13	19	20	17	24	21	13	17	286
GUI	12	13	7	17	18	7	1	5	3	6	3	8	5	5	3	113
GUB	4	6	3	6	-	6	4	2	3	5	4	-	1	2	6	52
IVO	13	9	24	4	11	6	7	4	3	12	5	5	5	3	2	113
LIB	8	15	4	6	10	13	11	6	7	12	1	6	6	10	9	124
MAL	8	6	5	5	3	4	4	3	8	6	3	10	7	3	4	79
MAU	3	2	7	3	-	6	2	3	3	1	5	1	2	1	11	50
NIG	5	4	9	4	10	4	1	5	4	8	5	3	2	6	4	74
NRA	24	25	22	18	26	16	15	13	16	13	10	15	17	18	22	270
SEN	22	16	17	17	4	7	10	9	5	11	15	5	6	1	18	163
SIE	2	5	5	5	7	3	4	3	3	4	2	7	5	11	7	73
TOG	7	12	9	2	6	5	5	9	8	4	5	12	6	8	7	105
Total	167	156	162	120	138	108	100	98	119	130	94	130	105	110	123	1,860

international politics of the subregion and, by extension, the persistence of political, economic, and cultural dependency. There are 2,505 directed events characterizing this dimension (i.e., representing events initiated by West African states to the non-African powers plus those initiated by the latter countries to West African states). This figure represents a majority - 57.39 percent - of the events in the entire data set. Of this proportion, events initiated by the great powers outweigh events initiated by West African states. In fact, the proportion of events initiated by West African states to those received by them is 901:2,505 (only 35.97 percent) indicating that 64.03 percent were initiated by the great powers within this dimension.

In descending order, the most active external actor in West Africa appears to be France followed by the United States, Britain, West Germany, the Soviet Union, and China. Events received by West African states from the non-African actors, and those initiated by these African states outward, appear to be concentrated mainly on France (i.e., 382 and 210 events respectively). Cantori and Spiegel have long speculated that although several other competitors are moderately active, France is the major intrusive actor in West Africa.³ There has been a distinct rise of U.S. activities in the subregion. The British, however, appear to be less involved in the subregion than one might initially expect.⁴ More than any other external actor, the magnitude of West German activities in West Africa is large especially on the economic front.

The events were coded on a series of dimensions designed to capture various

Table 7.3

Events Initiated and Received by non-African
Powers (1975-1989)

Years States	1975	'76	'77	'78	'79	'80	'81	'82	'83	'84	'85	'86	'87	'88	'89	Total
FRA (sent)	28	16	25	23	13	8	13	16	34	30	25	44	34	32	41	382
(received)	20	18	18	15	15	4	11	9	17	10	11	10	25	17	10	210
FRG	13	8	22	29	16	11	20	6	14	15	19	21	17	28	12	251
	4	6	13	10	8	9	4	5	2	4	5	13	8	10	3	104
PRC	6	15	16	14	13	11	3	7	9	13	10	15	11	11	7	161
	6	6	9	9	5	-	4	6	6	8	9	8	11	5	13	105
UK	22	19	26	28	19	10	11	19	14	24	12	14	22	19	21	280
	13	12	14	14	10	7	8	8	8	14	7	13	8	14	12	162
USA	16	11	33	29	17	26	24	21	13	21	19	12	32	24	26	334
	6	10	11	16	12	18	13	9	12	5	11	13	15	14	6	171
USR	17	18	19	13	9	10	8	4	13	13	11	12	16	13	20	196
	10	14	7	12	10	13	10	2	12	9	9	12	10	8	11	149
Total	161	153	213	212	157	127	129	112	154	166	148	187	209	195	182	2,505

Note: The table indicates for each country: (1) the number of events initiated by extra-African states towards West African states (top figures), and (2) the frequency of events initiated by West African states towards non-African powers (bottom figures).

The following codes are adopted: FRA=France; FRG=West Germany; PRC=China; UK=United Kingdom; USA=United States; and USSR=Soviet Union.

aspects involved in foreign policy actions. Each event was coded according to whether the primary resource used in executing the event was economic, military, or diplomatic, and the relative importance of the various foreign policy issues was investigated. An annual breakdown of the political, economic, social, and military events' types in our data set is presented in Table 7.4 (see Appendices II and III for monthly analyses on the intra-African and extra-African dimensions, respectively). In the international relations of West Africa, economic events are slightly more recurrent (42.98 percent) than political events (39.45 percent). In fact, both events' categories are far ahead of social (12.07 percent) and military (5.5 percent) interactions in the subregion. An examination of the intra-African and the extra-African dimensions is even more revealing. Whereas intra-African events tend to be more political than economic, the extra-African dimension tends to be dominated by economic events. Table 7.5 shows, for example, that the events initiated between West African states are more political (57.53 percent) than economic (27.8 percent). Conversely, Table 7.6 reveals that the proportion of events initiated on the extra-African dimension are more economic (54.25 percent) than political (26.03 percent). A facet of core-periphery relations, the interplay of political and economic conditions has assumed increasing importance in world politics. Ali Mazrui has correctly noted in this regard that African diplomatic thought tends to be aligned along two basic forms of supra-national arrangements: the continental supra-nationality in politics, and the global supra-nationality in economics.⁵ Consequently, since the West African subregion is

TABLE 7.4

**Aggregate Political, Economic, Social, and Military
Events Initiated in West Africa 1975-1989**

Years	Political	Economic	Social	Military
1975	115	150	42	21
1976	115	132	48	14
1977	99	190	62	24
1978	114	156	38	24
1979	116	126	40	13
1980	92	91	39	13
1981	115	83	18	13
1982	121	62	15	12
1983	126	96	32	19
1984	134	111	32	19
1985	108	100	19	15
1986	132	125	39	21
1987	113	155	34	12
1988	109	149	39	8
1989	113	150	30	12
Total	1,722	1,876	527	240
				<hr/>
			Events =	<u>4,365</u>
Percentages	39.45%	42.98%	12.07%	5.50%

TABLE 7.5

**Aggregate Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Intra-African Dimension**

Years	Political	Economic	Social	Military
1975	70	66	21	10
1976	84	53	16	3
1977	52	68	30	12
1978	65	32	17	6
1979	71	45	14	8
1980	62	32	10	4
1981	68	18	8	6
1982	75	19	4	0
1983	81	28	2	8
1984	83	27	14	6
1985	75	15	2	2
1986	82	22	13	13
1987	61	31	8	5
1988	72	20	16	2
1989	69	41	7	6
Total	1,070	517	182	91
Events = <u>1,860</u>				
Percentages	57.53%	27.80%	9.78%	4.89%

TABLE 7.6

Aggregate Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Extra-African Dimension

Years	Political	Economic	Social	Military
1975	45	84	21	11
1976	31	79	32	11
1977	47	122	32	12
1978	49	124	21	18
1979	45	81	26	5
1980	30	59	29	9
1981	47	65	10	7
1982	46	43	11	12
1983	45	68	30	11
1984	51	84	18	13
1985	33	85	17	13
1986	50	103	26	8
1987	52	124	26	7
1988	37	129	23	6
1989	44	109	23	6
Total	652	1,359	345	149
				Events = 2,505
Percentages	26.03%	54.25%	13.77%	5.95%


largely made up of small and weak states, it takes fewer funds to attain influence and this has attracted "a variety of intrusive actors seeking to gain substantial rewards at relatively low cost."⁶

Aggregate Interactions

In addition to the frequencies of action types, more dynamic findings may be reported on the characteristics of the events used in this study. A critic has argued that the pictures presented by the methods of contemporary foreign policy analysis are frozen in time since they typically fail to take account of process at the level of discrete foreign policy actions.⁷ Isolating the scores for West African states from the events data, Graph 7.1 shows the aggregate behavioral path of the 16 ECOWAS states over the 15-year period. Patterned interactions during this period were analyzed on COPDAB's 15-point scale ranging from conflict to cooperation. As discussed in the preceding chapter, conflict and cooperation dimensions may be calculated with data available on both the frequency and the intensity of international behavior (see Chapter 6 for discussion on formula for the dependent variable). One way of assessing the general trend of interactions in the regional subsystem is to plot and monitor both the cooperation and conflict scores, which indicate the behavior exchanged between all the West African states over time. This is depicted graphically in Graph 7.1 where each point represents the DI (Dimension of Interaction) score, identified on the vertical axis, along a time period that is identified on the horizontal

Dimensions of Interaction (Aggregate), 1975 – 1989:
West African Regional Subsystem

GRAPH 7.1



axis. In an effort at description and explanation through structural mapping procedure, events' indices for cooperation and conflict were employed in conjunction with graphic structuring process.

What is immediately evident is the considerable variation in the volume of interactions over the last 15 years. There have been higher levels of interactions in the 1970s relative to the 1980s, thus indicating decreased interactions over time. This trend in the dynamic foreign policy behavior of the West African subregion is in support of our major thesis. To be even more specific, cooperative Dis have been unstable and declining gradually over the period. Cooperative interactions constitute the majority of the international interactive behavior of West African states. Indeed, conflictual Dis have been relatively insignificant and consistently lower than cooperative Dis with occasional peaks in such moments of systemic crises as in 1975, 1981, 1986, and 1989. Overall, the trend line indicates that there is a moderately negative relationship between the cooperative and conflictual DI scores recorded for the regional subsystem ($r = -.463$), which is statistically significant at the .05 level ($p = .041$).⁸ Thus, 21 percent of the variation in conflict in West Africa can be explained by knowledge about cooperation in the subregion.

The conflicts of 1975 concentrated mainly on political disputes between Mali and Burkina Faso which later resulted in war. Those of 1981 concerned political differences between Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, and more importantly, the adverse consequences of the widespread deportation of Ghanaian immigrants. Reports of a second war between Mali and Burkina Faso and the continued deportation of

Ghanaian immigrants from Nigeria, Benin, and Togo, were mainly responsible for the high volume of conflicts in 1986. Finally, in 1989, the deportation of Ghanaians continued unabated leading to political tensions between states. Furthermore, Senegal was embroiled in a series of conflicts: border clashes and political antagonism with Mauritania; border (maritime) disputes with Guinea-Bissau; and political tensions with Gambia. The latter conflict led to the freezing of the Senegambian confederation and the withdrawal of Senegalese military assistance from Gambia. As was argued in the substantive and theoretical portions of this study, there appears to be a decline in cohesion within the West African regional subsystem in the 1980s. The assumption here is that increased cooperation and reduced conflict among coalition members indicates cohesion, and vice-versa. Apparently, in West Africa, cooperation was higher in the 1970s than in the 1980s, and less conflict occurred in the 1970s than in the 1980s.

One reason for the high cooperative DI scores from the mid to late 1970s was the relatively buoyant economies of many of the states concerned, compared with the economic disasters that characterized the 1980s. For Nigeria, a major actor in the area, this meant a sudden decrease in oil revenues and for Ghana, Ivory Coast, and many other states, it signified a rapid decline in surpluses generated by the economies (especially export markets). Changes in the post-ECOWAS period have not taken place in a straight linear fashion and there are ups and downs in the trend. However, it is clear that the overall direction, indeed the basic trend, is that the general optimism of the early 1970s which triggered off considerable elite interactions (and

which, consequently, culminated in the creation of the formal regional alliance, ECOWAS, in 1975), appear to have decreased steadily throughout the 1980s with little or no resource to support the desire for regional collaboration.


Selected Dyadic Relations

In addition to charting regional trends, events research also lends itself to making very rich dyadic profiles of behavior exchanged by specific states over time. Isolating dyadic actors, it appears that the systemic trend described above persists especially in those interactions involving the larger actors in the subregion. For example, a plot of the DI from Ghana to Ivory Coast reveals that interactions (especially cooperative interactions) tended to be higher in the 1970s than in the 1980s. In the 1980s, cooperative interactions dropped significantly, exacerbated by the sporadic rise in conflictual interactions during 1981-1982 (see Graph 7.2). Expressed in statistical terms, however, the relationship between the cooperative and the conflictual DI scores initiated by Ghana to Ivory Coast is negative, low ($r = -.197$), and insignificant ($p = .241$) at the .05 level. Likewise, plotting the DI scores for Ivory Coast to Ghana revealed similar trends - higher cooperative interactions in the mid-1970s and lower in the 1980s (see Graph 7.3). A similar trend exists for the DI scores from Ghana to Nigeria, although more recently, cooperation appears to have risen sharply especially towards the end of the 1980s (see Graph 7.4).⁹

It is important to note, however, that for good reasons, there are several


Dimensions of Interaction, 1975 – 1989:
Ghana to Ivory Coast

GRAPH 7.2




Dimensions of Interaction, 1975 – 1989:
Ivory Coast to Ghana

GRAPH 7.3



Dimensions of Interaction, 1975 – 1989:
Ghana to Nigeria

GRAPH 7.4



exceptions to the general trends outlined above. For instance, cooperative interactions between Senegal and Gambia have tended to represent exceptions to these systemic trends. The interactions here appear to be bell-shaped. As Graph 7.5 shows it, cooperative interactions were generally low in the years 1975-1980, rose rapidly after 1981 until they reached a peak, in 1982, with the formation of the most celebrated Senegambian confederation (which is currently dormant or frozen). Although the difference is hardly substantial, Senegal does appear more likely than Gambia to initiate cooperative behavior in the loose confederation. Cooperative interactions have decreased between the two actors from the mid to late 1980s (see Graph 7.5). Expressed in statistical terms, there is a very strong positive relationship between the cooperative DI scores of the two actors directed towards one another ($r = .949$), which is significant at the .001 level ($p = .000$). Notably, interaction studies are undertaken to show that the behavior of one actor is somehow contingent upon the behavior of another or that both actors are mutually dependent. This notion of mutual cross-actor dependence underlies the strong positive patterns observed in Graph 7.5.


Another interesting exception to the general systemic trend in West Africa is evident in the cooperative interactions between Burkina Faso and Ghana which was initially quite low from 1975-1982, but which increased rapidly thereafter. In this case, it is obvious that elite collaboration between the leaders of the two states contributed in no small measure to the dynamics of cooperative interactions which reached its zenith, in 1987, but dropped significantly thereafter with the assassination of the Burkinabe leader, Thomas Sankara, later that year (see Graph 7.6).

Cooperative and friendly interactions are usually greatest among ideologically compatible allies that share similar value constructs. Comparing the behavior patterns of the two nations exhibit a marked symmetry on several counts. Both nations are equally likely to initiate behavior (or remain inactive) following periods (years) when both are inactive. Ghana does appear more likely than Burkina Faso to initiate cooperative behavior although except for 1985 the difference is hardly a substantial one. The association in this Ghana-Burkina Faso case is very strong and positive ($r = .954$), and the relationship is statistically significant at the .001 level ($p = .000$). Thus, this specific example is a useful case study of the role of elite perceptions and collaboration in the contemporary foreign policies of West African states.

The cases examined above were selected primarily because they are the most interesting in the contemporary foreign policy behavior of West African states. These cases also comprise highly interactive dyads whose mutual relations are likely to be familiar to most analysts of African foreign policy behavior. Finally, the dyadic profiles are restricted to six actors because of the need for comprehensiveness and analytical coherence. What is learned in this respect are basically threefold. First, the interactions between West African states show that there were much higher levels of interactions in the 1970s relative to the 1980s, thus indicating in support of our thesis, decreased interactions between the ECOWAS states over time. At this aggregate level, the relationship between conflict and cooperation for the subsystem is moderate, negative, and statistically significant. Second, this thesis is supported


Dimensions of Interaction, 1975 – 1989:
Senegal and Gambia

GRAPH 7.5



Dimensions of Interaction, 1975 – 1989:
Burkina Faso and Ghana

GRAPH 7.6



further by the fact that dyadic charts of the major actors in the subregion - Ghana, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria - reveal that interactions between them tended to be higher in the 1970s than in the 1980s. The logic is that since most of the events are initiated and received by these actors, their behavior towards each other tend to reflect the general systemic trend. Finally, where dyadic relationships involve at least one small actor (e.g., Burkina Faso or Gambia) one observes exceptions to the systemic trend. For instance, cooperative interactions in the Senegal-Gambia dyad show that interactions were low in the 1970s (when they were high for the regional subsystem) and rose rapidly in the early to mid-1980s (whereas they declined for the subsystem). Similarly, for the Ghana-Burkina Faso dyad, cooperative interactions were low in the 1970s but rose rapidly thereafter towards the mid-1980s.

Bivariate Relationships: The Effects of National Attributes on Foreign Policy Behavior

In addition to systematically mapping out the interactions between West African states, the next major objective in this chapter is to identify the several sources of foreign policy behavior in the subregion and to estimate how the resources and capabilities of these states affect their range of external output behavior. Much of the theoretical insights comprise the impact of policy-making and domestic constraints (including psychological factors) on the foreign policies of states. These have already been dealt with extensively in the previous chapters. In Chapter 2, we utilized aspects of distinct but mutually complementary approaches to the study of foreign policy behavior. These multi-level and multi-variable explanations of international

behavior, we argued, are represented in the general systems theory, the power theory, and the decision making approach. From these frameworks, we argued that government decision makers, on the basis of their appraisal of domestic conditions, implement actions which they expect will maximize national policy goals within the international environment. Before undertaking a planned initiative, decision makers analyze the capability or power potentiality of their states vis-a-vis other states within the context of an international milieu and relative to the states directly affected.

In Chapter 3, we presented a conceptual and narrative account of the quest for cooperation by African leaders in West Africa, by analyzing the historical role of leaders' ideology and power configurations in the evolution of interstate interactions in the area. We argued that national resources (especially economic resources) influence the perceptions of decision makers about the power status of their country and its implications for foreign policy. Similar to the case of cocoa for Ghana in the 1950s and 1960s, the beginning of international energy and economic crises coupled with the sudden surge in oil prices after 1973, had influenced the perceptions of Nigerian decision makers about the power status of the country and its implications for African foreign policy. Indeed, the establishment of ECOWAS was due principally to the changing economic status of Nigeria as the dominant economic power in the West African subregion; contrary to the quiet, cautious, and conservative policies in the 1960s, Nigeria's change in the level of commitment in African and global diplomacy became particularly more obvious and accentuated in the 1970s with a new tempo of leadership characterized by a more assertive and

vigorous regime. Construed more broadly, in this section, amongst other research matters, we basically attempt to test empirically the hypothesized relationships between several key national attributes and external behavior. In addition, the section evaluates the combination of explanatory variables that account for observable behavior at the systemic level. As specified in Chapter 6, in terms of testing our major research propositions, the major national attributes in this study are taken from data for 1982 which represents the mid-point of the 15-year period in which data for the dependent variable are collected. Needless to say, these tested propositions have implications that go beyond the West African subregion and were generated principally through an extensive review of the relevant theoretical literature.

The next portion of our study develops two parallels of analysis. First, it investigates the bivariate associations specified in our research propositions in Chapter 2. In this regard, we will use indices of items grouped on the basis of six independent variables presented for 1982, namely, size, wealth, the level of development, military capability, diplomatic capability, and contiguity (see Tables 6.7 and 6.10). The analysis here is restricted to clusters that are based upon concepts formulated in Chapter 2 and, as indicated by data presented in Chapter 6, the various indices of these items are mostly highly intercorrelated. Second, to probe more complex multivariate relationships (through such techniques as multiple regression and partial correlation analyses), the three major dimensions of the factor analysis in Table 6.10 are adopted. It is argued here that in addition to reconciling our theoretical proposals with empirical reality, the dimensions of power, development,

and contiguity, help reduce potential problems of multicollinearity in our research. Since many of their indices intercorrelate highly, size, wealth, military capability, and diplomatic capability are eventually indexed into a much broader power dimension.

Size and Interstate Interactions

The proposition here simply states that the population size of a state is a determinant of its level of interactions with other states in the international system. This proposition reinforces the notion that more populated states tend to monopolize the benefits of regional cooperation, especially where one considers such issues as the likely effects of the international migration of labor. Due to the necessity for large manpower and human resources to engage in foreign adventures and imperial expansion, a positive relationship may be expected between population size and a nation's foreign conflict behavior. The pressures of population growth may increase the opportunities for anxieties and friction which may, in turn, lead to war. Conversely, larger states may spearhead unity thereby becoming major driving forces behind efforts at cooperation. Although most studies on this proposition find a relationship between the two variables, it remains unclear as to whether the relationship is positive or negative.

Analyzing African states, Patrick McGowan finds a positive relationship between large population (and territory) and a state's interactions measured in terms of political, economic, and military activities.¹⁰ In like manner, in his empirical investigation, C. F. Alger also finds a positive (albeit low) relationship between

population size and the interactions of delegates in a committee of the UN,¹¹ and Rummel's research on the foreign policy behavior of 82 states in 1955, show that size (and density) are two of the five factors which account for most of a nation's voting in the UN.¹² In terms of analyzing foreign policy conflict behavior, the Feierabands find in their analysis of 84 nations from 1955 to 1961, that the size of a country is positively related to foreign conflict for "high modern" and "low modern" nations,¹³ and Choucri and North find that there is a direct relationship between population size (and technology) and international violence for Britain, Germany, and, to a lesser extent, France between 1870 and 1914.¹⁴

Deutsch reports, on the contrary, a negative correlation between population (and territorial) size and interstate interactions defined and operationalized in terms of trade and mail flows for 71 states in the mid-1950's.¹⁵ In addition, this finding was later supported in studies of international integration by Deutsch and Eckstein in one study¹⁶ and by Deutsch, Bliss, and Eckstein in another study.¹⁷ The Feierabands also report in their study of 84 nations that the size of a country is negatively related to foreign conflict for "mid-modern" nations.¹⁸

The population size of West African states has a strong positive correlation ($r = .661$) with interstate interactions in the regional subsystem. In addition, this association is significant at the .01 level (see Table 7.7). This revelation confirms the first proposition in our study. But whereas the proposition is confirmed for the West African subregion, it may not necessarily reflect the reality of the global system at

Table 7.7

Correlation Coefficients Between the Independent Variables and Events Initiated (Interactions) to West African states

Independent Variables (1982)	Pearson's r
1. POPULATION SIZE	.661
2. Gross National Product	.617
3. Gross Domestic Product	.824
4. Contributions to ECOWAS Funds	.782
5. Gross National Product/capita	.406 ^a
6. Gross Domestic Product/capita	.772
7. Commercial Energy Consumption/capita	.334 ^a
8. Missions Received/West African States	.772
9. Missions Sent/West African states	.826
10. Missions Received/Other African states	.642
11. Missions Received/Non-African states	.838
12. Size of the Military	.588
13. Annual Military Expenditure	.595
14. CONTIGUITY	.012 ^a
15. ECONOMIC STRENGTH/WEALTH (2 + 3 + 4)	.734
16. LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT (5 + 6 + 7)	.790
17. DIPLOMATIC CAPABILITY (8 + 9 + 10 + 11)	.828
18. MILITARY CAPABILITY (12 + 13)	.595

^a

not significant at the .05 level.
Others significant at the .01 level or better.
major variables in capital letters.

large. There are many developed states with moderate populations but engaged in fairly intensive interactions. Conversely, one could argue that most underdeveloped states with teeming populations are unlikely to interact effectively in the global system where they may encounter economic powers with smaller populations, but possessing greater global capabilities.

Economic Source Variables and Foreign Policy

The effect of economic variables on foreign policy behavior has been a relatively neglected area of research that analysts should endeavor to investigate more extensively. To what extent, for example, do such independent variables as the wealth (or economic strength) of states on the one hand, or their level of economic development on the other, affect cooperative or conflictual behavior in the international system? Some studies suggest that there is no relationship between the level of economic development and a nation's foreign conflict behavior. For instance, Richardson measures conflict in terms of deadly quarrels and finds no correlation between economic development and 300 deadly quarrels between 1820 and 1945.¹⁹ Choucri and North support the proposition in their analysis of the members of the Triple Entente and Triple Alliance between 1870 and 1914.²⁰ Rummel's study of 77 nations for the period 1955-1957²¹ and his earlier study of 82 nations for 1955²² operationalize the variables in this proposition using the DON data and find no relationship between them. Similarly, East and Gregg find in their study of 82 nations that economic development is not related to either conflict or cooperation.²³

In his study of 82 states in the international system, Rummel finds that economic development is one of the two major factors (the other being size) accounting for the activity of states. Accordingly, he concludes that: "The more economically developed and larger a nation is, the more it will be active in the international system."²⁴ Similarly, Moore's study of 119 states in 1963 supports Rummel,²⁵ and Haas concludes in his analysis of about 70 nations that "Rich countries have more foreign conflict than more of the economically developing nations of the world."²⁶ But Salmore and Hermann contradict these studies, finding that economic development does not explain much of the variance in the activities of 76 states during 1966 and 1967.²⁷

Although Patrick McGowan supports the proposition that economically developed states are more likely to be active in the international system than less economically developed ones, he uses a different approach. He categorizes the types of foreign policy activity of 30 African nations for 1963 and 1964 and finds that states with the highest levels of economic development tend to be "active-independent" states, those with intermediate levels of development tend to be "transitional" states, and those with low levels of development tend to be "inactive-dependent" states.²⁸ Earlier, in an analysis of 32 African states between 1963 and 1965, McGowan had measured interaction along political, economic, and military dimensions and had found that the more highly developed states are high interactors and the less developed ones are low interactors.²⁹

In addition, there are studies that attempt to estimate the effect of economic

development on interactions and voting behavior in the UN. For example, many studies find that nations with greater levels of economic development are more likely to interact and vote more frequently in the UN General Assembly (and in selected committees). For 96 nations in 1962, Alger finds that there is a moderately strong relationship ($\rho = .53$) between GNP per capita and the interaction of delegates in the UN Fifth Committee.³⁰ Rummel concludes, in his 82-nation study of the General Assembly session of 1955, that "Economic development is the single most important determinant of U.N. voting behavior,"³¹ and Vincent finds, in a study covering about 100 nations for the early 1960s, that "'Economic Development' is the most important predictor" of a nation's voting in the UN.³²

Although both variables are hypothesized to be positively associated with interstate interactions, a distinction is drawn in this study between economic strength (also defined as wealth) and the level of economic development (or modernization). As specified before, economic strength is measured through such conventional attribute data as the GNP, the GDP, and FUND (see Chapter 6). However, these indicators are considered invalid measures of the level of economic development because they negate the salient impact of population on the real income of states. We have thus included a different set of categories for the level of economic development. More sensitive to the effects of population on national income, these indicators include the GNP per capita, the GDP per capita, and the commercial energy consumption per capita of West African states.

When separately considered, the various indicators of our economic strength

variable are each positively correlated with interstate interactions albeit to varying degrees. Both GNP ($r = .617$) and GDP ($r = .824$) are highly associated with interactions. Whereas GNP is correlated at the .01 level, GDP is associated with interactions at the .001 level of statistical significance. In addition, clearly, memberstates' contributions to the FUNDING of the subregional economic community (ECOWAS) is highly correlated with interactions ($r = .782$) and the relationship is more significant at the .001 level. Finally, our composite measure of economic strength in this study, WEALTH, is strongly and positively correlated with international interactions in West Africa ($r = .734$). The relationship is also statistically significant at the .001 level.

For the third proposition in this study, when the various indicators of economic development are analyzed separately, the GDP per capita is the most strongly correlated with interstate interactions ($r = .772$). This positive relationship is also significant at the .001 level. GNP per capita ($r = .406$) and commercial energy consumption per capita ($r = .334$) are more weakly associated with interactions and the relationships are not statistically significant (at the .05 level). The various indicators here generally support our theoretical position in terms of directionality, but less so in terms of the strength of the relationships. Finally, the combined measure of the level of economic development variable is fairly strongly correlated with interactions ($r = .790$). This relationship is positive as hypothesized, and it is statistically significant at the .001 level.

In terms of statistical associations, an explanation for the relatively weaker set

of correlations presented for Gross National Product per capita and Commercial Energy Consumption per capita may be that economic modernization may actually tend to overemphasize the effect of population on foreign policy spending and implementation. Since foreign policy concerns a public good, states with great economic resources and even larger populations (i.e., possibly weak income per capita) may still spend more on foreign policy than states with fewer economic resources but with even smaller populations (i.e., with fairly strong income per capita). In this sense, the relationship between per capita income and foreign policy activism may be more complex than is ordinarily assumed. Nevertheless, our basic proposition that economic modernization is positively associated with interstate interactions is generally confirmed.

Military Preparedness and Foreign Policy Behavior

The proposition here is that there is a relationship between the military power of a state and its foreign policy behavior. States with greater military capabilities are more likely to interact in the international system than states with less. Equating international relations with the concept of international conflict, most studies here have tended to investigate the relationship between the military power of a state and its foreign conflict behavior. There is thus a dearth of studies on the relationship between military power and interstate cooperative behavior. But there appears to be a positive correlation between the relative military power of a state and its warlikeness. The Correlates of War (COW) project on wars between 1816 and 1965 found that the

major powers have been the most likely to engage in war during this period.³³ Other studies have looked at several types of conflict besides war. For example, measuring the independent variable as "military preparedness" for 84 nations in the period 1955 to 1961, the Feierabends find a positive correlation with foreign conflict for the "high modern" states,³⁴ and Keim examines about 100 nations for 1963 in terms of conflict "uniqueness" and finds that nations with more unique conflict patterns are those with higher total military expenditures ($\tau = .419$), higher military expenditure as a percentage of GNP ($\tau = .295$), and a higher percentage of the population in the armed forces ($\tau = .263$).³⁵ Correlating military power with non-violent conflict behavior, Weede finds that "powerful states tend to engage in much more verbal foreign conflict activity than powerless states"³⁶ and Chadwick finds, in an analysis of 64 nations using DON data for 1955, that "nations with large force capabilities tend to engage in more diplomatic conflict than do nations with small force capabilities."³⁷

Operationalizing military power in terms of defense expenditures, it has also been suggested that a rise in the defense budget may be positively related to disintegration and insecurity in the international system. For example, in Smoker's studies of defense expenditures during the arms races before both world wars and during the Cold War, he finds a negative feedback between defense expenditure and international integration as measured by the number of NGOs formed annually.³⁸ Conversely, several studies have posited a negative relationship between different indicators of military capability and various dimensions of foreign policy behavior. In

a study of arms races before both world wars and between 1948 and 1962, Smoker finds that "a rise in defense expenditure does not necessarily imply an increase in tension in the whole system."³⁹ Similarly, Rummel finds little relationship between national power and foreign conflict behavior for 77 nations from 1955 to 1957,⁴⁰ and by using the same data on 59 nations, Weede finds, when controlling for verbal conflict, that the more powerful states tend to be involved in less violent conflict activity.⁴¹ Especially in relations between developing states, one would expect small defense allocations to be associated with low levels of international violence. Touval finds, for example, that the lack of military capability of Morocco and Somalia contributed to the containment of the border disputes in which they were involved in the 1960s.⁴²

When the various elements of military capability are considered individually, annual military expenditure is strongly related to interactions ($r = .595$). So is the size of the military ($r = .588$). Both relationships are statistically significant at the .01 level. The composite measure of military capability is strongly and positively associated with interstate interactions in West Africa ($r = .595$). The relationship is statistically significant at the .01 level.

The Effect of Diplomatic Capability

The diplomatic importance (or capability) of states has been analyzed both as a dependent variable and as an independent variable in foreign policy research.

Analyzing it as a dependent variable, for example, O'Leary finds in his study of 100

nations in the 1960s, that there is a strong relationship between the level of a country's development and the size of its diplomatic establishment.⁴³ An alternative proposition, however, is that there is a relationship between the level of diplomatic influence a state has (a measure of its national power as indicated by the number of diplomats and diplomatic missions) and its level of interactions in the international system. This makes conceptual sense because states that send and receive high amounts of diplomats and missions also tend to be more powerful diplomatically. In short, the bigger and more modern a state is, the greater the diplomatic resources decision makers have available for use in the conduct of foreign affairs. Testing this diplomatic capability assumption on a specific aspect of interstate interactions (i.e., the foreign conflict behavior of states) Singer finds that the level of power capability and diplomatic importance and the rates of change in these variables together account for 72 percent of the variance in the amount of war initiated in each half-decade of the period 1816-1965.⁴⁴

In terms of foreign policy successes, McKenna finds that the nature of the diplomatic bureaucracy and expertise of an actor affects the likelihood of success of that nation's acts.⁴⁵ David Johns argues that interstate interactions (specifically integration) are influenced by diplomatic activity⁴⁶ and Vincent Khapoya finds a positive relationship ($r = .504$) between African diplomatic activity (measured by the number of African embassies) and a specific foreign policy dimension (i.e., the decision to support national liberation movements).⁴⁷ More generally, McGowan and O'Leary have suggested that the organizational features of a state's foreign policy

establishment (measured by the average size of its diplomatic mission) is a source variable determining foreign policy behavior.⁴⁸ It may further be stated that the nature of the foreign policy bureaucracy of a target nation affects the success of acts directed by another state at that nation.

The fifth proposition in this study states that countries with greater diplomatic capabilities are more likely to interact in the international system than countries with less. When the empirical indicators of the diplomatic capability variable are analyzed in separate ways, diplomatic missions sent to West African states ($r = .826$) and missions received from the subregion ($r = .772$) are positively associated with interstate interactions. So is the missions received from non-African states indicator ($r = .838$). The three associations are statistically significant at the .001 level. However, as an indicator of diplomatic capability, missions received from other African states is less strongly correlated ($r = .642$) with interstate interactions in West Africa. This is also fairly less significant at the .01 level. The aggregate measure of the diplomatic capability variable is strongly and positively related with interactions in the subregion ($r = .828$). This association is statistically significant at the .001 level.

Geographical Contiguity and Interstate Behavior

The final proposition in this study involves a variable - a characteristic of the international system - that influences foreign policy from outside the boundaries of the state. For instance, East and Gregg have demonstrated in their study that nations'

actions are systematically related to their international situation.⁴⁹ The interested researcher may therefore proceed beyond the boundaries of the state and search for variations in the international environment that may explain foreign policy behavior. Indeed, many theorists, such as those in the geopolitical school, have considered international system variables as major determinants of foreign policy behavior. Although the assumption that geographical distance influences interstate interactions has not been rigorously tested, the argument for its plausibility remains in pitting cases against each other in order to support (or, alternatively, refute) the regional imperatives to cooperation.

Don Munton operationalizes geographical distance between nations by grouping state actors within the same regional proximate.⁵⁰ However, the most general finding relating to the contiguity proposition was presented by Roger Cobb and Charles Elder who, in their impressive work on 210 dyads in the North Atlantic region (1952-1964) and 1,176 dyads in the global system (1955), found a positive relationship between geographical proximity and what they call "mutual relevance" especially in dyads with a common boundary.⁵¹ Karl Deutsch presents the only disconfirming finding of this proposition in his research covering 15 North Atlantic states (for the years 1890, 1913, 1938, 1954) and 106 nations in the wider global system (1938, 1954), where he concluded that "geographic proximity has only limited effects on the distribution of international trade."⁵² Studying specific types of interaction on over 100 nations for 1962-1964, Brams finds that geographic proximity is one of two most dominating influences in structuring the transaction flow of

subgroups for trade, diplomatic exchanges, and shared IGO memberships.⁵³

Similarly, using the World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS) data for 452 dyads between 1966 and 1969, Kegley finds that geographic distance is related to the acts nations direct at each other, but more so when those acts "affective" than when they are "participatory."⁵⁴

Other studies have tested the more specific proposition that geographic contiguity tends to increase a state's involvement in foreign conflict. Weede's research using DON data for 59 nations for the period 1955-1960 shows that "nations contiguous to many other nations are likely to participate in more violent foreign conflict than geographically isolated states."⁵⁵ In this specific finding, he is supported by the research of Richardson and Wright on war. Richardson asserts that geographic relations may affect a nation's war-proneness since "States have tended to become involved in wars in proportion to the number of states with which they have common frontiers." He then modifies this statement by concluding that "The actual occurrence of war has been far less than would be expected from the opportunities for war presented by geographical contiguity. Such occurrences have been even less, proportionately, as the opportunities for war have increased through the advance of air and sea power."⁵⁶ Wright finds in his study that "geographic frontiers marking the transition from one economy to another have often been the scene of war," so that international stability is promoted by a moderate geographic separation of states having differences with each other.⁵⁷ By suggesting little correlation between the number of borders with other nations and foreign conflict behavior, Rummel's

research on 164 and 182 dyads in 1955 provides the only disconfirming finding to the proposition.⁵⁸

Rittberger modifies the general contiguity proposition by controlling for the level of industrial technology. Studying 17 regional groupings in the mid-1960's, he finds that at lower levels of industrial technology, geographical distance is negatively related to multinational cooperation, but at higher levels, distance ceases to become an obstacle.⁵⁹ The direct and obvious implication here is that with increasing communication between nations, geographical distance may be expected to exert less and less influence on all kinds of interactions. Although geographical proximity may be a predictor of the volume of transactions between states, it does appear that technological advancements have reduced the propinquity factor in importance throughout the twentieth century.

As already indicated, the final proposition in this study attempts to associate geographical contiguity (measured as the number of international borders in West Africa) with interstate interactions. The suspicion is that this will reveal a positive relationship. The greater the number of international borders a state shares within a regional grouping, the more it will use its geographical accessibility to interact with its neighbors. Although sounding plausible, the result of our analysis is not very supportive of our assumption. Geographical contiguity has little or no relationship ($r = .012$) with interstate interactions and the association is not statistically significant at the .05 level. In this case, the regression line appears to be almost horizontal. Consequently, the geographical contiguity variable is considered to be the least potent

in the several source variables presented in this study. But this lack of statistical association between geographical contiguity and foreign policy behavior does not necessarily imply that there is no relationship between the variables; the impact may simply not be as systematic nor as direct as it was expected.

Lagged Bivariate Relations and the Effects of an "Outlier"

In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the lagged analysis of observational data as behavioral scientists in the various fields have focused increasingly on the dynamic processes of social interaction.⁶⁰ In a conventional sense, lags can be specified as successive units of time in terms of the occurrence of phenomena. To investigate the issues that arise in correlations in the instance where observations range over time, the relationships between the independent and dependent variables in our study were replicated for different periods. Tables 7.8 - 7.10 present cross-sectional relationships between the variables at different time periods. The behavior of West African states is lagged for three 5-year periods during the 1970s and 1980s (i.e., 1975-1979, 1980-1984, and 1985-1989) to introduce a time element. How stable are the patterns across time? In other words, if the data are subdivided into smaller time intervals, would the same pattern exist in most time periods?

Table 7.8 presents evidence that support the argument that national attributes at t affect international interactions at $t + 1$. The empirical results show that in terms

TABLE 7.8

Bivariate Correlations Between Independent Variables (1977)
and Events Initiated to West African States
at Different Points in Time

	(Excluding Nigeria)				(Including Nigeria)			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
POP77	.657	.652	.718	.737	.651	.606	.634	.674
GNP77	.771	.696	.629	.773	.658	.604	.614	.670
GDP77	.405	.162	-.000	.236	.635	.534	.530	.615
FUND77	.719	.667	.554	.715	.773	.720	.691	.780
GNPK77	.681	.569	.411	.620	.777	.688	.580	.737
GDPK77	.184	-.067	-.300	-.036	.252	.036	-.149	.077
ENERGY77	.315	.288	-.000	.233	.220	.212	-.037	.149
EMBREC77	.766	.458	.414	.628	.824	.589	.561	.724
EMBSNT77	.814	.417	.485	.662	.867	.573	.629	.762
EMBRAF77	.674	.357	.378	.543	.773	.535	.557	.685
EMBRNA77	.687	.374	.491	.592	.752	.508	.601	.682
MISIZE77	.511	.411	.501	.526	.594	.541	.566	.607
MIEXP77	.394	.377	.453	.446	.580	.532	.555	.595
CONTIG	.197	.125	.171	.186	.026	-.017	.015	.012
WEALTH77	.680	.531	.420	.616	.657	.584	.597	.661
DEVT77	.482	.318	.083	.347	.570	.435	.255	.467
DIPCAP77	.778	.422	.496	.651	.839	.572	.631	.749
MILCAP77	.414	.386	.464	.461	.581	.533	.556	.596

a not statistically significant. * Significant at .05 level; others significant at .01 level or better
1=EVNT7579 (1975-79); 2=EVNT8084 (1980-84); 3=EVNT8589 (1985-89); and 4=EVINITWA (1975-89)

TABLE 7.9

Bivariate Correlations Between Independent Variables (1982)
and Events Initiated to West African States
at Different Points in Time

	(Excluding Nigeria)			(Including Nigeria)		
	1	2	3	1	2	3
POP82	.630	.676	.724	.592	.617	.661
GNP82	.380 ^a	.286 ^a	.477	.549	.560	.617
GDP82	.807	.809	.873	.753	.775	.824
FUND82	.672	.556 [*]	.719	.722	.692	.782
GNPK82	.075 ^a	-.098 ^a	.128 ^a	.339 ^a	.228 ^a	.406 ^a
GDPK82	.804 ^a	.782 ^a	.868 ^a	.749 ^a	.720 ^a	.772 ^a
ENERGY82	.417 [*]	.190 [*]	.355	.398	.203	.334
EMBREC82	.481 [*]	.440 [*]	.679	.619	.594	.772
EMBSNT82	.509 ^a	.522 ^a	.724 ^a	.672 [*]	.689 [*]	.826
EMBRAF82	.258	.187 [*]	.380	.538	.513	.642
EMBRNA82	.603 ^a	.524 ^a	.746 ^a	.730 [*]	.694 [*]	.838
MISIZE82	-.057 ^a	-.034 ^a	.134 ^a	.495 [*]	.519 [*]	.588
MIEXP82	.216 ^a	.105 ^a	.338 ^a	.528 ^a	.542 ^a	.595 ^a
CONTIG	.125	.171	.186	-.017	.015	.012
WEALTH82	.775	.749	.851	.659	.680	.734
DEVT82	.745 [*]	.651 [*]	.806	.757	.676	.790
DIPCAP82	.556 ^a	.492 ^a	.728 ^a	.703 [*]	.676 [*]	.828
MILCAP82	.169	.081	.307	.527	.541	.595

^a not statistically significant. ^{*} Significant at .05 level; others significant at .01 or better.
1=EVNT8084 (1980-84); 2=EVNT8589 (1985-89); 3=EVINITWA (1975-89).

TABLE 7.10

Bivariate Correlations Between Independent Variables (1987)
and Events Initiated to West African States

	(Excluding Nigeria)	(Including Nigeria)
		EVNT8589
POP87	.692 ^a	.612
GNP87	.377 [*]	.594
GDP87	.536 [*]	.584
FUND87	.513 ^a	.676
GNPK87	-.073 ^a	-.046 [*]
GDPK87	.135 ^a	.427 ^a
ENERGY87	-.074 ^a	.119
EMBREC87	.415 ^a	.586
EMBSNT87	.422 ^a	.641 [*]
EMBRAF87	.067 [*]	.428
EMBRNA87	.443 ^a	.641
MISIZE87	.133 ^a	.549
MIEXP87	.106 ^a	.405 ^a
CONTIG	.171 [*]	.015 ^a
WEALTH87	.461 ^a	.589 ^a
DEVT87	.007 ^a	.223
DIPCAP87	.403 ^a	.622
MILCAP87	.119 ^a	.502

^a not statistically significant. ^{*} Significant at .05 level; others significant at .01 level or better.

of directionality the associations between the variables are mostly positive. Analyzing with attribute data for 1977, the correlations with interactions (i.e., events initiated between 1975-1989) support our earlier results (in Table 7.7). Our research propositions are still confirmed even when allowing for time lags and there are little or no changes in the structure of the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. The strength of most of the associations are generally similar although analyzing with attribute data for 1977, GNP tended to have more impact on interactions, while GDP and the development indicators (i.e., GDP per capita and energy consumption per capita) produced very low correlations.

The correlations between the variables of West African states are still generally similar when the indicators are lagged for different periods, and there is a general tendency for the associations to continue into the next period in a self-reproducing pattern. However, there are distinct changes. In general, when interactions are subdivided into three 5-year periods,⁶¹ correlations between the attributes and interactions in the 1970s tend to be greater than associations between the same attributes and the future values of interactions in the early 1980s.⁶² In Table 7.8, associations tend to be stronger when national attributes are correlated with interactions between 1975-1979 (EVNT7579) than when they are correlated with events initiated between 1980-1984 (EVNT8084).⁶³ For instance, the relationship between population and EVNT7579 is strong ($r = .651$) but this association reduces slightly during the second 5-year period covering 1980-1984 ($r = .606$). Similarly, for GNP, GDP, and FUND, correlations with EVNT7579 are strong ($r = .658, .635,$

and .773 respectively) although these associations reduce somewhat ($r = .604, .534,$ and $.720$ respectively) during 1980-1984. This finding is significant especially where one considers that in a 5-year time period the impact of attributes on behavior should be maximally felt. Indeed, this empirical trend persists for all the statistical indicators in Table 7.8 thus generally supporting a major theoretical argument in this study; the period of foreign policy activism in the 1970s was replaced by one of relative passivity in the 1980s. Note, however, that contrary to our position, associations increase again in the mid to late 1980s.⁶⁴

Whenever one is dealing with a small sample, a single score can cause substantial changes in the empirical results. Consequently, statistical results that are derived from such small numbers may be termed "unstable" and therefore subject to considerable suspicion.⁶⁵ Since data for our independent variables may be skewed by the very large figures for Nigeria, the analyses were repeated without that specific case to check for correlations that may be reported falsely. Although clearly justifiable on theoretical grounds, a deviant case that lies outside data distribution may be temporarily eliminated for analytical purposes since such outlier may actually distort correlations.⁶⁶ As expected, in general, many of the bivariate associations decreased slightly with the exclusion of Nigeria thus supporting the argument by some scholars of the existence of a core state in the regional subsystem. It has been argued that because of its power, wealth, and huge size, Nigeria's presence in ECOWAS has established her as a strong core state in West Africa.⁶⁷ When Nigeria is removed from our analysis, the correlations between the indicators of wealth (especially GDP)

and interactions decrease considerably. For development, diplomatic capability, and military capability, correlations are also higher when Nigeria is included.⁶⁸ These trends remain with attribute data for 1977, 1982, and 1987 and when lags are introduced for the different observation periods of the dependent variables.

Investigating the Collective Relationships Between the Various National Attributes and Interactions in the Regional Subsystem

In addition to listing bivariate relationships and testing separate propositions for each type of national attribute and interstate interactions, researchers have analyzed the relationships between national attributes, taken together, and a state's foreign conflict and cooperative behavior. For example, Rosenau has suggested a typology of nations for investigating foreign policy which classifies nations according to size (large and small), wealth (rich and poor), and accountability of the political system (open and closed).⁶⁹ Analyzing the WEIS data for 1966 and 1967, Salmore and Hermann investigated the extent to which these three variables account for the variance in the foreign policy behavior of 76 nations. The scholars find that the variables, taken together, are only weakly related to cooperative and conflictual behavior. However, they find that size explains more of the variance than the other two variables until they control for the number of acts a state initiates, in which case accountability and wealth are better predictors of foreign policy behavior.⁷⁰ Using the DON data for 82 nations, East and Gregg find that, in general, those national attributes which are positively related to conflictual behavior are also positively

correlated with cooperative behavior.⁷¹ Finally, analyzing conflict dyadically, Rummel discovers that for 40 dyads in 1955-1957, "the magnitude of foreign conflict between nations is a resultant of the forces of their distances on dimensions of wealth, power (joint power), geographic distance, and value."⁷²

In order to present and test a more complex, comprehensive, and analytical picture in this study, a multiple regression analysis was employed to investigate the combined effects of the independent variables (as at 1982) on explaining the variance in the dependent variable (1975-1989). We seek, in other words, to estimate how much of the variation in interstate interactions in West Africa is accounted for by the national attributes collectively. There is no sufficient reason in our analysis to believe that the coefficients presented will not be uniquely determined. A system of variables is only assumed to be causal to the extent that the dependent variable is not "overdetermined." Put differently, no two variables within the system should explain the same part of the variation of the dependent phenomenon. But it is obvious that combining the six independent variables (as specified in our bivariate relations) in a multivariate relationship will lead to serious analytical problems. Specifically, the intercorrelations between some of the independent variables in the correlation matrix presented are dubiously high and may suggest a problem of multicollinearity in our analysis.⁷³ For instance, POP82 is almost a perfect linear function of MILCAP82 ($r = .992$). Note, also, that the associations between WEALTH82 and MILCAP82 ($r = .975$) are very strong (see Table 7.11). The higher the intercorrelations between

Table 7.11

Intercorrelations Between Major Attribute Variables (1982)
in the West African Regional Subsystem

Variables	POP82	WEALTH82	DIPCAP82	MILCAP82	DEVT82	CONTIG
POP82	1.000	.989	.792	.992	.362 ^a	-.141 ^a
WEALTH82		1.000	.826	.975	.482 [*]	-.267 ^a
DIPCAP82			1.000	.767	.666 ^a	.117 ^a
MILCAP82				1.000	.309 ^a	-.194 ^a
DEVT82					1.000	-.232 ^a
CONTIG						1.000

N=16

^a not statistically significant.

^{*} significant at the .05 level.

Others significant at the .01 level or better.

the independent variables, the less the reliability of the relative importance indicated by the partial correlation coefficients. Consequently, the more strongly correlated the independent variables are, the greater the need for controlling the confounding effects. To control for such effects, we depended heavily on the results of the factor analyses in Chapter 6. Thus, for the purposes of multiple regression analysis, such concepts as power, development, and contiguity (which represent the three major dimensions of our factor analyses for 1982) were used as independent variables and their relationships with the dependent variable analyzed accordingly. In systematic research, the confrontation of theory and evidence often requires that one, the other, or both be revised. Although the concepts of power, development, and contiguity were not in our original conceptual scheme (see Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2), in essence, the new understanding of foreign policy here is correct and consistent to the extent that it aids the development of a theoretical framework which can incorporate useful concepts and which can encourage the use of comparative methods. Again, our problem, given the relative significance of interstate interactions in a regional subsystem, is to analyze how states behave towards political activity. Do some states participate more than others? If some countries participate more than others, what are the correlates?

In the sense specified, the functional form of our theoretical model is:

$$Y = b_0 \pm b_1 \text{ DEVEL82} \pm b_2 \text{ POWER82} \pm b_3 \text{ CONTIG} \pm e$$

where Y represents the events initiated to West African states (the dependent variable); $b_1 - b_3$ are parameters to be estimated; b_0 is a constant and e is the error term. The direction of the signs (\pm) depends on the issue domain and may indicate positive or negative relationships with the dependent variable. Prima facie the argument that the national attributes of power, wealth, and contiguity affect international relations is nothing new. These relationships have been well documented in a wide variety of foreign policy studies. The upshot, however, is that the direction and strength of these relationships for West African countries is not clear. Although there are some reasoned guesses, one has little by way of accumulating hard evidence. In our analysis, the positive signs of the beta coefficients of the three variables indicate that the relationship between them and the dependent variable are in the expected direction (see Table 7.12). The size of the t-statistic indicates that two variables (DEVEL82 and POWER82) are significantly related to interstate interactions (at the .01 level) suggesting, therefore, that when controlling for all other independent variables, two significant relationships exist with the dependent variable. In addition, the relative sizes of the beta (or partial regression) coefficients of the independent variables suggest that they are not all closely associated with interactions. For example, DEVEL82 is more closely related to interactions (beta = .589) than POWER82 (beta = .489), and these two variables appear to be the most potent in producing differences in foreign policy behavior. But CONTIG is very weakly associated with interactions (beta = .147).

Table 7.12

Multiple Regression: The Effects of Contiguity,
Development, and Power (1982) on Interstate
Interactions (1975-1989) in West Africa

<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Regression Coefficient</u>	<u>Standard Error of Coefficient</u>	<u>Computed Value of Student's T</u>	<u>Beta Coefficient</u>
CONFIG	6.30057	5.94738	1.059 **	.14706
DEVEL82	.00512	.01426	3.865 **	.58935
POWER82	8.807716E-04	2.77269E-04	3.177	.48894

R - Squared = .81

**
statistically significant at the .01 level.

Overall, the size of the R-squared value indicates that the model fits 1982 more than any other period (see Table 7.13 [a]).

To establish the relationship between these independent variables and the dependent variable, a multiple correlation coefficient, R , is extracted. Its squared value (that is, "the coefficient of multiple determination" or R - squared) indicates the proportion of variation in the dependent variable which is explained by the independent variables.⁷⁴ In our multiple regression analysis (see Table 7.12) the three independent variables in our research, taken together, "explain" 81 percent (R - squared = .806) of the variance in interstate interactions with a multiple correlation coefficient of 90 percent ($R = .898$), which is a rather hefty correlation judged against many findings in quantitative international relations research.⁷⁵ Clearly, the explanatory power of our model is considerable. As it is not explained by these independent variables, the explanation for approximately 19 percent of the variance in the dependent variable must rest elsewhere. Power, development, and contiguity do not, therefore, appear to be solely the factors that influence interstate interactions. Finally, in a comparative context, Table 7.13 (a) shows that of R - squared values at the various time periods, the variation explained using the national attribute variables for 1982 is strongest. Furthermore, as demonstrated in Table 7.13 (b), with only one exception, these figures reduce somewhat when Nigeria is excluded.

The low intercorrelations between the independent variables in the regression matrix suggest that it is unlikely that we encountered any serious problems of multicollinearity in our analysis.⁷⁶ Table 7.14 represents the intercorrelations between all the newly created independent variables derived from the factor analyses

TABLE 7.13 (a)

Selected Regression Analyses: Variance in the Dependent Variables Explained by the Independent Variables

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables			
	EVNT7579	EVNT8084	EVNT8589	EVINITWA
	(R - SQUARES)			
DEVEL77 DIPCON77 POWER77	.752	.422 ^a	.445 ^a	.612
CONTIG DEVEL82 POWER82		.702	.630	.806
CONTIG DEVEL87 POWER87				.367 ^a

^a not statistically significant. Others are significant at the .01 level or better.

TABLE 7.13 (b)

Selected Regression Analyses: Variance in the Dependent Variables Explained by the Independent Variables (Excluding Nigeria)

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables			
	EVNT7579	EVNT8084	EVNT8589	EVINITWA
	(R - SQUARES)			
DEVEL77 DIPCON77 POWER77	.643 ^a	.334 ^a	.416 ^a	.506
CONTIG DEVEL82 POWER82		.609 [*]	.573 [*]	.731
CONTIG DEVEL87 POWER87			.420 ^a	

^a not statistically significant; ^{*} significant at the .05 level. Others are significant at the .01 level or better.

in Chapter 6. Although the problem may still persist, the reduced intercorrelations between the independent variables (as distinct from the situation in Table 7.11) reveal the effectiveness of the factor analytic technique as a means of reducing the multicollinearity problem. Whereas Table 7.11 reveal that several independent variables are correlated at the .90 level and above, the situation is less so in Table 7.14. However, the fairly strong associations between POWER77 and DIPCON77 ($r = .543$) and between POWER87 and DEVEL87 ($r = .500$) may still create problems.

Analyzing the variables in relation to several dependent variables over different periods presents the correlations in Table 7.15. The correlations between the several national attributes as at 1977 and interactions show (as before) that associations are stronger in the late 1970s (specifically, 1975-1979) than in the early 1980s (1980-1984). For instance, whereas associations between POWER77, DIPCON77, and DEVEL77 and EVNT7579 are .655, .815, and .570, respectively, these reduce to .583, .553, and .435, respectively, when the same variables are correlated with EVNT8084.

Finally, to further assess and control for the effects of multicollinearity, the partial correlations (partial r s) which reveal the relationships between each of the independent variables and the dependent variable while the other independent variables are being controlled (or held constant), were extracted.⁷⁷ As depicted in Table 7.16, the partial r s reveal what the simple correlations do not show - the

TABLE 7.14

Simple Correlations Between the Independent Variables

	POWER77	DIPCON77	DEVEL77
POWER77	1.000	.543 *	.469 *
DIPCON77		1.000	.367 ^a
DEVEL77			1.000
	POWER82	DEVEL82	CONTIG
POWER82	1.000	.480 *	-.267 ^a
DEVEL82		1.000	-.232 ^a
CONTIG			1.000
	POWER87	DEVEL87	CONTIG
POWER87	1.000	.500 *	-.169 ^a
DEVEL87		1.000	-.150 ^a
CONTIG			1.000

^a not statistically significant; * significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 7.15

Simple Correlation Coefficients Between the Various
Independent and Dependent Variables

Independent Variables	D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e s			
	EVNT7579	EVNT8084	EVNT8589	EVINITWA
POWER77	.655	.583	.596	.660
POWER82		.757	.678	.733
POWER87			.590	
DIPCON77	.815	.553	.613	.727
CONTIG		-.017 ^a	.015 ^a	.012 ^a
CONTIG			.015 ^a	
DEVEL77	.570	.435 [*]	.255 ^a	.467 [*]
DEVEL82		.757	.676 ^a	.790
DEVEL87			.223	

^a not statistically significant

^{*} significant at the .05 level

Others are significant at
the .01 level or better.

TABLE 7.16

Partial Correlation Coefficients Between the Various
Independent and the Dependent Variables

Independent Variables	CONTROLLED VARIABLES		D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e s			
			EVNT7579	EVNT8084	EVNT8589	EVINITWA
POWER77	DIPCON77	DEVEL77	.330 ^a	.349 ^a	.422 ^a	.402 ^a
POWER82	DEVEL82	CONTIG		.544 [*]	.564 [*]	.692
POWER87	DEVEL87	CONTIG			.576 [*]	
DIPCON77	POWER77	DEVEL77	.697	.279 ^a	.372 ^a	.522 [*]
CONTIG	POWER82	DEVEL82		.233 ^a	.172 ^a	.304 ^a
CONTIG	POWER87	DEVEL87			.137 ^a	
DEVEL77	POWER77	DIPCON77	.404 ^a	.190 ^a	-.098 ^a	.187 ^a
DEVEL82	POWER82	CONTIG		.687	.558 [*]	.759
DEVEL87	POWER87	CONTIG			-.094 ^a	

^a
not statistically significant

^{*}
significant at the .05 level

Others are significant at the .01
level or better.

relative importance of the independent variables in terms of their legitimate associations with the dependent variable. For example, in Table 7.15, DIPCON77 (an independent variable) shows a simple correlation coefficient of .727 with EVINITWA (a dependent variable). But when both POWER77 and DEVEL77 are controlled (held constant) the amount explained reduces to .522 (see Table 7.16). On the other hand, the correlation between CONTIG and EVNT8084, according to Pearson's r , is -.017. But when POWER82 and DEVEL82 are controlled, this rises to .223 although the relationship is still not statistically significant (see Tables 7.15 and 7.16).

Specifically, partial r s reveal instances of multicollinearity more clearly in a multiple regression analysis. For instance, ordinarily, the two independent variables (POWER77 and DIPCON77) have strong associations with the dependent variable (i.e., Pearson's r s are .660 and .727 respectively). But these relationships are dubious because they may be due to the fairly strong intercorrelation between POWER77 and DIPCON77 ($r = .543$). When partialled (using the partial correlation technique) the association between the dependent variable and POWER77 changes somewhat from .660 to a weaker, positive correlation ($r = .402$). Also, the new relationship is not statistically significant. The change in the association for POWER77 shows that when DIPCON77 and DEVEL77 are controlled for, the originally presumed correlation ($r = .660$) is spurious (i.e., DIPCON77 and DEVEL77 may indeed have been responsible for the initially stronger correlation between POWER77 and interactions).⁷⁸ In other words, the earlier relationship

between POWER77 and EVINITWA ($r = .660$) is spurious and partly due to the influence of DIPCON77 and DEVEL77 which may be the real predictors of interstate interactions (see Table 7.16). For the purpose of presenting a rigorously causal and predictive analysis the information revealed by the partial correlation technique is often very critical and helpful.

References and footnotes

1. Robert Rood puts it thus: "The scientific analysis of foreign policy involves a search for patterns of foreign policy behavior and for those factors which are associated with, or account for, variations in those patterns." See his article in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., et al., eds., International Events and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy (Columbia, S. C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1975), p. 135.
2. There are at least two principal parts to the discussion of the results in our analysis. The first part is to explain in more detail some of the interesting distinctions relative to our arguments and to reveal important patterns of distribution. The second dimension relates to whether or not our "national attributes" thesis receives empirical support. In other words, is there evidence to support the contention that interactions in West Africa are determined by attribute forces? To test specific propositions, we shall employ data collected on international relations in the subregion.
3. In their comparative approach to the international politics of regions, Cantori and Spiegel use the concept of an "intrusive system," defined as "the politically significant participation of external powers in the international relations of the subordinate system." See Louis J. Cantori and Steven Spiegel, eds., The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 25. See p. 250 for a specific reference to the French case.
4. *ibid.* pp. 250-251. In a similar finding, the scholars contend that early U.S. involvement in West Africa concentrated on the major Anglophone states - Ghana and Nigeria.
5. See his article entitled "African Diplomatic Thought and Supranationality," in Ali A. Mazrui and Hasu H. Patel, eds., Africa in World Affairs: The Next Thirty Years (New York: Third Press, 1973), p. 121. Similarly, Shaw and Aluko have contended that African foreign policy can be categorized according to (1) the level of interaction and (2) the type of political economy: "The regional and continental, in particular, tend to be rather different from the collective (Third World) and global levels. For notions of 'good neighbourliness' and 'pan-Africanism' operate at the former levels whereas at the latter, ideas of Third World solidarity and North-South cleavage prevail." See "Introduction: Towards A Political Economy of African Foreign Policy," in Timothy M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko, eds., The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy: Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), p. 9.
6. Louis J. Cantori and Steven Spiegel, *op. cit.* (1970), p. 250. Similarly, another scholar has found that a substantial amount of small state foreign policies in global affairs are concerned with economic issues. See Maurice A. East, "Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models," World Politics, vol. 25 (1973), pp. 556-576.

7. See William J. Dixon, "A Lag Sequential Approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy Behavior," Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and James N. Rosenau, eds., New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy (Boston, Mass.: Allen and Unwin, 1987), p. 77.
8. What the variations suggest is an inverse association between cooperation and conflict in West Africa. The resulting correlation yields an $r = -.463$ across 15 years (i.e., $N = 15$), and the number of cases here are points in time for which data are gathered for the variables.
9. Whereas the relationship between the cooperative and conflictual DI scores from Ivory Coast to Ghana is negative, low ($r = -.288$), and statistically insignificant ($p = .149$) at the .05 level, the association between cooperative and conflictual DI scores from Ghana to Nigeria is positive, low ($r = .167$), and not statistically significant ($p = .275$).
10. Patrick J. McGowan, "Africa and Non-alignment: A Comparative Study of Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 12 (1968), p. 290.
11. Alger's study of the Fifth Committee of the UN reveals a "weak" positive association. See C. F. Alger, "Interaction in a Committee of the United Nations General Assembly," J. David Singer, ed., Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 68-69.
12. Rudolph J. Rummel, "Some Empirical Findings on Nations and Their Behavior," World Politics, vol. 21 (1969), pp. 234, 238.
13. See Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Level of Development and International Behavior," in R. Butwell, ed., Foreign Policy and the Developing Nation (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1969), pp. 150-151.
14. Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, "The Determinants of International Violence," Peace Research Society Papers, vol. 12 (1969), p. 47. Although in the 19th and 20th centuries, the more populous European nations engaged in more continental warfare, their involvement in extra-continental war was no greater than that of smaller European nations. See J. David Singer, "The 'Correlates of War' Project: Interim Report and Rationale," World Politics vol. 24 (1972), p. 267.
15. Karl W. Deutsch, "The Propensity to International Transactions," Political Studies, vol. 8 (1960).
16. Karl W. Deutsch and A. Eckstein, "National Industrialization and the Declining Share of the International Economic Sector, 1890-1959," World Politics, no. 13 (1961), p. 289.

17. Karl W. Deutsch, C. I. Bliss and A. Eckstein, "Population, Sovereignty and the Shape of Foreign Trade," Economic Development and Cultural Change, no. 10 (1962), p. 363.
18. See article by the Feierabends in R. Butwell, ed., op. cit. (1969), pp. 150-151.
19. L. F. Richardson, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (Pittsburgh: Boxwood and Quadrangle, 1960), p. xi.
20. Nazli Choucri and Robert North, op. cit. (1969), p. 56.
21. Rudolph J. Rummel, "The Relationship Between National Attributes and Foreign Conflict Behavior," J. David Singer, ed., op. cit. (1968), pp. 204-213.
22. Rudolph J. Rummel, "Some Attributes and Behavioral Patterns of Nations," Journal of Peace Research, vol. 4 (1967), p. 197.
23. See Maurice A. East and Phillip M. Gregg, "Factors Influencing Cooperation and Conflict in the International System," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 11 (1967), p. 266.
24. Rudolph J. Rummel, "Some Findings on Nations and their Behavior," op. cit. (1969), p. 234.
25. D. W. Moore, "Governmental and Societal Influences on Foreign Policy: A Partial Examination of Rosenau's Adaptation Model," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1970), p. 75.
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29. Patrick McGowan, op. cit. (1968), p. 290.
30. C. F. Alger, "Interaction in a Committee of the United Nations General Assembly," J. D. Singer, ed., op. cit. (1968).
31. Rudolph Rummel, op. cit. (1969), p. 234.

32. Jack E. Vincent, "Predicting Voting Patterns in the General Assembly," American Political Science Review, vol. 65 (1971), p. 493.
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37. *ibid.*
38. Cited in Patrick McGowan and Howard Shapiro, The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings, vol. 4 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1973), p. 207.
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59. Volker Rittberger, "Organized Multinational Corporation With Regional Settings: A Preliminary Analysis," Peace Research Society Papers, vol. 17 (1971), p. 113.
60. See the article by William J. Dixon in Charles F. Hermann, et al., eds., op. cit. (1987), p. 94.

61. In addition to the rationale offered earlier (Chapter 6), the time periods here are chosen partly because they are considered to be moderate and reasonable intervals within which attributes can effectively affect foreign policy behavior.
62. In different words, this pattern indicates that the magnitude of association between the independent and dependent variables at time $t + 1$ (1980-1984) decreases considerably from the magnitude of association at the base period (1975-1979).
63. It does appear that compared with the early 1980s (EVNT8084), in general, relations between attributes and interactions tended to increase again for the latter part of the 1980s (EVNT8589) and for the 15-year period as a whole (EVINITWA).
64. Thus, as we move further away from the base year, it becomes difficult to sustain the "declining attributes, passive foreign policy" thesis across the observations. The period of activism effected in the first lag tapers off in the second thus raising the issue of whether these patterns are real in the sense of registered meaningful behavioral responses or merely chance occurrences.
65. See article by Patrick McGowan and Michael O'Leary in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., et al., op. cit. (1975), p. 250.
66. The deviant case may share with other cases similar foreign policy behavior while differing from others with respect to values of the independent variables. As a deviant case, Nigeria was selected more on the basis of its distinction on several of the independent variables than on the dependent variables. For similar analyses, see Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, (New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 7-12. See also, Neil R. Richardson, "Dyadic Case Studies in the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy Behavior," in Charles F. Hermann et al., eds., op. cit. (1987), pp. 168-173.
67. Olatunde J. B. Ojo, "Nigeria and the Formation of ECOWAS," International Organization, vol. 34, no. 4 (Autumn 1980), pp. 571-604.
68. Note that the contrary is the case with the population and contiguity variables. For these two, correlations with interactions tend to be stronger when Nigeria is excluded.
69. James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," R. B. Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 27-93.
70. S. A. Salmore and C. F. Hermann, op. cit. (1969), pp. 23-29.
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72. R. J. Rummel, "A Social Field Theory of Foreign Conflict Behavior," Peace Research Society Papers, vol. 4 (1966), p. 144.
73. In other words, our dependent variable may be "overdetermined" since the independent variables may "explain the same part of the variation of the dependent phenomenon." See Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (Malabar, Florida: Robert E. Krieger, 1985), p. 23. For other discussions of the problem of multicollinearity, see H. M. Blalock, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964). See also, Charles A. Powell, David Andrus, William A. Fowler and Kathleen Knight, "Determinants of Foreign Policy Behavior: A Causal Modeling Approach," James N. Rosenau, ed., Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings, and Methods (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1974), p. 155.
74. The standard interpretation of r here is that, when squared, the coefficient measures the percentage of the variation in one variable that can be explained or accounted for by knowledge of the other variable.
75. Although the predictive power of the regression is high, it has some problems that are typical of work with small number of observations. Its coefficients appear to be large and imprecisely estimated judging by their large standard errors.
76. "Indicators that are correlated may represent the same phenomenon; thus, ideally, the independent variables should correlate with the dependent variable, but not with each other." See Daniel Frei and Dieter Ruloff, Handbook of Foreign Policy Analysis: Methods for Practical Application in Foreign Policy Planning, Strategic Planning and Business Risk Assessment (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989), p. 124.
77. To what extent are the observed differences in the variables independent? For example, if one controls for IV1 and IV2, are there differences between IV3 and DV?
78. Controlling for DIPCON77 and DEVEL77 via partial correlation coefficient indicates a change in the relationship between POWER77 and EVINITWA.

CHAPTER EIGHT

GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In the preceding chapters we sought to analyze the nature, sources, and processes of international behavior in West Africa by focusing on the several dimensions of interactions in the area, from political independence until the present. By investigating such interstate activities, this study has fulfilled its two main analytical objectives. First, it has systematically mapped out the aggregate structure of interactions between the developing states of West Africa over a period. We conclude generally that the high volume of interactions in the 1970s (the period of relative affluence) has been replaced by a phenomenon of passivity in the 1980s (the period of resource scarcity and limited income). Second, the study has tested specific propositions about the network of relations in West Africa. We have argued that an analytical concentration on the roles of both national attributes and elite perceptual factors can resolve fundamental questions as to the combination of explanatory variables that account for observable interstate behavior.¹ The evidence suggests, first, that international relations in West Africa is highly stratified among actors in the subregion both in terms of leadership qualities and state capabilities and, second, that the structure of interactions can be usefully delineated along several dimensions at the broader systemic level.

This study has argued that international interactions eludes explanation by a simple, single cause at a simple, single level of analysis. Its conceptual and theoretical framework is thus based upon a critical combination of various approaches and levels to the subject matter. International politics can be reviewed from a number of distinct vantage points each valid in itself and each considerably overlapping in its actual application. Specifically, for analytical purposes, three distinct but mutually complementary approaches of international behavior (the systems, power, and decision making theoretical approaches) and two levels of analysis (the national and the systemic) were outlined and integrated at the outset of this study. We have argued extensively that a proper understanding of how images and capabilities explain behavior requires a merging of both unit and systemic perspectives (see Chapter 2). Put differently, in the study of interstate relations, there is no inherent inconsistency in the various levels of analysis. The general postulates of our analytical insights have now been qualified in the light of our substantive discussions and the empirical findings. Although elite perceptual and decision making factors were given a theoretical and narrative treatment, the impact of such state attributes as size, development, contiguity, and economic, military, and diplomatic capabilities was assessed empirically.

By drawing some loose threads together, this concluding chapter recounts the major points of our study by focusing specifically on findings at the regional, external, and domestic levels of international behavior. In addition, the study is briefly set in a wider perspective by highlighting critically its major utility,

applicability, and implications to research on interstate behavior in regional subsystems in general. The main conclusions presented at the regional level collates points previously made into a summative description of the political, economic, sociocultural, and military dimensions of interactions in West Africa. At the external level, we recount the role of experiences outside the area to West African cooperation. Finally, at the domestic level, we stress conclusions derived from the role of ideological and perceptual factors on the one hand, and the attributes of states on the other, to regional cooperative processes in the subregion. Ranging on a continuum from symbolic foreign policy events to joint actions in confederal programs, regional cooperation is defined here as any interstate activity with less than universal participation designed to meet some commonly expressed need of community-formation processes (see Chapter 1).

One major generalization at the systemic level is that interactions between West African states are overwhelmingly political. In the data presented in Chapter 7, political interactions accounted for well over half (approximately 58 percent) of the total number of events initiated between West African states. Earlier, in Chapter 4, we had argued that political and diplomatic interactions between these states were subdivisible into four main categories: (1) diplomatic representations, (2) presidential visits, (3) bilateral treaties and agreements, and (4) mutual memberships of regional organizations. We conclude here that as criteria for political interactions, these indicators may hold greater prospects for cooperation in West Africa. Although in line with our thesis there was a general reduction of foreign missions necessitated by

an economic crunch in the 1980s, the network of diplomatic representation in West Africa is still fairly intensive. Calculated as the ratio of the actually observed bilateral links to all possible links, the density of interactions on this score is modest at 33 percent.² However, relatively more powerful states like Nigeria, Ghana, Ivory Coast, and Senegal represent the most diplomatically active states in the subregion in contrast with less powerful states like Gambia, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, and Togo.

Analyzing presidential visits in West Africa within a 15-year period, one finds a similar but certainly more revealing trend.³ The leaders of major actors like Nigeria and Ghana tend to dominate with the highest scores of initiated presidential visits. Although this was less so in subsequent analyses, the results here appear to reveal the significance of geographical contiguity as a factor to be considered in inter-African relations. Most African leaders are attuned to activities with neighboring states and 49.5 percent of the visits recorded were targeted specifically on geographically contiguous states.⁴ Although there are more Francophone states in West Africa in terms of absolute frequency, one could conclude, first, that majority of the presidential visits initiated by the Francophone states were to other French-speaking states in the subregion and, second, that this phenomenon is less true of visits by Anglophone or Lusophone leaders. Indeed, overall, the French-speaking group maintains the highest degree of cohesiveness and foreign policy coordination in West Africa.

Subdividing the bilateral treaties and agreements between West African states for

a period of 15 years into political, economic, sociocultural, and military issue-areas shows that a majority of the agreements fall within the economic issue-area.⁵ For example, whereas 54.9 percent of the bilateral treaty commitments coded were on the economic issue area, 26.2 percent were political in nature. In addition, social and military agreements accounted for 13.4 percent and 5.5 percent of the total agreements and treaties, respectively (see Chapter 4). As is the case with both the diplomatic and visitation data, the relevance of the contiguity factor persists in the fact that "geographical location, and proximity bear a direct relationship to bilateral treaty relationship."⁶

The final facet of political interactions considered in this research is the mutual memberships of regional organizations.⁷ Evidence here suggests that with the exception of Guinea, all the Francophone states demonstrate a highly remarkable growth of joint organizational links both in the West African subregion and in continental Africa at large. Whereas Anglophone states like Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone were members of only a few regional organizations, the highest interactive levels were found among the Francophone states thus signifying that colonial experience still has serious consequences for the foreign policies of specific African states.

Interstate interactions between actors of the West African subsystem are less economic or commercial than they are political. For instance, evidence presented in Chapter 7 reveals that only 27.8 percent of all recorded events initiated between West African states are economic, the majority being political, social, and strategic (see

Table 7.5). Indeed, economic events are not predominant except when the extra-African dimension is isolated. Only then do economic interactions contribute 54.3 percent of the total number of events as opposed to 26.0 percent for political events (see Table 7.6). In addition to the increasing relevance of economics to the conduct of foreign policy, it has been argued in the literature that trade is one of the most important instruments for the domination of subordinate systems by intrusive powers. The West African subsystem is still highly dependent upon foreign trade, and if intra-subregional trade has an outstanding feature, it is that available evidence suggests that West African countries are not each other's principal customers.⁸ First, there is a low volume of trade among these states comprising a mere 3.6 percent of the total foreign trade for the subregion as a whole.⁹ Second, as is shown in Chapter 4, the dependence of the subregion on the developed states is very high at 87 percent.¹⁰ West African economies are still characterized by foreign trade, with production for, and investment aid from, Western Europe and North America. Indeed, it is to offset this external trade orientation that new initiatives have been undertaken to create regional economic arrangements. Further, with the exception of Nigeria's contribution, most of the trade and transaction flow in the subregion take place within the French subgroup - especially via Ivory Coast and Senegal.¹¹

The sociocultural issue area consists primarily of those foreign policy issues involving cultural, educational, and scientific exchanges. Largely representing the way of life of peoples, social and cultural interactions between West African states are less pervasive than one would ordinarily assume. Nevertheless, they constitute an

important aspect of international relations that is often overlooked in the literature.¹² Such events constitute only 12.07 % of our events data set (see Table 7.4). Both the analysis of bilateral treaties and agreements in Chapter 4 and data presented of the entire events data set in Chapter 7 show that sociocultural events consistently lag behind political and economic events. As depicted by data in Tables 7.5 and 7.6, social events also tend to characterize the extra-African dimension (13.8 percent) slightly more than they do the intra-African dimension (9.8 percent). One could justifiably conclude on this basis that West African states are generally more preoccupied with attempts at enlarging political and economic cooperation than they are with the sociocultural dimension.

A review of the various facets of systemic interactions in West Africa supports the contention that the military dimension is the least prevalent in the area. When the political, economic, social, and military interactions in West Africa are considered, military and security concerns consistently rank the least frequent. In intra-African affairs, this dimension constitutes only 4.9 percent of the total number of events initiated in the subregion (see Table 7.5). Although interactions among West African states in military affairs are almost non-existent, it could still be argued that the establishment of an economic community like ECOWAS has defense implications that transcend the territorial borders of memberstates.¹³ Indeed, social and economic cooperation only takes place effectively under an atmosphere of peace and tranquility. However, military and security arrangements in West Africa are generally more dependent on relations with the extra-African world.¹⁴ Slightly more than the intra-

African dimension, the extra-African dimension of our data reveals that 5.95 percent of the total events represents the military dimension (see Table 7.6). Military interactions between West African states are limited by the fact that most of these states have defense pacts with the major external powers. In particular, whereas the Anglophone countries do not have such agreements with extra-African powers, several of the Francophone states have explicitly or implicitly endorsed defense arrangements with France. In general, in a global context, Africa's security problems are largely out of its control since the absence of effective modern armies and industrial powers make Africa dependent upon the outside world.¹⁵ This dependence on non-African actors has militated against the development of intra-African cooperation in strategic and military affairs.

Consequently, it is impossible to discuss regionalism effectively in West Africa without recourse to the external dimension. In fact, there are significant economic, political, sociocultural, and military linkages between West African states and selected extra-African powers. In our events data set, 57.4 percent of the events collected represent actions initiated and received by West African states from powerful non-African actors. Only 42.6 percent of the events are between West African states exclusively (see Table 7.3). Although a West African subsystem exists that is fairly autonomous, it is not entirely independent of the international system, and the collective power of the subsystem is relatively inferior to that of the larger international system. West Africa's lack of sufficient resources to achieve its own economic development causes it to turn to outside sources of aid, for example, thus

opening the subsystem to foreign penetration, which ultimately threatens its autonomy. It does appear, therefore, that many of West Africa's troubles are to be found in the dilemma posed by two functions: first, the desire to solve problems, which often exceeds system capabilities and requires outside help, and second, the desire to maintain the autonomy of the system. Isolating this external dimension within a bidirectional setting reveals that events initiated by the external powers far outweigh events initiated by West African states - a ratio of 64 to 36 percent. There is thus considerable penetration of these developing states by selected foreign powers. The most outstanding feature of this dimension is the continuing dominance of France in the West African subregion which stands out both in our analysis of the substantive literature (especially in Chapter 5) and in our empirical results (in Chapter 7). Indeed, the fact that the external dimension is also mostly dominated by economic events makes this finding particularly interesting.

A descriptive review of the various foreign policy interaction categories leads to our attempt at explaining why nations act the way they do within the context of regional arrangements. It is our specific suggestion that foreign policy should be considered not only as a concept but as a variable (or set of variables) that assumes different discernible values in covariation with other variables. Thus, a nation's behavior can be more accurately predicted through knowledge of its physical attributes juxtaposed with the capabilities of the nations with which it interacts. Theoretically, we have argued that national attributes, and the perception of these attributes by decision makers, influence and determine the patterns of interactions in

West Africa. Specifically, we have suggested that a general decline in the West African economies has led to a reduction in the volume of foreign policy interactions in the subregion between the 1970s and the 1980s. This phenomenon, we believe, is a consequence of the declining resources in the West African subregion and, perhaps equally importantly, leaders' psychological perceptions of this decline. In a more empirical effort at estimating specific factors influencing international interactions in West Africa, we discovered that, in terms of bivariate associations, such variables as population size, economic strength, the level of economic development, contiguity, military capability, and diplomatic capability are, as hypothesized, positively related to international interactions in West Africa. Needless to say, instead of merely reporting the findings of the research as bare statistical outcomes, we have related our scientific findings to the theoretical literature and to general theoretical statements. A theory of comparative foreign policy behavior needs to incorporate economic, social, military and other pertinent national attributes into an explanation of why nations act the way they do toward one another. By testing propositions derived from our conceptual scheme,¹⁶ it was discovered that although the several independent variables have positive directionality with the dependent variable as hypothesized, they are not all equally potent.

As shown in Chapter 7, using national attribute and events data for 1982 and for 1975-1989, respectively, there is a strong positive bivariate relationship, although far from a perfect one, between population size and interactions in West Africa ($r = .661$), which is statistically significant at the .01 level. The relationship between

WEALTH and interactions in the subregion is also strong ($r = .782$) and statistically significant at the .001 level. So is diplomatic capability ($r = .828$) which is significant at the .001 level, and military capability ($r = .588$) which is significant at the .01 level. The association between the level of economic development and interstate interactions is strong ($r = .790$) and is statistically significant at the .001 level. Finally, the statistically insignificant relationship between geographical contiguity and interactions shows that this independent variable is the least potent predictor of the external behavior of the states in our framework ($r = .012$). Considering our earlier discussions, this last finding is rather surprising. Indeed, from investigations in Chapter 4, such political interactions as diplomatic representations, presidential visits, and bilateral treaties appeared to concentrate heavily on geographically contiguous states. But evidence in Chapter 7 shows that this relationship disappears as soon as contiguity is operationalized as the number of international borders and correlated with interstate interactions.

The bivariate associations between our major independent variables for 1977, 1982, and 1987, and the dependent variables, are fairly consistently positive at different time periods, thus enhancing the generalizability of our findings (Tables 7.8 - 7.10). In terms of the strength of relations, the correlations between national capabilities and interstate interactions are strongest for 1975-1979 (representing the period of relative affluence and foreign policy activism in West Africa). But findings for the 1980s appear to be much more complex than initially presumed. Theoretically, we had argued that, in general, the period of resource scarcity and

limited income in the 1980s will lead to relative passivity in West African foreign policy behavior for that decade. Whereas our findings reveal that correlations are generally reduced for 1980-1984 (in line with our theoretical reasoning), associations between national attributes and interactions for 1985-1989 are stronger than initially predicted. Overall, as shown by Tables 7.8 - 7.10, the various bivariate associations tend to reduce slightly when Nigeria is excluded from the analysis, thus supporting the argument for the presence of a core state in West Africa.¹⁷

When, for the purposes of multivariate analysis, the different variables are filtered and condensed into the substantive concepts of power, development, and contiguity (representing the major dimensions derived from our factor analysis for 1982 [see Table 6.10]), they explain 81 percent of the variance in our dependent variable (see Table 7.12). Although the strength of their relationship with the dependent variable are to varied degrees, the positive signs of the beta coefficients of the three variables show that the relationships are in the expected direction, which supports our major theoretical discussions as to the role of national capabilities in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. Finally, despite the efforts at quality control, further statistical analysis reveals that there are still slight problems of multicollinearity especially as some of the independent variables are still fairly strongly intercorrelated. For example, DIPCON77 is moderately associated with interactions but when POWER77 and DEVEL77 are controlled for, this relationship reduces considerably (see Table 7.16). The partial results for the bivariate relationships here are interested in the real (as opposed to the spurious) determinants

of international interactions. "The use of controls enables the research to make statements about explicit, unconfounded and non-spurious relationships. The ultimate statistical goal is to measure unique covariance between variables, such that the relationship between X and Y is not changed by the introduction of Z."¹⁸

Implications of the Study

By analyzing the domestic bases of the disposition of West African states in their execution of foreign policy, this study has illuminated areas of research that have remained largely unexamined in Third World research. The degree of cooperation in the subregion has been charted within the constraints imposed by state sovereignty, national attributes, and leaders' ideological and perceptual beliefs. In the study of international relations, a state's resources are frequently assumed to define its capacity for action, and power is often assumed to be exercised in effecting foreign policy behavioral output. As a consequence, our scholarly endeavors have tended to reflect an acceptance of the view that some states matter more than others, that large states matter more than small states because their size provides them with more resources and greater power. Among other indicators, the several salient factors have been the wide discrepancies of power, economic development, wealth, and perceptual variables among the countries under survey. In general, whether in Senegal or in Ghana, the patterns of relations of West African states are generally related to the domestic limitations of these societies themselves, and above all, to external structural differences. Rather than being highly diffused within the West African regional

subsystem, the distribution of power is somewhat hierarchically structured with power concentrated in a few states; thus, Nigeria, Ghana, and Ivory Coast have enough political and economic power to be seen as potential threats by the smaller African states.

Although some have suggested that the great diversities in the size of West African states may provide the required impetus for cooperation,¹⁹ a policy implication of this inequality in capabilities is that some states may reap the benefits of regional cooperation at the expense of others. One argument is that the more resourceful states may monopolize the benefits of cooperation especially with respect to such issues as the international migration of labor. As a consequence of internal pressures which spill over into the realm of interstate relations, large states with rapidly expanding resources and population may ultimately pursue active and aggressive foreign policies towards their immediate environment.²⁰ Thus, diversities in population size which have remained a characteristic feature of the West African subregion may carry along with it, quite understandably, a feeling of concern and comprehension from the smaller neighbors.

On a more theoretical level, our analysis demonstrates the relevance of international relations frameworks and the scientific approach to analyzing the foreign policies of developing states. Indeed, to a reasonable extent, some of the theoretical concepts used in the West do have relevance in the Third World. By excluding the smallest and the poorest of states, researchers have often avoided evaluating and quantifying the foreign policies of non-traditional states in the Third World. But a

few scholars have long stressed the need for studies of the developing areas in order to determine the extent to which indicators of cohesion hold consistent across regions.²¹ It is our thinking that a comparative study of foreign policy that purports to be general should be applicable to all types of states. By extending existing theoretical literature to the foreign policies of West African states, this study is an addition to recent works that have attempted to offer some systematic overview of the foreign policy behavioral patterns of developing states. By analyzing the often neglected dimension of inter-African relations, through a combination of attribute theory and events data analysis, our study has attempted to verify, replicate, and incorporate its findings with the works of others in the field of the comparative study of foreign policy, thus fulfilling one of the goals of scientific research - the development of a theoretically organized knowledge based upon cumulative empirical research.²²

Although there are several literature published in the field of West African regional cooperation that identify and discuss such functional issues as integration, trade, and investments, studies that analyze the broader question of the foreign policies of West African states are virtually non-existent.²³ This study has relied on the relatively expensive and time-consuming events data approach to capture empirically foreign policy interactions in West Africa for one and a half decades. One should emphasize, however, that to the extent that the international system is characterized by integrated regional subsystems, our empirical findings are not necessarily relevant to the West African subregion alone. Indeed, as empirical

generalizations, they have implications that extend beyond West Africa and are not, therefore, necessarily area-specific. Several preliminary studies have already been published on the various subregional constellations within the African continent (for example, the Maghreb, East Africa, and Southern Africa), and on other regional subsystems in the Middle East, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and so on.²⁴ We argue that given similar conditions and assumptions, our findings here could be incorporated into a general schema which may ultimately provide a universal framework for analyzing and explaining foreign policy relationships within international regional settings. As Przeworski and Teune put it, "social science theories, rather than explaining phenomena as accurately as possible in terms relative to specific historical circumstances, should attempt to explain phenomena wherever and whenever they occur."²⁵ Rather than employing spatio-temporal terms (for example, the proper names of states and specific time periods) that limit the scope of research generalizations, the ultimate objective of comparative research should be to substitute variables like "the degree of development" for spatio-temporal terms like "Senegal" and "Ivory Coast". In short, proper names of social systems should be replaced by variables "in the course of comparative research."²⁶

On the empirical front, this necessarily involves problems of measurement - that is, valid and reliable scales must be developed across regional subsystems and they must be shown to be "equivalent".²⁷ For example, data collection across regional subsystems should identify sets of items that would form satisfactory scales of similar values in all the countries involved. Thus, the criteria of generality and parsimony

should imply that the same theoretical frameworks must be evaluated in different systemic settings. Social science theories can gain confirmation only if analytical schemes formulated in terms of several common factors constitute the point of departure in comparative foreign policy research. The research design utilized in this study is no less valid for the foreign policy analysis of other regions. It is therefore not intellectually improper to conceptually relate research in West Africa to other studies in a systematic and comparative fashion.

To recapitulate the main points of this study, we have successfully mapped out the external behavioral patterns of West African states and, by incorporating the national attributes of these states, tested specific propositions about their foreign policy behavioral patterns. Analytically, by using events data within a comparative framework, we have asked a number of general theoretical questions: (1) Are larger, more populated, states more likely to participate internationally than smaller states? (2) Are economically powerful and developed states more likely to interact than economically less developed states? (3) Are militarily powerful and diplomatically influential states more likely to be active than less influential states? (4) Finally, is there a positive relationship between geographical contiguity and interstate interactions? Cast in terms of nomothetic explanatory statements, this study has found, first, that larger states are more likely to participate internationally than smaller states, and second, that such dimensions as size, wealth, the degree of development, military power, contiguity, and diplomatic influence are all positively related to interstate interactions albeit to varying extent. We conclude that in the

comparative foreign policy behavior of West African states, power and the degree of development appear to be the strongest influences. Central to this conclusion is the assumption that decision makers' perceptions of the variables will be reflected in the association between these factors and foreign policy behavior.

Our study has conceptualized several independent and dependent variables as part and parcel of the interplay of forces that impinge upon those who make policy decisions. It has further argued that, conceptually, elite perceptions and the ideological predisposition of leaders serve usefully as intervening variables (or contextual factors), in the comparative analysis of foreign policy behavior. Thus, the study improves considerably upon traditional conceptions of foreign policy because much attention is paid to the conversion processes by which national attributes are harnessed for foreign policy purposes. National capabilities are not merely policy resources but attributes that can affect the general predispositions of leaders to act in foreign affairs, and that can equally affect the goals and the objectives of states as defined and perceived by these leaders. It follows, then, that since capability analyses require an awareness of the situational as well as the more enduring and tangible aspects of capability, low capability nations may share images that are different from those of high capability nations. In short, national capability can contribute to a more comprehensive and analytical explanation of foreign policy behavior if research is sensitive to the role of the political context and the regional systems of which states are a part. While designed primarily to test the role of specific power capabilities, conceptually, our analytical scheme (in Chapter 2) incorporates a variety of contextual

variables often emphasized in the literature on comparative foreign policy: ideological belief systems, leaders' perceptions, personality traits, regional linkage with the global system, domestic political and economic variables, and examines the various dimensions of interactions across states.

The results of our study indicate general support for our hypotheses and approaches, and the related assessments of West African politics. The findings support the view that power and development remain important explanations of international behavior. The findings also sustain an approach sensitive to the role of capabilities, systems, and context. While the decision making context is not directly tested here, it clearly intervenes between state capabilities and foreign policy behavior. Indeed, a possible deficiency in this study is the absence of realistic yet rigorous and quantitative indicators of such contextual variables as ideological belief systems, personality traits, and leaders' perceptions. Arguably, these are important psychological and intangible factors that are often more difficult to assess empirically, since they can rarely be measured accurately. Nevertheless, to the extent that they may be responsible for the relationship among the leaders of various interacting states, they deserve greater scholarly attention and, therefore, should constitute grounds for further research in the future.²⁸ For the present, however, it is hoped that our findings are an addition to cumulation which is necessary in theory building in comparative foreign policy. Although developing states do not seem to be overwhelmingly preoccupied with security concerns (political and economic issues are far more significant problems), through an admixture of theory and data, this study

illustrates that the traditional assumptions about power, size, development, and expected foreign policy behavior may not be inappropriate for analyses of the smaller and less developed states of the global system.

References and footnotes

1. A similar approach is presented by researchers of the CREON project. See Maurice A. East, et al., eds., Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1978), p. 9.
2. For studies on diplomatic representation, see C. F. Alger and S. J. Brams, "Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Intergovernmental Organizations," World Politics, vol. 19 (July 1967), pp. 646-663; Bruce Russett and W. Curtis Lamb, "Global Patterns of Diplomatic Exchange, 1963-64," Journal of Peace Research, vol. 1 (1969); Patrick J. McGowan, "The Patterns of African Diplomacy: A Quantitative Comparison," Journal of Asian and African Studies, vol. 4 (July 1969), pp. 202-221.
3. For similar studies, see Johan Galtung, "East-West Interaction Patterns," Journal of Peace Research, vol. 3 (1966), pp. 146-177. See also, Steven J. Brams, "The Structure of Influence Relationships in the International System," James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 583-599. Galtung calculated East-West interactions by counting the number of official state visits and trade agreements between 1948 and 1965. Brams, on the other hand, collected data on visits between heads of states in the international system in 1964 and 1965.
4. Notably, this finding is similar to the results of the diplomatic representation data. It will be recalled from the analysis in Chapter 4 that each state in West Africa maintains a diplomatic mission with at least one neighboring state.
5. For studies on the salience of treaties in international relations, see Elmer Plischke, Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Problems and Options (Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977).
6. *ibid.*, p. 62.
7. One research on the activity of African leaders in IGOs is contained in Donald G. Morrison, Robert C. Mitchell and John N. Paden, eds., Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1989), p. 173. For more general studies, see Elmer Plischke, *op. cit.* (1977), pp. 93-94; J. David Singer and Michael Wallace, "Intergovernmental Organization and the Preservation of Peace, 1916-1964: Some Bivariate Relationships," International Organization, vol. 24, no. 3 (Summer 1970), pp. 520-547.
8. Inter-African trade has declined from 5.5 percent in 1970 to 3.8 percent in 1974. See W. A. Ndongko, Economic Cooperation and Integration in Africa (Dakar, Senegal: Codesria, 1985), pp. 61-65.

9. Uka Ezenwa, ECOWAS and the Economic Integration of West Africa (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 27-28. See also, S. K. B. Asante, The Political Economy of Regionalism in Africa: A Decade of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986).
10. S. K. B. Asante, *op. cit.* (1986), p. 40. See also, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Trade Among Developing Countries by Main SITC Groups and by Regions (Geneva: UNCTAD, 1981); Douglas Rimmer, The Economies of West Africa (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 15, 124, 142.
11. S. K. B. Asante, "ECOWAS/CEAO: Conflict and Cooperation in West Africa," Ralph I. Onwuka and Amadu Sesay, eds., The Future of Regionalism in Africa (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), pp. 84-85.
12. For scholarly works on the impact of cultural variables on foreign affairs, see R. P. Anand, ed., Cultural Factors in International Relations (New Delhi, India: Abhinav Publications, 1981).
13. Tom Imobighe, "ECOWAS Defence Pact and Regionalism in Africa," in Ralph Onwuka and Amadu Sesay, eds., *op. cit.* (1985), p. 116. More recently, interstate cooperation on the military front has assumed the unprecedented form of the five-nation ECOWAS peace-keeping force in West Africa. The troops involved here consist of an estimated 2,500 men from Ghana, Nigeria, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Gambia, and were sent to Liberia to help maintain order in August 1990.
14. See the presidential address to the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Third Press Review of Third World Diplomacy, vol. 1, no. 1 (New York: Third Press International, Winter 1982), pp. 21-22.
15. See I. William Zartman, "Africa as a Subordinate State System in International Relations," International Organization, vol. xxi, no. 3 (Summer 1967), p. 559.
16. To recapitulate, our conceptual scheme entailed propositions and variables deduced from systems, decision making and power theoretical literature. It further incorporated national attributes, the perception of these attributes by statesmen, and other systemic factors (Chapter 2).
17. See for example, Olatunde J. B. Ojo, "Nigeria and the formation of ECOWAS," International Organization, vol. 34, no. 4 (Autumn 1980), pp. 571-604.
18. See Samuel Kirkpatrick, ed., Quantitative Analysis of Political Data, (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill, 1974), p. 150.
19. See for instance, J. O. C. Onyemelukwe, Industrialization in West Africa (London: Croom Helm, 1984), p. 2.

20. Nazli Choucri, Population Dynamics and International Violence (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1974); Nazli Choucri and Robert North, Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International Violence (San Francisco: Freeman, 1975); Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Gerald W. Hopple, Paul J. Rossa, and Stephen J. Andriole, Foreign Policy Behavior (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1980), p. 63.
21. For some examples of such studies, see Roger Cobb and Charles Elder, International Community: A Regional and Global Study (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. 141; William J. Foltz, From French West Africa to the Mali Federation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 189-192.
22. See Patrick McGowan and Howard Shapiro, The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1973), p. 13. See also, Robert M. Rood, "Introduction: Patterns and Determinants of External Conduct," Charles W. Kegley, Jr., Gregory A. Raymond, Robert M. Rood, and Richard A. Skinner, eds., International Events and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1975), p. 144.
23. The study by Zartman is perhaps an exception in this regard. However, Zartman's study is outdated, focuses ambiguously on North West Africa and is essentially narrative and idiographic in its approach. See I. William Zartman, International Relations in the New Africa, Second Edition (New York: University Press of America, 1987).
24. For such literature on regionalism and international regional subsystems, see Leonard Binder, "The Middle East Subordinate International System," World Politics, vol. x (April 1958), pp. 408-429; Michael Brecher, "International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia," World Politics, vol. 15 (1963); I. William Zartman, op. cit. (Summer 1967), pp. 545-564; William R. Thompson, "Delineating Regional Subsystems: Visit Networks and the Middle East Case," International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 13, no. 2 (May 1981), pp. 213-235.
25. Adam Przeworki and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (Malabar, Florida: Robert E. Krieger, 1985), p. 17.
26. *ibid.*, p. 10.
27. *ibid.*, p. iv.
28. Although much work needs to be done, there are already significant studies in this area. For example, see Margaret G. Hermann, "The Effects of Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders on Foreign Policy," in M. A. East, S. A. Salmore, and C. F. Hermann, eds., op. cit. (1978), pp. 49-68; "Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 24 (1980), pp. 7-46; "Personality and Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Study of 53

Heads of Government," in D. A. Sylvan and S. Chan, eds., Foreign Policy Decision Making: Perception, Cognition, and Artificial Intelligence (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), pp. 53-80; "Assessing the Foreign Policy Role Orientations of Sub-Saharan African Leaders," and "Leaders' Foreign Policy Role Orientations and the Quality of Foreign Policy Decisions," in S. Walker, ed., Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1987).

APPENDIX I

Azar-Sloan Internation Scale

SCALE CATEGORY CODES	DESCRIPTION
1	VOLUNTARY UNIFICATION INTO ONE NATION--Merging voluntarily into one nation with legally binding government.
2	MAJOR STRATEGIC ALLIANCE--Fighting a war jointly; establishing joint military command or alliance; conducting joint military maneuvers; establishing economic common market; joining or organizing international alliances, etc.
3	MILITARY, ECONOMIC OR STRATEGIC SUPPORT--Selling nuclear power plants or materials or other advanced strategic technology; supplying military technical or advisory assistance; intervening with military support at request of government; training military personnel; initiating or concluding agreements on disarmament or military matters.
4	NON-MILITARY ECONOMIC, TECHNOLOGICAL OR INDUSTRIAL EXCHANGE--Making loans or grants for economic development; provision of favorable trade concessions; sale of major nonstrategic technology; establishing common communication or transportation systems; provision of non-military advice or assistance.
5	CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC AGREEMENT OR EXCHANGE--Extension of recognition to government; establishing diplomatic relations; cultural or academic exchanges; offering economic or military aid; signing economic and defense accords.

- 6 **OFFICIAL VERBAL SUPPORT OF GOALS, VALUES AND REGIME**--Official support of policy; elevation of level of diplomatic mission; affirmations of friendship or support; restoring broken diplomatic or other relations; other favorable verbal gestures; presidential and prime ministerial visits and discussions.
- 7 **MILD VERBAL SUPPORT: EXCHANGES OF MINOR OFFICIALS**--Meetings of high officials; discussions on problems of mutual interest; issuance of joint communique; visits by lower officials; appointment of ambassadors; statement or explanation of policy; request for policy support.
- 8 **NEUTRAL OR NON-SIGNIFICANT ACTS**--Rhetorical policy statements; indifference or no comment statements; compensation for nationalized enterprises or private property.
- 9 **MILD VERBAL HOSTILITY/DISCORD**--Low key objections to policy or behavior; expressing discontent through third party; objection to explanation of policy; request for change in policy; denial of accusations.
- 10 **STRONG VERBAL HOSTILITY**--Strong condemnation of actions or policies; threats of retaliation for acts; denunciation of leaders, system or ideology; strong propaganda attacks; postponement of head of state visits or withdrawal from meetings or summits; blocking or veto action in international body.
- 11 **HOSTILE DIPLOMATIC-ECONOMIC ACTIONS**--Troop mobilizations; granting sanctuary to opposition; hindrance of movement by closing borders; refusing visas; recall or expulsion of ambassadors; impositions of embargoes, economic sanctions or other activity designed to impose economic loss; termination of major agreements; expulsion or arrest of nationals or press; organization of demonstrations against target.
- 12 **POLITICAL-MILITARY HOSTILE ACTIONS**--Inciting of riots and/or rebellions by providing training, financial support, and sanctuary to terrorists or guerrilla activities on limited basis; termination of diplomatic relations; nationalizing companies without compensation; attacking diplomats or embassies; kidnapping or torturing foreign citizens or prisoners of war.

- 13 **SMALL SCALE MILITARY ACTS**--Limited air, sea, or border skirmishes; border police acts; annexation of occupied territory; imposition of blockades; assassination of leaders or target country; major material support of subversive activities.
- 14 **LIMITED WAR ACTS**--Intermittent shelling or clashes; sporadic bombing of military and/or industrial areas; small scale interception or shelling of ships; mining of territorial waters.
- 15 **FULL SCALE WAR**--Full scale air, naval or land battles, including the use of nuclear weapons or chemical and biological warfare; major bombing of military and civilian targets; occupation or invasion of territory.

KEY TO FOREIGN POLICY EVENTS' TYPES

P = Political/Diplomatic
E = Economic/Commercial
M = Military/Strategic
S = Social/Cultural

APPENDIX II

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Intra-African Dimension

<u>1975</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	5	7	0	2
Feb	6	1	2	0
Mar	4	1	1	0
Apr	4	6	0	1
May	5	5	0	0
Jun	6	7	0	2
Jul	7	4	4	0
Aug	1	8	2	0
Sep	15	8	7	3
Oct	3	8	2	0
Nov	5	4	0	0
Dec	9	7	3	2
Total	70	66	21	10

167 events

APPENDIX II

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Intra-African Dimension

<u>1976</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	8	2	2	0
Feb	10	3	1	0
Mar	7	9	0	0
Apr	3	5	2	2
May	9	6	0	0
Jun	18	4	3	0
Jul	4	2	1	0
Aug	5	5	1	0
Sep	3	2	1	0
Oct	6	6	3	0
Nov	5	6	2	0
Dec	6	3	0	1
Total	84	53	16	3

156 events

APPENDIX II

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Intra-African Dimension

<u>1977</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	2	9	2	1
Feb	5	2	2	0
Mar	9	11	2	0
Apr	6	3	6	3
May	8	2	2	4
Jun	2	3	0	0
Jul	2	3	3	0
Aug	6	3	5	0
Sep	4	5	2	0
Oct	3	4	0	0
Nov	3	4	0	4
Dec	2	19	6	0
Total	52	68	30	12

162 events

APPENDIX II

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Intra-African Dimension

<u>1978</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	6	4	2	0
Feb	3	4	2	2
Mar	4	2	2	0
Apr	4	3	3	0
May	9	7	2	2
Jun	5	4	2	0
Jul	6	3	2	0
Aug	5	0	2	0
Sep	8	1	0	0
Oct	6	3	0	0
Nov	5	0	0	0
Dec	4	1	0	2
Total	65	32	17	6

120 events

APPENDIX II

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Intra-African Dimension

<u>1979</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	5	11	3	2
Feb	6	4	2	2
Mar	14	3	1	0
Apr	5	8	0	0
May	11	4	4	3
Jun	3	2	0	0
Jul	4	2	0	0
Aug	3	2	3	1
Sep	2	4	0	0
Oct	4	4	0	0
Nov	3	0	1	0
Dec	11	1	0	0
Total	71	45	14	8

138 events

APPENDIX II

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Intra-African Dimension

<u>1980</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	6	1	2	0
Feb	2	8	4	0
Mar	5	9	0	0
Apr	6	0	0	0
May	10	2	2	0
Jun	9	0	0	1
Jul	5	0	0	1
Aug	6	6	2	0
Sep	5	4	0	0
Oct	0	1	0	2
Nov	2	0	0	0
Dec	6	1	0	0
Total	62	32	10	4

108 events

APPENDIX II

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Intra-African Dimension

<u>1981</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	3	0	0	0
Feb	2	2	0	0
Mar	9	1	2	1
Apr	16	0	0	0
May	2	0	0	0
Jun	7	0	0	0
Jul	4	3	0	0
Aug	2	4	2	2
Sep	1	3	2	3
Oct	3	0	1	0
Nov	10	3	1	0
Dec	9	2	0	0
Total	68	18	8	6

100 events

APPENDIX II

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Intra-African Dimension

<u>1982</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	8	2	2	0
Feb	10	0	0	0
Mar	6	1	0	0
Apr	3	2	0	0
May	2	1	0	0
Jun	8	0	0	0
Jul	13	0	0	0
Aug	4	8	2	0
Sep	1	1	0	0
Oct	7	0	0	0
Nov	9	4	0	0
Dec	4	0	0	0
Total	75	19	4	0

98 events

APPENDIX II

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Intra-African Dimension

<u>1983</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	5	2	0	0
Feb	11	1	2	2
Mar	3	3	0	1
Apr	0	0	0	2
May	5	3	0	0
Jun	5	4	0	0
Jul	10	7	0	0
Aug	3	0	0	0
Sep	15	3	0	0
Oct	6	1	0	0
Nov	6	4	0	3
Dec	12	0	0	0
Total	81	28	2	8

119 events

APPENDIX II

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Intra-African Dimension

<u>1984</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	10	4	0	1
Feb	4	2	0	1
Mar	3	3	0	2
Apr	17	7	2	0
May	4	0	0	0
Jun	10	2	2	0
Jul	8	2	5	0
Aug	6	1	0	0
Sep	4	3	2	0
Oct	1	3	1	0
Nov	1	0	0	0
Dec	15	0	2	2
Total	83	27	14	6

130 events

APPENDIX II

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Intra-African Dimension

<u>1985</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	6	3	0	0
Feb	7	0	0	0
Mar	11	6	0	2
Apr	6	0	0	0
May	3	2	2	0
Jun	3	1	0	0
Jul	5	2	0	0
Aug	8	0	0	0
Sep	5	1	0	0
Oct	6	0	0	0
Nov	7	0	0	0
Dec	8	0	0	0
Total	75	15	2	2

94 events

APPENDIX II

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Intra-African Dimension

<u>1986</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	5	1	0	3
Feb	6	2	2	0
Mar	2	0	0	0
Apr	1	2	0	1
May	4	0	0	0
Jun	11	6	2	0
Jul	5	0	2	2
Aug	12	0	0	1
Sep	10	6	1	1
Oct	15	3	0	0
Nov	7	2	6	2
Dec	4	0	0	3
Total	82	22	13	13

130 events

APPENDIX II

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Intra-African Dimension

<u>1987</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	6	4	1	0
Feb	4	2	0	0
Mar	6	1	0	0
Apr	7	0	2	0
May	5	0	0	0
Jun	10	2	3	2
Jul	2	11	0	0
Aug	6	5	2	0
Sep	2	0	0	1
Oct	4	0	0	2
Nov	4	0	0	0
Dec	5	6	0	0
Total	61	31	8	5

105 events

APPENDIX II

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Intra-African Dimension

<u>1988</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	3	0	2	0
Feb	7	9	0	1
Mar	7	0	0	0
Apr	5	1	3	0
May	6	3	2	0
Jun	0	0	0	0
Jul	3	0	0	0
Aug	9	0	0	0
Sep	18	2	0	0
Oct	3	2	7	1
Nov	3	1	0	0
Dec	8	2	2	0
Total	72	20	16	2

110 events

APPENDIX II

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Intra-African Dimension

<u>1989</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	4	0	0	0
Feb	2	2	2	1
Mar	6	5	2	0
Apr	16	0	0	1
May	5	1	0	0
Jun	4	0	0	1
Jul	9	2	0	0
Aug	9	4	3	1
Sep	6	1	0	1
Oct	4	16	0	0
Nov	3	8	0	0
Dec	1	2	0	1
Total	69	41	7	6

123 events

APPENDIX III

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Extra-African Dimension

<u>1975</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	3	4	1	0
Feb	7	2	0	0
Mar	6	10	2	3
Apr	0	4	2	0
May	0	4	1	0
Jun	4	6	0	1
Jul	6	6	4	0
Aug	5	12	1	1
Sep	4	5	4	0
Oct	2	10	5	3
Nov	2	12	1	2
Dec	6	9	0	1
Total	45	84	21	11

161 events

APPENDIX III

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Extra-African Dimension

<u>1976</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	1	1	2	0
Feb	4	1	1	0
Mar	2	17	3	1
Apr	5	11	4	1
May	5	12	8	1
Jun	5	8	9	3
Jul	1	5	1	0
Aug	1	8	2	0
Sep	3	3	2	0
Oct	2	9	0	4
Nov	2	3	0	0
Dec	0	1	0	1
Total	31	79	32	11

153 events

APPENDIX III

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Extra-African Dimension

<u>1977</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	3	6	0	0
Feb	2	10	2	3
Mar	2	6	4	4
Apr	10	12	4	0
May	4	15	3	2
Jun	2	12	2	0
Jul	6	8	3	0
Aug	5	4	4	0
Sep	6	12	5	0
Oct	3	13	2	0
Nov	0	11	1	2
Dec	4	13	2	1
Total	47	122	32	12

213 events

APPENDIX III

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Extra-African Dimension

<u>1978</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	3	11	3	1
Feb	4	11	0	5
Mar	2	9	2	1
Apr	3	15	0	1
May	7	5	2	0
Jun	0	11	0	1
Jul	8	14	5	0
Aug	2	12	0	0
Sep	5	8	4	2
Oct	7	21	1	5
Nov	3	1	2	1
Dec	5	6	2	1
Total	49	124	21	18

212 events

APPENDIX III

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Extra-African Dimension

<u>1979</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	9	14	4	1
Feb	2	4	6	0
Mar	4	5	4	0
Apr	4	10	0	1
May	7	8	1	0
Jun	5	3	1	0
Jul	2	13	2	0
Aug	2	1	0	0
Sep	2	8	0	1
Oct	4	4	2	0
Nov	2	6	2	1
Dec	2	5	4	1
Total	45	81	26	5

157 events

APPENDIX III

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Extra-African Dimension

<u>1980</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	4	5	0	0
Feb	6	4	3	2
Mar	3	4	6	0
Apr	0	3	2	0
May	3	5	3	1
Jun	3	4	3	0
Jul	7	2	0	0
Aug	0	4	4	0
Sep	0	9	2	0
Oct	1	8	4	1
Nov	2	5	0	0
Dec	1	6	2	5
Total	30	59	29	9

127 events

APPENDIX III

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Extra-African Dimension

<u>1981</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	0	1	0	1
Feb	2	4	0	1
Mar	8	4	2	0
Apr	5	7	0	0
May	3	4	2	2
Jun	3	7	0	0
Jul	6	7	0	1
Aug	1	11	3	0
Sep	7	5	2	1
Oct	7	2	0	1
Nov	2	5	0	0
Dec	3	8	1	0
Total	47	65	10	7

129 events

APPENDIX III

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Extra-African Dimension

<u>1982</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	4	3	0	0
Feb	0	4	2	1
Mar	5	2	0	1
Apr	5	1	2	2
May	10	2	0	2
Jun	2	4	0	1
Jul	5	2	0	0
Aug	4	6	2	0
Sep	1	9	1	1
Oct	4	4	2	1
Nov	6	6	0	1
Dec	0	0	2	2
Total	46	43	11	12

112 events

APPENDIX III

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Extra-African Dimension

<u>1983</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	8	12	1	0
Feb	1	1	2	3
Mar	5	4	1	0
Apr	1	4	3	0
May	2	4	2	0
Jun	4	5	1	2
Jul	14	6	2	1
Aug	1	8	4	0
Sep	0	4	3	1
Oct	2	8	3	4
Nov	3	6	4	0
Dec	4	6	4	0
Total	45	68	30	11

154 events

APPENDIX III

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Extra-African Dimension

<u>1984</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	3	5	0	0
Feb	2	8	4	0
Mar	3	11	3	0
Apr	6	6	3	2
May	7	1	0	0
Jun	3	5	0	1
Jul	12	9	1	0
Aug	1	4	2	1
Sep	2	8	1	0
Oct	4	9	0	3
Nov	3	10	3	4
Dec	5	8	1	2
Total	51	84	18	13

166 events

APPENDIX III

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Extra-African Dimension

<u>1985</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	3	1	1	0
Feb	4	8	2	0
Mar	4	5	1	1
Apr	5	10	3	0
May	0	11	0	5
Jun	1	10	2	0
Jul	4	11	1	1
Aug	4	9	1	0
Sep	1	6	0	0
Oct	1	11	2	1
Nov	1	1	4	0
Dec	5	2	0	5
Total	33	85	17	13

148 events

APPENDIX III

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Extra-African Dimension

<u>1986</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	8	8	2	1
Feb	4	12	3	0
Mar	1	5	0	0
Apr	7	6	3	1
May	2	12	0	0
Jun	6	5	1	1
Jul	7	8	2	0
Aug	0	11	2	2
Sep	4	8	4	1
Oct	4	11	3	0
Nov	1	8	1	2
Dec	6	9	5	0
Total	50	103	26	8

187 events

APPENDIX III

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Extra-African Dimension

<u>1987</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	7	2	3	1
Feb	0	6	1	0
Mar	2	12	4	0
Apr	2	14	1	2
May	6	14	3	0
Jun	13	18	2	0
Jul	2	14	2	1
Aug	6	12	2	1
Sep	1	7	2	0
Oct	2	5	1	0
Nov	10	7	3	2
Dec	1	13	2	0
Total	52	124	26	7

209 events

APPENDIX III

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Extra-African Dimension

<u>1988</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	0	6	2	0
Feb	3	9	1	0
Mar	7	10	0	2
Apr	2	15	1	0
May	1	7	2	2
Jun	5	19	3	0
Jul	0	14	2	0
Aug	5	14	1	0
Sep	0	2	3	1
Oct	6	13	4	0
Nov	1	8	1	1
Dec	7	14	3	0
Total	37	129	23	6

195 events

APPENDIX III

The Political, Economic, Social, and Military Events
Initiated in West Africa: The Extra-African Dimension

<u>1989</u>	P	E	S	M
Jan	6	4	1	1
Feb	6	5	0	2
Mar	2	1	1	0
Apr	4	12	0	0
May	7	9	5	1
Jun	3	12	3	1
Jul	2	12	5	0
Aug	2	9	3	0
Sep	3	12	3	0
Oct	7	15	2	0
Nov	2	7	0	1
Dec	0	11	0	0
Total	44	109	23	6

182 events

APPENDIX IV

RAW SCORES: NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND FOREIGN
POLICY BEHAVIOR OF WEST AFRICAN STATES

	POP77	GNP77	GDP77	FUND77	GNPK77	GDPK77	ENERGY77
BENIN	3.2	859	527	1.5	268	165	55
B/FASO	6.4	947	356	1.3	148	56	23
C/VERDE	0.3	77	.	0.5	258	.	.
GAMBIA	0.6	127	112	1.3	213	187	102
GHANA	11.0	9696	1741	6.3	881	158	167
GUINEA	5.0	1361	1075	1.4	272	215	92
G/BISSAU	0.6	112	177	0.7	188	295	71
I/COAST	7.3	7563	6441	6.4	1036	882	356
LIBERIA	1.7	857	473	3.3	504	278	402
MALI	6.1	1141	414	0.9	187	68	30
MAURITANIA	1.4	473	444	1.8	338	317	198
NIGER	5.0	1265	503	1.0	253	101	37
NIGERIA	69.9	70460	25960	16.1	1008	371	107
SENEGAL	5.2	2490	1184	2.7	478	228	175
S/LEONE	3.2	853	422	2.2	266	132	103
TOGO	2.4	901	396	1.8	375	165	95

APPENDIX IV

RAW SCORES: NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND FOREIGN POLICY
BEHAVIOR OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (contd.)

	EMBREC 77	EMBSNT 77	EMBRAF 77	EMBRNA 77	MISIZE 77	MIEXP 77	CONTIG
BENIN	7	7	9	36	3	11	4
B/FASO	6	3	8	30	6	31	6
C/VERDE	6	2	1	21	2	2	1
GAMBIA	8	6	6	27	0	0	1
GHANA	10	13	11	43	18	97	3
GUINEA	9	13	12	44	10	24	6
G/BISSAU	2	2	2	10	6	7	3
I/COAST	9	8	13	35	9	64	5
LIBERIA	5	6	5	19	4	9	3
MALI	7	6	5	36	7	36	6
MAURITANIA	3	4	6	28	17	110	2
NIGER	8	6	12	31	3	11	4
NIGERIA	12	15	17	48	300	2817	2
SENEGAL	11	10	12	45	13	46	5
S/LEONE	5	9	4	23	4	8	2
TOGO	4	2	6	27	4	20	3

APPENDIX IV

RAW SCORES: NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND FOREIGN POLICY
BEHAVIOR OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (contd.)

	POP82	GNP82	GDP82	FUND82	GNPK82	GDPK82	ENERGY82
BENIN	3.7	1147	830	1.5	310	224	38
B/FASO	6.5	1365	1000	1.3	210	154	22
C/VERDE	0.3	118	.	0.5	393	.	.
GAMBIA	0.7	252	213	1.3	360	304	78
GHANA	12.2	4392	31220	6.5	360	2559	161
GUINEA	5.7	1767	1750	1.5	310	307	54
G/BISSAU	0.8	136	132	0.8	170	165	35
I/COAST	8.9	8455	7560	6.5	950	849	191
LIBERIA	2.0	980	950	3.4	490	475	373
MALI	7.1	1278	1030	1.0	180	145	21
MAURITANIA	1.6	752	640	1.8	470	400	131
NIGER	5.9	1829	1560	1.1	310	264	31
NIGERIA	90.6	77916	71720	16.4	860	792	143
SENEGAL	6.0	2940	2510	2.7	490	418	206
S/LEONE	3.2	1248	1130	2.2	390	353	121
TOGO	2.8	952	800	1.8	340	286	125

APPENDIX IV

RAW SCORES: NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND FOREIGN POLICY
BEHAVIOR OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (contd.)

	EMBREC 82	EMBSNT 82	EMBRAF 82	EMBRNA 82	MISIZE 82	MIEXP 82
BENIN	3	5	4	8	6	27
B/FASO	2	3	2	7	9	28
C/VERDE	0	2	0	6	4	14
GAMBIA	5	4	0	6	1	2
GHANA	10	9	5	31	9	49
GUINEA	9	9	7	23	28	89
G/BISSAU	2	2	3	9	9	6
I/COAST	10	6	9	24	21	116
LIBERIA	5	5	6	19	5	51
MALI	6	4	4	11	11	26
MAURITANIA	2	3	5	9	16	49
NIGER	3	4	2	7	5	11
NIGERIA	12	13	17	52	144	1926
SENEGAL	7	7	8	32	18	64
S/LEONE	5	5	1	11	4	12
TOGO	2	2	6	7	6	16

APPENDIX IV

RAW SCORES: NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND FOREIGN POLICY
BEHAVIOR OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (contd.)

	POP87	GNP87	GDP87	FUND87	GNPK87	GDPK87	ENERGY87
BENIN	4.3	132	101	3.0	300	272	40
B/FASO	7.7	143	83	1.0	170	111	26
C/VERDE	0.3	17	11	1.0	500	346	135
GAMBIA	0.7	18	10	2.6	220	139	110
GHANA	12.2	533	673	12.9	390	509	97
GUINEA	4.5	194	160	2.9	320	274	73
G/BISSAU	0.8	15	15	1.5	170	181	45
I/COAST	9.3	826	655	13.0	750	714	208
LIBERIA	2.3	103	81	6.7	440	374	355
MALI	7.6	158	207	1.9	200	276	26
MAURITANIA	1.3	82	70	3.6	440	380	156
NIGER	5.7	190	183	2.1	280	313	60
NIGERIA	101.9	3953	7421	32.8	370	806	227
SENEGAL	6.4	355	264	5.4	510	410	167
S/LEONE	3.8	117	137	4.4	300	399	75
TOGO	2.7	96	67	3.6	300	231	48

APPENDIX IV

RAW SCORES: NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND FOREIGN POLICY
BEHAVIOR OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (contd.)

	EMBREC 87	EMBSNT 87	EMBR AF 87	EMBRNA 87	MISIZE 87	MIEXP 87
BENIN	3	5	4	9	4	35
B/FASO	2	4	3	9	9	51
C/VERDE	0	2	0	7	4	16
GAMBIA	3	3	0	3	1	2
GHANA	9	7	4	29	11	45
GUINEA	8	8	7	20	24	44
G/BISSAU	3	2	3	9	11	4
I/COAST	10	6	10	30	8	178
LIBERIA	5	5	5	18	6	40
MALI	5	4	4	14	8	47
MAURITANIA	2	5	7	8	16	37
NIGER	3	4	5	11	5	18
NIGERIA	12	13	17	53	138	180
SENEGAL	8	6	10	39	18	97
S/LEONE	5	4	1	10	6	5
TOGO	2	2	5	9	8	40

APPENDIX IV

RAW SCORES: NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND FOREIGN POLICY
BEHAVIOR OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (contd.)

	EVINITWA	EVRECDWA	EVINRDWA	EVINIT75	EVINIT80	EVINIT85
BENIN	93	96	189	36	27	30
B/FASO	116	96	212	17	46	53
C/VERDE	36	34	70	10	19	7
GAMBIA	113	120	233	54	32	27
GHANA	286	308	594	111	83	92
GUINEA	113	125	238	67	22	24
G/BISSAU	52	56	108	19	20	13
I/COAST	113	132	245	61	32	20
LIBERIA	124	90	214	43	49	32
MALI	79	85	164	27	25	27
MAURITANIA	50	41	91	15	15	20
NIGER	74	67	141	32	22	20
NIGERIA	270	235	505	115	73	82
SENEGAL	163	165	328	76	42	45
S/LEONE	73	96	169	24	17	32
TOGO	105	114	219	36	31	38

APPENDIX IV

RAW SCORES: NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND FOREIGN POLICY
BEHAVIOR OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (contd.)

	CPEVINWA	CPEVREWA	CNEVINWA	CNEVREWA	EVINEXWA	EVINIEXT
BENIN	82	92	11	4	117	24
B/FASO	107	87	9	9	146	30
C/VERDE	31	32	5	2	47	11
GAMBIA	108	116	5	4	178	65
GHANA	256	249	30	59	438	152
GUINEA	97	120	16	5	163	50
G/BISSAU	43	41	9	15	73	21
I/COAST	103	113	10	19	153	40
LIBERIA	102	78	22	12	195	71
MALI	72	77	7	8	129	50
MAURITANIA	39	33	11	8	69	19
NIGER	71	65	3	2	103	29
NIGERIA	236	214	34	21	453	183
SENEGAL	141	139	22	26	214	51
S/LEONE	69	87	4	9	145	72
TOGO	82	96	23	18	138	33

APPENDIX IV

RAW SCORES: NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND FOREIGN POLICY
BEHAVIOR OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (contd.)

	EVRECEXT	CPEVINEX	CPEVREXT	CNEVINEX	CNEVREXT
BENIN	44	21	42	3	2
B/FASO	66	26	65	4	1
C/VERDE	26	10	26	1	0
GAMBIA	120	60	120	5	0
GHANA	289	128	278	24	11
GUINEA	95	48	94	2	1
G/BISSAU	34	20	34	1	0
I/COAST	97	40	96	0	1
LIBERIA	97	55	89	16	8
MALI	103	49	102	1	1
MAURITANIA	58	17	57	2	1
NIGER	62	28	62	1	0
NIGERIA	181	140	164	43	17
SENEGAL	105	45	105	6	0
S/LEONE	171	65	167	7	4
TOGO	56	32	56	1	0

Note: See Chapter 6 for the various sources of data. Population scores refer to millions of people; the scores for GNP and GDP are in millions of dollars. Financial contributions to ECOWAS funds are in millions of dollars and percentage contributions to ECOWAS funds. Scores for GNP and GDP per capita represent dollar amounts. Energy consumption per capita are in kilograms of coal (1977) and oil equivalent. Finally, whereas military size is measured in terms of thousands of soldiers, defense expenditures are in millions of dollars.

APPENDIX V

TABLE 1

NATIONAL POPULATION IN 1977

POP77	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
0	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
1	2	12.5	12.5	18.8
1	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
2	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
2	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
3	2	12.5	12.5	50.0
5	2	12.5	12.5	62.5
5	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
6	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
6	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
7	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
11	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
70	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 2

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IN 1977

GNP77	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
77	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
112	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
127	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
473	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
853	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
857	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
859	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
901	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
947	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
1141	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
1265	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
1361	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
2490	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
7563	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
9696	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
70460	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 3

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IN 1977

GDP77	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
112	1	6.3	6.7	6.7
177	1	6.3	6.7	13.3
356	1	6.3	6.7	20.0
396	1	6.3	6.7	26.7
414	1	6.3	6.7	33.3
422	1	6.3	6.7	40.0
444	1	6.3	6.7	46.7
473	1	6.3	6.7	53.3
503	1	6.3	6.7	60.0
527	1	6.3	6.7	66.7
1075	1	6.3	6.7	73.3
1184	1	6.3	6.7	80.0
1741	1	6.3	6.7	86.7
6441	1	6.3	6.7	93.3
25960	1	6.3	6.7	100.0
.	1	6.3	MISSING	
TOTAL	----- 16	----- 100.0	----- 100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 4

CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECOWAS FUNDS IN 1977

FUND77	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
1	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
1	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
1	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
1	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
1	2	12.5	12.5	37.5
1	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
2	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
2	2	12.5	12.5	62.5
2	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
3	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
3	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
6	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
6	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
16	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 5

AGGREGATE WEALTH OF WEST AFRICAN STATES IN 1977

WEALTH77	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
240.30	1	6.3	6.7	6.7
289.70	1	6.3	6.7	13.3
918.80	1	6.3	6.7	20.0
1277.20	1	6.3	6.7	26.7
1298.80	1	6.3	6.7	33.3
1304.30	1	6.3	6.7	40.0
1333.30	1	6.3	6.7	46.7
1387.50	1	6.3	6.7	53.3
1555.90	1	6.3	6.7	60.0
1769.00	1	6.3	6.7	66.7
2437.40	1	6.3	6.7	73.3
3676.70	1	6.3	6.7	80.0
11443.30	1	6.3	6.7	86.7
14010.40	1	6.3	6.7	93.3
96436.10	1	6.3	6.7	100.0
.	1	6.3	MISSING	
TOTAL	----- 16	----- 100.0	----- 100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 6

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA IN 1977

GNPK77	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
148	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
187	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
188	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
213	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
253	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
258	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
266	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
268	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
272	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
338	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
375	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
478	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
504	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
881	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
1008	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
1036	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	----- 16	----- 100.0	----- 100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 7

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER CAPITA IN 1977

GDPK77	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
56	1	6.3	6.7	6.7
68	1	6.3	6.7	13.3
101	1	6.3	6.7	20.0
132	1	6.3	6.7	26.7
158	1	6.3	6.7	33.3
165	2	12.5	13.3	46.7
187	1	6.3	6.7	53.3
215	1	6.3	6.7	60.0
228	1	6.3	6.7	66.7
278	1	6.3	6.7	73.3
295	1	6.3	6.7	80.0
317	1	6.3	6.7	86.7
371	1	6.3	6.7	93.3
882	1	6.3	6.7	100.0
.	1	6.3	MISSING	
TOTAL	----- 16	----- 100.0	----- 100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 8

ENERGY CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA IN 1977

ENERGY77	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
23	1	6.3	6.7	6.7
30	1	6.3	6.7	13.3
37	1	6.3	6.7	20.0
55	1	6.3	6.7	26.7
71	1	6.3	6.7	33.3
92	1	6.3	6.7	40.0
95	1	6.3	6.7	46.7
102	1	6.3	6.7	53.3
103	1	6.3	6.7	60.0
107	1	6.3	6.7	66.7
167	1	6.3	6.7	73.3
175	1	6.3	6.7	80.0
198	1	6.3	6.7	86.7
356	1	6.3	6.7	93.3
402	1	6.3	6.7	100.0
.	1	6.3	MISSING	
TOTAL	----- 16	----- 100.0	----- 100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 9

LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT OF WEST AFRICAN STATES IN 1977

DEVT77	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
227	1	6.3	6.7	6.7
285	1	6.3	6.7	13.3
391	1	6.3	6.7	20.0
488	1	6.3	6.7	26.7
501	1	6.3	6.7	33.3
502	1	6.3	6.7	40.0
554	1	6.3	6.7	46.7
579	1	6.3	6.7	53.3
635	1	6.3	6.7	60.0
853	1	6.3	6.7	66.7
881	1	6.3	6.7	73.3
1184	1	6.3	6.7	80.0
1206	1	6.3	6.7	86.7
1486	1	6.3	6.7	93.3
2274	1	6.3	6.7	100.0
.	1	6.3	MISSING	
	-----	-----	-----	
	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 10

EMBASSIES RECEIVED FROM WEST AFRICAN STATES IN 1977

EMBREC77	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
2	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
3	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
4	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
5	2	12.5	12.5	31.3
6	2	12.5	12.5	43.8
7	2	12.5	12.5	56.3
8	2	12.5	12.5	68.8
9	2	12.5	12.5	81.3
10	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
11	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
12	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 11

EMBASSIES SENT TO WEST AFRICAN STATES IN 1977

EMBSNT77	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
2	3	18.8	18.8	18.8
3	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
4	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
6	4	25.0	25.0	56.3
7	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
8	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
9	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
10	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
13	2	12.5	12.5	93.8
15	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 12

EMBASSIES RECEIVED FROM OTHER AFRICAN STATES IN 1977

EMBRAF77	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
1	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
2	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
4	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
5	2	12.5	12.5	31.3
6	3	18.8	18.8	50.0
8	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
9	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
11	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
12	3	18.8	18.8	87.5
13	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
17	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	----- 16	----- 100.0	----- 100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 13

EMBASSIES RECEIVED FROM NON-AFRICAN STATES IN 1977

EMBRNA77	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
10	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
19	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
21	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
23	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
27	2	12.5	12.5	37.5
28	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
30	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
31	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
35	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
36	2	12.5	12.5	75.0
43	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
44	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
45	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
48	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 14

DIPLOMATIC CAPABILITIES OF WEST AFRICAN STATES IN 1977

DIPCAP77	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID	CUMULATIVE
			PERCENT	PERCENT
16.00	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
30.00	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
35.00	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
39.00	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
41.00	2	12.5	12.5	37.5
47.00	2	12.5	12.5	50.0
54.00	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
57.00	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
59.00	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
65.00	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
77.00	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
78.00	2	12.5	12.5	93.8
92.00	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 15

SIZE OF THE MILITARY IN 1977

MISIZE77	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
0	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
2	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
3	2	12.5	12.5	25.0
4	3	18.8	18.8	43.8
6	2	12.5	12.5	56.3
7	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
9	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
10	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
13	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
17	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
18	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
300	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 16

NATIONAL MILITARY EXPENDITURE OF IN 1977

MIEXP77	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
0	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
2	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
7	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
8	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
9	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
11	2	12.5	12.5	43.8
20	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
24	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
31	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
36	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
46	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
64	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
97	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
110	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
2817	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 17

MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF WEST AFRICAN STATES IN 1977

MILCAP77	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
0.0	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
4.0	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
12.0	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
13.0	2	12.5	12.5	31.3
14.0	2	12.5	12.5	43.8
24.0	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
34.0	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
37.0	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
43.0	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
59.0	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
73.0	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
115.0	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
127.0	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
3117.0	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 18

GEOGRAPHICAL CONTIGUITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES

CONTIG	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
1	2	12.5	12.5	12.5
2	3	18.8	18.8	31.3
3	4	25.0	25.0	56.3
4	2	12.5	12.5	68.8
5	2	12.5	12.5	81.3
6	3	18.8	18.8	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 19

NATIONAL POPULATION IN 1982

POP82	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
0	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
1	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
1	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
2	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
2	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
3	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
3	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
4	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
6	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
6	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
6	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
7	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
7	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
9	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
12	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
91	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 20

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IN 1982

GNP82	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
118	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
136	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
252	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
752	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
952	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
980	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
1147	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
1248	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
1278	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
1365	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
1767	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
1829	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
2940	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
4392	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
8455	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
77916	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 21

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IN 1982

GDP82	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
132	1	6.3	6.7	6.7
213	1	6.3	6.7	13.3
640	1	6.3	6.7	20.0
800	1	6.3	6.7	26.7
830	1	6.3	6.7	33.3
950	1	6.3	6.7	40.0
1000	1	6.3	6.7	46.7
1030	1	6.3	6.7	53.3
1130	1	6.3	6.7	60.0
1560	1	6.3	6.7	66.7
1750	1	6.3	6.7	73.3
2510	1	6.3	6.7	80.0
7560	1	6.3	6.7	86.7
31220	1	6.3	6.7	93.3
71720	1	6.3	6.7	100.0
.	1	6.3	MISSING	
	-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 22

CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECOWAS FUNDS IN 1982

FUND82	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
1	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
1	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
1	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
1	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
1	2	12.5	12.5	37.5
2	2	12.5	12.5	50.0
2	2	12.5	12.5	62.5
2	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
3	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
3	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
7	2	12.5	12.5	93.8
16	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 23

AGGREGATE WEALTH FOR WEST AFRICAN STATES IN 1982

WEALTH82	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
268.8	1	6.3	6.7	6.7
466.3	1	6.3	6.7	13.3
1393.8	1	6.3	6.7	20.0
1753.8	1	6.3	6.7	26.7
1933.4	1	6.3	6.7	33.3
1978.5	1	6.3	6.7	40.0
2309.0	1	6.3	6.7	46.7
2366.3	1	6.3	6.7	53.3
2380.2	1	6.3	6.7	60.0
3390.1	1	6.3	6.7	66.7
3518.5	1	6.3	6.7	73.3
5452.7	1	6.3	6.7	80.0
16021.5	1	6.3	6.7	86.7
35618.5	1	6.3	6.7	93.3
149652.4	1	6.3	6.7	100.0
.	1	6.3	MISSING	
	-----	-----	-----	
	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 24

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA IN 1982

GNPK82	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
170	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
180	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
210	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
310	3	18.8	18.8	37.5
340	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
360	2	12.5	12.5	56.3
390	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
393	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
470	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
490	2	12.5	12.5	87.5
860	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
950	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 25

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER CAPITA IN 1982

GDPK82	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
145	1	6.3	6.7	6.7
154	1	6.3	6.7	13.3
165	1	6.3	6.7	20.0
224	1	6.3	6.7	26.7
264	1	6.3	6.7	33.3
286	1	6.3	6.7	40.0
304	1	6.3	6.7	46.7
307	1	6.3	6.7	53.3
353	1	6.3	6.7	60.0
400	1	6.3	6.7	66.7
418	1	6.3	6.7	73.3
475	1	6.3	6.7	80.0
792	1	6.3	6.7	86.7
849	1	6.3	6.7	93.3
2559	1	6.3	6.7	100.0
.	1	6.3	MISSING	
TOTAL	----- 16	----- 100.0	----- 100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 26

ENERGY CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA IN 1982

ENERGY82	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
21	1	6.3	6.7	6.7
22	1	6.3	6.7	13.3
31	1	6.3	6.7	20.0
35	1	6.3	6.7	26.7
38	1	6.3	6.7	33.3
54	1	6.3	6.7	40.0
78	1	6.3	6.7	46.7
121	1	6.3	6.7	53.3
125	1	6.3	6.7	60.0
131	1	6.3	6.7	66.7
143	1	6.3	6.7	73.3
161	1	6.3	6.7	80.0
191	1	6.3	6.7	86.7
206	1	6.3	6.7	93.3
373	1	6.3	6.7	100.0
.	1	6.3	MISSING	
TOTAL	----- 16	----- 100.0	----- 100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 27

LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT OF WEST AFRICAN STATES IN 1982

DEVT82	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
346	1	6.3	6.3	6.7
370	1	6.3	6.3	13.3
386	1	6.3	6.3	20.0
572	1	6.3	6.3	26.7
605	1	6.3	6.3	33.3
671	1	6.3	6.3	40.0
742	1	6.3	6.3	46.7
751	1	6.3	6.3	53.3
864	1	6.3	6.3	60.0
1001	1	6.3	6.3	66.7
1114	1	6.3	6.3	73.3
1338	1	6.3	6.3	80.0
1795	1	6.3	6.3	86.7
1990	1	6.3	6.3	93.3
3080	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
.	1	6.3	MISSING	
	-----	-----	-----	
	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 28

EMBASSIES RECEIVED FROM WEST AFRICAN STATES IN 1982

EMBREC82	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
0	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
2	4	25.0	25.0	31.3
3	2	12.5	12.5	43.8
5	3	18.8	18.8	62.5
6	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
7	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
9	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
10	2	12.5	12.5	93.8
12	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 29

EMBASSIES SENT TO WEST AFRICAN STATES IN 1982

EMBSNT82	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
2	3	18.8	18.8	18.8
3	2	12.5	12.5	31.3
4	3	18.8	18.8	50.0
5	3	18.8	18.8	68.8
6	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
7	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
9	2	12.5	12.5	93.8
13	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 30

EMBASSIES RECEIVED FROM OTHER AFRICAN STATES IN 1982

EMBRAF82	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
0	2	12.5	12.5	12.5
1	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
2	2	12.5	12.5	31.3
3	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
4	2	12.5	12.5	50.0
5	2	12.5	12.5	62.5
6	2	12.5	12.5	75.0
7	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
8	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
9	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
17	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 31

EMBASSIES RECEIVED FROM NON-AFRICAN STATES IN 1982

EMBRNA82	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
6	2	12.5	12.5	12.5
7	3	18.8	18.8	31.3
8	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
9	2	12.5	12.5	50.0
11	2	12.5	12.5	62.5
19	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
23	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
24	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
31	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
32	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
52	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 32

DIPLOMATIC CAPABILITIES OF WEST AFRICAN STATES IN 1982

DIPCAP82	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
8.0	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
14.0	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
15.0	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
16.0	2	12.5	12.5	31.3
17.0	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
19.0	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
20.0	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
22.0	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
25.0	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
35.0	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
48.0	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
49.0	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
54.0	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
55.0	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
94.0	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 33

SIZE OF THE MILITARY IN 1982

MISIZES2	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
1	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
4	2	12.5	12.5	18.8
5	2	12.5	12.5	31.3
6	2	12.5	12.5	43.8
9	3	18.8	18.5	62.5
11	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
16	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
18	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
21	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
28	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
144	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 34

NATIONAL MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN 1982

MIEXP82	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
2	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
6	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
11	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
12	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
14	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
16	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
26	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
27	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
28	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
49	2	12.5	12.5	68.8
51	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
64	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
89	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
116	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
1926	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	----- 16	----- 100.0	----- 100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 35

MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF WEST AFRICAN STATES IN 1982

MILCAP82	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
3.0	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
15.0	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
16.0	2	12.5	12.5	25.0
18.0	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
22.0	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
33.0	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
37.0	2	12.5	12.5	56.3
56.0	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
58.0	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
65.0	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
82.0	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
117.0	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
137.0	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
2070.0	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 36

NATIONAL POPULATION IN 1987

POP87	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
0	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
1	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
1	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
1	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
2	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
3	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
4	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
4	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
5	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
6	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
6	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
8	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
8	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
9	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
12	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
102	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 37

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IN 1987

GNP87	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
15	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
17	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
18	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
82	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
96	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
103	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
117	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
132	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
143	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
158	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
190	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
194	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
355	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
533	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
826	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
3953	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 38

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IN 1987

GDP87	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
10	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
11	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
15	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
67	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
70	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
81	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
83	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
101	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
137	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
160	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
183	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
207	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
264	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
655	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
673	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
7421	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 39

CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECOWAS FUND IN 1987

FUND87	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
1	2	12.5	12.5	12.5
2	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
2	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
2	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
3	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
3	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
3	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
4	2	12.5	12.5	62.5
4	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
5	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
7	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
13	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
13	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
35	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	----- 16	----- 100.0	----- 100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 40

AGGREGATE WEALTH OF WEST AFRICAN STATES IN 1987

WEALTH87	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
29.0	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
30.6	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
31.5	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
155.6	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
166.6	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
190.7	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
227.0	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
236.0	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
258.4	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
356.9	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
366.9	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
375.1	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
624.4	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
1218.9	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
1494.0	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
11406.8	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 41

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA IN 1987

GNPK87	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
170	2	12.5	12.5	12.5
200	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
220	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
280	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
300	3	18.8	18.8	50.0
320	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
370	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
390	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
440	2	12.5	12.5	81.3
500	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
510	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
750	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 42

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER CAPITA IN 1987

GDPK87	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
111	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
139	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
181	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
231	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
272	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
274	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
276	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
313	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
346	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
374	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
380	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
399	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
410	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
509	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
714	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
806	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 43

ENERGY CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA IN 1987

ENERGY87	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
26	2	12.5	12.5	12.5
40	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
45	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
48	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
60	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
73	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
75	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
97	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
110	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
135	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
156	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
167	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
208	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
227	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
355	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	----- 16	----- 100.0	----- 100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 44

LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT OF WEST AFRICAN STATES IN 1987

DEVT87	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
307	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
396	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
469	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
502	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
579	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
612	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
653	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
667	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
774	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
976	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
981	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
996	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
1087	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
1169	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
1403	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
1672	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 45

EMBASSIES RECEIVED FROM WEST AFRICAN STATES IN 1987

EMBREC87	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
0	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
2	3	18.8	18.8	25.0
3	4	25.0	25.0	50.0
5	3	18.8	18.8	68.8
8	2	12.5	12.5	81.3
9	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
10	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
12	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 46

EMBASSIES SENT TO WEST AFRICAN STATES IN 1987

EMBSNT87	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
2	3	18.8	18.8	18.8
3	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
4	4	25.0	25.0	50.0
5	3	18.8	18.8	68.8
6	2	12.5	12.5	81.3
7	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
8	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
13	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 47

EMBASSIES RECEIVED FROM OTHER AFRICAN STATES IN 1987

EMBRAF87	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
0	2	12.5	12.5	12.5
1	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
3	2	12.5	12.5	31.3
4	3	18.8	18.8	50.0
5	3	18.8	18.8	68.8
7	2	12.5	12.5	81.3
10	2	12.5	12.5	93.8
17	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 48

EMBASSIES RECEIVED FROM NON-AFRICAN STATES IN 1987

EMBRNA87	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
3	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
7	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
8	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
9	4	25.0	25.0	43.8
10	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
11	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
14	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
18	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
20	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
29	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
30	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
39	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
53	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
	-----		-----	
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 49

DIPLOMATIC CAPABILITIES OF WEST AFRICAN STATES IN 1987

DIPCAP87	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
9.0	2	12.5	12.5	12.5
17.0	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
18.0	2	12.5	12.5	31.3
20.0	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
21.0	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
22.0	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
23.0	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
27.0	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
33.0	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
43.0	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
49.0	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
56.0	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
63.0	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
95.0	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 50

SIZE OF THE MILITARY IN 1987

MISIZE87	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
1	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
4	2	12.5	12.5	18.8
5	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
6	2	12.5	12.5	37.5
8	3	18.8	18.8	56.3
9	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
11	2	12.5	12.5	75.0
16	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
18	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
24	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
138	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 51

NATIONAL MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN 1987

MIEXP87	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
2	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
4	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
5	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
16	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
18	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
35	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
37	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
40	2	12.5	12.5	56.3
44	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
45	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
47	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
51	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
97	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
178	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
180	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	----- 16	----- 100.0	----- 100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 52

MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF WEST AFRICAN STATES IN 1987

MILCAP87	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
3.0	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
11.0	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
15.0	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
20.0	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
23.0	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
39.0	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
46.0	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
48.0	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
53.0	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
55.0	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
56.0	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
60.0	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
68.0	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
115.0	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
186.0	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
318.0	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 53

EVENTS INITIATED TO WEST AFRICAN STATES

EVINITWA	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
36	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
50	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
52	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
73	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
74	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
79	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
93	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
105	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
113	3	18.8	18.8	68.8
116	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
124	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
163	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
270	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
286	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 54

EVENTS RECEIVED BY WEST AFRICAN STATES

EVRECDWA	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
34	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
41	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
56	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
67	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
85	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
90	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
96	3	18.8	18.8	56.3
114	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
120	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
125	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
132	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
165	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
235	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
308	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 55

EVENTS INITIATED AND RECEIVED FROM WEST AFRICAN STATES

EVINRDWA	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
70	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
91	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
108	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
141	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
164	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
169	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
189	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
212	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
214	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
219	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
233	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
238	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
245	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
328	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
505	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
594	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 56

EVENTS INITIATED TO WEST AFRICA FROM 1975 TO 1979

EVNT7579	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
10	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
15	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
17	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
19	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
24	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
27	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
32	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
36	2	12.5	12.5	56.3
43	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
54	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
61	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
67	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
76	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
111	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
115	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	----- 16	----- 100.0	----- 100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 57

EVENTS INITIATED TO WEST AFRICA FROM 1980 TO 1984

EVNT8084	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
15	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
17	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
19	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
20	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
22	2	12.5	12.5	37.5
25	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
27	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
31	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
32	2	12.5	12.5	68.8
42	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
46	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
49	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
73	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
83	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 58

EVENTS INITIATED TO WEST AFRICA FROM 1985 TO 1989

EVNT8589	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
7	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
13	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
20	3	18.8	18.8	31.3
24	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
27	2	12.5	12.5	50.0
30	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
32	2	12.5	12.5	68.8
38	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
45	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
53	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
82	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
92	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 59

COOPERATIVE EVNTS INITIATED TO WEST AFRICA

CPEVINWA	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
31	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
39	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
43	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
69	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
71	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
72	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
82	2	12.5	12.5	50.0
97	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
102	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
103	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
107	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
108	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
141	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
236	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
256	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 60

COOPERATIVE EVENTS RECEIVED FROM WEST AFRICA

CPEVREWA	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
32	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
33	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
41	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
65	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
77	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
78	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
87	2	12.5	12.5	50.0
92	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
96	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
113	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
116	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
120	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
139	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
214	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
249	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 61

CONFLICTUAL EVENTS INITIATED TO WEST AFRICA

CNEVINWA	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
3	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
4	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
5	2	12.5	12.5	25.0
7	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
9	2	12.5	12.5	43.8
10	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
11	2	12.5	12.5	62.5
16	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
22	2	12.5	12.5	81.3
23	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
30	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
34	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 62

CONFLICTUAL EVENTS RECEIVED FROM WEST AFRICA

CNEVREWA	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
2	2	12.5	12.5	12.5
4	2	12.5	12.5	25.0
5	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
8	2	12.5	12.5	43.8
9	2	12.5	12.5	56.3
12	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
15	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
18	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
19	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
21	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
26	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
59	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 63

EVENTS INITIATED TO WEST AFRICAN AND NON-AFRICAN STATES

EVINEXWA	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
47	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
69	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
73	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
103	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
117	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
129	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
138	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
145	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
146	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
153	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
163	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
178	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
195	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
214	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
438	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
453	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 64

EVENTS INITIATED TOWARDS NON-AFRICAN (EXTERNAL) STATES

EVINIEXT	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
11	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
19	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
21	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
24	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
29	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
30	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
33	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
40	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
50	2	12.5	12.5	62.5
51	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
65	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
71	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
72	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
152	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
183	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 65

EVENTS RECEIVED FROM NON-AFRICAN (EXTERNAL) STATES

EVRECEXT	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
26	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
34	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
44	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
56	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
58	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
62	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
66	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
95	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
97	2	12.5	12.5	62.5
103	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
105	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
120	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
171	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
181	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
289	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 66

COOPERATIVE EVENTS INITIATED TO NON-AFRICAN (EXTERNAL) STATES

CPEVINEX	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
10	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
17	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
20	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
21	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
26	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
28	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
32	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
40	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
45	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
48	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
49	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
55	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
60	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
65	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
128	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
140	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 67

COOPERATIVE EVENTS RECEIVED FROM NON-AFRICAN (EXTERNAL) STATES

CPEVREXT	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
26	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
34	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
42	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
56	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
57	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
62	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
65	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
89	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
94	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
96	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
102	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
105	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
120	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
164	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
167	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
278	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 68

CONFLICTUAL EVENTS INITIATED TO NON-AFRICAN STATES

CNEVINEX	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
0	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
1	5	31.3	31.3	37.5
2	2	12.5	12.5	50.0
3	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
4	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
5	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
6	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
7	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
16	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
24	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
43	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 69

CONFLICTUAL EVENTS RECEIVED FROM NON-AFRICAN STATES

CNEVREXT	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
0	6	37.5	37.5	37.5
1	5	31.3	31.3	31.3
2	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
4	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
8	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
11	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
17	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
	-----	-----	-----	
	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 70

AGGREGATE POWER OF WEST AFRICAN STATES IN 1977

POWER77	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
240.9	1	6.3	6.7	6.7
303.3	1	6.3	6.7	13.3
1047.2	1	6.3	6.7	20.0
1292.4	1	6.3	6.7	26.7
1325.2	1	6.3	6.7	33.3
1347.7	1	6.3	6.7	40.0
1348.0	1	6.3	6.7	46.7
1404.7	1	6.3	6.7	53.3
1605.0	1	6.3	6.7	60.0
1788.0	1	6.3	6.7	66.7
2476.4	1	6.3	6.7	73.3
3740.9	1	6.3	6.7	80.0
11569.3	1	6.3	6.7	86.7
14090.7	1	6.3	6.7	93.3
99623.0	1	6.3	6.7	100.0
.	1	6.3	MISSING	
TOTAL	----- 16	----- 100.0	----- 100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 71

DIPLOMATIC CONTIGUITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES IN 1977

DIPCON77	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
19.0	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
31.0	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
38.0	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
42.0	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
43.0	2	12.5	12.5	37.5
48.0	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
53.0	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
60.0	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
61.0	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
63.0	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
70.0	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
80.0	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
83.0	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
84.0	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
94.0	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 72

AGGREGATE POWER OF WEST AFRICAN STATES IN 1982

POWER82	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
300.6	1	6.3	6.7	6.7
485.0	1	6.3	6.7	13.3
1479.4	1	6.3	6.7	20.0
1795.6	1	6.3	6.7	26.7
2026.4	1	6.3	6.7	33.3
2035.2	1	6.3	6.7	40.0
2378.1	1	6.3	6.7	46.7
2421.4	1	6.3	6.7	53.3
2423.8	1	6.3	6.7	60.0
3428.0	1	6.3	6.7	66.7
3689.2	1	6.3	6.7	73.3
5594.7	1	6.3	6.7	80.0
16216.4	1	6.3	6.7	86.7
35743.7	1	6.3	6.7	93.3
151907.0	1	6.3	6.7	100.0
.	1	6.3	MISSING	
	-----	-----	-----	
	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX V

TABLE 73

AGGREGATE POWER OF WEST AFRICAN STATES IN 1987

POWER87	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
43.3	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
58.3	1	6.3	6.3	12.5
64.3	1	6.3	6.3	18.8
231.9	1	6.3	6.3	25.0
235.3	1	6.3	6.3	31.3
272.0	1	6.3	6.3	37.5
293.2	1	6.3	6.3	43.8
300.3	1	6.3	6.3	50.0
312.7	1	6.3	6.3	56.3
426.8	1	6.3	6.3	62.5
456.5	1	6.3	6.3	68.8
472.4	1	6.3	6.3	75.0
808.8	1	6.3	6.3	81.3
1336.1	1	6.3	6.3	87.5
1745.3	1	6.3	6.3	93.8
11921.7	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
TOTAL	----- 16	----- 100.0	----- 100.0	

APPENDIX VI

TABLE 1

AGGREGATE DIMENSION OF COOPERATIVE INTERACTIONS
IN WEST AFRICA, 1975-1989

WACCOOP	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
813	1	6.7	6.7	6.7
911	1	6.7	6.7	13.3
1055	1	6.7	6.7	20.0
1071	1	6.7	6.7	26.7
1089	1	6.7	6.7	33.3
1092	1	6.7	6.7	40.0
1134	1	6.7	6.7	46.7
1216	1	6.7	6.7	53.3
1222	1	6.7	6.7	60.0
1278	1	6.7	6.7	66.7
1396	1	6.7	6.7	73.3
1601	1	6.7	6.7	80.0
1610	1	6.7	6.7	86.7
1703	1	6.7	6.7	93.3
2153	1	6.7	6.7	100.0
TOTAL	----- 15	----- 100.0	----- 100.0	

APPENDIX VI

TABLE 2

AGGREGATE DIMENSION OF CONFLICTUAL INTERACTIONS
IN WEST AFRICA, 1975-1989

WACONF	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
144	1	6.7	6.7	6.7
181	1	6.7	6.7	13.3
186	1	6.7	6.7	20.0
195	1	6.7	6.7	26.7
229	1	6.7	6.7	33.3
248	1	6.7	6.7	40.0
251	1	6.7	6.7	46.7
264	1	6.7	6.7	53.3
297	2	13.3	13.3	66.7
323	1	6.7	6.7	73.3
444	1	6.7	6.7	80.0
518	1	6.7	6.7	86.7
539	1	6.7	6.7	93.3
651	1	6.7	6.7	100.0
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX VI

TABLE 3

GHANA TO IVORY COAST, COOPERATIVE DIMENSION
OF INTERACTIONS, 1975-1989

GHIVCOOP	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
0	3	20.0	20.0	20.0
6	1	6.7	6.7	26.7
10	1	6.7	6.7	33.3
12	1	6.7	6.7	40.0
14	1	6.7	6.7	46.7
17	1	6.7	6.7	53.3
33	1	6.7	6.7	60.0
44	1	6.7	6.7	66.7
48	1	6.7	6.7	73.3
52	1	6.7	6.7	80.0
85	1	6.7	6.7	86.7
108	1	6.7	6.7	93.3
165	1	6.7	6.7	100.0
TOTAL	15	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX VI

TABLE 4

GHANA TO IVORY COAST, CONFLICTUAL DIMENSION
OF INTERACTIONS, 1975-1989

GHIVCONF	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
0	10	66.7	66.7	66.7
16	2	13.3	13.3	80.0
29	2	13.3	13.3	93.3
93	1	6.7	6.7	100.0
TOTAL	15	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX VI

TABLE 5

IVORY COAST TO GHANA, COOPERATIVE DIMENSION OF
INTERACTIONS, 1975-1989

IVGHCOOP	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
0	2	13.3	13.3	13.3
10	2	13.3	13.3	26.7
14	1	6.7	6.7	33.3
16	1	6.7	6.7	40.0
22	1	6.7	6.7	46.7
30	1	6.7	6.7	53.3
33	1	6.7	6.7	60.0
34	1	6.7	6.7	66.7
54	1	6.7	6.7	73.3
58	1	6.7	6.7	80.0
74	1	6.7	6.7	86.7
81	1	6.7	6.7	93.3
145	1	6.7	6.7	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX VI

TABLE 6

IVORY COAST TO GHANA, CONFLICTUAL DIMENSION OF
INTERACTIONS, 1975-1989

IVGHCONF	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
0	12	80.0	80.0	80.0
6	1	6.7	6.7	6.7
16	1	6.7	6.7	6.7
35	1	6.7	6.7	6.7
	-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL	15	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX VI

TABLE 7

GHANA TO NIGERIA, COOPERATIVE DIMENSION OF
INTERACTIONS, 1975-1989

GHNICOOP	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
0	3	20.0	20.0	20.0
16	1	6.7	6.7	26.7
20	2	13.3	13.3	40.0
30	2	13.3	13.3	53.3
39	1	6.7	6.7	60.0
43	1	6.7	6.7	66.7
48	1	6.7	6.7	73.3
49	1	6.7	6.7	80.0
76	1	6.7	6.7	86.7
79	1	6.7	6.7	93.3
92	1	6.7	6.7	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL	15	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX VI

TABLE 8

GHANA TO NIGERIA, CONFLICTUAL DIMENSION OF
INTERACTIONS, 1975-1989

GHNICONF	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
0	10	66.7	66.7	66.7
6	1	6.7	6.7	73.3
16	2	13.3	13.3	86.7
29	2	13.3	13.3	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
	15	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX VI

TABLE 9

SENEGAL TO GAMBIA, COOPERATIVE DIMENSION OF
INTERACTIONS, 1975-1989

SEGACoop	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
0	1	6.7	6.7	6.7
14	1	6.7	6.7	13.3
16	1	6.7	6.7	20.0
27	2	13.3	13.3	33.3
55	1	6.7	6.7	40.0
60	1	6.7	6.7	46.7
66	1	6.7	6.7	53.3
79	1	6.7	6.7	60.0
84	1	6.7	6.7	66.7
110	1	6.7	6.7	73.3
112	1	6.7	6.7	80.0
115	1	6.7	6.7	86.7
119	1	6.7	6.7	93.3
280	1	6.7	6.7	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL	15	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX VI

TABLE 10

GAMBIA TO SENEGAL, COOPERATIVE DIMENSION OF
INTERACTIONS, 1975-1989

GASECOOP	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
0	1	6.7	6.7	6.7
14	1	6.7	6.7	13.3
16	1	6.7	6.7	20.0
27	2	13.3	13.3	33.3
39	1	6.7	6.7	40.0
45	1	6.7	6.7	46.7
48	1	6.7	6.7	53.3
54	1	6.7	6.7	60.0
59	1	6.7	6.7	66.7
73	1	6.7	6.7	73.3
115	1	6.7	6.7	80.0
118	1	6.7	6.7	86.7
121	1	6.7	6.7	93.3
259	1	6.7	6.7	100.0
TOTAL	16	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX VI

TABLE 11

GHANA TO BURKINA FASO, COOPERATIVE DIMENSION OF
INTERACTIONS, 1975-1989

GHBUCCOOP	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
0	1	6.7	6.7	6.7
10	1	6.7	6.7	13.3
12	2	13.3	13.3	26.7
14	2	13.3	13.3	40.0
16	1	6.7	6.7	46.7
27	1	6.7	6.7	53.3
33	1	6.7	6.7	60.0
34	1	6.7	6.7	66.7
93	3	20.0	20.0	86.7
94	1	6.7	6.7	93.3
137	1	6.7	6.7	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL	15	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX VI

TABLE 12

BURKINA FASO TO GHANA, COOPERATIVE DIMENSION OF
INTERACTIONS, 1975-1989

BUGHCOOP	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUMULATIVE PERCENT
0	3	20.0	20.0	20.0
6	1	6.7	6.7	26.7
14	2	13.3	13.3	40.0
22	2	13.3	13.3	53.3
27	1	6.7	6.7	60.0
30	1	6.7	6.7	66.7
53	1	6.7	6.7	73.3
91	1	6.7	6.7	80.0
92	1	6.7	6.7	86.7
99	1	6.7	6.7	93.3
137	1	6.7	6.7	100.0
	-----	-----	-----	
	15	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX VII

Correlation Matrix: Attributes as at 1977 (row values) and
Various Interactions (column values) in West Africa

	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35
1	.67	.56	.62	.65	.61	.63	.67	.61	.61	.25	.73	.77	.42	.73	.39	.86	.80
2	.67	.56	.62	.66	.60	.61	.66	.60	.62	.26	.73	.78	.42	.73	.38	.87	.81
3	.62	.50	.56	.64	.53	.53	.61	.55	.56	.19	.67	.72	.35	.67	.31	.80	.75
4	.78	.70	.74	.77	.72	.69	.77	.72	.71	.46	.82	.84	.57	.81	.54	.89	.87
5	.74	.73	.74	.78	.69	.58	.73	.71	.67	.66	.73	.69	.59	.68	.57	.66	.68
6	.08	.10	.09	.25	.04	-.15	.07	.08	.12	.13	.07	.04	-.02	.04	-.03	.06	.10
7	.15	.12	.13	.22	.21	-.04	.12	.08	.29	.26	.14	.12	.14	.10	.13	.15	.23
8	.72	.72	.73	.82	.59	.56	.75	.77	.45	.38	.70	.62	.55	.63	.54	.52	.45
9	.76	.78	.78	.87	.57	.63	.77	.82	.58	.47	.79	.78	.75	.80	.74	.67	.66
10	.68	.65	.67	.77	.54	.56	.69	.70	.53	.35	.64	.54	.41	.54	.40	.50	.46
11	.68	.69	.69	.75	.51	.60	.69	.74	.53	.39	.64	.53	.50	.55	.49	.43	.39
12	.61	.48	.55	.59	.54	.57	.59	.53	.59	.18	.67	.73	.35	.68	.31	.84	.78
13	.59	.47	.53	.58	.53	.55	.58	.52	.58	.16	.66	.72	.34	.67	.30	.84	.77
14	.01	.04	.02	.03	-.02	.02	.02	.04	-.02	.00	-.08	-.21	-.12	-.17	-.10	-.29	-.26
15	.66	.54	.61	.66	.58	.60	.65	.59	.61	.23	.72	.77	.40	.72	.36	.85	.80
16	.47	.46	.47	.57	.43	.25	.45	.44	.47	.46	.46	.42	.34	.41	.33	.41	.46
17	.75	.75	.76	.84	.57	.63	.76	.80	.56	.42	.72	.63	.57	.64	.56	.53	.49
18	.60	.47	.54	.58	.53	.56	.58	.52	.58	.17	.66	.72	.34	.67	.30	.84	.77

N=16; * not significant; significant at .05 level. Others significant at .01 level or better. Values are Pearson's correlation coefficients.

1=POP77; 2=GNP77; 3=GDP77; 4=FUND77; 5=GNPK77; 6=GDPK77; 7=ENERG77; 8=EMREC77; 9=EMBSNT77; 10=EMBRAF77; 11=EMBRNA77; 12=MISIZE77; 13=MIEXP77; 14=CONTIG; 15=WEALTH77; 16=DEVT77; 17=DIPCAP77; 18=MILCAP77; 19=EVINITWA; 20=EVRECDWA; 21=EVINRDWA; 22=EVNT7579; 23=EVNT8084; 24=EVNT8589; 25=CPEVINWA; 26=CPEVREWA; 27=CNEVINWA; 28=CNEVREWA; 29=EVINEXWA; 30=EVINIEXT; 31=EVRECEXT; 32=CPEVINEX; 33=CPEVREXT; 34=CNEVINEX; 35=CNEVREXT

APPENDIX VIII

Correlation Matrix: Attributes as at 1982 (row values) and
Various Interactions (column values) in West Africa

	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33
1	.66	.54*	.61	.59	.62	.65	.59	.60	.23	.72	.76	.41	.72	.37	.85	.80
2	.62	.50	.56	.55	.56	.61	.55	.58	.19	.68	.73	.36	.68	.32	.83	.78
3	.82	.74	.79	.75	.77	.82	.77	.71	.48*	.87	.89	.61	.86	.58	.93	.89
4	.78	.70	.75	.72	.69	.77	.72	.71	.46	.83	.84	.58	.81	.54	.89	.87
5	.41	.36	.39	.34	.23	.40	.38	.40	.22	.42	.42	.26	.40	.24	.47	.47
6	.77	.84	.81	.75	.72	.78	.79	.58	.91	.75	.68	.84	.71	.84	.54	.59
7	.33	.26	.30	.40	.20	.29	.23	.52	.36	.33	.32	.28	.29	.27	.38	.41
8	.77	.80	.79	.62	.59	.78	.82	.59	.54	.79	.77	.73	.80	.72	.63	.63
9	.83	.80	.82	.67	.69	.82	.84	.69	.47	.85	.84	.69	.83	.67	.78	.77
10	.64	.56	.60	.54*	.51*	.61	.58	.77	.36	.64	.60	.31	.57	.28	.67	.64
11	.84	.78	.82	.73	.69	.82	.80	.80	.58	.85	.81	.63	.79	.60	.81	.77
12	.59	.47	.53	.50	.52	.57	.52	.59	.16	.64	.69	.32	.64	.28	.79	.73
13	.60	.47	.54	.53	.54	.58	.52	.58	.15	.66	.72	.33	.66	.29	.83	.77
14	.73	.63	.69	.66	.68	.72	.67	.65	.33	.79	.83	.49	.79	.45	.89	.85
15	.79	.82	.81	.76	.68	.79	.78	.65	.84	.78	.72	.79	.73	.78	.62	.67
16	.83	.78	.81	.70	.68	.81	.80	.78	.55	.84	.81	.62	.79	.60	.79	.76
17	.60	.47	.54	.53	.54	.58	.52	.58	.16	.66	.72	.33	.66	.29	.83	.77

N=16; not significant; significant at .05 level. Others significant at .01 level or better. Values are Pearson's correlation coefficients.

1=POP82; 2=GNP82; 3=GDP82; 4=FUND82; 5=GNPK82; 6=GDPK82; 7=ENERGY82;
8=EMBREC82; 9=EMBSNT82; 10=EMBRAP82; 11=EMBRNA82; 12=MISIZES82; 13=MIEXP82; 14=WEALTH82; 15=DEVT82; 16=DIPCAP82; 17=MILCAP82; 18=EVINITWA;
19=EVRECDWA; 20=EVINRDWA; 21=EVNT8084; 22=EVNT8589; 23=CPEVINWA;
24=CPEVREWA; 25=CNEVINWA; 26=CNEVREWA; 27=EVINEXWA; 28=EVINIEXT;
29=EVRECEXT; 30=CPEVINEX; 31=CREVREXT; 32=CNEVINEX; 33=CNEVREXT

APPENDIX IX

Intercorrelations Between Aggregate and Selected Dyadic Foreign Policy Interactions in West Africa (1975-1989)

Items	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
		*		a		a		a	a	a	a	a
1.	1.00	-.46	.90	-.43	.85	-.39	.64	-.21	-.06	.01	-.32	-.30
			a	a	a	a	*	a	a	a	a	a
2.		1.00	-.41	.31	-.33	-.10	-.53	.41	.06	-.03	.01	.10
				a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a
3.			1.00	-.20	.95	-.26	.68	-.19	-.09	-.02	-.36	-.30
					a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a
4.				1.00	-.26	.23	-.39	.38	.36	.13	-.25	-.20
						a	a	a	a	a	a	a
5.					1.00	-.29	.59	-.27	-.21	-.15	-.27	-.23
							a	a	a	a	a	a
6.						1.00	-.06	.07	.24	.28	.13	-.07
								a	a	a	a	a
7.							1.00	-.17	-.25	-.18	-.35	-.36
									*	a	a	a
8.								1.00	.65	.52	-.17	-.05
										a	a	a
9.									1.00	.95	-.33	-.27
											a	a
10.										1.00	-.27	-.23
11.											1.00	.95
12.												1.00

a N=15; not statistically significant. * Significant at .05 level. Others are significant at .01 level or better.

1. WACOOP	Aggregate Cooperative DIs in West Africa
2. WACONF	Aggregate Conflictual DIs in West Africa
3. GHIVCOOP	Ghana to Ivory Coast, Cooperative DIs
4. GHIVCONF	Ghana to Ivory Coast, Conflictual DIs
5. IVGHCOOP	Ivory Coast to Ghana, Cooperative DIs
6. IVGHCONF	Ivory Coast to Ghana, Conflictual DIs
7. GHNICOOP	Ghana to Nigeria, Cooperative DIs
8. GHNICCONF	Ghana to Nigeria, Conflictual DIs
9. SEGACOOOP	Senegal to Gambia, Cooperative DIs
10. GASECOOP	Gambia to Senegal, Cooperative DIs
11. GHBUCOOOP	Ghana to Burkina Faso, Cooperative DIs
12. BUGHCOOP	Burkina Faso to Ghana, Cooperative DIs

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